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Abstract 
 
This thesis sets out to investigate how law was used as a tool of governance in late colonial 
and early postcolonial India, with special reference to the invocation of states of exception 
or simply, extraordinary laws. The question is closely related to another issue, the creation 
of certain ‘problem categories’ to whom the normal process of law did not apply and which 
represented a legalised and permanent state of exception. With regards to both questions this 
thesis has found a consistency in perspective across the colonial – post-colonial divide. 
Bureaucrats in independent India were just as obsessed with maintaining peace and 
tranquillity as the colonial law and order administration. The case studies discussed in this 
thesis are diverse both in terms of their focus on different regions and the analytic angle of 
each instance involved. They include an analysis of the workings of the Defence of India 
Act of 1915 and the Rowlatt Bills in the 1910s, followed by more bottom-up case studies of 
how Section 144 CrPC was deployed in local emergencies in several provinces across India. 
Of particular importance in this context is Uttar Pradesh (UP) which is used to compare 
governmental practice under the pre and post-Independence Congress administrations. A 
certain overall pattern emerges from these case studies. For one, there was an increasing 
trend to normalize states of exception for the sake of maintaining law and order. At the same 
time, there was an important but subtle shift amongst the kind of situations leading to the 
invocation of extraordinary legislations and, the nature of those ‘exceptional categories’ of 
people- or problem categories to whom the normal rule of law was not believed to apply, 
from late colonial and early postcolonial India. The Raj started with a number of relatively 
clearly defined problem categories – badmaashes, dacoits, thugs, unruly labour, communists 
– it often had to totalise the potential reach of emergency legislation to the entire Indian 
populace. In post-colonial times, such a totalization was often reversed but a sense of 
problem categories nevertheless persisted. 
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Introduction 
 
Independence from British rule ushered in an era of unprecedented opportunity to construct 
a new polity in India according to the principles of democratic citizenship and nationalism. 
But not all civil servants of the new state were equally enthusiastic about the new political 
climate. Many of them maintained an underlying attitude of distrust towards ordinary Indian 
citizens that would have been more appropriate for colonial times. Ram Kinker Singh, the 
District Magistrate of Etah in the United Provinces, for instance lamented in an official 
communication in 1949, that since independence, “[T]he Police does not inspire fear” among 
the masses.1  He further deplored that “ignorant and illiterate people have got erroneous and 
perverted conceptions of freedom” and believed that they now had “no respect for authority”. 
Many police officers in the new nation also did not have a very favourable opinion about the 
general public order and, the citizen population in particular. The Superintendent of Police 
(SP) of Bahraich, for example, came to the conclusion that “[W]ith the advent of freedom 
the public at large had developed a peculiar psychology of confusing liberty with license.”2  
This, he felt was the result of a basic distrust between the police and the public that had 
remained unchanged since the British departed. For this reason, the public did not provide 
much cooperation to the security forces when dealing with criminals.  
 
These comments came in the wake of a complex discussion that took place between various 
departments of the bureaucracy responsible for maintaining public order and peace in what 
was soon to become the state of Uttar Pradesh. These high-ranking bureaucrats sounded 
uncannily like their erstwhile colleagues in the British Raj, who had stressed many times 
before that Indians could only be given good government because they were unsuited to 
enjoy free government. For the colonisers, the natives could not be trusted with their own 
freedom. When it came to policing and maintaining law and order, gathering evidence was 
often seen as a cumbersome process that led nowhere. Given the essential gulf between 
colonisers and colonised, between the administration and the public, on which the ideology 
																																																						
1 See, Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Secret letter no. 205/ST, dated 10/6/1949, from District Magistrate Etah, 
Ram Kinker Singh, to The Secretary to Government (Police-C), Lucknow. Part of File No. 464/1948 
Department (Police) B. 
2 See, Uttar Pradesh State Archives, copy of confidential letter D.O. No. G/37 dated July 20, 1949 from the 
Superintendent of police Bahraich to the District Magistrate Bahraich. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department 
(Police) B. 
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of colonialism ultimately depended, it was normal to distrust a non-cooperative public. In 
consequence, the British believed that the criminal justice system and the maintenance of 
law and order would be impossible without certain extraordinary legislative measures that 
circumvented and perverted the much invoked colonial ideal of bringing the ‘rule of law’ to 
a subcontinent plagued by oriental despotism. This extra-legal legislation remained in place 
throughout the career of the colonial state. When Ram Kinker Singh, and the Superintendent 
of Police in Bahraich voiced their opinions they were arguing in favour of maintaining 
precisely such an apparatus of extraordinary legislation which would short-circuit the due 
process of law and justice, even in times of independence when colonial divisions were no 
longer seen to apply.  
 
This thesis studies various instances where extraordinary legislation of different kinds was 
invoked at various instances in late colonial as well as early postcolonial India. It maps the 
invocation and effects of exceptional laws like the Defence of India Rules or the Rowlatt 
Bills but also other more routine laws like Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure 
Code, laws instituting curfews, laws allowing police firing to control crowds, which might 
appear to be ordinary and essential in maintaining public peace and tranquillity but exhibited 
exceptional tendencies. While grand laws like the Defence of India Act which applied to 
every corner of British India, were top down in nature, the invocation of ordinary criminal 
procedure laws like section 144 and curfews, and the decisions to open fire on protesting 
mobs were local. The figure of the District Magistrate (DM) and the local Superintendent of 
Police (SP) is specific in this regard. Also, once the process of decolonisation set in, 
provincial governments had a larger role to play when it came to deciding the actions to be 
taken in instances of provincial disturbances. 
 
 
Situating the subject 
 
Scholars of South Asian Studies have delved into various aspects of the law in India and its 
functioning. Earlier research has dealt with a broad range of issues from personal and 
religious law(s) to surveillance, the suppression of the vernacular press, civil and criminal 
procedure, racism embedded in the legal code and the association of legality and colonial 
liberalism. Many more scholars have touched upon various dimensions of law while 
discussing issues such as colonial racism, issues of colonial punishment, administrative 
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responses to labour issues or communal conflicts. Christopher Bayly3, Eric Stokes4, D.A. 
Washbrook5, M.R. Anderson6, Sumit Sarkar7, Rohit De8, Taylor Sherman9, Radhika 
Singha10, Partha Chaterjee11, Mitra Sharafi12, Elizabeth Kolsky13, Mithi Mukherjee14, 
Eleanor Newbigin15, are only some of the names that emerge in this context. However, the 
maintenance of law and order in India from a dedicated legal history perspective needs to be 
interrogated further. Radhika Singha and Elizabeth Kolsky have offered a dense scholarship 
on some aspects of extraordinary laws in colonial India by looking at the issue of colonial 
despotism and racism in colonial law. This thesis adopts a similar framework to evaluate the 
function of extraordinary legislation in India at a time when controlled decolonization had 
already begun. 
 
 
																																																						
3 Bayly, Christopher. Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 
1780-1870, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pages  
4 Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India, 
Cambridge University Press, 1980, pages; and Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford 
University Press, 1989, pages 
5 Washbrook, D.A. “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies, Volume 15, 
Issue 03, July 1981, pp 649-721. 
6 Anderson, Michael R. “Classifications and Coercions: Themes in South Asian Legal Studies in the 1980s,” 
South Asia Research, November 1990, 10: 158-177. 
7 Sarkar, Sumit. The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973, 
Pages xii+552. 
8 De, Rohit Co-author, “Introduction: Personal Law, Identity Politics and Civil Society in Colonial South Asia” 
46:1 Indian Economic and Social History Review (2009) pp.1-4; Rohit De “‘Commodities must be controlled’: 
Economic Crimes and Market Discipline in India (1939–1955).” International Journal of Law in Context 10, 
no. 03 (2014): 277-294; Rohit De “Rebellion, Dacoity, and Equality: The Emergence of the Constitutional 
Field in Postcolonial India, “Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 2 (2014): 
260-278; Rohit De. “A Peripatetic World Court” Cosmopolitan Courts, Nationalist Judges and the Indian 
Appeal to the Privy Council.” Law and History Review 32, no. 04 (2014): 821-851. 
9 Sherman, Taylor State violence and punishment in India, 1919-1956 (London: Routledge, December 2009); 
Taylor Sherman, Muslim Belonging in Secular India: Negotiating Citizenship in Postcolonial Hyderabad 
(Cambridge, 2015). 
10 Singha, Radhika. A Depotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, Oxford University Press, 
1998, Pages 342.  
11 Chaterje, Partha. The Politics of the Governed: Considerations on Political Society in Most of the World 
(2004); A Princely Impostor? The Strange and Universal History of the Kumar of Bhawal (2002); The Nation 
and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (1993); Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: 
A Derivative Discourse? (1993) 
12 Sharafi, Mitra. Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture 1772-1947, Cambridge 
University Press 2014. 
13 Kolsky, Elizabeth. Colonial Justice in British India, White Violence and the Rule of Law, New Delhi, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pages 252. 
14 Mukherjee, Mithi. India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal and Political History, 1774-1950, Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
15 Newbigin, Eleanor. The Hindu family and the emergence of modern India: law, citizenship and community, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society), 2013. 
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Some discussion about colonial state and nationalist politics is required here. The Cambridge 
historians, the nationalists and the subaltern historians, all have offered diverse set of 
perspectives and arguments to enable our understanding of colonialism in South Asia. Anil 
Seal has argued that nationalism in India was the work of a tiny elite who themselves were 
products of educational institutions set up by the British in India. In search for power and 
privilege, Seal further argued, this elite both ‘competed and collaborated’ with the British.16 
Such scholarship has discounted the role of ideas and idealism in history and offered a 
narrow perspective on what constituted “interest.” Cambridge school, for example, has 
argued broadly that Indians were active agents in the making of their own history as opposed 
to the view that Raj was unilaterally responsible for all the transformations that happened in 
the Indian social and political order. Such an understanding does have a point but at a certain 
level simplifies the unravelling of Indian history by merely seeing anticolonial politics as a 
scramble among the indigenous elites who came together opportunistically and mostly 
around purposes formed along vertical lines of patronage. Such a granting of agency to the 
colonized, as John Gallagher has pointed out, was the penetration of the colonial state into 
the local structures of power in India that eventually and gradually drew Indian elites into 
the colonial governmental process. Such a penetration was prompted by the financial self-
interest of the Raj rather than by altruistic motives.17  
 
Most notably, the relations of power in India changed to a great extent with the introduction 
of local and provincial elections. As Anil Seal has argued that the British introduction of 
electoral representation into India, especially in the twentieth century, allowed British to 
manipulate the political definition of particularistic ‘communities’ and drew them more 
closely into the structures of the state. Furthermore, the colonial state sought legitimation for 
itself by using nominations and elections to committees, councils, legislatures and boards in 
order to accommodate elites. Despite allowing controlled participation to the colonized, 
initiating reforms proposed as decolonization, the broader strategy of the colonial state 
remained concerned with maintaining the underlying structure of the Raj. 
 
																																																						
16 Seal, A. The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth 
Century. Political Change in Modern South Asia. Cambridge University Press, 1968.  
17 Gallagher, J., G. Johnson, and A. Seal. Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics 1870 to 
1940. Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
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Sudipta Kaviraj, has also discussed the significance of coalitional relations of ruling classes 
which is seen as phases of experimentation, instability and consolidation. Such phases, 
Kaviraj notes, are seen particularly in terms of a crucial stage of political realignments. 
Therefore, it is argued that the formation of a ruling bloc was pertinent in the strategy of a 
‘passive revolution’. However, Ranabir Samaddar raises an important question when it 
comes to making sense of collaborations and competitions initiated in a colonial setup. 
Samaddar points out that, for example Kaviraj and others who tend to make arguments about 
passive revolution, do not discuss the role of force in “passivity”. What should also be 
considered is the particular nature of decolonization in South Asia in the progressive strategy 
of building the state.18 Such strategy relied on both government and coercion. Furthermore, 
there is a conceptual tendency to reduce the history of the colonial geography as just another 
episode in the history of Europe or in other words, the empire. David Scott has alerted us to 
all such tendencies which either focus only on studying the insertion of Europe into the life 
and history of the colonised or others which have suggested to just forget Europe altogether. 
Both these tendencies overlook the political rationality of colonialism, as Scott has argued. 
According to Scott, rather than focusing on the ‘break’ with the past that the insertion of 
Europe into the colony focuses on, it would be more useful to investigate “how this break is 
configured and what is it understood to consist in.”19 Scott has pointed out that as a result of 
the formation of the political rationality of the modern colonial state, notably not only the 
rules of the political game changed but the political game itself changed. Therefore, scholars 
of South Asia must evaluate not only the politics of accommodation of the colonial state but 
challenges of resistance it faced in relation to the altered situation. Any scholarship that 
merely recognizes ‘agency’(elite) of the colonised in the making of their history aims to 
avoid the potency and complexity of the anticolonial politics.  
 
 
The combination of manipulated competition and collaboration facilitated by the colonial 
state, along with the use of force raises interesting questions about the nature of the colonial 
state and its strategy. Such a question needs to be raised in combination with what Patha 
Chaterjee and Ranajit Guha have argued in their conception of “rule of colonial difference” 
and “domination without hegemony” respectively, in the Indian context. For Chaterjee what 
																																																						
18 Samaddar, R. The Nation Form: Essays on Indian Nationalism. SAGE Publications, 2012. 
19 Scott, David, “Colonial Governmentality,” Social Text, No. 43 (Autumn, 1995), pp 191-220 
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is distinctive about colonial power is the deployment of a principle by which across 
differently inflected ideological positions within the field of colonialist discourse, the 
colonized are represented as inferior and radically ‘Other’. This othering of the colonized, 
this thesis will demonstrate, also took place though law. That is why, as David Washbrook 
has rightly pointed out, that “The condition of law may be seen to crystallize the condition 
of society.”20  
 
 
The relation between historiography and its willingness to engage with the Law cannot be 
overlooked. The question is closely tied to the politics of the colonial archive itself. When a 
file or a document is accessed for the purpose of writing history of the colonised, as Ranajit 
Guha21 has noted, two intentions are at work, the law’s intention and that of the scholar’s. 
The purpose of writing history then rests on the idea of reclaiming the document for history. 
As a historian, one has to initiate the tactic of “transgression”, suggested by Guha, where the 
scholar violates the intention for which the material is produced. Guha through “Chandra’s 
Death” has precisely done that. However, Upendra Baxi22 has alerted us to the oversight of 
overlooking alternate legalities i.e. legalities that operate as a legality of a community – like 
Chandra’s Samaj- in contrast to the colonial state’s legality. But what is unique about the 
colonial state’s legality, some scholars have already pointed out, is its tendency to generate 
a mass of criminal statistics.23 
  
In order to understand the enforcement of colonial law a conceptual foundation evaluating 
the question of sovereignty, law, government and society is required. Nasser Hussain24, for 
our convenience, offers us an overview of insights from the works of John Austin, A.V. 
Dicey and H.L.A. Hart supplemented by inputs from Michel Foucault’s scholarship. These 
studies allow us to make a quick point about the nature of law and sovereignty. For Austin, 
law simply is the command of the sovereign. It is here that authority functions through the 
																																																						
20 Washbrook, David. “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3, 
(1981), pp 649 
21 Guha, Ranajit. “Chandra’s Death” in Suabltern Studies, Vol. V, OUP, 1987, pp 135-165 
22 Baxi, Upendra, “The State’s Emissary: The Place of Law in Subaltern Studies,” in Subaltern Studies, Vol 
VII, OUP, Page 249 
23Arnold, David. “The Colonial Prison: Power, Knowledge and Penology in Nineteenth Century India” in 
Subaltern Studies, Vol. VIII, OUP, pp 62-115. Arnold has highlighted in his work the dynamic contradictions 
of colonial law enforcement in distress situations.  
24 Hussain, Nasser. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2003, page 14. 
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idea of a direct threat to its subjects and demands obedience accordingly. For Dicey, law and 
more precisely ‘rule of law’ operates both as a political ideal and an institutional 
arrangement. It is for Hart that law has a centre and a periphery. A structure of conducting 
authority based on the letter of law, which to be actualised, is supplemented by the 
interpretation/implementation of law. The conduct is defined through a primary set of laws 
that are substantive and apply to all. However, the secondary set of laws apply to those who 
implement law/authority. Such secondary law would amount to administrative procedure. It 
is not difficult to make a point then that sovereignty/authority is exercised through a direct 
threat as well as by conducting primary laws through secondary laws. Notably, the 
discussion about authority and law undergoes a transformation from Austin’s law as the 
command of the sovereign to Hart’s law as ‘theory of rules’.  These rules, in modern law, as 
Hart contends are not just descriptive of the sovereign but fundamental and constitutive. 
Hart’s concept of law shows how the notion of sovereign orders virtually disappears in the 
rule bound format of a modern electoral democracy. One can argue that such a virtual 
disappearance of the sovereign could not be fully accomplished during the late colonial era 
despite of the fact that electoral democracy (although controlled and limited) was introduced 
in India.  
 
Operation of sovereignty are aptly evaluated by Michel Foucault, who has argued that the 
normative force of modern life and the power relations it exhibits are best understood not in 
the prohibitory mechanisms of law but in the disciplinary mechanisms of the social. Foucault 
calls this biopower. This form of biopower, appears at the site of a historical disjunction, as 
it supplants older juridical modes and models of power. For Foucault,25 what is supplanted 
is not law but a form of sovereignty that he calls the juridical. In the new regime, law in its 
modern sense as a functioning of norms is pervasive. Rules are now required across an entire 
terrain of life, and legislation proliferates, as do the institutions of bureaucratic government. 
what is noteworthy is Foucault’s insistence to think of this movement from society to 
sovereignty to one of discipline and then government in terms of a “replacement,” but rather 
to conceptualize the modern (and in our case, the colonial) as a triangle of sovereignty- 
discipline- government, which has its primary target the ‘population’ and as its essential 
mechanism the apparatus of security.26 By security Foucault means, Akhil Gupta has argued, 
																																																						
25 Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. 1, Vintage, 1990, Pages 176. 
26 Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France 1977-1978, Picador, 2009, 
Pages 464. 
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regulating and managing the risks that affect the population so that negative tendencies do 
not get out of control.27 David Scott has drawn two distinctions in Foucault’s 
conceptualization of the political rationality of government. The first is between sovereignty 
and government, the second between discipline and government. Within the political 
rationality of sovereignty – individuals are dependent upon the absolute authority of the 
prince. They are subject ‘of’ and subject ‘to’ his power and protection. Here law is deployed 
as an instrumentality, a direct means towards the political end of commanding obedience. 
On the other hand, as Foucault has highlighted, with government “it is a question of not 
imposing law on men, but disposing things in such a way that, through a certain number of 
means, such and such ends may be achieved.”28 While with sovereignty the relation between 
ruler and ruled is such that power reaches out like an extension of the prince himself, 
announcing it periodically with clarity. With government, on the other hand, the governor 
and the governed are introduced to a new and different relation which is not merely the 
expanded capacity of the state apparatus, but of the emergence of a new field of social. In 
the colonial set up in India, we see an overlap of both these modalities. While command of 
the sovereign was maintained and displayed by invoking extraordinary legislation, and the 
government was established by the discipline of the social. Colonial legality and the 
accommodation of elites into government structures resulted in the birth of a new ‘rights’ 
bearing colonial subject. The disposition of instrumentalities and institutions such as the 
formation and manipulation of public opinion through the establishment of a Press, 
introduction of the idea of private property, the emergence of market resulting in the division 
of labour, and finally, the judiciary, sustained colonial government. As a result, the 
identification of ‘interests’ operates to ensure that the ‘rights bearing’ and ‘self-governing’ 
colonial subject does as (s)he ought to.29  
 
 Despite all the mechanisms put in place to ensure that the rights bearing colonial subjects 
are disciplined in their conduct, the danger of indiscipline remains. In a colonial context, the 
presence of anticolonial politics serves as the governmental crisis that rests upon the idea of 
an insurgency- a threat of civil war. Upendra Baxi has noted that the nature of colonial law, 
																																																						
27 Gupta, Akhil. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India, Duke University Press, 
2012, page 24. 
28 Fitzpatrick, Peter. and Ben Goulder (editors), Foucault and Law, Oxon, NY: Routledge, Page 166 
29 Gailey, Christine Ward. (editor), Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond, Vol.1, 
University Presses of Florida, 1992, specifically see, “Conscripts of Western Civilization?”  by Talal Asad, 
Page 336. 
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and indeed all law, expounded in the insurgency is inaugural. The question of insurgency/ 
civil war remained a pertinent concern for Hobbes too. Hobbes believed that civil war 
resulted from disagreements in the philosophical foundation of political knowledge. 
Therefore, through Leviathan he argued for a plan for a reformed philosophy to end 
divisiveness which as a result, would end war. For Hobbes, civil war was the ultimate terror, 
the definition of fear itself. 30 Recent scholarship especially by Giorgio Agamben, has 
emphasized that it is civil war that is the threshold between infrapolitics and politic per se. 
Civil war/insurgency remains an intimate possibility of the colonial, or for that matter any 
other political order. Such a threat from the ‘insurgent’ could legitimize a structure of 
domination.  
 
Ranajit Guha has pointed out that the colonial state in South Asia was fundamentally 
different to that of the metropolitan bourgeois state that created it. While the metropolitan 
state was hegemonic and its claim to dominance was based on power relations in which 
persuasion overshadowed coercion. On the other hand, what was paramount to the colonial 
state was its structure of dominance and coercion. It was not possible for such a non-
hegemonic state to assimilate the civil society of the colonized to itself. According to Guha, 
the colonial state was a paradox- ‘dominance without hegemony’. It raises some conceptual 
questions for the study of South Asian colonial history too. Did the colonial state survive 
merely by expanding structures of government and creating new social order or did it offer 
a combination of persuasion and coercion. If the nationalist elite dealt with the government 
and the persuasion side of the colonial order, the insurgent remained the subject of coercion 
and therefore, target of extraordinary legislation. Dipesh Chakrabarty31 has argued that the 
idea of a Pax Britannica in the nineteenth century lost its meaning once nationalism arrived. 
Any attempt at colonial sovereignty by the British was reduced to domination whenever the 
British faced nationalist demands of self-rule. Whenever the colonial state failed to establish 
sovereignty in the Hobbessian sense, colonial rule failed to transform its own war with 
anticolonial nationalism into battles internal to institutions.  It was not in a position to banish 
its internal wars from the Indian social body. Instead, it exacerbated them. Nationalism 
offered an everyday sphere of politics. however, the political methods of this sphere, as 
Dipesh Chakrabarty argues, were like tactics in a war- the war to end colonial domination. 
																																																						
30 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Penguin, 2002, Pages 736. 
31 Chakarabarty, Dipesh. ‘In the Name of Politics’: Democracy and the Power of the multitude in India, Public 
Culture, Winter 2007, 19 (1), pp35-57, especially see page 56. 
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Otherwise, local acts of ‘law breaking’ would not acquire broader significance. Furthermore, 
there is another layer to this war. The war of the anticolonialists or the nationalists was not 
always with the British only because there were wars of caste, class, religion, etc., internal 
to Indian society too. Both the colonial rule as well as the nationalist movement failed to 
produce a Hobbesian society by banishing these wars to the edges of the social body. As a 
result, disorder in public and everyday life in the form of a culture of disrespect for the law, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty argues, became a major ingredient of colonial and postcolonial politics 
in India. 
 
The relation between discipline and government is highlighted by the use of extraordinary 
legislation by the colonial state. Although a relatively narrow set of specific public order 
laws is very frequently mentioned in standard political history sources for the colonial 
period, but requires further investigation of how such laws were actually evoked and used, 
and how this use affected late colonial and earlier postcolonial politics in India. Most 
importantly, earlier studies have overlooked the problematic of invoking a ‘state of 
exception’ and the creation of exceptional legal categories by the colonial administrative 
regime in India. Some elements of this administrative framework have been studied in 
isolation – for instance the control of ‘Thuggs’32, ‘Banditry’33 and ‘Goondas’34– but they 
have not been connected up with a larger narrative of how public order laws worked in 
colonial, and then post-colonial India in a longer term perspective.  
 
This thesis studies the use of extraordinary public order legislation in India over the first half 
of the twentieth century covering the time period from 1914 to 1955. In so doing it bridges 
the conventional divide between the colonial and post-colonial periods, and seeks to 
challenge conventional notions of decolonisation as a singular change that happened with 
the transfer of power in 1947. The thesis begins in the early 1910s where members of the 
																																																						
32 Singha, R, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India. Oxford India Paperbacks. Oxford 
University Press, 2000.  
33Daechsel, Markus, “Z̤ālim Ḍākū and the Mystery of the Rubber Sea Monster: Urdu Detective Fiction in 1930s 
Punjab and the Experience of Colonial Modernity.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 13, no. 1 (2003): 21–
43. 
34 See, Das, Suranjan. “The ‘Goondas’: Towards a Reconstruction of the Calcutta Underworld through Police 
Records.” Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 44 (1994): 2877–83; Graham, Lancelot. “British India.” 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 16, no. 3 (1934): 131–41; Singha, Radhika. 
“Punished by Surveillance: Policing ‘dangerousness’ in Colonial India, 1872–1918*.” Modern Asian Studies 
49, no. 2 (009 2014): 241–69; Singha, Radhika. “Goonda.” In Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies, 95–96. 
NYU Press, 2015; Debraj Bhattacharya. “Kolkata ‘Underworld’ in the Early 20th Century.” Economic and 
Political Weekly 39, no. 38 (2004): 4276–82. 
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Ghadr party and the outbreak of First World War posed a serious threat to the British Raj. 
This decade is also significant because it was with the passing of the Government of India 
Act 1919, that the seeds for the long decolonisation of India were sown. But most 
significantly, this decade witnessed the invocation of the state of exception in the form of 
Defence of India Act and subsequent Rowlatt Bills. This time period saw major mass 
mobilisation in the form of anti-Rowlatt Bills agitation, non-cooperation movement and the 
Khilafat movement, later to be followed by civil disobedience movement in the early 
nineteen twenties. Much work has been done on the scope of these major mass mobilisations 
in the early twentieth century and the role of various nationalist parties and leaders played 
in it. However, what lacks is the analyses of law as such, its interface with the nationalist 
politics and the impact it had on the way such mobilisations unfolded. 
The thesis looks closely at some of the major controversies of the decade of 1930s, especially 
focusing on case studies that occurred after the passing of the Government of India Act 1935. 
These case studies demonstrate the scope of legal governmentality once the process of 
decolonisation had already begun and provincial politics enabled a kind of shared 
sovereignty for the provincial governments. 
 
 
The legal strategies of colonial government in India were complex and varied, became tied 
with the creation of a particular kind of knowledge – one based on classification, 
differentiation, enumeration and creation of hierarchies of culture, power, customs and 
normative orders. This ‘violent’ and ‘totalising’ control by colonial regime not only 
fossilized a certain normative legal order, but also dramatically altered the nature of law and 
justice in the colony as well as the post-colony. But this introduction of a particular tendency 
in relation to law and the state did not end with the moment of de-colonization; rather, it 
continued beyond the ‘Age of Empire’. Colonialism and post-coloniality should not be 
considered as specific, disparate historical events, but also as conceptual categories that are 
interwoven historically and interconnected in their logics. Research in the field of critical 
legal studies and sociology of law by scholars like Peter Fitzpatrick35, Upendra Baxi36, 
																																																						
35 Fitzpatrick, Peter.  The Mythology of Modern Law, Routledge, 1992, pages 235; Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism 
and the Grounds of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2001, Pages 261. 
36 Baxi, Upendra. “The Rule of Law in India”, Sur. Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos, vol.4 no.6 São 
Paulo, 2007. 
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Nasser Hussain37, Piyel Haldar38  Peter Goodrich39, Camaroff & Camaroff40, Achille 
Mbembe41 and the recent translated works of Pierre Legendre42 are important in this regard. 
  
With reference to a wide range of contemporary political issues in India related to various 
laws which have their origins in colonialism, the thesis examines the question whether the 
promulgation of certain laws and legislative techniques and institutions inherited from the 
colonial past, has continued to the postcolonial. For example, recent incidents of state 
authoritarianism in the Singur and Nandigram areas in the state of West Bengal while 
acquiring land for the construction of a TATA car plant. State violence by means of police 
action was conducted in the name of ‘public good’. Similarly, detention of human rights 
activists like Binayak Sen under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 2004 (UAPA), and the 
frequent invocation of Public Security Act (PSA) against protesting youth and separatist 
leaders in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the name of fighting insurgency and protecting 
state sovereignty are noteworthy. 
  
 
What difference in attitude took place when laws born out of distinctly colonial modes of 
governance were used in a postcolonial situation? To what extent did the legal techniques 
and tactics of invoking states of exception extend beyond colonialism and even the process 
of decolonization? When independence finally came, few had a clear idea of what precisely 
it would mean.43 What would happen to the institution of the colonial state which had made 
such intimate contact with the lives of people at both a private and a public level. Would the 
moment of breaking free from the Raj also end farcical social contract that the colonial state 
had imposed on the people of India? What this thesis will suggest is rather the entry into a 
second farcical social contract where the division between the state and its people was 
																																																						
37Hussain, Nasser. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law, Ann Arbor, The 
University of Michigan Press, 2003, Pages 185. 
38Haldar, Piyel.  Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism: The Jurisdiction of the Lotus-Eaters (Discourses of 
Law), Routledge Cavendish (2007), pages 200. 
39Goodrich, Peter “Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written,” UC Irvine 
Law Review, 2011, Vol 1:3, 773-812. 
40 Camaroff & Camaroff (ed), Introduction in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, The University of Chicago 
Press, 2006, pages 400. 
41Mbembe, Achille. On the Postcolony, University of California Press, 2001, Pages 274. 
42Legendre, Pierre. Law and the Unconscious: A Legendre Reader, Peter Gooodrich (Eds), Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997, pp 1-71, 164-210. 
43Gould,William. Bureaucracy, Community and Influence in India: Society and the State, 1930s - 1960s. 
Routledge Studies in South Asian History. Taylor & Francis, 2010. 
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carried over. The postcolonial Indian state, we notice, failed to formulate new rules and new 
standards of maintaining public order and conducting politics.  
 
Studies discussing anticolonial mobilisations, labour strikes and communal confrontations 
have pointed out that maintaining public order was one of the most important preoccupations 
of governance in India.44 Generally, most studies tend to regard the years from 1947-1950 
as part of the transfer of power period. However, this thesis agrees with scholarship that has 
argued that the transfer of power although initially minimal and aimed at preserving rather 
than dissolving the Raj, started way back with the first government of India act 191945, with 
the first major shift in the rearrangement of power to Indians with the Government of India 
Act 193546.. However, the issue of decolonisation did not result in moving away from 
colonial attitudes but began with redrafting them to suit the nationalist rhetoric of Indian 
politics.  
 
The entire question of decolonisation is also closely tied to the question of sovereignty and 
counter-sovereignty in late colonial India. Movements like Swadeshi, Ghadr, Non-
cooperation, Khilafat, Quit India, and ultimately the entire framework on which nationalist 
leaders would contest colonial policies pivoted on the question as to who was the legitimate 
sovereign. It is here, that a study of public order laws like section 144 CrPC, the preventive 
detention, curfews and cases of police firing on crowds, and of the creation of other new 
extraordinary laws, offers us a unique analytical angle on this contest over sovereignty and 
the contingent process of decolonisation. 
 
The geographic focus of this thesis shifts throughout the discussion. While a focus on several 
Indian regions prevails in the earlier sections, the latter chapters focus very closely on events 
in one single province – the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, or Uttar Pradesh as the unit 
came to be known soon after independence. This focus is in part down to pragmatic 
																																																						
44 For example, Sandra Freitag, William Gould, Markus Daechsel, Taylor Sherman, and Chitra Joshi, have 
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45Legg, Stephen. ‘Democracy, Autocracy, and the Scalar Sovereignty of Interwar India’, Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 36, Number 1, May 2016, pp 44-65. 
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considerations to do with source availability and in part a reflection on how public order 
legislation in colonial and post-colonial India actually worked. This thesis is not meant to be 
a consistent regional study. However, it offers a comparative analysis between the Congress 
and the non-Congress ruled provinces after the Government of India Act 1935 was passed. 
It uses evidence from U.P. as well as other provinces where appropriate. The thesis discusses 
U.P. more than other provinces as a particular region or locality but without an assumed 
separate history from other parts of India. Case studies from Punjab, Calcutta, Bombay and 
U.P. not only provide us with a comparative overview of provinces but also offers local 
insights into the invocation of extraordinary legislation between the Congress and non-
Congress ruled provinces. The selection of UP as a focus case study towards the latter half 
of the thesis allowed a provincial focus because it enabled us to compare directly Congress 
administrative practice before and after 1947. Govind Ballabh Pant, a prominent Congress 
leader, was in power on both occasions. Furthermore, such a provincial selection 
complemented the study of the process of decolonisation, another major theme that the thesis 
engages with. 
 
 
The colonial state began to devolve power to the provinces in the aftermath of the First 
World War by bringing in the Government of India Act 1919, followed by the Government 
of India Act 1935. This was a deliberate strategy to forestall the development of an all-India 
political opposition whilst also offering real opportunities for self-governance to Indian 
political parties and organisations. In consequence, any study of administrative strategy over 
this period has by necessity to include a regional focus. The process of long decolonisation 
highlighted the practices of the Congress government at the provincial level both before and 
after 1947. Secondly, the invocation or imposition of the public order legislation is the centre 
of attention in this thesis – for instance the use of the infamous Section 144 of the Indian 
Penal Code which allowed preventive detention, the imposition of curfews, and other forms 
of pre-emptive legal action was always local in nature. It was the District Magistrate who 
would invoke such legislation, also involving police and other parts of the local 
administration, and the purview of such laws was always confined to certain specified 
localities. To observe the working of public order legislation in colonial and post-colonial 
India in action always necessitates a local focus, which again is most easily maintained by 
selecting certain provinces as case studies. This is also related to questions of source 
availability. Material from the National Archives in India and the British Library in London 
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provide a top down perspective and need to be supplemented by provincial material to really 
understand the operation and effect of extraordinary legislation at a local level. To repeat, 
our strong focus on UP for much but not all of the thesis, is for pragmatic reasons. The larger 
argument of the thesis simply needs to be geographically grounded in some way. The study 
does not aim to attribute any special status to UP, but merely utilises it as a site to study the 
invocation of extraordinary legislation in postcolonial India and to make a larger argument. 
 
A few other issues regarding archival practice need to be mentioned right from the start. The 
thesis depends mostly on government documents and newspaper reports to track and study 
various instances that involved the invocation of extraordinary legislation. While the 
legislative, judicial and political files of the Home Department (both colonial and 
postcolonial) present us with the official version of the story, the newspaper reports, mostly, 
offer a different version of it. Thus, such a cross referencing facilitated the possibility of a 
nuanced understanding of events. The tone of both the colonial and the postcolonial archive 
is often patronising with the emphasis on the naivety of public protests and the obligation as 
well as the ability of the government to look at the larger picture. However, by following 
certain case studies and tracking them in detail could help us invert such a position and could 
enable us to understand both the immediate position as well as the larger picture. 
 
There is more at stake than mere factual accuracy. Any use of the colonial archive needs to 
recognise how paper work itself had agency, a life of its own that imposed a certain logic on 
how the law was used at the everyday level. Scholars like Jonathan Saha, Akhil Gupta and 
Emma Tarlo have demonstrated the potency of bureaucratic paperwork in the colonial and 
postcolonial contexts in India. Saha has outlined a creative way of looking at the colonial 
state as it was experienced in everyday life. His work has revealed complex world of state 
practices where legality and illegality were often inseparable. At numerous occasions the 
formal colonial power rested upon the informal world for its survival.47 Akhil Gupta, on the 
other hand, conceives the relation between the state in India and the poor as one of structural 
violence. He argues that neither the state is indifferent to the plight of the poor nor the poor 
are disenfranchised because the state offers numerous poverty amelioration programs. What 
is pertinent about Akhil Gupta’s intervention is that he offers insightful analyses of 
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corruption in India, the significance of writing and written records, and governmentality, or 
the expansion of bureaucracies. He argues that ‘care’ is arbitrary in its consequences, and 
that arbitrariness is systematically produced by the very mechanisms that are meant to 
ameliorate social suffering. He notes: 
 
No matter how noble the intentions of programs, and no matter how sincere the 
officials in charge of them, the overt goal of helping the poor is subverted by the 
procedures of bureaucracy. 48   
 
Akhil Gupta highlightes specific modality of uncaring operating here. For hm, uncaring 
indicates not a psychological state of government employees but a constitutive modality of 
the state. Emma Tarlo also has explored a period of deep civil unrest in India in 1975 when 
Indira Gandhi declared emergency. She offers documentation and analyses of a relationship 
between state archives (bureaucratic paperwork) and lived experience and has highlighted 
the process by which policies were subverted at the local level through a combination of 
violence, trickery and marked forces. She argues that files portray emergency “not as a 
moment of explosive drama, but as a humdrum fact of bureaucratic existence – a time when 
paperwork was prolific and when housing rights were redefined.”49 Through the case study 
of an unfortunate bystander detained for the violation of public order legislation this thesis 
will explore the sometimes fictitious nature of the official archive.  
 
 
Sovereignty and the Law: some theoretical preliminaries 
 
There has been a great deal of interest in the question of states of exception especially in the 
wake of various emergency laws that came into being after the events of September 11, 2001. 
Most of the countries both western and eastern have passed such laws which are frequently 
referred to as draconian.50 While the states have argued for the necessity for such laws for 
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the protection of its sovereignty as well as its citizens. Others see it as a license to violate 
the legitimate rights of the people denying them fair trials and depriving them of justice. 
Debates about the question of states of exception became further intensified since the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben published his work on ‘Homo Sacer’.51 Agamben rejuvenated 
the conservative ideas of Carl Schmitt on the question of sovereignty and argued that the 
problem of exceptional law lay at the heart of the question of sovereignty and its 
preservation. Agamben’s work came in the wake of some highly potent provocations thrown 
at philosophers and theorists of state and its citizenship by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 
the 1980s.52Foucault’s ideas reached debates in India a decade later in the 1990s.53 His ideas 
enabled scholars to understand the discourses and the practices of governmentality. Citizens 
participated in such governmental practices54. and disciplinary regimes55 without realising 
the effect they had on their political life. 56 In addition, Foucault’s work consistently 
highlighted the presence of the ‘other’ in the state’s effort to manage life – behind normality 
always lurked the figure of the abnormal. The abnormal, as Foucault highlighted in his 
various works, is what made the normal possible. For the late colonial as well as early 
postcolonial state in India it was certain individuals, groups and populations that constituted 
a ‘problem category’ which provided these constitutive figures of the abnormal. 
 
 
 The ‘normal’ rule of law is constituted with reference to something outside itself – a state 
of exception when normality does not apply. As argued by various texts on sovereignty, it 
is the sovereign’s sole right to declare this state of exception. So by definition, any legal 
framework that depends on such a declaration for its existence is extraordinary in nature. 
Carl Schmitt has highlighted that the issue with liberal constitutionalism is that it contends 
that all legitimate acts of a state are supposedly based on general legal norms which aim to 
meet the general and predictable demands of law as opposed to the arbitrary authority of 
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persons.57 Contesting such a framework Schmitt argued that such general legal norms often 
lack the force to offer determinate guidance if not subject to circumstantial interpretation 
and interstitial legislation.58 Hence the unavoidable need for an authority to make a firm 
decision and effective interpretation of law. For Schmitt, what cannot be ignored is the fact 
that law does not interpret and determine itself, it is processed through a sovereign authority 
who would have to apply general rules to particular instances.59 Arguing in a Hobbesian vein 
Schmitt contends that it is authority and not truth that makes the law.60 Sovereign decision 
will override legal norm, or in other words, the sovereign will decide what interpretation of 
the law would apply to whom and in what circumstance(s). Furthermore, since it is 
impossible to legally ascertain the very nature of an emergency situation, the law can at best 
determine who can make a decision on when such a situation has arisen. Therefore, the 
power to act or make a decision during an ‘emergency’ also rests on the power to decide 
what constitutes a state of exception. 
 
Once the question of the authority to decide on the ‘state of exception’ is resolved the second 
issue that arises regards the nature of the political. Here, Schmitt argued that the specific 
nature of the political rests on the distinction between friend and enemy/foe.61 This friend 
and enemy distinction works at two levels first, as hostility between two groups who are 
willing to kill(or harm) each other as a group;  In the second instance, when a group sides 
with the sovereign authority in its declaration of an opposing group as enemy. Therefore, 
sovereignty itself rests on playing the political difference between friend and enemy. In a 
way, this boils down to a simplistic logic of collectivist self-defence. The significant point 
here, is the importance of a sovereign power to decide, to interpret general law in particular 
situations, to split communities into friends and foes, and finally, the justification to 
eliminate the enemy based on the sequence of such a configuration or arrangement of 
sovereign power. 
 
A state of emergency can be described as the state machinery separating the population into 
friends and enemies and then waging a ruthless war against the latter.  Sovereign power 
depends on the ability to separate out certain social constituencies as social problem 
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categories. The question arises as to how do we understand the elimination, 
control/subjugation or exclusion of these ‘problem categories’ or foes. Giorgio Agamben, 
who offered us a more contemporary reading and further understanding of the state of 
exception also provided us with the classificatory category of the ‘homo sacer’- ‘one who 
can be killed but not sacrificed’62. This approach will be important for our discussion of 
colonial and post-colonial legality as emergency legislation was always tied to decisions 
about who or what constituted a problem category that fell outside the law, or to whom the 
law applies in exceptional ways, often calling for the exercise of state violence. Contra 
Michel Foucault, who argued that the historical emergence of biopower marked the 
threshold of modernity63, Agamben brings the nexus between colonial sovereignty and 
biopolitical life to the fore. Inspired by such inputs from political theory and philosophy, this 
thesis examines public order through law and the invocation of emergency in late colonial 
and early postcolonial India. 
 
The foundational role of a state of exception usually operates at a theoretical level, silently 
in the background so to speak, while the workings of the law as empirically observed belong 
to the internal universe of normal legality. Exceptional laws are not meant to be utilised in 
day-to-day governance or be invoked on a day-to-day basis. It is for this reason that the 
declaration of an emergency still comes as a shock and is linked to moments of historical 
importance. In India, for instance, the suspension of the Indian constitution and the 
declaration of emergency by the Indira Gandhi government in the nineteen seventies is one 
major and often referred to example in recent history.  
 
There is an additional question regarding a situation when the constitution of sovereignty is 
itself consistently challenged. This was the case at moments of anti-colonial mass 
mobilisations when the British right to rule India was itself directly questioned. Such 
contestations expose the nervous nature of colonial sovereignty and the weak foundations of 
the paranoid politics in which it operated. In these moments, the colonial administration 
would adopt a manoeuvre that sought to hide issues of sovereignty behind notions of legality 
as far as it could reduce anti-colonial politics to legal battles which would enable it again to 
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decide on the nature of right and wrong, and, therefore, to win small sovereign victories. A 
politicization of legality was countered by a legalisation of politics. 
 
These manoeuvres relied on the fact that legal exceptionalism operated in two modalities. 
At one level, it affected the everyday politics that unfolded in streets and factories, and relied 
on ‘ordinary laws’ of emergency like Section 144 CrPC, enabling preventive detentions and 
curfews. Then, there were major moments like the First and the Second World War, where 
special measures like the Defence of India Rules, a kind of martial law, would take over. 
What this thesis will demonstrate is that between the two world wars, we notice the 
emergence of another trend, the gradual conflation of these two modalities, or in other words 
the normalisation of exception. Laws to deal with anarchical and revolutionary crime or the 
Rowlatt Acts 1919 are precisely the kind of laws which highlighted the capacity of the 
sovereign decision and its legal machine to create and interpret laws armed with exceptional 
powers and insert them into the practices of maintaining everyday law and order. In a 
colonial situation, the state of exception is no longer simply a matter of life and death but 
becomes an altogether new relation of managing life by criminalising it to the extent where 
violent actions of the state become just normal/ordinary.  
 
There is an important subsidiary theme at play which features repeatedly in this thesis but 
with particular prominence in chapter 4. Colonial legality was deeply embedded in practices 
of bureaucracy. The relation between bureaucracy and law is one where the latter replenishes 
the former through the consolidation of a strict procedure. Such a procedure maintained an 
order of life because it consistently maintained an order of files. The sheer volume of the 
records of the Raj available for study today are a proof of this. Such files, as numerous 
scholars have discussed,64 generate data and therefore evidence of social, political, economic 
and overall administrative transactions. Bureaucratic procedures were based on the argument 
that their operations were/are a necessity for the functioning of a rational and just society. 
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On the other hand, such procedures also tightened the grip of state on its subjects gradually 
and persistently. In the colonial archive, we notice two kinds of public order that existed in 
the functioning of the colonial state in India. The one which existed on paper and in files, 
and the other which existed on the ground. The two were not necessarily the same. In fact, 
it was precisely because of this gap between paper reality and ground reality that colonial 
public order laws of the kind discussed in this thesis were needed.  
 
The basic aim of this thesis is to study the connection between a certain understanding of 
public order and the invocation of apparently unavoidable emergency measures both in a 
colonial as well as postcolonial setup in India. This flirtation was connected to the rationale 
of pre-emption - legal action even before a crime had been committed. The pre-emptive 
nature of public order laws highlights their authoritarian character as well as their flexibility 
to manipulate political situations on the ground into governable outputs. One significant 
example in this regard is section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which 
dealt with the prohibition of person(s) from certain activities and from the use of public 
space for designated persons and groups. This law was often supplemented by curfews, 
where public life was suspended in the name of maintaining public order and tranquillity. 
Whereas, the aforementioned laws were promulgated to avoid, most commonly, mob 
violence or a riot, related administrative tactics like preventive detention aimed to arrest a 
person even before a crime had been committed by the concerned person. An invocation of 
urgency permitted or enabled short-circuiting of due process. There were certain kinds of 
people at large to whom the normal rule of law did not apply and who could be subjected to 
severe restrictions without them having to commit any observable offence at all, let alone 
such an offence actually having to be proven. 
 
While, as we shall see in a minute, the colonial government of the 19th century proposed an 
understanding of legal exceptionalism that rested on the criminalization of clearly pre-
defined and limited groups of people, the late colonial state extended this criminalization to 
any anti-state/ anti-colonial activities and by implication potentially to the entire Indian 
population itself. This sense of general suspicion never left Indian governance, even after 
the achievement of independence. There was no root and branch reform of the relation 
between state and its people or a wholesale cleansing of laws from the colonial presumptions 
of generalized illegality.  Racism, repression and a sense of domination survived.  
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When the state invoked emergency laws, it aimed to preserve a political order and to prevent 
physical violence, since it was the state which according to the law had the monopoly over 
physical violence. But the legal justification was far from straightforward, especially when 
we move from colonial to post-colonial times. Public order laws could be legitimate only if 
state sovereignty and popular sovereignty were ultimately imagined as one and the same, if 
the interests and ends of the state were projected to be the interests and ends of the 
subjects/people/citizens as well. (One could add, that even if homogeneity could be achieved 
it would not actually lead to the image of a democratic state in action: the total 
homogenisation of a public would have assumed its complete docility and subordination 
under a totalitarian state.)  However, such a coming together was always illusory. The very 
operation of extraordinary law had material implications for the lives of the people too. It 
led to a compartmentalisation of various publics who were often at loggerheads with each 
other. It was the necessary heterogeneous nature of the public that brought confrontation 
between state and its people back to the debate. Hence, the matter of law would always 
remain a question of power rather than justice. Therefore, law always retained an underbelly, 
an illegality in its foundation and it is the provision of emergency in the name of maintaining 
public order that allowed it to cut loose from democratic procedure and its obligation to the 
people. It allowed the state to transform into a sovereign body with no obligations towards 
its people, acting mostly out of considerations of self-preservation.  
 
 
Colonial law and its exceptions: Historical background 
 
Having sketched the contours of the argument that this thesis will pursue it is necessary to 
provide a little more historical background to set our investigation into decolonising public 
order laws into a wider context. This requires a tour back into history to the beginnings of 
colonial legality in India, when the main poles of our discussion: the separation between 
normal process of law and extraordinary or emergency legislation, and its dependence on 
certain abnormal ‘problem categories’ was first established. 
 
 
Law began to occupy an important part in the ideology of British colonialism in India in the 
final decades of the eighteenth century. Officials of the East India Company deputed 
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themselves to absolve Indians from the ‘despotism’ of their rulers.65 For example Lord 
Bentick and his moral crusade in India is noteworthy in this regard. He initiated 
‘modernising projects’ which aimed at westernisation of Indian administration. he was 
influenced by the utilitarian ideas of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. He started reforming 
the courts in India and made English rather than Persian as the language of the higher courts. 
Furthermore, he argued for a western-style education for Indians so that they could be 
incorporated into British bureaucracy. These officials also emphasized the absence of any 
proper sense of right to property in Indian laws or of any universal principles of justice more 
generally. The Pitts India Act 1784, marked the moment of transformation of the Company 
from a trading company to a governing body. The establishment of institutions and 
administrative structures was now required to enable and sustain the new order of 
governance. Security of property, the rule of law and the idea of moral improvement became 
the broader guiding principles to justify colonial rule in India. Simultaneously, in order to 
prevent any abuse of power, a case for embodying universal principles of justice was argued 
for. For this purpose, the first Law Commission for India was established in 1835. 
 
From the very beginning of the process of formulating an Indian Penal Code (IPC), British 
colonial ideology often referred to utilitarian philosophy66 guided by a liberal 
constitutionalist framework of some sort. This discourse has been well-covered in the 
existing literature, for instance in the work of Eric Stokes67, Uday Singh Mehta68, and 
Karuna Mantena69 amongst others. Michael Mann70 has pointed out a very important 
element of the effect this legal code would have on its subjects. He argues that part of the 
colonized population, at least, had to accept their oppressors’ hegemonic claims about 
universal rationality imported from the ‘civilized’ West. ‘To be civilized’ was to be free 
from specific forms of tyranny. It was based on a scientific approach guided by reason and 
rationality. A legal system designed to abolish the tyranny of despotism over liberty was part 
and parcel of the civilizing mission. Right from the beginning, this mission was fraught with 
																																																						
65 Metcalf, Thomas. Ideologies of the Raj, 1800-1899, Volume 3 and 4, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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67 Ibid. 
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contradictions between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the law. Since Indians were not full 
rational subjects yet, ‘normal’ legality could also not yet fully apply.  
 
Legal exceptionalism was a constitutive factor in the making of the colonial legal regime 
right from the very beginning. If anything, it predated the compilation of a body of 
substantive law in India. By the early 1830s, the company administration had already 
embarked on a concerted effort to use the law in ways that were diametrically opposed to 
the enlightenment legal principles: no assumption of innocence until proven guilty, no notion 
of individual moral responsibility regardless of race, caste or creed, no due process of law 
based on the presentation of evidence. Instead law operated as a preemptive and 
extraordinary force.  
 
The ‘discovery’ of Thuggee by the British Colonial administration in the 1820s initiated the 
development of a regime of legal suppression that was constructed not around the ‘rule of 
law’ but around a notion of legal exceptionalism which served as the proto-type for similar 
forms of legislation later on. The timing is highly significant: legal exceptionalism in the 
context of public order legislation actually predated institutionalised attempts to create a 
universal rule of law for India through the series of Law Commissions beginning in 1835. 
In short legal exceptionalism was an essential ingredient of how the colonial regime used 
the law right from the start. It was neither a later addition nor something that only applied in 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
Thugs was the name given to gangs of ‘professional assassins’/robbers who the British 
perceived as a major public order problem in the early 19th century.71  They were locally 
known as Phansigars,72 from the Hindustani word for ‘noose’, referring to a person/people 
who kill using a noose. In many respects the identity of this group of criminals was obscure. 
Even though, many Thuggs were assumed to be Muslims, the British administration claimed 
that they were a religious cult in themselves and worshipped the Hindu Goddess Kali and 
showed no influence of Islam. This raises questions whether Thuggs ever existed outside the 
																																																						
71 It is important to mention that according to the earlier recorders of cases of Thuggee, this specific tribe 
consisted of both Hindus and Muslims with as many as seven tribes of Muslims involved in this occupation. 
72 It was claimed, they joined travellers and during journey gained the trust of fellow travellers and at an 
appropriate moment strangled them with a noose or a handkerchief around their necks. After robbing them off, 
these Thuggs would bury the body of their victims. The term Thugg and Thuggee became popular after Philip 
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colonial imagination. It is incomprehensible that such a cult would have remained untracked 
during the Mughal period when politics around such a community could have been a 
sensation given the stress on Sharia law for administrative purposes. It is also interesting 
because if such a cult actually existed, the Ulama and Qazis would have given some religious 
statement on the operation of such a religious cult which violated the fundamental principles 
of Islam i.e., opposition to idol worship. But there are, by and large, no such records.73  
 
By the early 1830s many even amongst those British administrators who did perceive 
Thuggee as a threat to public order had conceded that whatever its nature, such a threat had 
been successfully repressed. But this did not stop an extraordinary effort in ideological and 
institutional innovation. A dedicated police department, complete with its own trademark 
modus operandi and legal back-up was established under the Governor General Lord 
William Bentick in 1835. Its importance was far greater than the actual public order problem 
it was designed to tackle.74 Detective methodologies were applied as a new approach to 
understand ‘crime’. Of central importance was a process of profiling and the use of 
intelligence gathering. William Sleeman, an ardent self-promoter and evangelist of the anti-
Thuggee cause, was appointed as the Superintendent of the Department in 1835 and, in 1839 
became its Commissioner. The campaign that followed resulted in imprisonment, execution 
or expulsion of thousands of men from British India. 
 
The kind of ‘legal procedure’ involved to convict Thuggs is significant to understand the 
broader argument here. Radhika Singha75 among various others has emphasized the 
significance of a law called ‘Act XXX’. According to this Act, all the administration needed 
was an ‘approver’ to testify that the accused was a Thugg.76 This law did not identify any 
specific activity as criminal, rather specified the members of Thugg groups as criminals. The 
punishment for belonging to such gangs was life imprisonment. Special courts were 
established for the trial of the Thuggs, which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Company at 
that point of time. The act permitted the arrest of entire families, including women and 
																																																						
73 However, the only reference that can be traced in writings before British regarding Thuggs appears in Ziya-
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children as legitimate means of arresting active Thuggs, since Thuggee was understood as a 
family affair as per the officials of the East India Company. It was held that Thuggee was 
passed on from father to son. Therefore, wives and children of Thuggs were also fit targets 
for the colonial state’s punitive and corrective measures. In addition, there was no right to 
appeal. But the strangest element of all was that the nature of the crime of Thugee itself was 
not actually precisely specified. Thuggee was not something one had to do to be guilty, one 
simply was a Thugg regardless of whether one committed any robberies or murders. This 
strange construction gained traction in the British colonial legal imagination at precisely the 
same time, as Radhika Singha notes, ‘when a penal code upholding precision and exactness 
was on the agenda.” 77 Most of the discourse about Thuggs was based on the confessions 
extracted from arrested Thuggs. Shahid Amin78 has rightly observed that the ‘confessions’ 
that dominated and drove all accounts of Thuggee were not confessions, but ‘approver 
testimonies’. An accused would escape severe punishment if he or she could help identify 
another ‘thugg’, thereby having a vested interest in keeping the myth of Thuggee as a 
criminal phenomenon alive.79 Therefore, the outcome of the trial was known in advance. 
 
The ‘Thuggee department’ as in reality a ‘truth production department’ of central importance 
for the legal imaginary of the Raj. Most historians would now agree that Thuggee was in fact 
a construction, part of ‘colonial imaginings’ as Martine Van Woerkens put it. As Kim 
Wagner has pointed out, “the government went as far as removing a judge from his post 
because he claimed Thuggee did not exist and refused to cooperate in the operations against 
them.”80 This only highlights the significance which the campaign against Thuggs held for 
the British colonial administration. Thuggee provides us an example of not only the new 
framework of classifying crime by the British administration in the early nineteenth century 
India but also how groups were being controlled after being declared criminal. Hence, it 
acted as a pseudo-scientific way of dealing with disorder, which not only essentialized crime 
but communalized it as well.  
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By 1870s the Thugg cult was declared extinct but the methodology and legal practice it had 
created was not abandoned. A very similar methodology but with a different target 
constituency was enshrined in law in the infamous Criminal Tribes Act of 1871. The ambit 
of ‘problem categories’ and ‘risk groups’ kept widening. The ‘criminal tribes’ were defined 
as communities who were addicted to committing non-bailable offences such as thefts etc. 
A campaign to systematically register them was conducted by the colonial government. 
These communities, in addition to the Thuggs, were referred to as ‘habitually criminal’ 
which led to the imposition of restrictions on their movement. Also, adult male members of 
such groups were required to report weekly to their local police station. However, the 
Thuggee Department lasted until 1904 and was replaced by the Central Criminal Intelligence 
Department popularly known as CID. This department formed in 1904 was a new initiative 
developed by the British to gather intelligence on criminal elements (read oppositional 
politics) operating in Indian society.81 
 
The question remains as to what such an obsession with a mythic/religious cult and ‘criminal 
tribes’ or ‘habitual offenders’ achieved for the British administration. There must be some 
logic to the extraction of Thuggs as the essential component of menace in Indian society in 
1830s. The repression of Thuggs in a wholesale manner exposes the overt repressive tactic 
of the colonial administration. Michel Foucault warned us against understanding repression 
as something purely negative and alerted us to its productive capacity. As explained above 
the administrative persecution of Thuggs facilitated in the creation of a moral ‘non-criminal’ 
other. But this non-criminal other also helped to maximise the productive aims of colonial 
government. It delineated the space in which ‘normal’ legality in its universalist and 
utilitarian sense could be constituted. By creating extra-legal subjects like the thugs, the 
general parameters of conduct for the legal subjects of colonialism produced. Indians were 
reconfigured for a new state of legal incarceration. Such an incarceration was aided and 
achieved through new modes of conducting life as proposed by each law commission report. 
The seven law Commission reports in colonial India, one by one, founded a new quotidian 
legal and social order. 
 
																																																						
81 In 1920, James Sleeman, the grandson of William Sleeman published his book ‘Thug, Or a Million Murders’ 
and re-emphasized the cult status of Thuggee. It classified Thuggee in a communal framework where the 
Goddess Kali appeared as the sole deity of the members of such a community.  
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It was at this precise moment that the colonial administration devised a legal-cum- moral 
yardstick to distinguish its various subjects. The first split is the creation of an immoral 
criminal ‘other’ – starting with the prototypal Thuggs - within Indian society. Such a 
situation created the space for the moral righteousness of ‘the non-criminal self’. When the 
‘the non-criminal self’ realised its superiority in the given framework, it felt a moral 
responsibility to deal with the ‘criminal other’. This was essential for this process otherwise 
the moral superiority of the ‘non-criminal’ would not hold. This resulting binary thus 
operated on two levels. On one level, it criminalised a set of population amongst the Indians 
and, at the second level established a moral and racial superiority for the ‘white’/ European/ 
English. It was no real contradiction therefore to keep ‘whites’ out of the legal penalties 
applicable to Indians as Elizabeth Kolsky82 has pointed out in her work on the nature of 
‘white violence in colonial India’. After all, it was the racial differentiation of law that made 
the second split among the subjects of colonial government, possible. What is more, it also 
divided the Indian population as ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ for the purpose of colonial governance. 
The Thuggs and the ‘criminal tribes’ were now the foes not only of the colonial 
administration since they apparently violated law and order but were also now foes of ‘other’ 
Indians as they posed danger to their lives and property. Most importantly, in the case of 
Thuggee and the criminal tribes, the enemy was known and could be described in advance. 
Therefore, specific measures were put in place to deal with such problem categories whilst 
on the second track of the colonial use of law, so to speak, an ideology of universal justice 
– ‘the rule of law’ – could be promulgated.  
 
While Thuggee and its suppression remained a central preoccupation of British 
administration for almost a century, in 1835 the utilitarian philosopher and politician 
Thomas Babington Macaulay took charge of the Law commission to draft a penal code for 
India that represented the other side of colonial legality – an imposition of universalist values 
and due process. On July 10, 1833, he had made an argument before the British Parliament 
about the future role of British governance in India. He argued that the role of the British 
was to give ‘good government’ to Indians, to whom they could not give ‘free government’. 
The hallmark of such a good but not free government, for Macaulay, was the rule of law. 
Macaulay was then serving as the Secretary of the Board of Control under Lord Grey. With 
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the Passing of the Charter Act 1833, Macaulay was appointed by the British Parliament as 
the member of the first law member of the Governor-General’s Council. He arrived in India 
in 1834 and became the Chairman of the First Law Commission in 1835 and was assigned 
the responsibility to draft a new legal code for India. Foregrounding the manner in which 
English law set out to level the ‘uneven’ field of Indian legal system(s), the set of seven law 
reports eventually published by the Law Commission over the following decades provide us 
with bird’s eye view of what most preoccupied the British lawmakers in their engagement 
with colonial society in India.  
 
The commission’s reports – even though they were about aspects of civil law - highlight 
some of the general priorities that would also influence the design of penal law. The usual 
divisions of public and private fail to take into account that the domain of modern law began 
by a focus on the private in the first instance. It interfered in the personal lives of 
communities by converting everything into a universal ‘public’ which now had to be 
processed through the Law or a legal framework. The first of the law report published in 
1863 observed:  
 
[S]ubject to necessary consideration for the existing laws and usages of various parts 
of India, there is a necessity to prepare a body of Substantive Law.” 83 
 
It recommended that: 
 
[I]n preparing such a body of law, the law of England should be used as a basis. Also, 
once enacted, such a body of law should itself be the Law of India and its 
jurisdiction.”84  
 
The commissioners of the first report85 categorically stated that in accordance with the 
wishes of ‘various classes of persons who were neither Hindus nor Muslims’ there was a 
need for a substantive civil law. As the Hindus and the Muslims, according to the report, had 
laws of their own on the subject of devolution of property on death, on questions of 
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inheritance and succession.86 the general law of India should make no such distinctions in 
the case of devolution of property. Additionally, the devolution of property of every kind 
should be governed by ‘one system of rules’.”87  
 
Similarly, the second report of Law Commission (1866)88, illustrates how the commissioners 
– guided by their concern about the inviolable right to property - set out to deal with the 
theme of ‘contracts’. The report dealt with the provisions regarding consumer rights 
(purchaser rights) and law of suretyship. It initiated a mechanism of further making ‘certain’ 
the law and its relationship to its subject through the act of ‘definition’. Conduct was 
‘legalized’ with the involvement of a procedure. It defined, ‘contract’ as ‘an agreement 
between parties whereby a party engages to do a thing or engages not to do a thing’. 89 It 
further stated that Law Commission had considered whether it would be expedient to render 
binding in law promises made without consideration, because by the English law such 
promises were held to be binding only when expressed in writing under seal. 
 
‘Contract’ followed the idea of devising a currency. Business could not take place unless 
‘things’ were ‘revalued’. Such a revaluation is illustrated in the third Report of the Law 
Commission (1867),90 which dealt with ‘promissory notes and bills of exchange’. This report 
highlights the fact that it was “a subject to which the recent extension of mercantile enterprise 
in India”91 gave increased importance. Hence we can understand through this collage of facts 
that the idea of revaluation was inherent to the theme of profit making but took place through 
the mode of ‘governance’, through ‘legitimate’ means. These reports demonstrate the 
process of law making and its philosophy consequently leading to the understanding of the 
‘legitimate’ and by extension, the criminal. In addition to this, we notice that there is an 
emphasis on the conduct of conduct, in a Foucauldian vein, a power to act on the actions of 
the colonised subjects. The rules of everyday social conduct were altered, with a new set of 
rules instituted by each Law report. 
																																																						
86 As regard to property laws the report states that the British subjects in India at that time saw property as an 
investment, and not in terms of any interest in settling. It mentions that Armenian, Parsees, or other classes like 
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The philosophy of ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ stood at the centre of the discussion of the 
fourth report of the Law Commission92 published on 18th December 1867. It raised the 
problem of the definition of law itself. The Report highlighted the fact that Penal Law was 
a ‘Substantive Law’, the confusion, it felt was on whether the subject of the enforcement of 
the specific performance of contracts, properly belonged to substantive law or to the law of 
procedure. The body of rules that determine the rights and obligations of individuals and 
collective bodies is referred to as substantive law and, the body of rules that regulate or 
govern the process for determining the rights of individuals or concerned parties is called 
procedural law. Following this, the fifth Law Commission93, which was published on 3rd of 
August 1868, elaborated the ‘law of evidence’ and its technicalities. Most importantly, ‘Law 
of Evidence’ was “oscillating between substantive law and procedural law.”94 The issues 
dealt with in the first and second report, had not succeeded in its purpose to clarify the matter. 
This is brought to our attention by the Sixth Law Commission Report95 published on 28th 
May 1870, which remarked that the chief object of the draft was:  
 
[T]o bring the rules regulating the transmission of property between living persons 
into harmony with the rules affecting its devolution upon death. Thus, it provided an 
opportunity to furnish the necessary complement of the work which have 
commenced in framing the law of succession.”96  
 
 
The Great Rebellion of 1857, opened up a political chasm between the coloniser and the 
colonised. The violent uprising saw many Europeans killed in India which resulted in the 
colonial administration becoming even more suspicious and hostile towards its own subjects. 
The events of 1857 destabilised the colonial pretence that it had successfully tamed Indians 
and served as a wakeup call for its ‘civilising mission’.  
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It was important in terms of legal theory because it was also a moment when the colonised 
subjects rose in arms with an aim to decide who the actual sovereign was, at least as far as 
mutineers/rebels were concerned. Events of 1857 highlighted that the British sovereignty in 
India was still not established completely. Scholars have pointed out in numerous studies 
that sovereignty in India had made a rather peculiar journey in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. The Mughal Emperor, who could be called a grand sovereign in the seventeenth 
century, was not a sovereign in the strict sense.97 For example, Farhat Hasan brought to our 
attention that the relationship of the Mughal government with the Indian subjects was more 
of revenue collection rather than a total system of direct and uniform government. Therefore, 
any aim of the Mughal empire to homogenise and centralise their polity, was internally 
fractured by the local administrators.98 Sovereignty in India in the nineteenth century until 
the 1857 at least, operated autonomously yet overlapped at different levels. On the first level, 
Bahadur Shah Zafar, was the Mughal sovereign, followed by the regional Rajas, Princes and 
Nizams. On the second level, East India Company with powers to control and regulate Fort 
William and Fort George in Madras and Bengal Presidencies respectively acted as the 
sovereign in its territories given the jurisdiction granted by the Royal Charters along with 
the diwani granted by the Mughals. Also, the company was an acting sovereign 
administrating on behalf of its superior and ultimate sovereign, the British Crown.  
 
This was not how the colonial regime regarded sovereignty and the events of 1857 gave 
them the chance to overhaul political realities according to their ideological expectations. 
The colonial authorities responded to the rebellion with spectacular violence – like mass 
executions and deportations - motivated in part by vengeance but also to make an exemplary 
spectacle of its sovereign might. The Mutiny granted the British a reason to tighten their grip 
on the Indian masses by painting them as inherently rebellious and untrustworthy. It also 
provided them with a reason to emphasise the ‘barbaric nature’ of the natives. 1857 brought 
a certain administrative urgency that any dissent against the British rule must be crushed to 
avoid any future uprisings. This marked a change in British attitude towards the colonised 
subjects. It was a moment when the entire population was under suspicion of being the 
‘enemy’ in Schmitt’s sense, not just some exotic and largely imaginary public enemies like 
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the Thuggs. Over the following years, the suppression of any political opposition and the 
promulgation of extraordinary laws became central to this operation. 
 
The Indian Penal Code was enacted in 1860, just three years following the mutiny of 1857. 
The content of the Law Commission reports illustrates that ‘law-making’ in colonial India 
was a well thought-through exercise.99  Noticeably, crime and punishment did not figure 
overtly in the law making process until the seventh report of the law commission, at a 
moment when other aspects of the law had already been largely clarified.  
 
Historically, the primary concern of magistrates had been how to bridge discrepancies of 
punishment and of the dispute resolution process inherent in the Islamic justice system. The 
late Mughal model of government did not operate in a monolithic and linear fashion. Instead 
it allowed a different permutation of administration adopted locally at times. During the 
creation of a new penal code for India, Mughal justice administration system based on 
principles of Sharia was gradually replaced by colonial British law. It was argued that the 
Mughal law as an administrative system was unscientific in nature guided by the partial 
attitudes of Qazis and their disproportionate punishments.  
 
The seventh report of Law commission100 published on 11th June 1870, stated as its purpose 
the revision of the criminal procedure code. A dispatch of 21st December 1868101, the local 
Government of India observed that at that moment there could scarcely be said to be a Code 
of Criminal Procedure. It further recorded that the original code enacted in 1861, had already 
been amended by three subsequent Acts. A fourth short amendment was suggested under the 
instruction of Sir Stafford Northcote. It added that there has been a large amount of judicial 
decision on the construction of the code, and the decisions were most of the time not known, 
or were occasionally conflicting.102 Such a contradictory narrative complicates the entire 
system of administration and procedure itself.  
 
The process of the formation of a new legal code was influenced by the utilitarian philosophy 
of Bentham and was emphasized on the axiom of ‘rule of law’. But the colonial law-making 
																																																						
99 See IOR/V/26/100/11 
100 The members of this Law Commission were Sir John Romilly, Sir Edward Ryan, Robert Lowe, John 
Macpherson Macleod, William Milbourne James, and Sir Robert Lush. 
101 Enclosed in the Duke of Argyll’s letter of 23rd April 1869. 
102 See IOR/V/26/100/11 
	 41	
process faced complicated issues. Various laws operating over different provinces were 
resulting in an administrative hazard for the administration. This issue was resolved by the 
Indian Councils Act, which changed colonial ‘administration’ to a form of colonial 
‘government’. 
 
The foundation of a new legal subjectivity was laid when the British decided to venture into 
devising a legal code for India. The Law Commission worked for almost three decades to 
accomplish this project.  The law reports sketch the displacement of indigenous modes of 
conduct by a new English one. Public order could only be maintained once the need for it 
had been created. Also, it opened up a space for colonial authorities to control and 
manipulate the conduct of the people. Redesigning the social through the legal allowed the 
colonisers to set up the rules of the colonial form of governance and, facilitated the 
immediate and efficient unleashing of colonial control of various populations. 
 
In the process of displacing the earlier practices of Mughal judicial system, new English 
laws required new jurists. The English magistrates were already meting out decisions to 
various disputes in the light of the ‘new’ laws. Institutions were introduced or even 
transferred from Britain because ‘public justice’ was supposed to be introduced in 
contradistinction to ‘personal injury’, one of the most problematic elements of 
‘Mohammedan law’ for the British in India. The new Courts of law would have a dramatic 
impact on the Indian masses because dispute resolution now was proposed to be much more 
‘just’ and ‘impartial’. However, there were still issues unresolved. One of such issues was 
racial justice. Elizabeth Kolsky among various other historians has pointed out that in 1890s 
when the issue of ‘white violence’ was at its peak, the British administration was caught in 
its own trap because the champions of ‘rule of law’ had to deal with disputes ‘uniformly’, 
without favouring Europeans over Indians. The consolidation of laws in 1893 resulted in the 
birth of a universal subject in colonial India irrespective of race. Such equality before the 
law was deeply resented by the majority of the European settlers in India. In the spirit of 
resolving the ‘racial’ contradiction in the recently introduced English law, eventually a 
universal legal code was adopted by emphasizing the ‘norms of justice’ and the 
responsibility of ‘western civilization’. Even though bitterly opposed by the European 
settlers in India the universality of colonial law had to transcend race, at least in letter, in 
order to establish maximum control and authority. 
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The entire exercise of establishing ultimate authority of the British crown in India and the 
formation of the Indian Penal code in 1860s can be read as the initiation of a modern social 
contract in India. However, it was not until 1893 that the IPC was consolidated and became 
one universal overarching body of law. It was one of the sovereign’s problems of whether 
to govern by ‘rule of law’ or ‘rule by law’. While the idea of ‘rule of law’ simply meant that 
no one was above the law and the arbitrariness of power was kept in check by a set of written 
rules. However, rule by law meant written rules were applied yet did not presuppose equality 
before law. The consolidation of IPC in 1893 did claim to transition from a rule by law to a 
rule of law, but it did not alter the governance attitude which had already assumed in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century that since the Indians could not have a ‘free’ 
government, they should be provided a ‘good’ government.  
 
The British articulated sovereignty in an Indian idiom, and second they felt obliged to justify 
their rule in a European idiom too. The most powerful tool of the civilizing mission was the 
colonizer’s claim that the purpose of the colonial enterprise was to improve the locals and 
was aimed at bringing the fruits of progress and modernity to them. Michael Mann has 
argued that ‘the point where the colonizers are about to give up their role as civilizers, the 
colonized ask to continue as objects of civilizing mission’. Therefore, it was inherent in the 
logic of colonialism that people who were different were regarded as inferior. In order to 
govern themselves they needed to be made similar. Such an understanding drove a seemingly 
sympathetic attitude of philanthropic enlightenment and the self-inflicted ‘duty’ of the 
‘white man’. But this was only one part of the story. The very same ‘civilizers’ who were 
uncomfortable with ‘irrational’ Mughal as well as customary laws, did not necessarily follow 
the spirit and procedure of the so-called ‘rational’ laws they themselves had introduced. The 
complete absence of evidence collection and due legal process in the case of Thuggee 
demonstrates the ‘irrationality’ of the so ostentatiously ‘rational’ administration in India. 
While the Law commissions were busy drafting a universalist Penal Code for India, the 
suppression of the criminal cult of Thuggs remained a main obsession of the British colonial 
administration for a very long time.  
 
The career of the colonial state in India highlights that right from the beginning of the 
colonial administration in India the functioning of law was not about justice but rather risk 
management. In ordinary times, social demographics that were seen as potential problems 
for the colonial administration were placed outside the operation of the law. The 
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establishment of a clear dividing line between the normal and the extraordinary could not 
only make dealing with such problem categories easier whilst also maintaining the pretence 
of a polity built on enlightenment ideals, it also set norms of conduct for all those who were 
not perceived as problem categories themselves. But this game of ruling through sovereign 
distinctions of this kind was not successful. As this thesis will demonstrate, the formation of 
mass anti-colonial resistance in the twentieth century made the boundary between normal 
and exceptional uses of the law very permeable indeed. At least potentially, the entirety of 
the Indian population could become a problem category – or ‘enemy’ in Schmitt’s sense. 
The legal exception in other words would increasingly become ‘normalized’ and began to 
penetrate how public order legislation was used in an everyday context.  
 
The Ghadr movement in the second decade of the twentieth century, the Congress mass 
campaigns, the growth of the labour movement resource mobilization in India during both 
first and second world war, were all instances extraordinary laws became part of the 
everyday toolkit of the colonial state. What is more, the logic of extraordinary but 
normalized law did not disappear with the transfer of power to a newly independent India. 
The new Congress governments, for example in the United Provinces reenacted colonial 
methodology by pursuing a similar sovereign decisionism. One could argue that there was 
no great difference between colonial and postcolonial times when it comes to the application 
of extraordinary legislation in India. 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
The thesis examines the character of extraordinary legislation in colonial and postcolonial 
India and is divided into five chapters. The first chapter- Invoking Exception and Defining 
Enemies: Extraordinary Legislation and The Colonial War on Terror in the Early Twentieth 
Century India - is a broad survey that revisits the nature of legality in the early days of 
colonial. It highlights the problematic nature of the colonial law that thrived on the creation 
of problem categories since the beginning. The events of 1857 leading to suspicion of 
various sections of population followed by strict regulation of the vernacular press are 
important in this regard. The major eruption of problem categories arose once again with the 
Ghadr movement where entire population was now suspect and branded potentially disloyal. 
With the creation of the Rowlatt Bills we notice that there was a liminal outside to define 
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who fell under the rule of law. By the end of 1920s with the Rowllat Bills, everybody became 
a potential suspect and lead to the production of a binary of the loyal and the disloyal subject. 
It asserted that those who were loyal had nothing to fear and it was only the disloyal who 
was discomforted with the creation of Rowlatt Bills. It once again produced a governmental 
distinction of its own thriving on the element of ‘problem category’ to define the entire 
population in colonial India. 
 
The second chapter -  Dynamics of ‘Public order’ in late colonial India: A study of the 
tactical use of section 144 CrPC in the Punjab and Bengal Presidencies 1935-1940 - 
discusses how the use of emergency or extraordinary situation cannot be assigned to 
emergency/crisis only but had to be everyday. This chapter studies the use of a specific 
preventive legislation, section 144 CrPC, which was invoked to deal with ‘unlawful’ 
assemblies, riotous mobs, and was promulgated to prohibit access to various public or 
industrial spaces. The chapter takes two different case studies from two different non-
Congress ruled provinces of colonial India. One case study each from the province of Punjab 
and Bengal are studied closely to understand and interpret the use of section 144. These case 
studies highlight the governmental emphases on the use of preventive legislation to deal with 
the political situations through the creation of problem categories like the satyagrahi, and 
the communists. 
 
From the third chapter onwards, - Controlling ‘Mobs’ and Maintaining Public Order in 
Congress-ruled Provinces, 1930-1947 - the thesis focuses on the politics of extraordinary 
legislation in the Congress-ruled Provinces of Bombay and the United Provinces. It 
undertakes a detailed study of two famous incidents in the United Provinces, the Cawnpore 
labour strikes and the Madhe Sahaba controversy in the 1930s followed by another case 
study from the Bombay province. It investigates attitudes of both the local administration 
and the Congress ministry among others towards the use of extraordinary legislation and 
shows that they were not very different from each other. It also points out why 
decolonization as a process had to start with the recalibration of laws than anything else. The 
case study from Bombay demonstrates that ordinary clashes could often escalate to major 
law and order issues. However, the case studies from Bombay and U.P. demonstrate that the 
Congress leaders succumbed to the same logic as the colonial administration when it came 
to the handling of crisis and the use of extraordinary legislation. They too were comfortable 
to govern by sustaining problem categories like Goonda, Mawaali, and Badmash 
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The fourth chapter - When administration broke the law: Peter Budge scandal and the issue 
of race, name and law in UP - brings together observations from previous chapters and 
focuses on the importance of proper names in a new India. The chapter tells the marginal 
but nevertheless important story of an elderly person named Peter Budge who got arrested 
in a time of heightened communal tension in the United Provinces. Peter Budge suffered a 
year of illegal detention without trial solely for the reason that he had an 
unusual/unexpected/different name. Also, his story highlights the gaps in bureaucratic 
procedure in such cases as opposed to the claims often made by the colonial government. 
The case led to great embarrassment for the Congress Ministry in the newly independent 
India and resulted in a judicial enquiry. 
 
 
The final chapter - Lineages of a Post-Colonial State: Understanding the ‘New’ Sense of 
Public Order in United Provinces 1947-1955 - focuses on the institution of Mukhiyagiri and 
Chowkidari. It is a longer study of certain laws and administrative practices in the United 
Provinces and highlights the practices of congress government after 1947. The chapter 
argues that there was a continuity in governmental practice of the United Provinces Congress 
government in postcolonial India and was no different from its predecessors. The United 
Provinces government after 1947 started with the reorganization of Police with the intention 
of reframing its outlook in ‘changed times’. It abolished the colonial institutions of local 
policing and public order and surveillance like Mukhiyagiri and Chowkidari but replaced 
them with nothing different. Also, the administrative bureaucracy in United Provinces 
despised the local population which it perceived had failed in maintaining sanitation and 
order in public places. To this, the UP government extended a specific law called the Police 
Act section 34 to most of the towns and villages of the province. The chapter also discusses 
laws, which reflected the force of the government, and were enacted or resorted to, in order 
to deter people from doing certain things/acts. This chapter looks at four instances where the 
UP government resorted to the use of extraordinary measures in order to achieve everyday 
peace and order. These measures were the issue of a gun to every village, the enactment of 
the UP Rakshak Dal Act 1948, extension of section 34 of the Police Act to more and more 
districts and towns, and most importantly, the UP Prevention of Crime Bill (Special Powers) 
(Temporary) 1948, and will argue that the postcolonial UP administration maintained 
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everyday public order by following a two-pronged strategy. On one hand it argued for the 
cultivation of responsible citizenship by militarising society and on the other hand it resorted 
to special powers and extraordinary legislation to inculcate fear of police in the mind of the 
masses. However, this was attempted by the creation of a binary between ‘reliable villagers’ 
and ‘social pests’. As noted in the first chapter of the thesis, colonial government in India 
had a career of violence and suppression. Such violence was often perpetrated through ‘law’ 
by classifying certain sections of Indian society as ‘criminals’ for instance, ‘thuggs’ and 
‘criminal tribes’. In the late colonial period too, ‘goondas’ and ‘hooligans’ supplemented for 
such a criminal nomenclature. However, disciplining masses through the activation of 
similar laws did not cease after independence and remained one of the obsessions of the 
postcolonial state too. The United Provinces (UP) Prevention of Crime (Special Powers) 
(Temporary) Bill, 1948, is an important insight in this regard. This law had emergency 
powers to deal with persons of ‘bad character’ and operated by short-circuiting normal rules 
of criminal procedure. Therefore, this chapter would lay out administrative attitude towards 
‘public order’ by engaging with the bureaucratic communication that emerged after the UP 
government considered taking action against such ‘persons of bad character.’ Such 
‘preventive laws’ were helpful to the UP Congress ministry to take action against the 
political ‘others’. This chapter will demonstrate how the then UP government armed with 
the zeal to have better governance promulgated an extraordinary law to deal with ‘bad 
characters’. Elaborating on the functioning of extraordinary laws the chapter will highlight 
the regulatory urge of the UP administration. It will demonstrate how in addition to having 
a disregard for individual liberty, the provincial government had a certain romance for 
emergency measures. While on one hand such measures point out their use of serving the 
government’s desire for ‘swift’ action, on the other hand it also highlights how it sometimes 
opened up a debate and disagreement between different bureaucratic institutions about the 
possible punishment for such ‘bad characters’. 
 
 
Overall, the thesis contends that the late colonial government in India thrived on the creation 
of problem categories. Strangely, the same colonial categories rather than being problematic 
for the postcolonial government in fact facilitated its manoeuvres to maintain law and order. 
This points out the fact that there was no decolonisation of political understanding but just 
handover of political sovereignty. Rather than establishing democracy through the 
legitimisation of juridico-political order, the early postcolonial state in India opted for the 
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‘reasons of the state’ logic. Presumably law should have undergone transformation once 
India attained independence, but the central postcolonial problematic remained the same, 
one where various groups in population were kept outside citizenship. Rather there is a 
continuity in the imagination between the colonial and postcolonial Indian state as to what 
was meant by public order. There was no transformation in modality of dealing with such 
problem. Emphasis was on frequent invocation of extraordinary laws deployed for everyday 
purpose of governance. Furthermore, the postcolonial Indian state was also distrustful of its 
subject population, which goes against any idea of popular sovereignty. As far as law is 
concerned, one can see a continuation between colonial and postcolonial governmentality so 
far as legal governmentality is concerned. 
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Chapter one 
Invoking Exception and Defining Enemies: Extraordinary Legislation 
and The Colonial War on Terror in Early Twentieth Century India 
 
 
The administration of public order in colonial India used the law by way of a twin strategy: 
on the one hand, it emphasized an ideological notion of ‘rule of law’ whilst on the other hand 
it created a catalogue of exceptions through the delineation of certain problem categories to 
which the rule of law did not apply in the usual way. Ever since the formation of the first 
law commission in 1835, the colonial administrators in India argued for the necessity of a 
new legal code which would deliver impartial justice, even though it took until 1893 for this 
promise to be truly realized, when racial exemptions to the rule of law were finally removed. 
At the same time, the operation of colonial law always remained dependent on a basic 
premise of exclusion. It started with the creation of problem categories like the Thuggs and 
other criminal tribes in the 19th century, but was later extended – as the nationalist movement 
was gathering force - to include, at least potentially, an entire disloyal population. While the 
initial marking of problem categories depended on a moral distinction between criminality 
and non-criminality, the later extension of legal exceptionalism to potentially the entire 
population brought with it a new language of governance predicated on notions of war and 
emergency, and a categorical separation between friends and foe. To outline this process is 
the principal aim of this chapter. 
 
As this chapter progresses in roughly chronological order through several important case 
studies, it will furthermore demonstrate the late colonial state could resort to three different 
tactics in times of disorder. It could declare an emergency in which civil authorities were 
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given special powers; it could call in the military in aid to civil administration; and it could 
also declare a state of martial law. The underlying logic of order was often based, not on any 
principle of ‘rule of law’ at all, but on calculations of risk management, that itself depended 
once again on the demarcation of certain classes of people as problem categories. The 
exceptional laws designed to deal with such people involved a short-circuiting of standard 
procedures of law. The authorities often argued, for instance, that the police administration 
was unable to collect and produce evidence against such persons, so legal procedures could 
not be conducted in the ordinary way. Such exceptionalism soon applied not only to certain 
categories of ‘criminals and offenders’ who could be identified in advance of any crime 
taking place, but potentially to the entire colonial population, now perceived as ‘enemy’. 
One could argue that in the nineteenth century, colonial governance was conducted through 
an ‘institutionalized exception’, whereas the twentieth century saw the foundations of a 
‘normalized exception’. 
 
This chapter will undertake an examination of three case studies; the formation and the 
emergence of the Ghadr Party, the anti-Rowlatt agitations and the Jallianwalla Bagh 
massacre. These case studies are already quite well known from the secondary literature. 
However, this chapter evaluates the laws that responded to each of these situations instead. 
For example, the formation of the Ghadr party also coincided with the arrival of First World 
War and therefore the invocation of the Defence of India Rules. Similarly, the Revolutionary 
Crimes Act or the Rowlatt Act was legislated to deal with the anticolonial revolutionary 
groups that challenged the British colonial rule in India, and the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre 
which resulted in a series of events that led to the invocation of Martial law in Punjab. 
Together, these case studies will further enable our understanding of the colonial state of 
exception. 
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Ghadr (1913-1919) and the Defence of India Act: Public Grievances, Revolutionary 
Diaspora and Anti-Colonial Insurgency. 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial government in India had already 
witnessed significant mass resistance, not the least the activities of the Bengal 
revolutionaries and the Swadeshi movement. The next decade brought the First World War 
and the outbreak of insurgency in colonial Punjab. ‘Public disorder’ in colonial Punjab like 
in the rest of India had been largely limited to conflicts and contestations amongst various 
classes/religious communities.103 But it gained a rather unusual momentum in the 1910s 
when the colonial government itself became the target of political and revolutionary 
activities over the course of the Ghadr movement. 104  Ghadr remains one of the most 
significant anticolonial revolutionary movement against the British in India. The post-Ghadr 
account of General O’Dwyer, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab puts the story in 
perspective. He understood Ghadr as a major and dangerous threat to the British Empire.105 
Scholars have highlighted the scope of Ghadr in numerous studies. Scholars have noted 
Ghadr as an anticolonial mobilisation against the British rule in India and Burma that took 
place from the west coast of North America. South east Asia served as a major route for 
Ghadr attempts to infiltrate propaganda and arms into India for the purpose to spark revolts 
and subsequently an armed insurrection against British rule.106 Others have noted that the 
																																																						
103 For a broader discussion see, Barrier, N.G. ‘The Punjab Government and the Communal Politics’ in The 
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Ghadr movement was a convergence of many strains of thought and agitation. A movement 
initiated by Lala Har Dayal - later on by many others, for example Ram Chandra after 1914-  
mobilized as well as organized Punjabi and Sikh migrant workers in the North Americas to 
return to India and reproduce a rebellion along the lines of 1857.107 Some studies have 
focused on the range of organizational skills of Ghadrites in Canada and the patterns on 
which the Sikhs were mobilized against the British rule in India.108 Others have elaborated 
the ideological dimensions of the Ghadr party, detailed the collaborative efforts of US, 
Canadian, and British officials to deport the Indian radical and Ghadar Party leader Har 
Dayal under the anti-anarchist law in 1914 and focused on the anti-imperial character of the 
Ghadr.109 The mobilization of the Sepoy working for the British rule as an important element 
of Ghadr has also been studied. Such studies of the soldiers of British Empire - both Sikh 
and Muslim sepoys- highlight the utility of religious mobilization to invoke rage amongst 
regiments of Indian soldiers in the British Army. In addition to references made to Sikh and 
Muslim honour and pride being the followers of great Gurus and Prophet Muhammad, the 
economic condition of the Sepoy was equally relevant for his mobilization for mutiny.110 All 
such studies demonstrate the significant role Ghadr had in the anticolonial mobilization in 
India and abroad. This chapter utilizes existing scholarship on Ghadr but expands on existing 
analyses by focusing on the invocation of extraordinary laws at different levels - unleashing 
a state of exception- were activated to curtail the momentum of Ghadr. The difference of 
this study lies in its focus on the colonial state of exception invoked by the British 
administration at a crucial time when anticolonial Ghadr mobilization coincided with the 
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First World War.  Out of fear of rebellion, the British administration instituted extraordinary 
measures which did not rely on the everyday rule of law. 
The influence of Ghadr not only mobilised the masses in a new active and aggressive manner 
but also had an overt revolutionary character. Due to the economic downturn in India, many 
Indians, the majority of them Punjabis, sought to emigrate to North America. Noticing a 
huge influx of Indian immigrants, the Canadian Government decided to bring in a set of laws 
aimed at checking the influx of South Asians. Such discrimination led to growing protests 
and a rise in anti-colonial sentiments, especially among the Punjabi community. It led the 
community to organise into new political groups. Many who had moved to the United States 
encountered similar problems there too.111 Initially their grievances were voiced through a 
small political organisation called ‘Hindustani Workers of the Pacific Coast’. This 
organisation later became ‘Pacific Coast Hindustan Association’ and finally, in 1913, the 
‘Ghadr party’ was formed under the leadership of Har Dayal and others. The Urdu word 
Ghadr translates into revolt/rebellion, and the ultimate aim of this organisation was the 
overthrow of British Rule in India. A weekly paper ‘Ghadr’ was started to disseminate the 
views of the Ghadr Party. The aggressive posture of the Ghadr party was already spelt out 
with absolute clarity in its first issue from San Francisco on November 1st, 1913. It carried a 
caption on the masthead – Angrezi Raj ka Dushman, - which translates as ‘the enemy of the 
British rule’. It made a foundational distinction between the colonial government and the 
people of India, and then declared war against this newly declared existential ‘enemy’. The 
message of this move could not have been clearer as the timing of the movement coincided 
with the outbreak of the First World War.  
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Men and resources from India were immediately mobilised for the British war effort. In 
addition to the regiments of soldiers from India who were deployed overseas, many ordinary 
Indians were mobilised as labourers for building trenches, roads and bridges, and also to 
serve as porters. When Indians, mostly Sikhs and Muslims from Punjab along with Gurkhas 
were sent to fight in France, they experienced a different racial politics there. Once forbidden 
to confront Europeans, they were now deployed abroad to kill ‘White men’. The emergence 
of Ghadr and the possibility of a civil and military mutiny at the time of war was an alarming 
prospect.  
 
Meanwhile, a stridently anti-colonial tone emerged amongst Indian radicals spearheaded by 
the Ghadr party. Publications with self-explanatory titles like Ghadr-di-Gunj (Echo of 
Mutiny – referring to 1857), Eilaan-e-Jung (Declaration of War), Naya Zamana (The New 
Era) and a leaflet titled The Balance Sheet of British Rule in India, were considered the most 
controversial publications at the time. Ghadr-di-Gunj consisted of a collection of poems or 
songs and was the first books which the ‘Yugantar Ashram’ undertook to publish.  The first 
edition of 10,000 copies was printed in Gurmukhi in 1914 and a later edition in Urdu was 
also printed. The judgement of one of the Ghadr related cases known as the Lahore 
Conspiracy case,112 was conducted as per the Defence of India Rules. It described the 
writings of the Ghadr-di-Gunj as one which described:  
 
“… The British as a nation, all white men as a race and the English Government in 
particular, are all maligned in a spirit born of a depraved nature. Facts are not only 
distorted but most maliciously perverted to appeal to the lowest passions of Indian 
subjects. In the most open, defiant and unmasked manner mutiny is preached. All 
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sense of decency has given place to foulest abuse of the worst possible vulgarity. The 
entire pamphlet is meant to incite the masses against the British Government. … 
Sikhs are excited by the references to the doings of their Guru; Muhammadans are 
similarly excited by reference to the Balkan War, for which England is blamed. 
Political convicts and Hardayal are praised to the skies.”  
 
Similarly, Eilaan-e-Jung, described India as a downtrodden land, trampled on by foreigners 
who export and drain away its produce. It further claimed that Indian soldiers were kept in 
the front during the war while Europeans were allowed to serve in the less dangerous rear.113 
Muslims were specifically urged by the pamphlet to kill the “pork-eaters” and were also 
incited with reference to England fighting Turkey (the land of the Caliphate), while the 
imposition of a new Khedive in Egypt was also stated. Hindus and Muslims were exhorted 
to make common cause and to establish a republic in India. Finally, Naya Zamana, which 
was allegedly written by Hardayal himself, was a pamphlet that explained the role of 
Congress leaders in the cycle of British oppression and attacked Indians as popular as Gopal 
Krishna Gokhale, Pherozeshah Mehta and Dadabhai Naroji. The argument was that these 
men are members of the Imperial Legislative Council, which is headed by British. Congress 
was referred to as official assembly and all its members as “flatterers” and “timid men.” The 
pamphlet further accused Congress members of parroting sentences they had learnt over the 
years, and of begging the British Government for their rights. Such a politics could not 
prevent famines, reduce taxes, spread industry, conduct administration of real justice, feed 
the population and control plagues. This was a concerted attack on the Indian participation 
in the British colonial bureaucracy by exposing them as collaborators to the colonial project. 
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Another important track of argument in these pamphlets was to invoke the sense of history 
and religious pride, which often glossed over the hostility that historically often existed 
between groups such as Muslims and Sikhs. But the resentment against British rule was 
meant to unite these communities. Though Sikhs dominated the Ghadr movement, Muslims 
also participated in large numbers. Ghadr was a larger pan-Indian plot to inspire insurrection 
against the British colonial rule in India during the First Word War. The Ghadr movement 
not only created minor conspiracy cases but also resulted in certain regiments revolting 
randomly against the British in numerous places. The supposed ‘mutiny plot’ had many 
participants ranging from the Ghadr Party operating from San Francisco, many Indian 
revolutionaries working underground against the British Rule within India, the Berlin 
Committee comprising of Indians in Germany and the crucial support of the German Foreign 
Office through the German consulate in San Francisco.114 It was the reason that the ‘mutiny’ 
was referred to in some places in the colonial archive as the German-Hindu mutiny. Hence, 
it was a transnational movement and involved various ‘enemies’ of the British Empire, both 
internal and external.  
 
Ghadr not only attempted to appeal and mobilise masses but also highlighted oppressive 
administrative practices of the colonial government. Above all, at the dawn of the First 
World War, Ghadr incited soldiers to turn their guns on the British. This was a very 
disturbing situation for the British. The Central Investigation Department (CID) – the 
successor to the Thuggee department first founded in the 1830s - came in handy when they 
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successfully infiltrated a spy named Kirpal Singh115 into the main group, which was planning 
to launch a wider mutiny all over British India starting from Lahore on 21st of February 
1914. The Police foiled this plan by arresting some key members, yet the most ‘notorious’ 
Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose managed to escape.  
 
Suspicious of a German-Hindu conspiracy and the migration of Indians to foreign countries, 
the colonial government had a precursor to the Defence of India Act - the Ingress Ordinance. 
It was passed a year earlier in September 1914 during the outbreak of First World War and 
enabled colonial government to detain, screen or restrict the movement of people entering 
or returning to India. The British colonial government in India reacted to the threat of Ghadr 
as well as the increasing challenges of the First World War by creating a new law called the 
‘Defence of India Act’ 116 which came into being on 18 March 1915. This Act aimed to 
provide for special measures to secure public safety and the defence of British India. It also 
offered new and speedier procedures for bringing certain offences to trial, mainly 
revolutionary activities.  
 
The Defence of India Act 1915 was a Criminal Law Amendment, which extended to the 
whole of British India. It stated that “it shall be in force during the continuance of the present 
war and for a period of six months thereafter.” But it would continue to operate even beyond 
these temporal limits for all cases which had been registered during its enforcement period. 
“Legal proceedings pending under this Act at the time of the expiration thereof may be 
																																																						
115 See Part II, specifically ‘Kirpal Singh Spy’s Evidence’ in “Ghadr Movement Original Documents Vol.I, 
Lahore Conspiracy Cases Iand II, Edited by Malwinder Singh Waraich and Harinder Singh, Chandigarh: 
Unistar Star Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2008, Page 38. 
116The Defence of India, Act V of 1915 (As Amended by Act II of 1916) With Rules and Notification Thereon 
By Pt. Bhagat Ram, B.A. L.L.B. Pleader. Amritsar. Printed at The Union Steam Press, Lahore 1917. Pages 35. 
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completed and carried into execution as if this Act has not expired.”117 Once invoked the 
law had the power to make its own rules. As it was invoked during the War it had the power 
to bring almost anything under its authority. The law empowered both civil and military 
authorities to act against any person(s), group(s), and property, posing any ‘threat’ to British 
authority. It also dealt with securing harbours, trains, tracks and roads for this purpose.118  In 
addition to the powers to arrest and seize property, this law put at the disposal of Governor-
General in Council, the whole or any part of the output of any factory, workshop, mine or 
other industrial concern for the manufacture, preparation or extraction of any article or thing 
which in his opinion, could be utilised in the war. Industry was required by this law to 
‘facilitate’ the war efforts of the British authority in any possible way. 
 
The Defence of India Ordinance III of 1915 was considered inadequate for the War situation 
and therefore, got repealed and the Ordinance had to be modified.119 The colonial authorities 
thought of it as insufficient to deal with the foreign threats since the revolutionaries were 
also actively supported and engaged by other anti-British European powers. Hence, the 
modified rules made under section 2 of this Act stipulated that any contravention thereof or 
of any other order issued under the authority of any such rule shall be punishable by 
imprisonment for a term which could extend to seven years, or with a fine, or with both. In 
case, if the intention of the person contravening any such rule or order was to assist the 
King’s enemies or to wage war against the King, the Act provided that such contravention 
shall be punishable with death, transportation for life or imprisonment for a term which could 
extend to ten years, to which a fine could be added.120  
 
																																																						
117 The Defence of India, Act V of 1915, Page 1. 
118 Ibid. Page 2-3. 
119 Ibid. Page 4. 
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Little difference remained between actual transgressions and mere suspicion under this law. 
For instance, section 3 of this Act stated:  
 
“Where in the opinion of the Local Government, there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that any person has acted or is acting or is about to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety, or the defence of British India, the Local Government 
may, by order in writing, direct such person to relocate, extern or discipline 
themselves and abstain from such acts.”  
 
Furthermore, section 6 of this law stated that any officer could direct person(s) by the general 
or special order of the Local Government, to be photographed, give fingerprints, furnish the 
designated officer with specimens of his handwriting and signature and attend at such times 
and places as such officer would direct for all or any of the foregoing purposes. Failing to 
comply or attempts to evade would be punishable with imprisonment of either description 
for a term, which could extend to six months or with fine up to Rs. 1,000 or with both.121 As 
this law was a wartime law, it enabled military authorities to make arrangement for the 
“purpose of securing public safety.” However, there was an element of compensation 
involved too. The law provided that the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency-town 
and the District Magistrate elsewhere could, on the application of the person who had 
suffered loss by exercise of such powers, award to the person compensation he thought to 
be reasonable, and such awards were to be final.122 In addition to this, military authority was 
given the right to access any lands or buildings and could also impose a temporary 
suspension of right of way over any such land, building or other property. Refusal to comply 
																																																						
121 The Defence of India, Act V of 1915, Page 6-7. 
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would mean that the law had been contravened. Surveillance and control of sea, channels, 
and rivers along with tighter border controls that allowed the frisking of baggage, post, 
publication etc. was also part of this law.123 This law enabled the dormant absolutist 
tendencies of the late colonial state. 
 
Justice under such a law was quick and avoided the usual process. Section 4 of this Act 
specified that Commissioners for the trial of persons under this Act were to be appointed by 
the Local Government. These Commissioners could be appointed for the whole province or 
any part thereof or for the trial of any accused person or class of accused persons. The trials 
under this Act could be held by three Commissioners, of whom at least two had to be persons 
who had served as Sessions Judges or Additional Sessions Judges for a period of not less 
than three years or were qualified under section 2 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, for 
appointment as judges at the High Court, were advocates of a High Court or, were advocates 
of a Chief Court or pleaders of ten years’ standing.124  
 
 
 
A Special Tribunal under the Defence of India Act, which was passed in March 1915, heard 
the ‘Punjab Mutiny’ event in 1914 popularly known as Lahore Conspiracy case.125 With 63 
of the persons accused in the dock and 18 still absconding, the trial began on the 26th of 
April 1915. One of the absconder, Nidhan Singh, was arrested later and put on trial in the 
same case. Others were tried in supplementary cases. The final list of persons tried in the 
first instance numbered 82 because many of the absconders were arrested during the course 
																																																						
123 The Defence of India, Act V of 1915, Page 9-25. 
124 Ibid. Page 26. 
125 The Commissioners were Major Irvine and Mr. Ellis, Sessions Judges, and Rai Bahadur Pandit Sheo Narain, 
a leading lawyer of the Chief Court. 
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of the trial. The total number of approvers was 10. Only one from the accused, Umrao Singh, 
became an approver during the trial in the first case.126  
 
All were accused of waging war against the Crown or conspiring to do so, inside and outside 
of India, seducing troops to mutiny, committing dacoities. In addition, two were also charged 
with murder, abetting murder or attempting murder. Some were further accused under the 
Explosives Act. Because the number of accused was high and due to the fears of an armed 
attempt to rescue them, the trial was held in Central Jail Lahore with no access to the general 
public. However, the proceedings were officially reported to the Press, a procedure that met 
with strong opposition from the English newspapers of the Province. The main trial lasted 
from 26th April 1915 to the 13th September 1915. The magnitude of the trial was huge, as 
the record comprised 704 pages of printed matter, containing abstracts of the statements of 
404 prosecution witnesses, the statements of the accused and abstracts of those of 228 
defence witnesses. Later, the same Tribunal tried a supplementary case which began on 29th 
October 1915 and ended on the 30th March 1916. One hundred and two accused were named 
in the plaint, of which 11 were absconders. Two of these were arrested after the trial had 
begun and were sentenced to death by the tribunal in cases taken up during a postponement 
of the main one. In the Lahore conspiracy case and later supplementary cases up to 1919, 
we know there were 154 persons tried. 24 were acquitted, 19 were hanged, 55 were 
transported for life and 56 were awarded lesser sentences of rigorous imprisonment.127 There 
were other cases related to Ghadr too but the Lahore conspiracy demonstrates the scope of 
																																																						
126 See Apendix C ‘Summary of the criminal cases arising out of the Ghadr movement’ in “An Account of the 
Ghadr Conspiracy 1913-1915,” compiled by F.C. Isemonger & J. Slattery, Indian Police, Punjab, Lahore: 
Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1919, Page xii. 
127 See Apendix T ‘Summary of the criminal cases arising out of the Ghadr movement’ in “An Account of the 
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such trials under the Defence of India Act. Rebels or the ‘enemies of the king’ were to be 
tried in a grand process aimed at a juridical demonstration of exception. 
 
A similar case known as the Delhi conspiracy case128, further sheds light on the nature of the 
invocation of Defence of India Rules. While hearing the Delhi Conspiracy Case, Sir Donald 
Campbell Johnstone on 10th February 1915 stated the amended129 charges against the eleven 
accused persons130 as: 
 
“That you between 27th day of March, 1913, and 31st March, 1914, both at Delhi and 
Lahore and other places in British India, did agree with one another, and other 
persons unknown, to commit the offence of murder under section 302, Indian Penal 
Code, and that you were thereby parties to a criminal conspiracy to commit the 
offence of murder, to wit the murder of Ram Padarath, was committed at Lahore on 
17th May, 1913, and that you thereby committed offences punishable under sections 
302/102-B and 302/109 of the Indian Penal Code within my cognizance.”  
 
The case to which the current case was an appeal lasted from 21st May, 1914, to 1st 
September, and on 5th October passed orders, acquitting five of the accused persons131, and 
convicting the other six132 under section 302/102-B, I.P.C. Three were sentenced to death133; 
																																																						
128 Appeals Nos. 851 to 854 and Nos. 905 and 921 to 924 of 1914 and Revision No. 2069 of 1914, against the 
order of H.M. Harrison, Esquire, Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dated 5th October 1914. 
129 The original case was heard by Sessions Judge on 11th July 1914, in Trail No. 6, and further the charges 
against the accused were aded or amended during the course of the trial. 
130 A special bench comprising Sir Donald Campbell Johnstone, Kt., Judge and Justice Rattigan heard the case. 
Six prisoners named Balmokand, Abad Bihari, Amir Chand, Hanwant Sahai, Balraj and Basant Kumar Biswas 
filed appeals in their names against an order of 5th October 1914 by H.M. Harrison, Additional Sessions Judge, 
Delhi. 
131 Namely, Chota Lal (called Ram Lal in the rest of this judgement) alias Ram Lal, Charan Das, Mannu Lal, 
Raghobar Sharma and Khushi Ram. 
132 Namely Basant Kumar Biswas, Abad Bihari, Amir Chand, Balmokand, Balraj and Hanwant Sahai. 
133 Namely Abad Bihari, Amir Chand, and Balmokand. 
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and three were sentenced to transportation for life134. Simultaneously to the above case the 
Court also tried two of the accused aforesaid on a charge under sections 4, 5, and 6 of Act 
VI of 1908 (Explosive Substances Act)135 in connection with a bomb cap said to have been 
found in their possession on 16th February, 1914, and (again on 5th October) found them 
guilty and under section 4 of the Act sentenced them to transportation for 20 years. Though 
the finding of the bomb cap came from a different case but was sufficient to frame them 
under the extraordinary law.136 The court created a brilliant narrative by forging evidence 
and concluded that “reasonable ground” existed for believing that: 
 
“the accused had joined hand in conspiracy to wage war against the Queen and 
procured arms in Europe for the conspiracy. It added, that the accused collected 
money in Calcutta for the objective and persuaded other persons to join their 
conspiracy in Bombay. They published writings advocating the object in view at 
Agra and transmitted from Delhi to Kabul, the money collected at Calcutta. A letter 
giving the account of the conspiracy was used as evidence to prove the complicity of 
the accused.”137 
 
The details of the Lahore and Delhi conspiracy cases is pertinent as it demonstrates not only 
the scope of the use of Defence of India Act to curtail anti-colonial activities but also the 
narrative and level of threat the colonial government perceived. throughout the trial, crimes 
like murder or abetting murder -that could have been tried under ordinary criminal law - took 
																																																						
134 Namely Basant Kumar Biswas, Balraj, and Hanwant Sahai. 
135 Namely Abad Bihari and Amir Chand. IS IT WORTH MENTIONING THEM IN THE MAIN TEXT? 
136 Page 3 of the “Complete Judgement of the Punjab Chief Court, Lahore in the Delhi Conspiracy Case,” dated 
10th February 1915 together with the abstract of the findings of the Judges, 1915, Lahore, Printed by S.S. 
Deane, Manager, at the Punjab Steam Press. 
 
137 Page 5 of the “Complete Judgement of the Punjab Chief Court, Lahore in the Delhi Conspiracy Case,” dated 
10th February 1915 together with the abstract of the findings of the Judges, 1915, Lahore, Printed by S.S. 
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a prominent place. The scope of revolutionary activities and conspiracies, according to the 
colonial government, spread across different provinces, all the way from Bengal to Kabul. 
Ghadr along with the Lahore and Delhi conspiracies had already made the colonial 
government paranoid.  
 
The main fuel to the Ghadr panic came from overseas in the shape of the deportation of 
Indians from Canada and the United States. The iconic case was that of the ship Komagata 
Maru, which had been chartered by a Sikh, Gurdit Singh, carrying many Indians, mostly 
Punjabi Sikhs and some Muslims, and others from Manila, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Moji and 
Yokohoma. They all attempted to emigrate to Canada, but the ship was prohibited entry into 
Canada. When the Ship arrived at Vancouver on the 24th May 1914, the emigrants were told 
that, except for former residents and some students, no one would be allowed to land. An 
appeal against this order was lodged in the case of one passenger Mansa Singh, which was 
taken up at Victoria as a test case on which to decide the fate of all.138 Newspapers like 
Amrita Bazar Patrika were consistently reporting on the Komagata Maru episode. Thus, 
informing Indians of the developments in the case as well as the ordeal of Indian passengers. 
Meanwhile, Indians in Canada held many mass meetings discussing the situation. On 17th 
July 1914, orders were passed in the case of Mansa Singh and his appeal was rejected. Orders 
of deportation were then served on all the passengers but they assumed a defiant attitude, 
locked up the captain and his officers, and refused to allow the ship to leave. On 19th July, 
the immigration authorities attempted to board the ship to regain control but were prevented 
from boarding it by the people on-board.139 Later, the immigrants agreed to carry out the 
																																																						
138 Amrita Bazar Patrika, “Komagata Appeal, Thrown out by Canadian Court, Court’s ground of rejection,” 
Thursday, July 9, 1914, Page 5. 
139 Amrita Bazar Patrika, “‘Komagata Maru’ Hindus and Police,” Tuesday, July 21, 1914, Page 5. 
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orders of the authorities to depart140 if they were provided with sufficient supply for their 
voyage.141 Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that the supplies were sent on board142 and the ship 
left with orders to proceed direct to Hong Kong.143 It was this ship that was later dealt with 
under the ‘Ingress into India Ordinance’.  
  
After the contestation and confrontation in Vancouver with the Canadian authorities it was 
known that the passengers on the ship were discontented. It was evident to the colonial 
authorities that such a distressed crowd of three hundred failed emigrants (with Ghadr in the 
background) could constitute a serious challenge to public tranquillity if permitted to land 
in Calcutta and left to find their way to Punjab unassisted. Their arrival could easily trigger 
a renewed agitation over Indian migration to other colonies. It was therefore decided to make 
use of the ‘Ingress into India Ordinance,’ and to organise the immediate return of the 
passengers to the Punjab under strict government control, with a special train being supplied 
at Government expense. In the wake of First World War, owing to the fears that war 
conditions might provoke ‘enemies within’ to plot armed insurrection against the British 
government with support from outside led the government to promulgate the Ingress into 
India Ordinance 1914 and the Defence of India (criminal Law Amendment) Act IV of 1915. 
While the Defence of India Act as an extraordinary ordinance aimed at dealing with 
challenges that arose within the territory of India, the Ingress Ordinance was aimed at the 
threats that might arrive from abroad at Indian ports. The Ingress ordinance authorised the 
government to seclude ‘foreigners’ from the local population, and restrict Indians coming 
																																																						
140 Amrita Bazar Patrika, “‘Kamagata’ Hindus, Cost of this Venture, The Komagata Passengers, Will return to 
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141 Amrita Bazar Patrika, “‘Komagata’ Hindus, Government refuses to defray expenses, The Government 
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Punjab, Lahore: Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1919, Page 37-39. 
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from foreign countries to certain areas. Furthermore, it was directed towards restraining the 
influx of Indian revolutionaries, mostly Ghadrites from abroad. Under this measure, 
thousands of Sikhs returning to Punjab from abroad were brought under surveillance and 
scrutiny.144 
 
The then Lieutenant-governor of Punjab Sir Micheal O’Dwyer had noted that such 
extraordinary laws were the main “safeguards” available to the colonial administration 
against the “returning Ghadr conspirators.”145 He referred to the scenario for the British 
officials in India as “living over a mine full of explosives.”146 Ghadrites had appealed to 
Punjabis and Sikhs living in the North Americas to return to India to participate in an 
organized mass revolt against the British rule. Fearing the arrival of thousands of Ghadrites 
back into India was a major concern for the British officials. The circulation of Indian 
migrants and their revolutionary anticolonial political mobilization across the Pacific even 
before the First World war happened served as a pretext for the British Indian states to not 
only strengthen its exceptional character but also expand it in the name of ‘national 
security’.147 By 1917, the United States as well as the British Indian states had enacted laws 
precisely aimed at the mobility and activism of Indians. Gurdit Singh and certain of his 
immediate followers were to be detained at Ludhiana pending enquiries into the 
circumstances of the voyage of the Komagata Maru. Four Sikh Police officers and one 
British police officer from Punjab were deputed to meet the Ship, and a District Magistrate 
was sent to Calcutta to represent the Punjab Government with full powers under Ordinance 
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V of 1914 to deal with these passengers. The ship arrived at the mouth of the Hugli on the 
evening of 26th September with 321 passengers on board, and was detained at Kalpi, six 
miles below Diamond Harbour, during the 27th and 28th, while the ship and the passengers 
were searched for arms. On the 29th of September, the ship was brought up the river to Budge 
Budge, where the special train to Punjab was waiting for them. The passengers refused to 
disembark from the ship and stated that they would only land at Howrah. They declined to 
travel by the special train. What is important here is that the passengers of Komagata Maru 
were neither under arrest nor convicts or accused, or even foreigners.  Therefore, there were 
no ordinary legal grounds to enforce their transportation on a special train to Punjab.  
 
But the Ingress Ordinance evaluated the passengers of Komagata Maru as potentially 
dangerous and made them available for scrutiny and surveillance to the colonial state. Thus, 
altercations between the police and some of the passengers led to violent confrontation and 
later firing.148 A riot followed, leading to the death of a European officer of the Calcutta 
Police, a head constable and a constable of Punjab police, a shopkeeper, a Bengali spectator 
and an officer of the Eastern Bengal State Railway. Three of the officials were wounded 
including three Sergeants of the Calcutta Police, one Indian Officer and four men of the 
Punjab police. A cordon was placed around Calcutta to nab the passengers who escaped from 
the ship following the riot. By the 11th of October, 201 of the rioters had been captured. Of 
the 321 passengers on Komagata Maru, 62 had left quietly for the Punjab, and 18 had been 
killed or died of wounds, one drowned, 9 were in hospital and 202 were interned in jail under 
the Ingress Ordinance.149 The colonial governments response to the arrival of the passengers 
of Komagata Maru at Calcutta highlights the flimsy reasons the government invoked to deal 
																																																						
148 Amrita Bazar Patrika, “Komagata’s return, Fatal array at Budge Budge, Sudden attack on Police officers, 
Deplorable loss of life,” Friday, October 2, 1914, Page 5. 
149 An Account of the Ghadr Conspiracy 1913-1915, compiled by F.C. Isemonger & J. Slattery, Indian Police, 
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with the already disgruntled emigrants. As a result, the passengers of Komagata Maru would 
now fit the colonial classification of Indian immigrants (all potentially Ghadrites) returning 
from North Americas as dangerous, seditious and therefore mutinous. The following section 
will discuss how even after the end of the First World War, the late colonial government in 
India continued to promulgate another set of extraordinary to deal with ‘revolutionary crime. 
The focus from potential Ghadrites who had returned from North Americas and assembled 
in Punjab for a violent mutiny against the British rule was now extended potentially to the 
rest of the population who could be conspiring against the colonial government in India. A 
civilian version of Defence of India Act in the form of Rowlatt Bills was enacted. Hence, 
the figure of the Ghadrite became a ‘problem category’ that necessitated and consequently 
justified action under extraordinary laws such as the Defence of India Act and the Ingress 
into India ordinance. 
 
There is no ‘outside’ of War: ‘Revolutionary Crimes Act’ 1919 and the normalising of 
exception in colonial India 
 
With immaculate structures of intelligence gathering in place, along with the swift use of 
extraordinary laws like the Defence of India Act and the Ingress into India Ordinance, the 
colonial government was successful in dealing with the Ghadrites. But a fierce movement 
like Ghadr was bound to influence the larger nationalist movement too, which was gathering 
pace in India against British colonialism. The spill-over effect of Ghadr needed to be 
contained in every possible way. The emergency triggered by Ghadr would exceed the 
timeframe of emergency legislation limited to the times of the First World War and the 
conclusion of the Delhi and Lahore conspiracy trials. Though the Defence of India Act was 
supposed to continue for only six months after the declaration of peace, the colonial 
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administration had plans to deal with the situation in the longer run. A committee was 
already working on a report that assessed the situation of revolutionary crimes in India. As 
a result, the Revolutionary Crimes Act 1919 was soon to replace the Defence of India Rules 
1915. The following section analyses the politics around the promulgation of the 
Revolutionary Crimes Act 1919 and will demonstrate how it enabled the normalisation of a 
state of exception and of extraordinary laws in late colonial India. 
 
Following the events of Ghadr, the colonial government in India, in the name of dealing 
with ‘anarchical and revolutionary crime’ started the process to pass the ‘Revolutionary 
Crimes Act’ popularly known as ‘Rowlatt Act’ owing its popular name to Justice Sidney 
Arthur Taylor Rowlatt, who was the president of a sedition committee already set up in 
December 1917 by the British Colonial Government to examine and analyse political 
terrorism in India. The colonial government decided to appoint the Commission to draft laws 
based on its recommendations. This Committee consisted of a President, Justice Rowlatt, 
who was a prominent Judge of the King’s Bench Division, and four members, two British, 
the Chief Justice of Bombay and a Member of the Board of Revenue in the United Provinces, 
and two Indians, a Judge of the Madras High Court and an Additional Member of the Bengal 
Legislative Council. The Committee presented the result of their recommendations which 
were then approved by the Governor General in Council, and finally assented to by the 
Secretary of State for India.150  
 
As discussed earlier, the Defence of India was a war measure and was to remain in force 
only until six months after the termination of the war. However, the colonial government 
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felt that on its removal it might have to face new outburst of opposition activity resembling 
the ‘terrorism’ in Bengal from the years before the war. The colonial government was not 
convinced that ordinary laws or the Criminal Procedure Code could deal with such acts, 
persons or groups. The attitude towards ordinary laws was that they were utterly inadequate 
to deal with the danger faced by the British colonial government in India. The powers 
granted to authorities under the the Rowlatt Act, as discussed above, demonstrates its 
exceptional character. The ‘Rowlatt Act’ gave government vast powers, under special and 
carefully defined conditions for dealing with “anarchical and revolutionary movements.” 
The remit of this could be exceedingly wide, not only offences against the State, such as 
waging war, or conspiring to overthrow the Government, etc. but also more ordinary 
offences against persons and property, such as rioting with deadly weapons, murder, 
robbery, dacoity, damaging roads and bridges, house-breaking, criminal intimidation. 
Certain offences connected with the use of explosives and of arms; provided always that 
such offences are connected with “anarchical and revolutionary movements.”151 
 
 
The findings of the committee gave birth to the infamous ‘Rowlatt Act,’ which were to 
replace the Defence of India Act. The report identified dangerous conspiracies in Bengal 
which also engendered murders and robberies and were sustained by persistent propaganda 
conducted by young men belonging to the educated middle classes. Chitpavan Brahmins 
stirring Maratha nationalism was another source of disturbance in the Bombay Presidency. 
Insurgency in Punjab by emigrants returned from America was also stated as an additional 
source of disturbances against colonial rule.152 While the Defence of India Act 1915 was a 
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wartime law and therefore ‘emergency’ in nature, the ‘Rowlatt Act’ was permanent and 
meant as a reincarnation of the Defence of India Act for ‘normal’ times. We notice that the 
colonial administration exhibited the desire to deal with everyday crime under emergency 
laws.  
 
The Rowlatt Bills met with great opposition during the debates in the Imperial Council and 
other official forums. To aid deliberations and to dispel public suspicion, Oxford University 
Press brought out a booklet explaining details of the Act. The content of this booklet is 
important because it neatly laid out the administrative position of the colonial government.   
 
Explaining the context of the situation in question, the booklet153 foregrounded the fact that 
“India is swept by a storm of political feeling … which is difficult to account for.” Protests 
all over India erupted with activists and nationalist leaders voicing their fear that the Acts 
would be used to silence political dissent against the colonial government. Humphrey 
Milford, who brought out the booklet asserted that most of the people who were opposing 
Rowlatt Act had never read it. He wrote: 
 
“A little while ago, in Nasik, a political agitator who had spoken vehemently against 
the bill admitted in conversation with a Government officer that he has never read it. 
This was indeed a case of blind leading the blind. Are thoughtful Indians going to be 
content with such second-hand ignorance (we cannot call it knowledge)? Or will they 
read or judge for themselves?”154 
																																																						
Kumaraswami Shastri, Madras High Court Judge, Sir Verney Lovett, member of U.P. Board of Revenue, and 
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153Milford, Humphrey.The “Rowlatt Act”, Its Origin, Scope and Object, Oxford University Press, Elphinstone 
Circle, Bombay; Esplanade, Madras1919, Pages 32. 
154Humphrey Milford made such an assertion on the first page of this booklet. 
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Humphrey warned readers that later in the booklet they would come across words like 
“anarchical and revolutionary crime”. He then proceeded to define against what the Act was 
directed at precisely. Most of such ‘crime’ was directly connected to the aim of 
“overthrowing the Government”. Challenging prevalent claims against the Rowlatt Act, 
Humphrey elaborated that neither (a) orderly rational criticism of Government and the 
peaceable expression of political opinion, nor (b) criminal offences not committed from 
political, anti-government motives, were included under the definition of ‘anarchical and 
revolutionary crime.’ As Bengal had already witnessed revolutionary terrorism, the booklet 
contended that “Bengal, in particular, during the ten years or so that preceded the war, was 
the scene of an unending series of violent outrages directed against the authority of 
Government and its officers, which while leaving government unshaken, succeeded in all 
events in rendering the property and even the very life of innocent and peaceable citizens 
unsafe.” Activities to fall under the purview of Rowlatt Act were divided into two classes; 
(1) murders, by members of revolutionary gangs, of officials and police officers who in some 
way or other had made themselves obnoxious to them, and (2) dacoities, that is organised 
and violent robberies, carried out with the object of securing funds for the furtherance of 
revolutionary schemes and often accompanied by murder or attempts at murder. The Rowlatt 
Act was a law devised for all of India and would give vast powers to the local government 
to deal with almost any oppositional situation.  
 
Humphrey’s analysis, quite similar to colonial government’s statements, was not shy of 
pointing out that the ordinary laws were not able to deal with such a situation due to the 
difficulty of procuring evidence, the intimidation of witnesses and delays of normal legal 
procedure. The effect of these obstacles, according to Humphrey, was that anarchical crime 
	 72	
made swift headway against the authorities because the greater proportion of the ‘criminals’ 
were difficult to be brought to book, and of those that were tried, many had to be released 
because of the lack of proper legal evidence. Furthermore, it was felt that the Government, 
had failed in its duty of protecting law and order and safeguarding the life and possessions 
of its people. This was not owing to any lack of zeal on its part, but simply because of the 
‘defective state of law’ when it came to “anarchical and revolutionary crime.” Humphrey 
argued for the necessity of bypassing ordinary rules and process in order to deal with the 
threat of revolutionary crime. 
  
The Ghadr movement and the Lahore and Delhi conspiracy cases, it was claimed, provided 
British authority with alarming facts, and evidence that ‘seditious’ societies in India were in 
league with German agents for the overthrow of British power. To this, the colonial 
Government promptly adopted strong measures and claimed certain special powers, which 
were incorporated in the Defence of India Act of March 1915. What is pertinent to observe 
is that the rules under this Act, which although even more stringent than the new ‘Rowlatt 
Act’, were accepted by the country in general without any protest given that the invocation 
of these rules supplemented war efforts. The Defence of India Act gave the authorities 
facilities for the prompt arrest and internment of persons known to be dangerous and 
arranged for their quick trials by special tribunals. As a result, Government used the Defence 
of India Act to deal with revolutionary situation not only in Punjab but in Bengal too. 
Humphrey’s booklet argued:  
 
“the effect of these wise measures for the defence of the country against both its 
internal and its foreign enemies was immediate and startling. Anarchy in Bengal and 
elsewhere was practically stamped out, a dangerous plot for the importation of 
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German arms and a general revolt in India was detected and thwarted, and, in a word 
India during the wars was enabled to enjoy the blessings, the order and the 
commercial well-being of peace, without any interference in the rights and liberties 
of her law-abiding subjects.”  
 
Such laws, we notice, were based on a Schmittian ‘friend’ and ‘foe’/enemy distinction. Any 
activity, be it the conspiracies to overthrow the colonial government or collaboration with 
Germans, would invite action under this law. The rest, who had the interest of the colonial 
government and love for peace would come under the ‘friend’ category and had nothing to 
worry about, apparently. The rest would be designated as foes (and hence as a problem 
category) posing a serious challenge to the British rule in India. One cannot overlook 
Humphrey’s observation as well as his manner of assurance when he noted: 
 
“Indeed it is possible, and even, we hope, probably, that no part of India may ever be 
subjected to it. It is a measure to be used in an emergency only and against a 
particularly dangerous class of criminals; just as a wealthy man who saw a robber 
entering his room, might seize up a stick with which to defend his property and life. 
He might even, if he were wise, keep such a weapon handy in case of need. And if 
he did so, would his family and his friends have a right to consider themselves 
insulted and mistrusted? Obviously, the only people who would ever need to fear it 
would be his enemies.” 155  
 
																																																						
155 See Rowatt Bills and also Milford, Humphrey. The “Rowlatt Act”, Its Origin, Scope and Object, Oxford 
University Press, Elphinstone Circle, Bombay; Esplanade, Madras1919, page 9. 
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Such an assurance comes with a warning, a notice to correct oneself and to fall in line with 
the current order. Otherwise anybody could fall in the category of the seditious criminal.  
 
 
It is noteworthy that once the Rowlatt Act would come into existence it was supposed to 
continue in force for three years from the date of the termination of the war and was to extend 
to the whole of British India. Humphrey’s pamphlet warned people from rushing to hurried 
conclusions and urged them to  read the first section of each of the three main parts of the 
Act, in which it was ‘clearly and expressly’ stipulated that the special powers offered by the 
Act of Local Governments shall not come into force in any part of the country unless the 
Viceroy in Council (that is after due deliberation with his British and Indian advisers) would 
decide that “anarchical or revolutionary movements” are being promoted in that part and the 
situation was serious enough to make it necessary for him to apply some or all of the special 
provisions of the Act to that region of the country. Once again it was stressed that the act did 
not apply to ‘ordinary criminal offences’ but only to those included in a ‘special schedule’. 
However, how ordinary offences could be interpreted as offences in the ‘special schedule’ 
remained a significant source of ambiguity. 
 
Humphrey’s booklet took great pains to explain, “What the Act is not”. In nationalist 
discourse the Act was seen as a measure that gave special and tyrannical powers to the police 
and robbed Indians of free speech and imposed restrictions on the expression of political 
opinion. Contrary to such nationalist apprehensions, Humphrey took pains to explain and 
assure that the government would not arrest people without reason and only a speech or a 
publication or a newspaper article, which incited the people to outrage and rebellion, would 
most probably come under the Schedule. But he also added that there was nothing new in 
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the prohibition of such speeches or writings. They been criminal offences for the last four 
years already. In fact, many sections of this law were already available to the authorities as 
the Criminal Procedure Code. However, by becoming an emergency measure, the Act had 
acquired the power to bypass ordinary procedures against the accused and hence aimed to 
strike terror in the minds of nationalist and revolutionary persons and groups in colonial 
India. Rowlatt Act was an extraordinary law, conferring on Government special powers in 
exceptional cases. But Humphrey was confident of the safeguards the ‘Rowlatt Act’ 
contained and therefore argued that it “can harm neither the purse, nor the liberty, nor the 
dignity, of any good citizen of India.”156 The image of a good, obedient, disciplined, non-
revolutionary citizen, were clearly stated in these laws. Whoever would decide to be 
otherwise, had to be ready for the ‘consequences’. Rowlatt Act, being a civilian version of 
the Defence of India Act, made possible the swift transition of exceptional laws – until now 
primarily a sovereign prerogative- into extraordinary laws, which would still be exceptional 
in character but in contrast to Defence of India Act now available to the civilian government. 
War against the enemies of the state became extended, it did not cease with the end of the 
First World War. The nature of laws suitable to operate exclusively to deal with challenges 
of war were transformed to adapt to the civilian administration. Even though Rowlatt Acts 
were repealed three years later in 1922, they paved way for the rise of the surveillance state 
and succeeded in further enabling the dark side of colonial extraordinary laws to be used 
hereafter. Such laws normalised the capacity of the colonial state to use the ‘maxim’ of 
exception, permanently. The message was that hereon the late colonial state in India could 
not only do everything, but anything to protect its authority.  
 
																																																						
156Milford, Humphrey. The “Rowlatt Act”, Its Origin, Scope and Object, Oxford University Press, Elphinstone 
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The following section takes the discussion further by discussing ‘Martial laws’, a scenario 
where the civilian administration failed to maintain law and order and requested military 
assistance. Consequently, if the situation got further out of control, the military could take 
over complete control of administration from the civilian administrative machinery. Such 
laws, again, were exceptional and further enlighten us about the various layers in which 
exception was invoked. 
   
 
Legality and moral legitimacy: Satyagraha, martial law and the massacre at 
Jallianwalla Bagh 
 
The ‘Rowlatt Act’ was finally passed despite the unanimous opposition of all non-official 
members of the Imperial council.157 Vast sections of the Indian population and their political 
leadership became agitated about the Governments’ indifference to their opposition to the 
Rowlatt Act. As part of the collective response, Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi started 
satyagraha on 23rd March 1919, to oppose the Rowlatt Act. 6th April 1919 was declared as 
an All India Hartal day to be observed with twenty-four hours of fasting and suspension of 
business. On March 1, 1919, Gandhi in a statement to the press opposed the Rowlatt Bills. 
The arguments he made are of great relevance for the argument of this thesis. The report of 
the Rowlatt committee taking stock of revolutionary crimes in India had been of the opinion 
that secret violence was confined to “isolated and very small parts of India” and “to a 
microscopic body of the people.” Gandhi now responded that although the existence of such 
																																																						
157 The Madras Mail, Wednesday Evening, March 19, 1919, Page 5, “The Imperial Council, Rowllatt Bill 
Passed, Madras Member Resigns.” 
	 77	
men was truly a danger to society, the Rowlatt Bills would in fact affect the whole of India 
and all of its its people. For Gandhi, the design of the Bill laid bare a colonial conspiracy of 
arming the Government with powers out of all proportion to its stated aims. In other words, 
Gandhi- himself a lawyer- was pointing out the capabilities of such extraordinary laws. He 
seems to be aware of the sweeping powers this law could have. It would make the distinction 
between ordinary and extraordinary disappear or make it so porous that ordinary crimes 
could be interpreted as part of a revolutionary conspiracy. For Gandhi, the Rowlatt Bill was 
a greater danger than revolutionary crime itself. He argued that “millions of Indians were by 
nature the gentlest people on the earth”.158 He further considered the Bills to be “the 
unmistakable symptom of the deep-seated disease in the governing body.”159 While pleading 
with the Government for the use of ‘ordinary laws’ to deal with revolutionary crime, he 
proposed  that a strong ‘remedy’ like the Rowlatt Bills should only be prescribed once all 
the milder ones had been tried. His use of the metaphor of the body is noteworthy here. 
Without contesting colonial concerns of revolutionary crime, Gandhi seems rather 
concerned at the possibility of any opposition termed revolutionary. It could mean that even 
protests and anticolonial mobilization could invite action under Rowlatt Bills. It could 
endanger his own advocacy of non-violent protests and could endanger peaceful 
demonstrators. This said, we know that the British surely were not likely to listen to his 
hollow spiritual advice; instead they were the makers of an empire which had violence at its 
heart and legality in its head.  
 
 
																																																						
158 Tendulkar, D.G. Mahatma: Life of Karamchand Gandhi, Vol. 1, Bombay, 1951, Page 251 
159 Ibid. Page 251. 
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The anti-Rowlatt Act political mobilisation resorted to Satyagraha. The Satyagraha vow 
against ‘Rowlatt Act’ was as follows; 
 
“Being conscientiously of the opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Bill No. 1 of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) 
Bill No. 2 of 1919 are unjust, subversive of the principle of liberty and justice and 
destructive of the elementary rights of individuals, on which the safety of the 
community as a whole and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that in the 
event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse 
civilly to obey those laws and such other laws as a committee to be hereafter 
appointed may think fit and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully 
follow the truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.” 
 
Despite nationwide opposition, the Rowlatt Bill was passed into Law on 18th March 1919. 
It was carried by the 35 Government votes and opposed by 20 out of 25 non-official Indians 
REPETITION? There were in total 187 amendments proposed by the Indian Members and 
the official block defeated every one of them.160 Jinnah, Aiyangar, Mazharul Haque, 
Khaparde, Sunder Singh, Zulfiqar Ali, who all along strongly protested were absent as a 
protest on the last day of voting.161 Meanwhile, Gandhi was welcomed in Madras on 18th 
March and 20th March 1919, by huge mass meeting following his call for satyagraha. Gandhi 
opposed the Rowlatt Bills but described the character of the western form of Government in 
																																																						
160 Details of some of the amendments can be seen in The Madras Mail, Monday Evening, March 17, 1919, 
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an interesting way in his speech of 20th March, which was read by one Mr. Desai because 
Gandhi was not feeling well. Gandhi’s message stated: 
 
 “By demonstrating to the party of violence the infallible power of satyagraha and 
by giving them ample scope for their inexhaustible energy we hope to wean that party 
from the suicidal method of violence.” 162 
 
Gandhi’s message rejected Sir William’s contention that the movement had great potential 
for evil and retorted that it had only a potential for good. The appeal constituted an attempt 
to revolutionize politics and to restore moral force to its original importance. However, the 
government did not believe in a principled avoidance of violence or physical force. It, in a 
way, operated on a Weberian logic where only the colonial state had the monopoly over the 
use of physical force. Gandhi emphasised that the ultimate principle of Western modes of 
governance which the colonial government of India then also represented, had been 
succinctly expressed by President Woodrow Wilson in his speech delivered to the Versailles 
Peace Conference at the time of introducing the League of Nations Covenant where he said: 
 
“Armed force is in the background in this programme, but it is in the background, 
and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, physical force of the world 
shall.”163 
 
Gandhi denounced physical force and affirmed the supremacy of moral force, which 
according to him India possessed and the West did not. Though Gandhi had already 
																																																						
162 See, Message sent by Gandhi to Madras meeting, The Bombay Chronicle, 22 March 1919 & 4 April 1919. 
163 Broader context for Woodrow Wilsons quote can be seen in The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
(New York, 1924), Vol.2, Page 634. 
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announced satyagraha the first practical confrontation arrived on 23rd March 1919 when 
Gandhi gave a call for an ‘All India Hartal’ for 6th April 1919,164 against the Rowlatt Act. 
Gandhi issued four major instructions for the observance of this hartal which included 
twenty-four hours fasting, suspension of all work other than necessary in the public interest 
and finally, public meetings all over India at which resolutions for the withdrawal of these 
Bills were to be passed. All instructions were aimed at a moral, non-violent, mobilization of 
the anticolonial sentiment. 
 
A message from Gandhi read to a mass meeting in Madras on March 30th, 1919, draws our 
attention to the framework of his understanding of satyagraha and its relation to law and 
order. The message read: 
 
“A satyagrahi is nothing if not instinctively law-abiding, it is his law-abiding nature 
which exacts from him implicit obedience of the highest law, i.e., the voice of 
conscience, which over-rides all other laws. His civil disobedience even of certain 
law is only seeming disobedience. Every law gives the subject an option either to 
obey the primary sanction or the secondary; and I venture to suggest that the 
Satyagrahi by inviting the secondary sanction obeys the law. He does not act like the 
ordinary offender who not only commits a breach of the laws of the land, whether 
good or bad, but wishes to avoid the consequences of that breach.” 
 
What can be deduced from Gandhi’s statement is his positive expectation of justice from 
law. What distinguished Gandhi from many others was his political approach. We notice the 
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element of obedience and discipline in Gandhi’s exhortations. It appears that Gandhi was 
quite aware of the scope of exceptional laws yet moralised conduct by referring to 
conscience. He appealed to the masses to accept the consequences of law rather than 
avoiding them.  
 
Satyagraha committees were formed in every part of India. The Satyagrahis of Delhi under 
the guidance of Swami Shraddananda, who was popularly known as Mahatma Munshi Ram 
of the Haridwar Gurukul School, made arrangements to observe Sunday, the 30th March, as 
a day of self-humiliation and prayer among the citizens of Delhi. This was also a protest 
meeting against the Government’s passing of the Rowlatt Bills.165 On 30th March, as 
proposed by the Delhi Satyagrahis, no shops were opened and the few that did, speedily 
closed at the requests of the organisers. After the organisers had accomplished a shut-down 
of baazaars and transport, some workers proceeded to the railway station to persuade the 
shopkeepers there to comply with the call for hartal. These shopkeepers refused to close 
their shops because they argued that they were bound by their contracts to keep their shops 
open. This resulted in an altercation, resulting in a minor clash after which the police took 
two of the demonstrators into custody. Delhi was already observing hartal, and the news of 
the arrest led to more people rushing to the spot to request the release of the arrested, which 
was refused. Police caned the crowd and as a result a proper clash ensued. When the police 
were unable to control the growing size of the crowd intimation was sent to the 
administration of how to handle the situation.  
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By noon, an Additional District Magistrate arrived at the spot with a small military force and 
two machine guns. He ordered the crowd to disperse which was not obeyed. Following this, 
the machine gun was fired first in the air and then on the crowd killing a few and wounding 
more. The crowd withdrew to the Queen’s Garden, Clock tower and Chandni Chowk area. 
The crowd then tried to enter the garden of the municipality to form a procession but the 
military guarding the building fired at them killing a few and wounding many more. This 
was an extreme response from the authorities. Jacque Derrida in his famous essay ‘Force of 
law’166 has worked out the entire logic of operations of law for our convenience. Derrida 
argued that since modern law is neither foundational nor antifoundational, it is law not 
because it is ‘just’ but because it has ‘force’. It has the quality of enforcing itself. 
 
As a result of firing, the numbers of dead was around eight. Mahatma Munshi Ram arrived 
on the spot and pacified the crowd by explaining to them what had happened. By the 
afternoon the crowd had reached a number of around ten thousand. The District Magistrate 
and Commissioner were expecting more violence from the crowd and told Mahatma Munshi 
to at once call off the gathering as it posed a danger to public peace. Mahatma Munshi 
explained to them that the gathering will only observe peaceful protest and took the 
responsibility for peace and order, in case any untoward incident happened thereafter. 
According to various newspaper reports, after Mahatma Munshi Ram pleaded with the 
crowd to follow the principle of satyagraha and protest non-violently, the crowd agreed to 
observe a peaceful protest. This meeting despite experiencing military firing and deaths 
concluded with a peaceful passing of a resolution of protest against the Rowlatt Bills and the 
meeting terminated and later dispersed by 6 P.M. 167  
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Though the 30th of March 1919 had passed off after the military firing, the following day 
there was tension when people refused to open their shops and demanded dead bodies of 
those killed in firing from the police. After much pleading and soliciting, the Chief 
Commissioner Mr. Barron ordered the release of the dead bodies. Delhi mourned on 31st 
March and both Hindus and Muslims cremated and buried their dead respectively with 
thousands participating in the funerals.168 Later in the evening, on 31st March, a conference 
of citizens was held when a commission of private and independent enquiry consisting of 
Rai Saheb Piyare Lal, Hazi-ul-Mulk, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and 
others were appointed to record evidence and to report. A committee of 16 members was 
also appointed to help them secure evidence for the preparation of this report. Gandhi, who 
was visiting Madras at the time issued a statement to the press and condemned the firing on 
Delhi protestors.169 He said that “local authorities in Delhi have made use of a blacksmith 
hammer to crush a fly.”170 The Delhi Satyagraha Sabha decided that the City has already 
suffered in the Hartal of 30th March and should be spared participation in the hartal planned 
for 6th April 1919. But on 6th April Delhi observed a total shutdown like the rest of India. 
People defied government orders by organising mass gatherings and distribution of 
prohibited satyagraha newspapers. Following the success of 6th April hartal, Gandhi issued 
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a message171, which said “We are now in a position to expect to be arrested at any moment. 
It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that if anyone is arrested, he should, without causing 
any difficulty, allow himself to be arrested, and if summoned to appear before a Court, he 
should do so.” Larger part of this message directed people not to offer any defence or engage 
any pleaders, in case arrested. If fines were imposed as alternative to imprisonment, people 
should opt for imprisonment.172 In a characteristic note, Gandhi also wanted the satyagrahi’s 
to follow prison rules if arrested, because he stated that the current campaign did not aim to 
make prison reforms. His emphasis could be understood as an attempt to demonstrate that 
by following law the truth of the illegitimacy of colonial law could be highlighted. His advice 
was to first violate the ‘untruthful’ law in the service of upholding truth- satyagraha- by 
means of peaceful protest in the first place yet follow the rules once a prisoner in Jail. Gandhi 
appears to be quite aware that challenging colonial law through simple, straightforward and 
precise issues could bring success to the anticolonial protests. The political move to hold an 
all India hartal based on satyagraha protests against colonial repression exposed the myth of 
the strong colonial laws. It enabled the emergence of a unique counter-tactic- satyagraha- 
to challenge the nature of colonial legality. 
 
The most prominent of these All India Hartals was the one at Lahore in the Punjab. On 2nd 
April, the Superintendent of Police issued a notice requiring the convenors of processions 
and meetings to apply for a license not later than 10 a.m. the previous day. The Government, 
passed orders against two popular leaders Dr. Satyapal, who was a medical practitioner, and 
Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, who was Bar-at-law, prohibiting them from addressing any public 
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meetings.173 On satyagraha day i.e., 6th April, a meeting was scheduled at Bradlaugh Hall, 
which generated a difference of opinion among the local leaders after the administration put 
official pressure on them to abandon the event. On April 2nd, a meeting was called and after 
deliberations two options were proposed. Ratan Chand moved for the cancellation of the 
Bradlaugh Hall meeting while Dev Raj Sawhney urged that the meeting should go ahead as 
planned given that the protest against the ‘Rowlatt Act’ was far more important than any 
other consideration. The proposals were put to vote and the latter proposal to go ahead with 
the meeting was adopted 18 to 2. As per the plan, on 6th April all businesses were suspended 
in Lahore and shops were closed without exception. The leaders of hartal in Lahore managed 
to keep the situation largely peaceful despite the intensity of the agitation and slogans against 
the ‘Rowlatt Act.’ The participation of Hindu, Muslims and Sikhs in large numbers was a 
salient feature of the protest. The Bradlaugh Hall meeting, which was supposed to take place 
at 5 P.M., began earlier as the Hall was packed. Three overflowing meetings were also held 
simultaneously in the adjoining grounds outside the hall. Pandit Rambhuj Dutt addressed the 
meeting in the Hall and a resolution was passed entreating the King Emperor to disallow the 
measure as they constituted an immediate insult to millions of his law-abiding and loyal 
subjects in India. Notably, Dutt’s address and the consequent resolution seems to propose 
that the general population in India must not be seen as ‘foes’. Such a position is the exact 
opposite of the Ghadrite strategy to declare upfront that they had become ‘foes’ of the British 
Raj. Dutt’s address aimed to consciously clarify that Indians did not deserve to be seen as a 
problem category.  Three more resolutions were passed. They voiced a disapproval of the 
repressive orders against Dr. Satyapal, Dr. Kitchlew and others, strong disapproval of the 
recent firing on unarmed civilians by the Delhi authorities and finally, a resolution requested 
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the President of the meeting to forward resolutions passed to the Secretary of State for India, 
the Viceroy and the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. 
 
Mahatma Gandhi was supposed to reach Delhi on 9th April from Bombay. But he was 
arrested at the earlier station Palwal, and sent back to Bombay. He was ordered neither to 
enter Punjab nor Delhi but to restrict himself to Bombay. The news of Gandhi’s arrest spread 
like wildfire and caused great resentment amongst people in Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.174 
It was alleged that Gandhi was arrested on instructions from the Punjab Government. It was 
barely a month after the Rowlatt Act was passed that a peculiar autocratic character of 
colonial administration started to emerge which not only confirmed the concerns voiced 
during the Rowlatt agitations in March 1919, but also raised questions as to whether a non-
violent approach to colonial repression WAS a feasible approach. 
 
The Government in Punjab intended to break the momentum of satyagraha in the province. 
The Deputy Commissioner Amritsar called the popular leaders of Punjab Dr. Satyapal and 
Dr. Kitchlew to his house where they were immediately arrested. News of their arrest spread 
quickly and all the shops shut by noon. By 12.30 in the afternoon, a large procession marched 
towards the residence of the Deputy Commissioner with a view to make a representation for 
the release of their leaders. But the crowd was fired upon and were forced back. Meanwhile, 
another huge crowd marched to the business area of the city. They burnt the National Bank, 
the Chartered Bank, the Alliance Bank, the Town Hall, the Mission Church and the Depot 
of the Punjab Religious Book Society. They also attacked and killed European officials (Mr. 
Stewart and Mr. Scott) of the National Bank and (Mr. G.M. Thomson) of the Alliance 
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Bank.175 The telegraph office was attacked which was rescued by soldiers from a Pathan 
regiment sent to the spot. Dr. Easdon, a Lady Doctor working in the Municipal Zenana 
Hospital was also attacked and she had to hide in a closet for hours after being rescued by 
her Indian friends. Seargent Rowland, a cantonment electrician was killed near Rego Bridge 
while he was walking towards the Fort. The railway guard Robinson, an ex-
Northumberlander Fusilier was beaten to death with lathis in the goods yard. Another 
woman, Nurse Sherwood was also injured. The situation in Amritsar was now out of hand. 
Europeans were terrified and running for their lives and any of them unfortunate enough to 
be spotted by the protestors was dealt with immediately. Most pertinently, we notice in the 
newspaper reports that the Europeans attacked or killed had their names mentioned whereas 
Indians who got killed by the police or military remained nameless and were referred to 
simply as the ‘riotous mob’ in subsequent government reports. The ‘riotous mob’ had now 
become the foe/ the problem category that required exceptional response. 
 
At the time of the riot, the Garrison in Amritsar consisted of one company of Somerset Light 
Infantry under charge of Captain Massey, half a company of Garrison Artillery and the 12th 
Ammunition Column. Since extraordinary laws like Rowlatt Bills were now at the disposal 
of colonial administration and revolutionary crime a stated enemy, additional forces were 
mustered to control the situation. A Company of the 9th Gurkhas on its way to Peshawar was 
stopped and armed under the Command of Captain Crompton who used them for patrolling 
streets and roads. Another company of the 6th Sussex Regiment from Lahore and the 24th 
Baluchis under the command of Major Donald was deployed, in addition to further troops 
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from Jullundur including the 25th Londons.176 On 11th, the next day, the entire city was 
surrounded by British and Indian troops and finally late in the evening Brigadier General 
Dyer reached Amritsar and by 13th April 1919, Amritsar was already under an undeclared  
Martial law. 177 On 15th April, 1919, - as similar protests spread to other parts of Punjab -  
Martial Law was declared by the Punjab Government following a communiqué issued by 
the Home department of the Government of India a day before. It was known as the Martial 
Law Ordinance or Ordinance No. 1 of 1919 and came into operation on the night between 
15th and 16th April 1919. This ordinance provided for the takeover of local ‘law and order’ 
administration by the military authorities. Promulgation of such a law proves that the civil 
administration in Punjab had failed and it was the protesting crowd that was ruling the 
streets, even though it was for a short period only.  
 
The fear of Ghadr was still haunting the colonial administration. Offences were to be tried 
by Commissions appointed by Local government comprised of persons who had served as 
Session Judges and Additional Sessions judges for a period of not less than three years or 
Judges of the High Court. These Commissions had all the powers of a general Court Martial 
under the Indian Army Act 1911. The finding and sentence of such a Commission was not 
to be subject to the confirmation by any authority. In short, it was an imposition of military 
authority over the region of Punjab in response to the extremely violent riots of 10 April 
1919. 
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As stated above, Martial Law was declared in the entire Punjab province on 15th April 1919 
but the military was requested to support the efforts of the local administration in Amritsar 
in maintaining law and order from 11th April onwards.178 Furthermore, April 13th coincided 
with the religious festival of Baisakhi. The civil administration did not feel confident to 
remain in charge of law and order administration in Amritsar in the wake of growing crowds 
who had come to observe Baisakhi festival. The administration already fearful and 
suspicious of its local population handed over the charge to military officials completely. 
Arrival of military in Amritsar sent a wrong signal to the local population who understood 
it as the formal invocation of martial law, whereas it was meant to prevent further escalation 
of violence. Since 11th April 1919, Amritsar was under partial military control. The 
administration punished the city of Amritsar by depriving it of electricity and water. Evening 
blackouts were intended to stop people from gathering or moving during the night. Trains 
stopped third class bookings for Amritsar from the neighbouring towns so that protests did 
not get outside support. General Dyer - himself in command of the 45th Brigade at Jullundur 
- also brought more reinforcements to Amritsar. Before his arrival in Amritsar, he has 
already sent one hundred British and two hundred Indian soldiers to Amritsar on the request 
of the local administration. On 12th April, he made a round of the city with 120 British 
soldiers and 320 Indian soldiers and two armoured cars.179 A plane was also hovering in the 
air. This was a tactic of intimidating the people of Amritsar and to send a clear message to 
the leaders that the administration had changed to military, and that no one should dare to 
think of it as any civil administration. It appeared to be a war-like situation, but a war that 
was not to be fought in the battlefield but in the streets and roads of a city where civil 
administration had failed. It was a moment of uncertainty for the British colonial government 
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who feared the political momentum, now that the mask of peace and order under colonial 
control had shattered. This was a moment when the naked claws of sovereign power and its 
ability to withdraw civil administration appeared in full sight were on display and made clear 
its ability to invoke its exclusive right to use physical force. The magnitude of confrontation 
had escalated to a higher level than in usual situations of crowd control involving the police. 
It was now an absolute distinction between friend and foe, and the entire population in 
Amritsar was now as if declared the enemy.  
 
General Dyer while staging his military takeover of Amritsar on 12th April 1919 experienced 
some confrontation by the crowds in the streets. He made a proclamation warning people 
against damaging any property and against acts of violence, and against collecting in groups 
numbering more than four in the streets and other public areas. It is pertinent to note that this 
proclamatory warning of Dyer is similar to section 144 of the Criminal Procedure code -
available to the civilian administration- which had the ability to ban public space for public 
gatherings. The next morning, Dyer marched through the streets with troops and issued 
another proclamation under the Seditious Meetings Act, warning the people against 
assembling and holding meetings, which were declared liable to be dispersed by the force of 
arms. The same fateful day, 13th of April, General Dyer got news that a huge crowd had 
collected at Jallianwala Bagh and a meeting was going to be held. He immediately marched 
towards the spot with 25 British rifles, 40 Gurkhas, 25 Indian rifles, and two armoured cars 
with machine guns. He arrived at the spot at 5p.m. The Bagh was also a spot for a Baisakhi 
mela and for this reason many people had come unaware of proclamations and orders. The 
proclamation of a law and its interpretation by subjects could be quite different. The crowd 
in the Bagh had come to celebrate Baisakhi but could equally be interpreted as a mob which 
had assembled for seditious purposes challenging administrative authority of the military 
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general at the helm of affairs. Also, the quick and effective overnight transmission of any 
official communication prohibiting public gatherings remains questionable. The estimated 
number of people in the Bagh at that time is put between sixteen thousand and twenty 
thousand. After reaching the spot, General Dyer, so enraged by the defiance of the people 
ordered firing immediately. It continued for ten to fifteen minutes. People ran in all 
directions and mostly towards the only narrow exit. Dyer kept directing fire towards the 
areas where the crowd was thickest. Firing continued until the ammunition ran out. 
Altogether 1650 rounds were fired. The Bagh was full of dead bodies and the number ran 
into hundreds at least. British official figures put the number of dead identified at 379180, 
while the number of dead claimed by Congress was over a thousand181.  
 
Whatever the number of dead may be, it was enough to be considered as a massacre. Dyer 
did not warn the crowd because the enemy need not be warned but attacked ruthlessly and 
crushed. Later he submitted to the Hunter Commission that he could have dispersed the 
crowd without warning but then they would have assembled again making a mockery of his 
orders. This would have resulted in making a fool of himself. Therefore, ‘his duty was to 
fire and fire well’. Most interestingly, General Dyer left the wounded on the spot without 
any medical assistance. This was nothing short of not caring for the injured and dead of the 
enemy. Amritsar remained under the protection of ‘dutiful’ General Dyer for almost a 
month. A significant distinction in the application of state machinery is evident here. While 
a civilian administration was required to ‘maintain law and order’ only, the military 
administration was called-in to initially supplement and later overtake civilian 
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administration. The military administration was clearly aimed at crushing even the slight 
hint of disorder and any opposition to the government machinery.  
 
One of the important point to be considered is that even though the martial law was 
proclaimed on the 15th April 1919, but Dyer understood- as his statements at the Hunter 
Commission point out- that martial law came into being ipso facto from the time he took 
command on 11th April 1919 i.e the moment the civilian administration failed or resort to 
military apparatus for maintaining order was first made. He had no doubts about his authority 
and control over Amritsar as a military general. Civilian subjects were now military subjects 
and any disobedience/disturbance would face a martial response only. Dyer held a durbar on 
the 14th and forced people to open shops even when the city was still disturbed and when the 
people were searching for the dead bodies of their family and relatives. Humiliation of 
Indians on the streets followed. Flogging for minor offences or defiance in the streets, 
making people crawl on the streets and ordering them to ‘salaam’/salute every European 
they came across were some of the initial steps General Dyer took after the massacre at 
Jallianwala Bagh.182 The day following the massacre, a meeting of local residents, Municipal 
Commissioners, Magistrates and merchants were called at the Kotwali where the 
Commissioner Mr. Kitchin made a threatening speech at around 2 P.M. but only exposed his 
helplessness; 
 
“Do you people want peace or war? We are prepared in every way. The Government 
is all powerful. Sarkar has conquered Germany and is capable of doing everything. 
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The General will give orders today. The city is in his possession. I can do nothing. 
You will have to obey orders.”183 
 
Dyer, along with other British officials – all extremely angry-  reached the Kotwali around 
5 P.M. Dyer’s speech or rather threat to the meeting is noteworthy: 
 
“You people know well that I am a Sepoy and soldier. Do you want war or peace? If 
you wish for war the Government is prepared for it, and if you want peace, then obey 
my orders and open all your shops; else, I will shoot. For me the battlefield of France 
of Amritsar is the same. I am a military man and I will go straight. Neither shall I 
move to the right, nor to the left. Speak up, if you want war.”184 
 
He also offered the attendees to turn collaborators. According to the deposition to the 
Congress Inquiry Committee, he further said; 
 
“You must inform me of the budmashes. I will shoot them.”185 
 
Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner took Dyer’s speech as a cue and followed by 
making a simple and straightforward statement; 
“You have committed a bad act in killing the English. The revenge will be taken 
upon you and your children.”186 
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These threatening speeches created a difficult binary between an ‘abstract law-abiding 
citizen’ and a ‘wicked’ badmash that needed to be punished. 
 
As soon as the news of Amritsar spread, the mood in Lahore turned tense too. The city was 
already observing protests since the 10th April but now it had become more violent. Like the 
military takeover of Amritsar, in Lahore too, military men belonging to the 43rd Brigade 
headquarters arrived on 11th April and posted pickets all over the city. On 12th the military 
under Col. Frank Johnson was ordered to go into Lahore city with eight hundred men. He 
entered the city through Delhi Gate and was supported by four planes overhead.187 He 
entered the city at 9.30 in the morning and left at 1.30 in the afternoon leaving three 
detachments inside the city. He ordered that no detachment should move about unless it 
consisted of at least two hundred men. The scale of military presence was grand. Amritsar 
and Lahore both became a sovereign spectacle. 
 
On 13th and 14th April, hartal continued in Lahore and paralysed the life of the city. On 15th 
morning at 11, Col. Frank Johnson issued his first proclamation informing people of Lahore 
that Marital Law was now officially declared. Lahore remained under Martial Law until the 
end of May.188 Under Martial Law, orders were passed to immediately lift hartal and resume 
business. The military authorities began this campaign with Anarkali Bazaar following other 
markets. Badshahi mosque was closed to the public for six weeks. Minor arrests, flogging 
of people etc. followed like in Amritsar.  
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As the disturbances were underway in India, the Secretary of State for India presented a draft 
for the new constitution for India – came to be known as The Government of India Act 1919- 
to the British Parliament in London. There were expectations in India that at the end of the 
first World War there would be colonial reforms in India. This was expected out of India’s 
support to the colonial government during the war. The opposition to Rowlatt Act and the 
extreme colonial repression in response to it did put some pressure on the British parliament.  
 
Owing to the pressure of the anticolonial mobilisation in India in the wake of the upcoming 
Government of India Act 1919 to be passed later in December 1919, a Disorders Enquiry 
Committee, also known as Hunter Committee189 was appointed on 14th October 1919 to 
enquire into the incident of Jallianwalla Bagh. It began on 29th October and sat for 46 days, 
8 in Delhi, 29 in Lahore, 6 in Ahmedabad and 3 in Bombay. Congress was outraged and 
boycotted it and instead set up a parallel non-official committee of enquiry.190 The Hunter 
Committee prepared a report of its findings. The three Indian members, called the ‘minority’, 
dissented from the European majority on some of the wider issues and produced a separate 
report, which was, however, published in the same volume as the combined report. The 
difference between them lay in the approach as well as conclusions. The European members 
held that elements of rebellion were persistent throughout the disturbances. The Indian 
members conceded that there were certain acts, which ‘may amount to waging war in a legal 
sense’, but they could not be described as an ‘open rebellion.’ Disobedience, according to 
this logic, did not make a person an enemy of the state. The European members stressed the 
magnitude of the movement and maintained that it might have ‘developed into a revolution’ 
with which the Indian members disagreed. Both European and Indian members reacted 
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unfavourably to Dyer’s handling of the Jallianwalla meeting and the difference between their 
reports is one of a degree rather than substance. However, it cannot be overlooked that the 
iron fist response by the colonial administration to civilian protestors through a military 
takeover confirms the extent of mobilization by Ghadrites and the fear of a potential mutiny 
it had generated. 
 
The committee criticised General Dyer in two respects: first, that he started firing without 
giving the people who had assembled a chance to disperse and secondly, that he continued 
firing for a substantial period of time after the crowd had started to disperse. Dyer himself 
never suggested any emergency circumstances for the use of firing without warning but 
expressed that he had made up his mind to shoot.191 Following the murder of Europeans in 
Amritsar during the 10th April hartal, the European community was supportive of the general 
policy and of Martial Law imposed by the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Michael 
O’Dwyer.192 The element of racism resurfaced again.193 The hartal of April 6, 1919 was the 
highest point of the Anti-Rowlatt mobilisation. However, the events unfolded in manners 
unexpected involving violence of unimagined proportions.194 What is significant to remind 
ourselves that General Dyer was criticized greatly both in India and abroad. However, one 
newspaper in London ran a campaign to generate a reward fund for General Dyer, who was 
stripped of pension by the British Government. Morning Post, a Tory newspaper in London, 
succeeded in generating a grant of 26000 pounds and hailed him as the ‘saviour of Punjab’ 
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who had served the British Empire and had guarded and avenged the honour of English 
women in Punjab during the disturbances.195 Despite the official criticism, while on duty 
Dyer was crushing opponents of British Empire, as a military general. Dyer is not just 
another example of bureaucratic rationality combined with military rationality that could 
justify sovereign commands as following orders to one’s best capability pure and simple. He 
was a battle hardened military man who delighted in getting his hands dirty and offered full 
justification for his actions. Jallianwalla Bagh has indeed become one of the central focus of 
scholars studying violence of imperial Britain. While some have called Dyer as “The Butcher 
of Amritsar”, others have also joined chorus on condemning actions of Dyer in Amritsar. 
Taylor Sherman has noted that General Dyer justified his actions in Jallainwalla Bagh on the 
grounds of “necessity” and fired to produce a “sufficient moral effect” on the entire 
Punjab.196 The then Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab Michael O’Dwyer and Hunter 
Committee did condemn Dyer for his actions and criticised his strategy as well as questioned 
his judgement. Sherman notes that the then Secretary of State reiterated his commitment to 
the “minimum use of force necessary” and also held Dyer responsible for complete violation 
of the principle of the use of minimum force.197 However, most of the works pay lesser 
attention to military atrocities in the city of Lahore and other towns of Punjab province.198 
Most of the criticism of Dyer emphasized his oversight of following the procedure by not 
warning the crowd. Even the Viceroy who shielded Dyer from criticism had to concede that 
Dyer did not act with sufficient humanity against the congregated crowd.199 Consequently 
Dyer was removed from command and forced to resign from his command. Despite 
highlighting the criticism of Dyer, scholars tend to focus more on the violation of rules 
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prescribed for crowd control rather than offering us analysis of the “necessity” for his action 
-that Dyer stated in the first place- as a symptom of sovereign violence. As if, procedure-
following colonial administration was utterly humane at other instances and this was an 
aberration from the usual pattern of upholding rule of law by all officials always. Such an 
analysis misses the point by putting the onus on Dyer only and understands it as a “single 
officer using his own discretion.” By singling out sole deviation from procedure by Dyer, 
most scholars unintentionally humanize colonial ‘rule of law’. 
 
 Before I attempt to discuss the concept of martial law itself, Kim Wagner’s argument about 
the Amritsar massacre highlights a trend. He argues that the Hunter Commission Report 
rejecting Dyer’s rationale in 1920 conceded that the use of violence might even be counter-
productive. He argues that “colonial violence ultimately undermined colonial rule by 
alienating the native population and turning its victims into martyrs of nationalist 
movements.” Sites of colonial violence became central to anticolonial narratives and remain 
so. He further argues that “colonial violence was self-defeating” and “that the reliance on 
spectacles of violence was anything but triumphant and ultimately proved to be the undoing 
of empire.”200 He sees a continuity in such spectacles of colonial violence, for example, in 
earlier cases of repression during 1857 mutiny soon followed by the Kukka rebellion in the 
1870s. Events of 1919, in the aftermath of Ghadr mobilization and preparation for mutiny 
could be noted as yet another episode in such a colonial cycle of violence. 
 
Now let us turn our attention to the much-evaded question in this entire episode- the Martial 
law. Nasser Hussain facilitates our understanding in this concern. He noted that the central 
point of the entire exercise of Hunter Commission was highlighting Dyer’s “bad judgement” 
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and his flawed logic for justifying his actions, rather than finding fault with the invocation 
of Martial law - replacing civilian administration-  in an already volatile political situation. 
The Hunter commission did recognise Dyer’s sense of duty but concluded that it was 
“misconceived”. The questioning of Dyer by members of the commission points out that 
even firing on the crowd was alright but firing continuously was wrong.201 Hussain extends 
his discussion of the event by dissecting the nature of “Martial law”. Hussain extrapolates 
the deeper relation between law and violence that martial law demonstrates by reading 
Amritsar massacre through a reading of Walter Benjamin. According to him, emergency 
covers the general situation of jurisprudential doubt that exists on a continuum from military 
aid to civil power to the more intensified manifestation of Martial law. 202 Hussain highlights 
that Martial law occupies a profoundly ambiguous place in jurisprudential writing because 
it is considered to be both a properly legal question and a marker of law’s absence. According 
to Hussain, on the one hand, there is recognition of the inevitability of martial law in certain 
situations where it represents the force of the state at its purest, the necessary condition if 
both law and state are to survive. On the other hand, an insistence on rules that determine 
the moment of emergency can be noted– an insistence that the law shall appear at its own 
vanishing point to determine the rules of its own failure. He notes: 
 
“Martial law, like other responses to emergency, simply rested not on an 
authorization of ordinary law but on the legal maxim Salus populi suprema est lex 
(safety of the people is the supreme law). Here it become the manifestation of both 
the highest law and no law at all. But while martial law is based on necessity, and 
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these rules are historically variable. It became possible, thus, to approach martial law 
as a changing cognitive question.”203 
  
Taking a clue from Albert Venn Dicey, a British jurist and constitutionalist, Hussain points 
out that in order to understand the ideological and jurisprudential significance of martial law, 
it must be read within the general prerogative of the Crown to resort to violence to check a 
challenge to its authority, be it in connection with the form of response to domestic riots or 
rebellions.204 In short Martial law could be seen as sovereign decree for swift and efficient 
control of a situation bypassing lengthy procedure of civil law and administration that had 
to rely on producing evidence. Exception highlights Law’s ability (Martial or Civilian) not 
to do everything but anything. Even though it can intervene at every level, it does not. The 
basic function of the myth of disturbance to law and order is the conferring of an identity to 
the population involved such as ‘unruly’ crowd, rebellious mob, mutinous subjects, 
insurgents, etc. In the case of Amritsar massacre too, Martial law became the interiority of 
General Dyer’s consciousness as a military general, which got reflected in the materiality of 
external circumstances. Therefore, Martial Law was not the standard law which could be 
understood on the usual ‘rule of law’ maxim. It served as an outside to civilian administration 
but once invoked controlled the inside in the process. Even though it enveloped everyday 
conduct of the population but remained dissociated from all interiority. In other words, it is 
a darkness that had no limits. It was an expression of sovereign’s dissatisfaction with the 
conduct of its subjects.  
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After the Punjab disturbances, Gandhi had to withdraw his Satyagraha temporarily as he 
concluded that the masses did not understand the level of discipline and patience required in 
such political situations. The Anti-Rowlatt satyagraha was a failure because it failed to 
achieve its end i.e. the repeal of Rowlatt Act. It also failed to enforce non-violent political 
mobilisation on the masses especially in Punjab. But it did succeed in turning Gandhi into a 
national leader and satyagraha as a more acceptable and a moral political weapon which was 
now known and available to millions of colonised Indians. Also, once the Government of 
India Act 1919 was passed, both Congress and the Muslim League were unhappy with the 
new constitution, as it did not meet their demands. As per the new constitution although 
seats were kept for government and nominated members of the legislative bodies for the first 
time each body was about to have a majority of elected members. Also, in the central 
assembly a vast scope for the elected members was given ‘to argue’, ‘make noise’ and ‘create 
a fuss’ – but they would have no control over the government. All powers of government 
were reserved to the Governor General/Viceroy and his executive council. The government 
was not bound by assembly votes nor could it be dismissed by a vote. In the provinces, a 
half step was taken toward establishing a ‘responsible’ government. A set up was proposed 
in which the cabinets would include not only ministers who were elected and therefore were 
responsible to the councils but also executive councillors who would, as before appointed 
by the governor and therefore only accountable only to him. Under this arrangement, certain 
portfolios would be “transferred” and be under Ministers while others would be “reserved” 
and be under the executive councillors. The system at the provincial level was termed 
“diarchy.” 
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Conclusion 
 
The first two decades of the twentieth century in India were marked by the invocation and 
promulgation of three different kinds of extraordinary laws - a combination of Ingress into 
India Ordinance and Defence of India Rules, the Rowatt Bills and the use of Martial law. 
While the Defence of India Rules - a proper wartime measure - might seem a logical 
legislative measure to safeguard law and order in exceptional circumstances, there was no 
such easy justification at play when the Rowlatt Bills were passed. The continuity of Defence 
of India Rules in the name of the Rowlatt Bills for the next three years- before they were 
repealed in 1922 -  raised important issues in the study of colonial legality. The colonial 
state, which claimed to rule for justice and by law, often violated the premises of its own 
administrative ideology. It invoked the Defence of India rules to mobilise resources for 
military purposes but also to maintain order and to prevent the outbreak of an armed mass 
rebellion. The declaration of the Ghadr party to be ‘angrezi raj ka dushman’ and the charge 
of sedition used in subsequent trials of both the Lahore and the Delhi conspiracy case 
highlight a political environment in which Schmitt’s separation between friend and foe had 
become generalised and upended the normal operations of legality. The call to arms against 
the sovereignty of King legally necessitated treating the revolutionaries as the ‘enemy’ of 
the colonial state. However, the enemy was not selective or specific. The entire population 
was considered a potential hotbed of ‘revolutionaries.’ By examining the operation of 
extraordinary laws in late colonial India at the beginning of the twentieth century, from the 
Ghadr movement, the promulgation of the Defence of India Rules during the First World 
War to the infamous Rowlatt Acts and the subsequent events associated with anticolonial 
mass mobilization which invited use of Martial law, the discussion across various sections 
discussed in this chapter demonstrate the administration of public order in colonial India 
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through the use of the law by way of a twin strategy.  On the one hand, it emphasized an 
ideological notion of ‘rule of law’ applicable to obedient subjects, whilst on the other hand 
it sustained itself by creating a catalogue of exceptions that rested on the delineation of 
certain problem categories or its enemies to which extraordinary laws were applied. This 
was best demonstrated not only in the Ingress into India Ordinance but in the Defence of 
India Act and its subsequent extension as the Rowlatt Act. Also, the reference to the use of 
‘anarchical violence’ referred to the chaotic/uncertain nature of the insurgent tactics as 
opposed to the organised politics of the then emerging Congress party founded on ideas of 
liberalism and constitutionalism, within the colonial dispensation. The use of Defence of 
India rules and the further extension of pre-emptive legislation in the name of the Rowlatt 
Bills demonstrates the fact that colonial authority normalised exception by the successive 
implementation of extraordinary laws. The reason for the extension of these extraordinary 
laws was to maintain order, prevent civil war and contain revolutionary violence. In an era 
of anti-colonial mass nationalism, the scope of such laws is not very difficult to decipher. 
One of the main impacts of the passing of Rowlatt Bills was that it explicitly exposed the 
violent character of the colonial government in India. Furthermore, Jallianwalla Bagh served 
as a symptom of the possibility or the potential of the repetition of such a cycle of violence 
again. It also proved that peaceful mass gatherings were not always safe from colonial 
repression. 
 
The invocation of exceptional laws in late colonial India demonstrates the governmental 
‘crisis’ of the colonial administration. Also, the Defence of India Rules and the subsequent 
Rowlatt Bills as well as Martial law in Punjab highlight the fact that the colonial government 
was quite aware of the ‘exceptional’ tactics available at its disposal within the ‘fair and just’ 
laws framework it often boasted about. Such extraordinary laws facilitated the normalisation 
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of colonial violence at a quotidian level. The period 1913-1920 could be seen as the proper 
establishment of the colonial state as the ‘enemy’ of the Indian masses. A contestation for 
sovereignty on both sides hence ensued. On one hand the demand for Swaraj from colonial 
rule emerged at a mass level and on the other hand the attempts to preserve the colonial order 
from insurgency was intensified. The utilisation of extraordinary laws by the colonial state 
highlights not only its strategy to rule by fear rather than law but also exposed its own 
fragility and fear of uprisings.  
 
The colonial state in India, which had created the myth of thuggee to push certain problem 
categories beyond the law, ultimately turned into what I would call a ‘Dissimulate State’ in 
its own right. The colonial narratives described the Thuggs as stranglers/phansigars who 
posed as fellow travellers and attacked at an opportune moment. The colonial state similarly, 
posed as the one upholding justice, fairness, impartiality and rule of law, and often repressed 
its own subject population by the invocation of exceptional laws like Defence of India Rules 
and the Rowlatt Bills. What frequent use of exception did was to expose a monolithic 
character of colonial sovereignty in times of crisis. The colonial government – as 
demonstrated through various events in this chapter - declared a war on its subjects and 
immediately transitioned its activities from the maintenance of law and order to a repressive 
machine totally external to the usual everyday government. Surely, opposition was not a 
‘War’, it was an everyday politics of protest in a colonial setup. But the colonial 
administration used its sovereign power to draw its own limits of what kind of protest stood 
outside the law and what could be allowed and tolerated. It was a limit negotiated by 
extraordinary laws where any relationship of responsibility of the colonial state towards its 
subject population could be denied or severed. 
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Chapter 2 
The Dynamics of ‘Public order’ in Late Colonial India: A study of the 
tactical use of section 144 CrPC in the Punjab and Bengal Presidencies 
1935-1940 
 
Political mobilisation during the anti-Rowlatt Bill agitation, especially in the aftermath of 
the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre brought in a new wave of bold anti-colonial protests. The 
Khilafat movement, the non-cooperation and the civil disobedience against the colonial 
government drew clear battle lines between an emerging anticolonial nation and the colonial 
governmental apparatus. As explained in the previous chapter, colonial legal administrative 
strategies depended on marking out certain groups and communities as criminal subjects 
with a special status in the law, and on institutionalizing legal states of exception. By the 
1920s such notions of legal exceptionalism became increasingly visible at a quotidian level. 
Over the 1920s, 30s and 40s, a particular piece of legal of colonial legislation -  section 144 
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) - became an ever more useful tool for the administration 
to exercise its powers to control the operations of political mobilization. Its extended use 
became particularly significant in the 1930s when a major constitutional change further 
broadened the colonial regime’s strategies for maintaining public order. After the passing of 
the Government of India Act 1935, India’s various political forces ranging from the 
Congress and the Muslim League to the Indian Communists and the Backward Castes were 
invited to at least partly own the administration of public order through participation in new 
political institutions. Although the colonial regime maintained ultimate control throughout, 
political responsibility was devolved in a large measure to provincial governments 
established through elections. At the same time, however, mass mobilisation and mass 
confrontations between them and numerous small auxiliary organisations sharpened further, 
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making the issue of law and order maintenance a pressing concern of everyday 
administration. Political contestations often led to public confrontation between the 
followers of different ideologies, and between different political communities. Often that 
also resulted in confrontations between the people or groups and the local Police authorities. 
In all such cases, action under section 144 created conditions for the justification of 
administrative repression. 
 
 
This chapter offers two case studies, one each from the newly empowered provinces of 
Punjab and Bengal to understand the everyday politics of public order laws. Further case 
studies from Bombay and the United Provinces will be introduced with a slight shift in focus 
in the next chapter. The aim is to understand the circumstances of the promulgation of a 
preventive law like section 144 CrPC and to offer insights into the administrative mind-set 
of the late colonial government when it came to maintaining everyday ‘public peace and 
tranquillity’. The selection of these case studies is a result of a broader survey of all 
significant instances when public order laws, especially section 144 CrPC, were deployed, 
as they were noted in the Governor’s Fortnightly Reports in a sample of different provinces. 
Although not comprehensive, this survey of top-level and routine government 
documentation, offers a bird eye’s view of how the colonial administration sought to tackle 
public order problems in the post-1935 environment and how Indian political activists, both 
subaltern and elite, responded to the new environment. The case studies were chosen to offer 
a broader understanding of the invocation of section 144 in quite different local 
circumstances. A key concern here was the nature of the provincial governments involved:  
both the Punjab and Bengal were governed by non-Congress coalition governments 
involving significant loyalist or regional parties. The case of provinces where Congress 
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emerged as the party in government, and where for this reason a direct connecting line exists 
between the public order policies of the pre and the post-colonial period will be considered 
separately in the next chapter.   
 
The first case study examines a Muslim-Sikh confrontation in Punjab, followed by a case of 
labour agitation in Bengal. Communalism and the rise of labour militancy have both received 
considerable attention in the established literature – but the two case studies introduced here 
the Sikh Muslim confrontation at Kot Bhai Than Singh resulting in a wider Punjab agitation 
and the Bata shoe factory strike of 1939 - have not so far been covered in any detail.  
 
Each case study focuses on how late colonial government’s law and order strategy thrived 
through the creation of new problem categories that were distinct from ordinary legal 
subjects and helped to formalise the normalization of states of exception are the centre of 
attention in this thesis. These categories were often very fluid and varied from one province 
to another, depending on circumstances. There were so called satyagrahis in Punjab, for 
instance, while a binary of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ was used to contain significant 
communist agitation in Bengal.  
 
 
 
Background: The Government of India Act and the use of Section 144 CrPC 
 
Following the politically charged and tumultuous 1920s, the year 1935 was a watershed 
moment in the late colonial history of India. In August, the new Government of India Act 
1935 was passed. It would come into force after the upcoming provincial elections in 
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February 1937, when the newly proposed legislative assemblies would replace the old 
legislative councils. The Act was significant in many respects. First, it aimed at broadening 
Indian participation in the colonial government and secondly, it expanded the boundaries of 
democracy in the colonial government by increasing the total franchise to thirty-five million 
people as opposed to the mere seven million earlier. This Act broadened membership of the 
provincial assemblies by including more Indian representatives and enabled them to form 
majorities and to form governments. Federalism was originally a core project of this Act. 
However, it could not be achieved completely given the opposition from many princely 
states. The Indian National Congress opposed this Act because it wanted real power at 
central government level. While the Act was radical for British Parliament and aimed at 
meeting the demands of its Indian subjects, it did not receive a positive response from 
various Indian stakeholders during the drafting of the Bill and after, mainly but not 
exclusively from Congress.  
 
Congress was dissatisfied because neither did the Bill include a ‘Bill of rights’ nor a new 
preamble. It retained the preamble from the Government of India Act 1919 which did not 
include full independence as a clear or imminent policy goal. Also, the 1935 Act limited the 
degree of autonomy to be introduced at the provincial level. For one, the provincial 
governors retained important reserve powers. Second, the right to suspend responsible 
government was retained by the British authorities. The Indian subjects of the colonial 
government were expecting dominion status by now but the British Parliament was not 
satisfied that India had ‘attained’ the maturity to run a responsible government on its own, 
like Australia and Canada at that time. Also, there was discontentment in Indian political 
circles over Egypt been granted dominion status while India was not. Given, enormous 
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contributions (economic and manpower) of India to Britain’s war efforts, many in India were 
puzzled as to what Egypt had done to secure dominion status or what India had not. 
 
Andrew Muldoon in Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act has observed 
that “the vision many in British governing circles had of the Indian Act raises important 
questions about the ways in which the Raj worked.”205 Other scholars have noted that the 
supporters of the 1935 Act within the British Parliament believed that the plans for federation 
and provincial autonomy in India would effectively counter the growing nationalist 
movement by potentially creating a split in the All India National Congress and would 
therefore succeed in distracting Indians from a united nationalist movement.206 Public 
participation to elect representatives for provincial governments transformed the character 
of most political parties from merely being an anticolonial movement to independent 
political parties contesting to grab positions in Provincial governments and wield power.  
 
Another significant aspect of the 1935 Act was the creation of a ‘Federal Court’ with Sir 
Maurice Gwyer as the first Chief Justice. Holding its seat in Delhi, the Federal Court was a 
judicial body established under the new Act, holding appellate and advisory jurisdiction. It 
held a right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Most 
importantly, given that the new Act aimed at a federal structure of government, the Federal 
Court had exclusive original jurisdiction in disputes between the central government and the 
provincial governments. 
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The years 1936-1937 intensified contestation and political articulation in all sections of 
Indian society. The Congress party announced that it would reject the new Act, while also 
undergoing reconstitution of its provincial Committees. Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar 
Vallabh Bhai Patel were interested in the top job being the Congress supremo and sought to 
react to the new reality in ways that furthered this aim. A columnist in The Leader in 
December 1936 summed up the available choices as follows: 
 
“In December, the National Congress will decide its attitude towards the new 
constitution. Will it enter India’s new Parliament? If it does, will it enter to bring the 
legislative machine to a deadlock, wrecking and obstructing? Or will it accept office 
if in a majority, and work for the constitution?”207 
 
This column also pointed out that the Muslim League and other organisations would accept 
the new Act in a somewhat positive spirit, resulting in leaving Congress party no choice but 
to engage with it as well. Because the Hindu leaders would try to recover the ground they 
had lost among other sections of the society, a recovery for the Congress was now possible 
only through the new constitution that the 1935 Act had brought. The column concluded in 
a strong tone, “But - whatever happens - the new constitution is going to be worked despite 
Indian discontent with it.”208 The two major constitutional moments of the late colonial 
period - the Government of India Act 1919 followed by the Government of India Act 1935- 
one Act followed by another, both aimed at widening the ambit of colonial model of 
democracy in India.  
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208 Ibid. 
	 111	
 
Case study I 
A case of Justice ‘Improper’: Magisterial Orders and Sikh-Muslim communalism in 
Attock District of colonial Punjab. 
 
 
This case study discusses a case of communal conflict in the village of Kot Bhai Than Singh 
in late colonial Punjab where the Muslim landowner Sardar Muhammad Nawaj Khan and 
the local Gurudwara leadership clashed over drawing water from a local stream. The 
confrontation followed by a riot took place in July 1937 and was initially settled by the 
District Magistrate. However, it was pursued at the higher court by the Sikhs later. During 
the entire dispute, this case study will demonstrate, law and legality played a crucial role in 
the way politics unfolded. During the trial, the courtroom transformed into a theatre of 
politics offering performative space to religious communities to act out politics in their own 
ways and posed as an impartial referee to the dispute. The case study highlights the colonial 
tendency to imagine communities as mutually exclusive where the politics of the street was 
projected as disorderly and the legality of the British courts as apparently orderly. In the late 
colonial period, litigation not only allowed the colonial state to intervene in community lives 
but consolidated its position further by upholding litigated communalism. 
 
 
Articulating religious identity through contested community rights  
 
Community politics during the late colonial period is often seen in the context of nationalist 
movement which relegates the quotidian juridico-political machinery into oblivion and tends 
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to focus more on the nationalist metanarratives. Despite such attempts to obscure internecine 
communal conflict, there is a tendency for them to erupt nonetheless in the ‘public arena’. 
At the provincial level, politics unfolded in unexpected ways and drew political motivation 
guided by communitarian concerns. In certain cases, local conflicts infused energy into 
broader provincial political confrontations too. In such instances, the provincial government, 
when in a difficult position, would steer confrontations away from the streets into the 
courtroom. Communal confrontation continued at two levels. The case study will 
demonstrate that the courtroom did not de-communalize the situation and instead continued 
the communalism from the public arena to the legal arena. While litigation would continue 
in the courtroom, the suit would be argued simultaneously with the more raucous battle in 
the streets. 
 
Punjab province experienced numerous clashes between Sikhs and Muslims in the late 
colonial period. A major incident of communal conflict arose in Kot Bhai Than Singh, 
Cambellpur, Attock District, over the contested right to draw water from a stream called 
Dotal Nullah. The immediate cause was Muslim discontent over Sikhs visiting the stream to 
fetch water when allegedly Muslim women were bathing there. It began as an issue of 
protecting the honour of women from one community but soon was to metamorphose into a 
provincial issue. Objections from Muslims followed by confrontation between the religious 
communities led to local riots prompting the District Magistrate to impose orders under 
section 144 Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) barring Sikhs from visiting the stream. This is 
when the incident first came to attention of the highest echelons of the provincial 
administration and when this case study begins.   
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The river was a part of the property that belonged to Sardar of Kot Muhammad Nawaz Khan, 
who was a Muslim. On July 29, 1937, representatives of the Sardar of Kot and Sikhs from 
the nearby Gurudwara Kot Bhai Than Singh appeared before the District Magistrate to 
challenge the notices issued by him under section 144 Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) over 
the river dispute. On this occasion, the District Magistrate defended his decision emphasising 
the urgency and significance of communal concord and reminded both the groups of ‘the 
spirit of give and take’. He further pointed out that the object of the administrative 
proceedings was to devise ways and means to ensure an agreement suitable for both the 
communities -  a ‘desideratum’ to be achieved ‘in the interest of peace and tranquillity.’  
Newspapers reported that the discussions between the District Magistrate and the counsels 
on behalf of the two parties lasted for about two hours. An agreement was reached according 
to which the Sikhs would draw water from the stream between 10 a.m. and noon, and again 
from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. Also, the Sardar of Kot agreed to ensure that his Muslim employees 
would not visit the stream during these hours. In addition to his employees – over whom he 
had direct control -  the Sardar of Kot was urged to use his influence to ensure that local 
Muslims from the general population also accepted this restriction. In case any party would 
decide to terminate this agreement, a notice of at least four days was to be provided to the 
District Magistrate. This agreement came into force the following day, July 30th, 1937.209 
The issue started on the issue of women who apparently felt violated by the presence of men 
from the other religious community while they washed themselves. The local administration 
rather than fixing separate timings for women and men instead facilitated an agreement 
which allotted different time slot for the use of stream to each religious community. It occurs 
as a blind spot of law or the local administration which failed to settle the dispute by focusing 
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on the issue of women only. It could not imagine their religious coexistence and instead 
reified their mutual exclusiveness. 
 
Before proceeding to discuss this conflict, some background to communal politics in late 
colonial Punjab is necessary. The Unionist Government led by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan came 
to power in Punjab following the first elections held under the 1935 Government of India 
Act in spring 1937. It was a broad coalition between Muslim Agriculturalists and Hindu Jat 
Agriculturists. Noticeably, Sikhs were not integrated well unlike the other two religious 
communities. Deprived of due representation in the then Punjab government, Sikh politics 
became sharper since it was effectively mobilising Sikh peasants since the 1920s through to 
1930s.  As J.S Garewal210 has noted, the phase between 1920s and 1940s intensified with 
the introduction of the Government of India Act 1935. He argues that the struggle for 
freedom was not always constitutional but often involved agitation and militant in nature. 
Following the general meeting of Sikh leaders at Lahore in March 1919, and later at Amritsar 
in December 1919 led to the formation of Central Sikh league. Its objectives as published 
by its organ Akālī were to reconstruct the Gurudwara Rakabganj, transfer control over the 
Khalsa College at Amritsar to the representatives of Sikh community, to launch a movement 
to free Gurudwaras from the control of Mahants etc.211 Among many such exclusively Sikh 
community oriented objectives, intensifying Sikh participation in country’s freedom 
struggle was also pledged. In the wake of Gurudwaras becoming a significant point of 
contention, politics became prominent and militant, hence transforming the political mood 
of Sikhs in Punjab.  
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The Unionist government in Punjab which was unique in that different agriculturist groups 
came together to share political power. The landed class, which was feudal in nature, was 
the main constituent of this government. However, the British who earlier had been pleased 
with the loyalty of both Punjabi agriculturalist Muslims and Sikhs to the Empire now became 
suspicious of political mobilisation in the aftermath of Ghadr and subsequent events. 
Moreover, local communal confrontations often challenged the conflict resolution 
capabilities of colonial authorities. Such local conflicts, as we will discuss in the following 
sections, often utilized meta-discourse in nationalist politics of that time to settle scores at 
the local level. 
 
What is pertinent to this dispute is its occurrence in the aftermath of the passing of the 
Government of India Act 1935 as well as a phase in Punjab politics when broader Sikh 
mobilization was taking place on the ground. Both, the Government of India Act 1919 
followed by the Government of India Act 1935 were the two major constitutional moments 
of the late colonial period. One Act followed by another, aimed at widening the ambit of 
colonial model of democracy in India. The passing of the Government of India Act 1935, 
further sharpened the political contestation at an all-India level among various stake holders 
like the Congress, the Muslim League, the Indian Communists, the Backward Castes and 
numerous small auxiliary organisations attached to one or the other major party. Politics 
changed in two ways. Firstly, because of the introduction of separate electorates which 
transformed politics. Secondly, the idea of separate electorates was vested on the provincial 
nature of politics which emphasised the idea of a shared horizontal governmental 
responsibility among Indians. However, the vertical hierarchy of power was always 
dominated by the colonial administrators. In the first quarter of the twentieth century Sikh 
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politics increasingly gained a tendency to revolve around numerous Gurudwara issues, most 
significantly two disputes- the Shaheed Ganj mosque212 issue in Lahore, and the Raqab Ganj 
Gurudwara213 issue in Delhi. The former dispute was between Muslims claiming Shaheed 
Ganj Mosque and Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) which argued that 
the property belonged to Sikhs.214 However, on the night of July 7, 1935, while the dispute 
was in court, the Sikhs demolished the mosque.215 This was an incident that fed the local 
clashes between Muslims and Sikhs. The latter dispute concerned a Gurudwara constructed 
by Sardar Baghel Singh in Raisina (Delhi) in 1783. Much later, in the beginning of the 
twentieth century when the capital of colonial India was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi, the 
British demolished a portion of the Gurudwara Raqab Ganj while constructing a road to the 
secretariat.216 Because the SGPC was taking control of Sikh religious properties and the 
same site had already been a controversy in the past, the issue regained currency in the 1930s. 
Since the wall of Gurudwara had been demolished by the British officials, it allowed Akali’s 
to agitate for Sikh rights and stand up for Sikh honour against the colonial state.217 To some 
extent such a confrontational politics was also a result of variety of reasons such as the 
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repression of the Ghadr movement in Punjab, police and military atrocities at Jallianwalla 
Bagh and the agitations that followed with the passing of the Rowlatt Bills.  
 
A quick description of the state of legality is also worth mentioning here. In the 1910s Punjab 
had witnessed invocation of extraordinary laws to curb anticolonial revolutionary activities 
- like the Ingress into India Ordinance 1914, Defence of India Act 1915, Rowlatt Acts passed 
in 1919 (and subsequently repealed in 1922), followed by the promulgation of Martial law 
in Punjab- which aimed at instilling a fear of law in the protesting masses of Punjab as well 
as other provinces. In the aftermath of Punjab disturbances of 1919, the Sikh League had 
also adopted Gandhi’s non-violent satyagraha in the 1920s after Gandhi had extended his 
support to the broader Sikh religious demands. The frequent use of a more specific law - 
section 144 Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) - became a manipulative administrative tool 
to control public space in the name of public order.  Notably, it fell into a wider category of 
laws designed to maintain ‘public peace and tranquillity’, and could prohibit the use of public 
space for a person or a group. Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code218 dealt 
with ‘Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger’. It would be 
invoked in cases where in the opinion of a District Magistrate (or a Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government 
with powers to execute this legislation) there was sufficient grounds for invoking this section 
and would result in immediate prevention of a disturbance to law and order administration. 
A magistrate in such situations could direct any person to abstain from a certain act in a 
certain place. Furthermore, a Magistrate could promulgate the section if he considered that 
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its invocation was likely to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully 
employed, or posed danger to human life, health or safety, or was a disturbance to public 
peace and tranquillity.219 As political confrontation became ever more prevalent on India’s 
streets over the 1920s, 30s and 40s Section 144 CrPC, as the colonial archive suggests, 
became an ever more useful tool for the administration to exercise its powers to control local 
political mobilization. Political contestations often led to public confrontation between the 
followers of different ideologies, and between different political communities. Often that 
also resulted in confrontations between groups and the local Police authorities. In all such 
cases, action under Section 144 created conditions for the justification of administrative 
repression. The Kot Bhai Than Singh case study not only will highlight the cunning of the 
administration to criminalise politics by creating the figure of the protesting Akali as a 
problem category which in turn exposed its own legal vulnerabilities. What is insightful is 
that though the character and composition of multiple conflicts could be different, but the 
law invoked (to maintain public order) was often the same.  
 
 
Public arena to Legal arena: Between the disorderly streets and the orderly courtroom 
 
The Sikhs at Kot Bhai Than Singh who had consented to the agreement of July 30th1937 in 
the presence of the District Magistrate soon started to express discontent. Dissatisfaction 
with the agreement soon emerged from within their ranks, drawing in Akali activists from 
elsewhere in the province. Part of the agreement had been an order by the District Magistrate 
prohibiting Sikhs from visiting the Dotal Nulla east of Pindigheb Road. This matter was now 
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challenged by Sikh community leaders in Kot who sought advice and assistance 
telegraphically from the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) at Amritsar. 
The matter had acquired such significance because it impinged on the Gurduwara’s ability 
to draw water for the Langar which was of considerable moral and religious importance for 
the Sikhs of Kot Bhai Than Singh. Master Tara Singh, who was at that point President of the 
SGPC, immediately telegraphed the Punjab Premier, Sikandar Hyat Khan as well as Sir 
Sunder Singh Majithia, one of the largest land owners in the Punjab and a revenue member 
of government.220 At the same time, the Akali movement decided to send out Morchas in 
batches of two to the stream to create a public confrontation with the government by court 
arrest. An issue that needed to be resolved at the village level acquired provincial proportions 
and began to be articulated as a violation of Sikh rights. 
 
With the larger Shaheed Ganj Mosque and Raqab Ganj Gurudwara issue as the background 
which fuelled communal discord, the SGPC also instructed the Sikhs to initiate satyagraha 
against the imposition of Section 144 by the District Magistrate. Satyagraha was deployed 
as a performance of defying law. Two sewadars proceeded to the stream on August 4, 1937 
and were arrested by the police for defying magisterial orders. While the satyagraha 
continued, sewadars refused to draw water from the western end of the stream which was 
still permitted according to the Magistrate’s orders. The sewadars refused to draw water 
from the western end of the stream arguing that the water there was polluted and unfit to 
drink. At the same time, the SGPC Committee opened an office at Rawalpindi to direct the 
Satyagraha movement at Kot Bhai Than Singh. The formula of truth and non-violence as 
upheld by Gandhian model of civil disobedience was actively adopted by the Akalis. Shortly 
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after the arrest of the two sewadars, there were reports that two Akali members of the 
Provincial Legislature were also about to visit Kot with the intention of defying the orders 
of the District Magistrate.221 The colonial administration reacted by dispatching a large 
police force from Campbellpur to Kot Fateh Khan to keep the situation in control.222 What 
is pertinent is the attempt of the Sikh legislators to defy law while they themselves were part 
of the government and were supposed to be maintaining it. Participation by legislators would 
experiment with the potential to subvert law. However, such a subversion would not be 
possible through legality, but morality only.  
 
An emergency meeting of the Gurudwara Committee Panja Sahib was summoned for August 
5, 1937. It swiftly condemned the order under section 144 CrPC and conformed the decision 
to launch satyagraha. Additionally, it was decided to file a revision application in the Punjab 
High Court challenging the validity of the District Magistrate’s order.223 Meanwhile, the 
administration’s response was also escalated.  Sewadars who continued to defy orders were 
produced before the Additional District Magistrate, Campbellpur, summarily tried and 
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 30 each or in default of which they had to undergo three weeks’ 
rigorous imprisonment. This was an arbitrary increase in punishment as the first volunteers 
had only been sentenced to two-week rigorous imprisonment for precisely the same 
transgression. More and more prominent Sikh leaders began to arrive at Kot Bhai Than 
Singh to study the situation, while the langer (kitchen) of the Gurudwara remained closed 
owing to the scarcity of water, sending an important signal that normal religious life had 
been suspended. The provincial administration reacted with incomprehension as to why such 
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escalation had taken place, insisting that the District Magistrate’s imposition of section 144 
applied to the “taking of water from the Nullah only on the east side of Pindigheb road.”224 
There was no restriction against the drawing of water from the stream on the west side of 
Pindigheb road. 
 
Regular arrival and arrests of sewadars continued, while prominent Sikhs like Master Tara 
Singh, Gyani Kartar Singh, M.L.A, and Sardar Harnam Singh, Advocate, arrived to chalk 
out a line of action. As the langer could not remain close for a long time, the Gurudwara 
Committee decided to import water from Fatehganj that was 12 miles away from Kot Bhai 
Than Singh. On one occasion a Tonga carrying water for Gurudwara was stopped on its way 
by the police constables seeking to restrict access to the area, but the Inspector of Police 
quickly ordered his men not to prevent sewadars from taking water.225 In the light of the 
Akali satyagraha, Sandra Freitag’s understanding of the ‘public arena’ in India remains 
pertinent, where communities have been expressing and redefining themselves through 
collective activities in public spaces. The collective activities expressing these values, 
according to Freitag, tended to be of three types: public performances, collective ceremonies, 
and collective protests.226 Freitag’s framework of ‘public arena’ enables us to make sense of 
the Sikh-Muslim communal clashes and collective protests in late colonial Punjab. As the 
conflict progressed, the performances of defiance of magisterial orders by Akali’s in the 
public arena, the street –we will see in the following section- would soon be transferred to 
the ‘Legal arena’ i.e. the Court. Legal arena became an extension of Frietag’s ‘Public arena’ 
where communalism of the street was continued into the courtroom.  
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The court as a theatre of politics: The other function of the law 
 
Oliver Mendelsohn227 has highlighted two major gaps in the study of ‘Modern’ Indian legal 
system that the British established. He disagreed with Bernard Cohn228 who noted that the 
problem was to be rooted in the character of Indian peasant society which failed to accept 
the court system and therefore abused its processes. He disagreed with Robert Kidder229 too, 
who argued that the unsatisfactory results of the judicial processes in India should be 
attributed to an understanding of litigation more as negotiation rather than adjudication. 
Kidder’s understanding highlighted that the courts could not provide quick, decisive 
outcomes because they are complex social systems in themselves. Mendelsohn argues that 
understanding the concrete issues of litigation could shed light on the ‘pathology of the 
judicial process’ in India. He further argues that the British authorities perceived the 
establishment of courts as the corollary of defining and allocating rights and duties in land. 
This led to litigation by disputants who came to courts for defence of rights to be claimed 
under the new system. As a result, the British had dictated court use by the way in which 
they intervened in land (social) relations. Mendelsohn alerts us to consider the procedures 
and claims that are exploited in the litigation process because it “will be contingent on the 
character of the society in question.”230 In the light of Mendelsohn’s argument we cannot 
overlook the motives of the colonial state to transfer the conflict from the messiness of the 
public arena in Kot Bhai Than Singh to the more orderly legal arena. The court did not 
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dissipate the communalism of the street while the litigation was under process, it only 
exacerbated it. The communalism of the streets continued in the courtroom. 
 
In Kot Bhai Than Singh, by August 1937, the focus of the confrontation shifted back to the 
law courts when the revision of the original order to impose Section 144 came up for hearing 
before Mr. Justice Bhide of the Lahore High Court. The counsel for the Gurudwara, 
Advocate S. Harnam Singh, argued that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to use 
section 144, CrPC to restrict the Sikhs from drawing water from the nullah. His argument 
was that the District Magistrate was armed with these powers for the protection of civil rights 
of the people and not for their suppression. The Advocate quoted authorities and orders from 
Patna, Madras and other High courts in support of this contention.231 On behalf of one 
Sukhnandan Singh and six other sewadars, S. Harnam Singh, filed an application in the 
Lahore High Court for the transfer of their case from the court of the District Magistrate 
Attock to the Court of District Magistrate Rawalpindi, which was granted by Mr. Justice 
Bhide. The counsel on the behalf of the sewadars argued that “it was in the interest of justice 
that the case should be tried in a free and purely judicial atmosphere.”232 Thus highlighting 
the tendency of late colonial litigants to evaluate certain officials as communal and seek 
justice in the name of fairness and justice. Colonial administration would also attempt to 
depoliticise issues by maintaining that courts were the impartial avenues of justice only 
concerned with justice and legality, and therefore, dissociated from community interests. It 
aimed at shifting the expression and redefinition of communities from the public arena to 
the legal arena. The colonial juridico-political order was reflected as a machine. Ronald 
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Inden has argued233 that the major effect of the comparison of a polity with a machine is to 
transfer the physical scientists’ notion of a ‘system’ from mechanics to a body politic. Such 
a perspective understands a system consisting of hierarchically arranged levels of discrete, 
interdependent parts. Such a system claims to order itself by principle of a binary opposition 
among its levels and not simply one of distinction. Therefore, the state and its administrative 
hierarchies possess absolute sovereignty. Like a natural system, such a perspective is also 
characterised by mutual exclusion among its parts. Similarly, the orderliness of the British 
late colonial state was based on principles of mutual exclusion of communities in society, 
unity of sovereignty across its administrative departments, determinacy of law for dispute 
resolution, and uniformity of procedure. The forefathers of the British colonial 
administration and law in India acted as the ‘transcendent knower of the Indological 
discourse’234 and proceeded by discovering mutually exclusive categories, reduced to a 
single order, the order of modern law. Such an order resolved disputes according to the socio-
political distribution of power. 
 
Rajiv Dhavan has noted that the British legal scholarship was self-protectively encapsulated 
in a ‘black letter law’ tradition which separated ‘law’ from morality and sought to interpret 
law as a distinct, relatively autonomous reality. Thus, emphasis was on the self-constitution 
of legal principles and concepts. Dhavan further argues that such a ‘black letter law’ tradition 
worked at two levels. At one level, it sought to redefine and reconstitute people’s 
understanding of their social, political and economic relations, guaranteeing exclusiveness 
and derived strength from the notion of ‘rule of law’. On another level, it presented itself as 
a fair arrangement drawing support from legal reconstruction of social reality while granting 
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full power to the State to contain transgressions of the letter and spirit of ‘rule of law’.235 In 
Kot Bhai than Singh too, the colonial administration upheld a similar strategy. But a trial 
might not be always what it appears. Despite the spirit of the ‘rule of law’ maxim there were 
often supplementary intentions behind such a trial. Judith Shklar asserts, “A trial, the 
supreme legalistic act, like all political acts, does not take place in a vacuum. It is part of a 
whole complex of other institutions, habits, and beliefs.”236 In Kot Bai Than Singh too, it 
had diverse meanings. It would establish the colonial state as the sole impartial arbiter of 
disputes and would reflect that the social and political life of religious communities was 
mutually exclusive. However, the consistent and elaborate newspaper reporting about the 
trial connected the inside, the court, with the outside, the street/public. The trial assumed the 
character of a theatre, a political performance.237 Various scholars have argued that 
performativity plays a pivotal role in how identities express themselves. Courts and therefore 
legal discourse also thrive on performativity that enables subjects to articulate their identity 
in a juridical idiom. John Austin argued that the meaning of a word depends on its use. Such 
understandings complement Wittgenstein who believed that deployment of speech-acts 
generate true and false sentences. Austin classified performative utterances as locution, 
illocution and perlocution.238 Most importantly the effect of a speech-act, perlocution, is 
what matters in performing politics through legality. Judith Butler has also highlighted that 
the effect of speech is beyond the intended semantic and syntactical meanings. 
Supplementing Michel Foucault, she argues that the constitution and reconstitution of reality 
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by subjects take place through language, gesture and sign.239 Foucault has argued that subject 
construction takes places through juridical notions of power. Juridical notion of power 
represents subjects that it had created in the first place. One that reiterates performances of 
a subject/citizen of law that conforms to a legal norm, which has the discursive function of 
re-inscribing subject/citizen performances and renders legal claims of the subject(s) 
intelligible. For Butler, “Law is not internalized, but incorporated, with consequences that 
bodies are produced which signify that law on and through the body.”240 What is pertinent 
is that law dictates the form of performance. In Kot Bhai Than Singh, courts enabled the 
realisation of such subjectivity. It allowed performativity of subject/citizen claims. By citing 
and reciting law in the court the satyagrahis/ Akalis temporarily staged subversive use of 
performativity. We will notice in the following sections that the staging of temporary 
subversion not only re-inscribed the normative hegemony of law but also demonstrated how 
claims could be made intelligible to seek justice from the colonial state. It reflected that 
articulating legal processes correctly had ontological effects241 on colonial subjects and 
naturalized assumptions that it was law that constituted reality. 
 
The newspapers regularly reported the trials of sewadars arrested for defying magisterial 
orders under section 144 at the Dotal Nullah. Earlier the sewadars were sentenced to two 
weeks’ imprisonment, which was modified to Rs. 30 as fine or in case of failure to pay the 
fine, three weeks’ rigorous imprisonment. By August 10, as the newspapers reported, that 
the 7th batch of two sewadars was sentenced to 3 months’ rigorous imprisonment by the 
Additional District Magistrate. What is notable is that there is an enhancement of punishment 
for the same crime over the period of one week.  
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Sardar Ujjal Singh, M.L.A. arrived in Rawalpindi on the 11th of August in connection with 
the Kot Bhai Than Singh satyagraha. He took Sardar Kartar Singh, president of the 
Gurudwara committee, Punja Sahib, along with him to have a meeting with Mr. King, 
Commissioner of Rawalpindi Division. When interviewed by the Associated Press, Sardar 
Ujjal Singh stated although the conversation remained confidential, that the attitude of the 
Commissioner was most sympathetic and he was hopeful of a settlement anytime soon.242 
But these attempts to de-escalate the conflict were more apparent than real. Elsewhere a 
change in political vocabulary indicated an upping of the ante. 
 
Some other prominent members of the Sikh Community243 issued a joint statement 
expressing the opinion that the Kot Bhai Than Singh affair had ‘reached such an impasse 
that no person who has some humanitarian feeling can sit quiet’ while reasserting that it was 
‘undoubtedly the birth right of every human being to have a free access to light, air and 
water'. A conference of prominent Panthie workers was summoned along with 
representatives of various organisations in the Province to take a ‘concerted action in this 
direction and to create a keen sense of awakening amongst the masses to vindicate the cause 
of civil liberties’. They emphasised in their statement that they had been ‘forced to take this 
step not from the communal point of view, rather stirred by humanitarian actualities’.244 
What is notable once again here is the capability of colonial(modern) law which enabled 
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Sikhs to argue that trials were impartial means, based only on rules and regulations and 
hence depoliticized in nature. The issue is pitched not to be a matter of community power 
and communal rights but a question of civil rights and a humanitarian issue. It turned into a 
derivative trial245 for the colonial state. 
 
To mark a further escalation, the tactic of sending sewadars in the batches of two each to 
court arrest at the stream changed. The meeting of the Executive Committee of the Shiromani 
Akali Dal held on August 15th, 1937, decided to expand the scope of the protest and to send 
jatha of 100 Sikhs who would leave from Amritsar on August 25, 1937. At the above-
mentioned meeting resolutions were passed which viewed with alarm the conditions 
prevailing in the Punjab since the Unionist had come to power in the Province. It also 
condemned any restrictions imposed on Sikhs with regards to taking water from the stream 
in question and appealed to the Sikh Sangats to help the Akali Dal in making the Kot Bhai 
Than Singh ‘morcha’ a success.246 Such resolutions adopted at the Executive Committee of 
the Shiromani Akali Dal highlight that the issue was larger than drawing water from the 
stream. The issue was now used as a weapon to assault the credibility of the Unionist 
government at large.  
 
Lynda Mulcahy has pointed out: 
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public adjudication will always be enriched by the physical presence of participants 
and the absence of bodies can serve to impoverish the performance of important 
public functions and rituals.”247  
 
The SGPC and Shiromani Akali Dal must have felt ecstatic, when on August 19, 1937, a 
bench comprising of Mr. Justice Jailal and Justice Bhide delivered a judgement, to a court 
room packed to its utmost capacity as one newspaper reported, in connection with the 
revision petition filed by Advocate S. Harnam Singh on the behalf of Gurudwara Committee 
of Panja Sahib. The crucial element in this petition was to question the validity of the original 
order of the District Magistrate of Attock under Section 144, that restrained Sikhs from 
drawing water from the Dotal Nullah. The bench held that the order of the Magistrate as it 
existed was an improper one, thereby rendering it no longer valid. Moreover, it suggested 
that the Sikhs should be allowed to take water from the stream during certain hours.248  
 
Lynda Mulcahy’s assertion that face to face contact is much more likely to confer interaction 
with meaning and an important reason why mediators encourage litigants to the power of 
face-to-face interaction in dispute resolution. It presents itself as an opportunity for the 
disputing parties to have their say in the presence of those who had earlier failed to listen. It 
is an opportunity for acknowledgement of one’s narrative as the trial unfolds. This face-to-
face interaction between litigants does not just have procedural value but, as Mulcahy notes 
“an intrinsic value because it speaks to our political morality.”249 The legal arguments made 
by the petitioning counsel in this case study are highly relevant for our discussion and 
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deserve detailed scrutiny. Undertaking to administer law in the government’s courts, the 
British took the decisive step towards a modern legal system that initiated the process that 
is called by Marc Galanter as ‘expropriation of law’. Galanter argues that this expropriation 
made the power to find, declare and apply law as a monopoly of government.250 Elaborating 
on the design of the administrative action in the conflict, S. Harnam Singh argued that the 
District Magistrate should not have promulgated the orders unless he had found that the 
Police force was incompetent to cope with the first conflagration that started the whole 
episode, given it was a small village. He added that it had been possible for the District 
Magistrate to manage the situation simply by means of the police force which was posted in 
front of Gurudwara Kot Bhai Than Singh. He argued that under section 435, the High Court 
had to satisfy itself of the propriety and validity of such an order. The advocate stressed that 
whilst the legislature had undoubtedly given wide powers to the magistrate to issue order 
like a promulgation of section 144, and the wider the powers thus bestowed, the greater the 
Legislature’s responsibility to safeguard the exercising of such powers. He asserted that it 
was possible for the District Magistrate to manage the situation by means of police force and 
that such powers of ban or prohibition should have been used only if the District Magistrate 
thought that other measures were inadequate to meet the situation. Even after that, if such 
an order was to be enforced, the civil rights of the Sikhs would have to be protected. The 
maximum life of this magisterial order was two months given that the District Magistrate 
mentioned in his self-justification that there had been two riots on previous occasions. To 
this, the counsel replied that the men of the Sardar of Kot – not any member of the Sikh 
community - had been convicted on those occasions. The counsel then went further in 
emphasising that the dispute in question was in fact one between individual Sikh residents 
attached to the Gurudwara and the the Sardar of Kot rather than the ‘clashes of the 
																																																						
250Galanter, Marc. Law and Society in Modern India, OUP: Delhi, 1994, Page 17. 
	 131	
communities’. Therefore, once again prioritizing individual citizens over community rights 
here.  
 
The colonial administration itself had become party to the conflict because the initial order 
under section 144 CrPC was being challenged in the court along with the right of Sikhs to 
draw water from the stream. Challenging S. Harnam Singh’s plea, Diwan Rani Lal, 
Advocate General arguing on the behalf of the Crown replied that the position taken by ‘the 
petitioner’s counsel ignored the circumstances forming the basis of the order of the District 
Magistrate’. He clarified that such orders were promulgated because a new situation arose 
even after an agreement had been reached and Sikhs from outside the locality went to the 
Nullah shouting slogans implying that ‘Jat women had taken possession of the water which 
was used by the Khalsa’. Therefore, the Sikhs had broken the terms of the earlier 
compromise and started taking water from the stream to provoke the other party. According 
to Advocate General’s submission each of the incidents mentioned by the District Magistrate 
showed that there was ‘a danger to the breach of peace’. In an interesting twist Justice Jai 
Lal, remarked that the District Magistrate had in fact upheld the right of the Sikhs whereas 
it was the Sardar of Kot who was responsible for the breach of agreement and not the Sikhs. 
The rights of the parties were settled by the District Magistrate subject to the approval of the 
Sardar, which had not been forthcoming. Justice Jailal’s remark aimed to protect the decision 
of the magistrate and reflect that it was the communities who did not provide sufficient 
support to the administration in mitigating the conflict. 
 
Before the session was adjourned for lunch, discussions suggested that the bench was 
prepared to modify the order to the effect that a period of four hours be fixed for the Sikhs 
to draw water to which, the Advocate General requested time to consult Malik Barkat Ali, 
	 132	
counsel for the Sardar of Kot. After the resumption of the hearing, the Advocate General 
submitted that the four-hour time was excessive and three hours was more than enough and 
that Sikhs could draw water from nallah from 12 Noon to 3 p.m., when the Muslim women 
of the village did not go there. Malik Bartkat Ali counsel for the Sardar of Kot said that the 
order of the District Magistrate under section 147 CrPC which effected the compromise, was 
binding on the Sikhs and on the Sardar of Kot, but not on the other public of the village. He 
expressed that the dispute arose when the ladies of the village objected to the Sikhs taking 
water at the time when they were bathing in the nallah. He further submitted that the nallah 
was on the village Shamilat in the possession of the Sardar of Kot who could forbid the Sikhs 
from going into his land. The District Magistrate had given the Sikhs the right of taking 
water. But even if the Sikhs had been taking water from the nallah for the last fifteen months, 
it did not establish their right to take water. The District Magistrate, according to Barkat Ali, 
was well within his jurisdiction to promulgate an order under section 144 CrPC against a 
private person ‘to enforce public peace’. Notably, Barkat Ali was also a leading politician 
and in fact the only Muslim league MLA in Punjab after the 1937 elections. His involvement 
as the defence lawyer for the Sardar of Kot is noteworthy here. 
 
S. Harnam Singh, on behalf of the Gurudwara Committee, then assured the Court that the 
Sikhs would abstain from provocative slogans and will take water from the stream peacefully 
during the fixed hours. After the arguments and counter-arguments were over, the bench 
held that the order of the District Magistrate was not a ‘proper’ order. This meant that 
according to the new agreement, Sikhs could take water from 10.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m., while 
the counsel on the behalf of the Sikhs gave an undertaking that they would do so peacefully 
and would not offend the Muslims of the village. The Advocate General could neither give 
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assurance nor rejected the proposal, so the bench left this question to be decided by the 
District Magistrate if necessary by a supplementary order.251 
 
On August 26, 1937, in Rawalpindi S. Kartar Singh Advocate, president of the Gurudwara 
Committee Panja Sahib and of the Sikh All-Parties Committee in a press statement declared 
that the ‘morcha’ at Kot Bhai Than Singh had now ended and the right, which the Sikhs 
claimed, had been vindicated. While announcing the legal victory of Sikhs, he expressed his 
gratification that the decision of the Panja Sahib committee to file a revision petition in the 
High Court had proved successful. However, he added that the Provincial Government had 
not yet taken steps to release the prisoners convicted based on the original order under 
Section 144, which the highest court in the Province no longer approved. Appealing to the 
Unionist government and the Premier directly the statement read: 
 
Will Sikandar Hayat Khan and the Government rise to the height of the occasion and 
without losing more time issue an order for the release of the prisoners in question 
before they appeal to the High Court to seek redress.252  
 
We know from the newspaper reports that at least until 28th August 2nd batch of Sikhs were 
released only after they had served the three weeks sentence in jail for defying the 
Magisterial prohibition order. Upon their release from jail they were taken in a procession 
through the bazaar in Campbellpur, and the women outnumbered men in the procession.253 
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Marc Galanter has noted254 that the strength of the British law lay in its techniques which 
were able to replace local laws by official law. The official law did not tolerate any rivals, it 
dissolved away that which could not be transformed into modern law and absorbed the 
remainder.  As a result, it created a numerous class of professionals who form the connecting 
links of the nation-state and a vast array of vested rights and defined expectations. The 
politics of challenging a magisterial order provided a boost to the agenda of Sikh politics in 
the Punjab. It was a tactical gain for the Akalis to mobilise as well as radicalise Sikhs in the 
name of the Gurudwara issue. At the same time, the administration did not change the due 
process involved in such conflicts. During the conflict, at one level the colonial 
administration acted as a disciplinary power by instituting section 144 and banning public 
space, and on the other level, it created a new set of power filters by articulating 
administrative power allowing appeal in the higher court while recognizing community 
claims. It acted in the first instance with a prohibition order, instituted a police force to 
enforce it, and then steered the protest to the courtroom, which was the only ‘legitimate’ 
place and method of resolving the conflict. Such a tactic reinforced the administrations’ role 
as an impartial mediator upholding the ‘rule of law’. However, once the instituting of the 
initial magisterial order was challenged in the higher court, the administration also became 
a party to the conflict. In the end, the original order - that was deemed ‘improper’ in the face 
of a new agreement - remained largely intact in substance as the new settlement only slightly 
adjusted the time of the day when the Sikhs could draw water from the stream. In fact, 
according to the new order the Sikhs had reduced time to do so in comparison to the earlier 
settlement. In the entire episode, the courtroom facilitated not only the expectations of the 
religious communities but colonial administration too. Both the Sikhs and the colonial 
administration derived legitimacy by resorting to the courtroom and transforming the trial 
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into a spectacle, which had effects on Sikh mobilization in Punjab province, much beyond 
the courtroom and the village of Kot Bhai Than Singh. 
 
 
Conclusion I 
 
In the light of the case study discussed above, few questions need to be raised. Had the 
outcome of the case differed, had the courts acted differently? Had the local administration 
or the District Magistrate or the local police had been more successful if they commanded a 
more powerful enforcement agency? Why was the local administration unsuccessful to 
secure compliance with the orders issued? Why did they not act to bring out a compromise 
so as the whole basis of conflict was removed? The issue gained currency because it was 
tied to the Gurudwara. However, the core issue, the women who bathed at the river, was 
entirely neglected in the entire litigation. What if a time slot could have fixed only for the 
women of the village, irrespective of their religious identity, to use river in the first place 
and not religious communities. Hence, the incident at Kot Bhai Than Singh provides us with 
important insights into the operation of prohibition orders and the responding local politics. 
Firstly, the argument made by the lawyer of Sikhs that the powers under section 144 CrPC 
were provided to the District Magistrate to protect civil rights of the people and not for their 
suppression highlights that at convenient occasions the colonised population was willing to 
participate in the game of law by demanding its proper enforcement. While the participation 
of Sikhs as satyagrahis and subsequent episodes of arrests was argued as issues of individual 
rights of human beings pure and simple, the dispute was framed by the Akali defence lawyer 
as an issue of rights of collectivities defined by religious customs. Moreover, the counsel on 
behalf of the Sikhs when argued that the earlier order of the local magistrate did not fulfil 
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the criteria necessary for issuing an order, he conceded that the order of prohibition would 
have been justified if the police had been ‘incompetent’ to cope with the situation. This 
signalled an agreement with the colonial legal procedure only if upheld in letter and spirit, 
and provided the colonial administration with the opportunity to serve as impartial judge in 
communal disputes, which it always claimed its real aim was. Furthermore, what is 
significant is the response of the administration itself. We cannot overlook the fact that law, 
which should be standard and firm, is indecisive in nature here: first, in the difference of 
assessing the judgement by the local and then the High courts. Second, in meting out 
divergent punishments for the same crime over the period of one week.  
 
The contestation of issues arising from extraordinary legislation like section 144 cut both 
ways, however. The Panthie workers adopted the Gandhian strategy of satyagraha 
successfully by arguing that their struggle was championing the vindication of the cause of 
civil liberties. By doing so, they put the colonial administration in a difficult position by 
pressurising it to be more sensitive and alert to its own administrative philosophy. The entire 
philosophy of confrontation in the name of satyagraha, as was often emphasized during the 
trial, was motivated by ‘human actualities’ rather than ‘communal animosity’. However, the 
administration transplanted the communalism of the street into the courtroom. The trial 
transformed into a spectacle which became derivative for the colonial state as well as the 
religious communities. What can be observed from the arguments of Akali defence lawyer 
as well as the lawyer of Sardar of Kot Barkat Ali is that the entire issue is a conflict between 
individual citizens. While each Akali satyagrahi acted on his own volition, the Sardar of Kot 
could refuse water insisting his individual right to property. However, neither the issue of 
Muslim women in whose name the Sardar of Kot instituted the expulsion of Sikhs from the 
stream nor the issue of Sikhs collectively drawing water and arguing for the defence of their 
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religious rights gets discussed. The entire episode circles around the rights of individual 
citizens with occasional community rights. What is furthermore noticeable is the ability of 
the colonial administration to steer conflicts to the courtroom which served to depoliticise 
events and helped administration to paint these episodes more as cases of individual rights, 
citizenship and legality rather than everyday politics of the intense late colonial times. In 
this entire episode, what emerges is that the Akali satyagrahis repetitively defied 
administrative orders and exacerbated the law and order situation and that extraordinary 
legislation like section 144 CrPC got normalized whilst also reintegrated into the rule of law 
myth by opening it up to the courts. Law had implications of the language of legality with 
emphasis on human rights and citizens contrasted with language of communities and other 
special categories when the law acted pre-emptively.   
 
The ban on the public arena by promulgating section 144 allowed the local administration 
to conduct the disorder of the streets in the orderly legal arena. In such a light, the use of 
section 144 CrPC was often more of a tactical purpose than aimed at actual conflict 
resolution. Confrontational situations provided the colonial government with opportunities 
to invoke public order laws and institute curfews and justify police action to enhance its own 
administrative calculations. However, it defeated its own principles at numerous occasions. 
The most important use of such orders was that it facilitated administrative intervention in 
community lives while arguing that they were mutually exclusive and hence incapable of 
resolving their own conflicts. Also, the late colonial state was not very interested in the day 
to day maintenance of civil liberties. It often resorted to politics of ban at every opportune 
moment. Banning the drawing of water from the stream for Sikhs and after arrests of 
satyagrahis, and the utilisation of laws like section 144 highlight the attempt to establish 
administration’s view of public order. The colonial administration through such laws aimed 
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to mark public space with invisible signs of state power. However, the criminalisation of 
local politics, by deeming protests unlawful, led to the emergence of a counter-public. For 
example, the Akali satyagrahis volunteered to court arrest to challenge the magisterial order. 
Another significant ability of such extraordinary orders of prohibition was the ability not 
only to declare spaces and political gatherings as unlawful but also the potential to take 
charge of the issue. However, any politics of ban was often challenged by defiance. In Kot 
Bhai Than Singh, it was not only the local Akalis that participated in satyagraha but when 
volunteers from Amritsar and Lahore started to arrive, it created an administrative challenge 
for the provincial government. Therefore, the usual binary of insiders and outsiders to a 
dispute was complicated. But in the end, it was often the influence of outsiders who would 
preside or bring settlements to such conflicts. The target audience of the trial too was not 
merely the litigants whose names were recorded in the courts but the larger religious 
communities who were following the trial in the press outside the courtroom. The entire 
theatrics of law and legality enabled colonial administration to both enforce its might as well 
as replenish a certain moral legitimacy for itself while also allowing parties to a conflict, a 
space to argue out their case articulated though a language of community rights case in an 
‘impartial’ atmosphere, i.e. the court. Therefore, courts not only became judicial spaces but 
a theatre of politics where constitutionalism and ‘rule of law’, led, maintained and guided 
local politics. 
 
 
Case Study II 
 
Workers urged ‘boycott’ and the Management feared the ‘outsider’: 
public order and labour politics in the Bata Shoe Factory 1939 
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Calcutta was a very important production hub for the British Empire. Numerous factories 
and mills were set up in the city. It was also the capital of British India up to 1910, when the 
capital shifted to Delhi after the reunification of Bengal. The labour crisis in Calcutta began 
at the end of the nineteenth century when in 1890’s the Indian Jute Mill Association (IJMA) 
extended working hours and increased the work load in the factories. By 1895, strikes by 
factory workers had increased anxiety of the Mill owners to such an extent that the IJMA 
had to petition the government to mobilize police forces for the protection of European 
managerial staff from angry workers.255 During some instances of communal confrontation 
among mill hands in 1896, the colonial rulers deployed the military to subdue disturbances 
in mill areas. This brought protesting or rioting mill workers face to face with the armed 
forces of the colonial state. The colonial government saw the riots and strikes at the end of 
the nineteenth century as a clear evidence of the intrinsic volatility of rootless migrant 
peasants crowding the city and its suburbs in search of jobs.256 A general perception 
remained in the minds of colonial officials, mill owners and managers, and law an order 
administration, that the Indian worker was ignorant and lacked commitment to factory work. 
After 1896, Calcutta witnessed three more major waves of strikes in 1920-21, 1929 and 
1937-38. Such prolonged industrial conflicts generated frequent confrontations between 
poorer urban dwellers and the law enforcement machinery of the colonial state. Despite 
numerous strikes the formal labour organisation remained considerably weak because the 
trade unions were few and had little influence whatsoever.257 Various scholars have studied 
																																																						
255 See, A petition from the Indian Jute Manufacturers’ Association, advocating the employment of a police 
force at Barrackpur and of a civil magistrate either at that station or some other station, in “Report on police 
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256 See, The Report of the Indian Factory Labour Commission of 1908. Also see, Census of India 1911, Vol. 
V, Part I (Calcutta 1913), page 529. 
257Basu, Subho. “The Paradox of Peasant Worker: Re-Conceptualizing worker’s politics in Bengal 1890-1939, 
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the figure of the urban mill worker in Colonial India facing numerous challenges to make 
ends meet in the industrial cities. Raj Chandravarkar’s approach to study urban labour 
advocated to view economy as constituted by production conditions, shaped by a 
relationship between rural and urban, considering the agency of the social classes, 
recognizing the political presence of the colonial state, and all taking place in the context of 
global economy.258 Railways also enabled mass migration within India and abroad, and 
migrants especially from Bihar and east United Provinces were found in great numbers in 
Bengal. Pertinently, Calcutta was located on this migration route.259 Migrants from rural 
India, distressed because of land and agricultural woes, migrated to cities and provided a 
continuous supply of mill hands to industrial urban centres. Scholars like Subho Basu has 
highlighted that migrant ‘peasant’ labourers wanted to supplement their rural resources from 
urban employment. The continuous arrival of labour to mills, however, soon glutted the 
labour market. Also, their earnings were not enough to bring their family to mill towns. 
Therefore, insufficient urban wages resulted in separation of male worker and their wives 
and children necessitating periodic migration back to villages. 260 The narrative of such a 
migrant worker across various studies appears to be of an unsettled settler and highlights the 
demands of urban citizenship in late colonial India. 
 
Calcutta in late colonial Bengal started to become a hotbed of labour politics. During the 
great depression of 1930s the management enforced and tightened discipline in the mill, the 
management adopted measures to restrict movement of workers during the working hours. 
Workers perceived such interference as gross violation of customary practices within 
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factories.261 In the early twentieth century Bengal, the Scottish managers of jute mills 
established a stranglehold over mill town administrations and not only dominated municipal 
boards, but controlled the local police force and acted as judicial magistrates of mill towns. 
This was sustained by forging alliances with propertied high caste Indians, generally white-
collar professions. Workers often responded to such an arrangement of managerial authority 
and state power by organizing sudden strikes to avoid immediate victimisation by the factory 
management. Strikes extended beyond the confinement of factories and mobilised wider 
industrial action to avoid dealing with the management of single factory.262 Thus, becoming 
a ‘threat’ to factory management as well as the law and order administration in mill towns. 
 
The passing of the Government of India Act 1935, was a major attempt at decolonization 
that allowed Indians more participation in decision-making process at the provincial colonial 
level. After 1935, Bengal Presidency became a regular province with an enlarged elected 
provincial legislature and increased provincial autonomy. The elections of 1937 resulted in 
Congress winning the maximum number of seats yet declined to form government providing 
A.K. Fazlul Huq, from the Krishak Praja Party, to form a government in coalition with the 
All-India Muslim League paving way for a non-Congress government. In the year 1939, 
communist efforts to mobilise workers in Bengal was intense. Especially in the city of 
Calcutta, frequent strikes not only imposed a heavy toll on various Mill and Factory 
Management, but on local administration too. The sheer number of workers who participated 
in strikes could easily be in thousands. Calcutta had numerous Jute Mills, but one of the most 
famous factory establishments in Calcutta was the Bata Shoe Factory on the Budge-Budge 
Road in 24 Parganas. This case study will discuss how the colonial administration used the 
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invocation of Section 144 to deal with an important strike at the Bata Shoe Factory. This 
case study is important because it demonstrates how invocation of public order laws 
sometimes supplemented by police firing during labour protests, argued categories like the 
insiders and the outsiders. Whilst, ‘outsiders’ i.e. people who were not the direct employees 
of the factory and were blamed to be involved in encouraging political confrontations 
became the problem category here. Later, it became difficult both for the colonial 
administration as well as the factory management to sustain the binary of the ‘inside’ and 
the ‘outside’ of the factory. This case study will demonstrate that public order often did not 
know boundaries between the in-factory politics and the politics of the ‘outside’ i.e., the 
broader anticolonial movement.  
  
Right at the beginning of the year 1939, on Sunday morning, January 1st, workers of Bata 
shoe factory who were not happy with certain attitudes of the management and held a 
meeting under the chairmanship of Soumyendra Nath Tagore, a famous Trade Union 
communist leader in Bengal during those times. In the evening workers came to Batanagar 
shouting slogans and expressed their desire to meet the management. The Managing Director 
assured them that their grievances would be considered on Monday, the next day, on the 2nd 
January. According to the newspaper reports, the management directed their supervisors to 
consider their respective departments and called them for a meeting to place the grievances 
of their departments in writing. After the meeting, the management of Bata Factory informed 
the supervisors that Company would reply on Saturday the 7th January. Despite the 
supervisors meeting with management the workers chose to go on strike on Wednesday 3rd 
of January at 4 p.m. in the Leather and Rubber section of the factory. The striking workers 
spent the entire night in the factory buildings but vacated the factory building on Thursday 
around midnight. The representatives of the workers approached the management for a 
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hearing of their grievances and settlement thereof. Meanwhile, many of the other 
departments were working as usual. By 4th of January six thousand workers were on strike. 
The demands that the Union had submitted to the management included issues like 
permanent service, introduction of provident fund, rent for worker’s quarter, free medical 
aid, right to bring their relatives and friends to their quarters, minimum wage to be fixed at 
Rs. 25, one month sick leave with half pay, Muslim workers should be allowed reasonable 
time for namaz, issues concerning victimisation of workers and the recognition of the Union 
by the Company.263 
 
Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that while the workers have no complaint regarding housing 
conditions in Batanagar, their demand is the quarters should not be roofed with corrugated 
sheets and the rent be reduced. The newspaper also reported that the management was 
considering making pucca roofs and as regarding rents, in the case of lowest wages, the rent 
would work out to a proportion of 6 per cent and the case of lowest average wage the rent 
bears a proportion of 4 per cent. The issue of the right to return to work after long leave and 
permanence of service, the newspaper reported that the management felt that the condition 
in Batanagar in both cases is similar to other factories in Bengal. Also, the authorities were 
not opposed to a Worker’s Union but were opposed to the control of the factory union by 
‘outsiders’. The management were willing to consider the ‘legitimate needs and reasonable 
requirements’ of the workers in the Bata factory.264 
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But on the 9th of January, situation got out of control and due to a major clash at the factory 
gates between the Police and the striking factory workers, police had to open fire. A crowd 
of 400 workers who were demonstrating at the factory gates came face to face with a posse 
of armed Gurkha Police when the factory authorities arranged to escort the ‘loyal workers’ 
in lorries. The police attempted to drive back strikers away from the factory gates and had 
to resort to a lathi-charge which was reciprocated by the workers with brickbats, resulting in 
the police opening fire. The Inspector General (I.G.) in his statement alleged that Benoy 
Chaterjee, a communist leader and prominent trade unionist, was addressing a gathering of 
strikers outside the Nangi Railway Station even though section 144 CrPC was in force in the 
area. He added that when Inspector of Sadar ‘A’ Circle, Khagendra Nath Mukherjee, who 
was on duty at the Batanagar factory, saw that a meeting was taking place, he proceeded to 
the spot with 26 policemen in a lorry and found Benoy Chaterjee, addressing a gathering of 
around 2000. He asked Benoy Chaterjee if he knew that section 144 CrPC was in force to 
which he replied affirmatively but persisted that he would instruct the workers in their rights. 
He was arrested and put in the lorry and the police dispersed the meeting. Meanwhile, two 
buses belonging to the company and their ambulance was fetching clerical staff from Nangi 
Railway Station. When the buses and the ambulance arrived at the gates of the factory in 
Batanagar, the strikers, according to the I.G.’s statement attacked these conveyances and 
pulled the staff out of these vehicles. Though the workers statement claimed that they were 
pleading to the staff being ‘imported’ by management from Konnagar, to go away. The 
Inspector after dispersing the gathering at the Station and arresting Benoy Chaterjee for the 
violation of section 144 CrPC, when arrived back at the Batanagar factory, the workers there 
had already confronted the company vehicles fetching the Companies ‘loyal’ workers, with 
brickbats. The inspector when reached inside the factory in the same lorry in which they had 
put Benoy Chaterjee after arrest, was confronted with a crowd of fourteen or fifteen hundred 
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men who attempted to rescue Benoy Chaterjee from the lorry. The Inspector quickly got his 
men and lined them up on the road leading from the main gateway to the office. The 
policemen were few and had lathis. They were attacked with brickbats when they started to 
move forward to charge on the protesting workers.  The Inspector then ordered his armed 
policemen to fire five rounds, one round each. As a result of firing, two men were injured, 
one in the thigh, one sustaining a flash wound only and the other, a fracture of the femur.265 
 
The Inspector General who visited the place of incident later, according to the newspaper 
reports, found a lot of brickbats lying around at the place of this incident. He was confident 
that the Inspector acted strictly with the instructions for the procedure to be adopted in 
dealing with ‘riotous mobs’. Senior Additional Superintendent of Police, Alipore, R. 
Banerjee visited the spot immediately and ‘pacified the strikers by reasoning with them’. 
Regarding the administration K.A. Hill, Collector of 24-Parganas, Mr. A.D. Gordon, 
Inspector General of Police, R.E.A. Ray, Deputy Inspector General, Presidency Range and 
the Sub-Divisional officer, Alipore also visited the place. Mr Pollard, Additional 
Superintendent of Police was the first on the spot with the Armed Police force. The workers 
statement claimed that they were only protesting and pleading with the staff being ‘imported’ 
by the factory management from Konnagar and fell prostrate at the gates of the factory to 
prevent them from entering. To this, the police ordered the workers to disperse, which they 
did not, resulting in the police lathi-charge. Later due to firing, more than 10 workers had 
been seriously injured of which Mohammed Idris and Moklesh Mistry were in precarious 
condition. The management’s version claimed that it was very sorry about the incident but 
the strikers were obstructing ‘loyal’ workers and were led by an ‘outsider’ Benoy Chaterjee 
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who was violating orders under section144 CrPC. Meanwhile the Bengal Trade Union 
Congress Committee (BTUCC) under the chairmanship of Mrinal Kanti Bose also passed a 
resolution at its office where Soumyendra Nath Tagore was also present. The resolution 
condemned the firing on the workers and the one-sided communiqué issued by the 
Government of Bengal which justified the police firing. A demand for the appointment of 
an independent Committee to enquire into the incident by a higher judicial officer was also 
made. The meeting expressed its support to the workers’ demands. The high point of this 
meeting was a tactical move on the part of these ‘outsiders’. They appealed to the public to 
not to use shoes manufactured by the Bata Company till they removed the just grievances of 
workers. A ‘Bata Disputes Committee’ was proposed with members with powers to co-opt. 
Soumyedra Nath Tagore, who was the President of the Bata Shoe Factory Workers’ Union, 
and connected to the larger worker movement in Bengal266 during that time, in his statement 
also condemned the lathi charge and police firing, and maintained that there was no meeting 
at all of the sorts Police claimed. He expressed that the Bata Workers were not allowed to 
bring their relatives to their quarters without the permission from the Company. Calling it a 
‘preposterous regulation’ Tagore argued that the workers were deprived of all civil liberties 
by the Bata Factory Management and the police was used only to intimidate the peaceful 
strikers. He stated that the Inspector acted ‘unlawfully’ because he arrested Benoy Chaterjee 
and took him to the factory compound rather than the police station. Various workers, civil 
society members and student organisations erupted in support of the strikers of Bata Shoe 
Factory. Meetings in parks and squares were held. Meanwhile, Home Minister, Nazimuddin 
paid a visit to the Medical College Hospital where Muhammad Idris who was injured in the 
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Batanagar firing was admitted and was recovering.267 It is pertinent to mention that the 
matter published in the newspapers concerning various meetings in support of the striking 
workers at Bata Factory points out that Idris was engaged in organising the workers on a 
union basis. 
 
Another large meeting of strikers, students and residents of Calcutta took place in the Hazra 
Park on Wednesday at 4 p.m., which was presided by Kartar Singh, secretary, Motor 
Transport Workers Union. This meeting again reiterated the demand to the Government to 
institute an impartial enquiry lead by a judge of the High Court and exhorted the people of 
Bengal to boycott Bata goods till the Company accepted the demands of the Union. This 
meeting also passed a resolution and ‘emphatically protested’ the ‘cruel’ lathi-charge and 
firing on the Bata factory workers. It also resolved to carry out a ‘tearing campaign of boycott 
of all Bata goods till the strike is successfully concluded’.268 K.M. Ahmed, president of the 
Bengal Provincial Students Federation also held a meeting and issued a statement 
condemning the role of the police in the incident calling it “extremely deplorable” and urged 
to all ‘self-respecting citizens’ to boycott Bata products. Meanwhile claims of workers 
returning to work were made by factory management, which were met with denials by the 
Union spearheading the strike. The Bata Shoe Company started to get uncomfortable with 
the appeals of such protests to boycott Bata goods. On Jan 12, the Company issued a 
statement to the Press, which among other things emphasised the disadvantages of such a 
campaign. The statement stressed that while the people calling for boycott were claiming 
that they had the interests of labour at their heart, but they were ‘injuring’ the interests of the 
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labour by making boycott propaganda because even if it met with partial success would 
throw hundreds of workers out of employment. It reiterated its position that the management 
was already considering all these issues and was about to reach a decisive settlement before 
the ‘outside’ elements influenced and upset the possibilities of a peaceful solution to the 
dispute. Additionally, it expressed pride in the institution of Bata factory as recognised by 
hundreds of ‘distinguished persons’ who had visited it. It further argued about its greatness 
by stating that it employs thousands of Indian workers and supervisors, used indigenous 
materials as well as offered cheap and comfortable shoes to the public’.269 The Company 
was not only facing an economic pressure due to the strike but also of moral credibility given 
the appeal for its boycott. Meanwhile the management was claiming in statements that many 
workers had returned to work and appealed to those who had not. But the Union trashed such 
statements as misguiding. 
 
The president of the Bata Shoe Factory Workers’ Union, Soumyendra Nath Tagore issued a 
reply to the management regarding such claims, which was published in the newspaper 
reports. He called the management’s version as ‘mis-statement of facts’. The statement 
claimed that despite all the attempts of the Company to prevail upon workers to join work, 
the strikers have not resumed work but few clerks were functioning in the office. As far as 
the factory was concerned, Tagore stated, it was at standstill. The Company management, 
according to S.N. Tagore’s statement, “indulged time and again in the cheap luxury of using 
the ‘unintelligent’ word “outsiders” in relation to the couple of officers of the Bata Shoe 
Factory Workers’ Union.” He responded that the Union is a registered Union and, non-
worker of the Union is not necessarily an outsider. He expressed his expectation that the 
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Company would change its attitude towards the workers and their chosen representatives. 
We also notice that the formulation of workers’ politics along communist lines was taking 
place. Tagore’s statement retaliated to Company’s statement made a day ago, and 
emphasised that the company is hit hard and therefore was talking of economics, employing 
India and using indigenous raw materials, which he stressed, was simply prompted by the 
concern of capitalist profit. He also highlighted that the company worked to fill its pockets 
rather than serving the workers’ interest.270 
 
While the newspapers reported that fifteen hundred workers were still on strike, the 
Management, which was struggling with the moral pressure of the calls of boycott of Bata 
goods, responded with a statement clarifying their position on their use of the term ‘outsider’. 
According to the statement, the Company used the term ‘outsiders’ to refer to the people 
who were not connected in any way with the Bata organisation.271 Subho Basu has 
demonstrated how Strikes and riots among Calcutta workers in the late colonial period 
revealed that working-class politics did not flow from ‘pre-bourgeois’ religio-communal 
consciousness of workers based on their lack of exposure to urbanization. On the contrary, 
Subho Basu argues, these conflicts were products of the new industrial situation where 
workers tried to adapt themselves to the processes of new work discipline. The Bata workers 
put forward fifteen demands. These included bringing back Mohammed Idris to the Calcutta 
factory,  reinstatement of workers in the same position in case of suspension, freeway to 
relatives of workers to stay with them without the need for review by factory administration, 
reduction of workers rent from 5 annas/week to 3annas/week, old employees to be given 
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preference in case of fresh appointments, permanency of service, arrangement for provident 
fund, expansion of the factory mosque compound for Eid and Bakr-Eid prayers, minimum 
monthly salary to be fixed at twenty five rupees, free medical attendance and doctor’s 
service, efficient workers to be given preference in case of promotions rather than outsiders. 
Furthermore, all workers should be given one month sick leave in a year with half pay, a 
provision for a temple for Hindu workers. Most importantly, the worker’s union already in 
existence and registered should be recognised by the factory management.   
 
To this extensive list of demands, the company accepted a few, rejected some, and made 
assurances on many. It replied that Mohd. Idris could not come back on business grounds 
and a representative of workers could go to Bombay to see him working at the Bombay 
factory. Reinstatement of workers would only be made if not suspended for insufficient 
work, no person would be allowed to stay in workers’ colony without the permission from 
factory lodging department, rent would be reduced to 3 annas until a complete pucca colony 
was built in which case the rent would increase by one anna, preference would be given to 
ex-workers for new appointments only if they were not dismissed for misconduct or 
considered undesirable to new applicants, workers are themselves responsible for 
maintaining the permanency of their service, provident fund scheme was already under 
consideration and was about to be operational soon, Mosque could not be expanded but the 
factory grounds could be utilised heretofore for Eid prayers, subject to the usual statutory 
deductions, the minimum salary for rubber and leather factories would be rupees five per 
week and would come to twenty two rupees monthly provided the workers met the usual 
daily production mark. Some reduction in medical service charges were made corresponding 
to different weekly salaries, a leave of 14 days per year with half average pay was offered to 
only those who worked satisfactorily in a continuous service for one year.  Promotions would 
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be made of efficient workers subjected to the opinion of the department heads and the 
demand for the building of a temple was rejected. Most, importantly, the management 
conveyed that the present union could not be recognised by the Company, but the Company 
was preparing a scheme for forming its own organisation for the welfare of its workers. In 
the said organisations there would be standing arrangements between the workers and the 
management of the Company for representation and Disposal of worker’s grievances.272 
Shobho Basu has argued that urban workers were ‘unsettled settlers’ because  of the lack of 
investment in urban infrastructure like housing and public health by the colonial state and 
the very nature of the urban ecology supplemented by a disposition of colonial industrialism 
governance that preferred temporary workers.273 Basu further argues that an understanding 
that rests on the notion of workers’ entrapment into primordial loyalties274 presents a static 
image of migrant workers’ social and political consciousness and replaces the totalising 
notion of class with another totalising notion of communities based on ethnic identities. The 
entire purpose of regulating housing by the Bata factory management in the case study points 
out that in urban areas migrants depended on village ties often based on caste, religion, 
region and linguistic affiliation. Support from relatives or other community members was 
essential for the migrant labourer to survive during the long waiting periods to find 
employment. Often relatives of fellow villagers helped them to find jobs in the mills.275 Such 
an arrangement existed because of the demands of urban citizenship on the migrant casual 
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labourer and the labourer’s persistent struggle to initially enter and subsequently serve in the 
urban labour market.  
 
Finally, on 16th January, a settlement was reached between representatives of the Bata 
workers and Management of Bata factory. The representatives of Bata Workers met M.L. 
Khaitan and J. Bartos, managing director of the Bata shoes. In the presence of M.L.A. J.C. 
Gupta, both the parties arrived at a settlement and it was decided that the strike had now 
ended and normal work would resume from Thursday, 19th January, 1939. The management 
assured the workers that there will be no victimisation and promised sympathetic treatment. 
The meeting was concluded by signing of a written memorandum by both parties.276 The 
settlement at Bata Shoe Factory was claimed as workers’ victory and all sort of statements 
about the struggle followed. Somyendra Nath Tagore’s statement explaining the terms of 
agreement was published in the newspaper and the Company also agreed to co-operate with 
the workers for getting orders under section 144 CrPC withdrawn and release those against 
whom charges have been brought during the incident. The statement concluded that the 
strike had now been lifted and therefore the boycott that was preached against the Company 
was also removed.277  
 
As soon as the settlement between striking workers and the company was reached, the report 
of the Magisterial enquiry into the firing incident was submitted. The enquiry was 
constituted to deliberate on two issues (1) whether the firing on January 9th by police was 
justified and (2) whether the instructions contained in rule 776 of the Police Regulations, 
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were complied with by the police. It is pertinent to note, that the Inspector General had 
already immediately after the incident issued a statement stating that the action of the 
Inspector was within the rules and instructions to deal with a riotous mob. The enquiring 
magistrate during enquiry, visited worker’s colony and asked the workers to select some 
witnesses to present their version of the case regarding firing. The workers selected five 
persons, who were examined by the Magistrate. The Magistrate examined sixteen witnesses 
in total, including the five workers’ witnesses, the injured men and the doctor. The report of 
the Magisterial enquiry about question (1) stated above concluded that (a) the situation was 
such as to threaten danger to life, (b) nothing short of firing by the police could have 
controlled the situation (c) the rioters were amply warned to desist, but no heed was paid to 
the warning, (d) the firing ceased as soon as the rioters showed signs of dispersing and (e) 
the wounded persons were attended to immediately after the incidents. Regarding question 
(2), the Magisterial enquiry concluded that the provisions of Rule 776 P.R.B. were complied 
with on both the occasions in as much as (a) blank ammunition was not fired (b) ball 
ammunition was used, (c) the rioters were duly warned; (d) the men were instructed to aim 
low and did so, as the position of the injuries indicates. The Magistrate also found out that 
the conduct of the police officer in-charge of the situation was above reproach, and averted 
what might have been a great calamity.278 The magisterial enquiry clearly absolved the 
factory management and police administration of any misconduct. 
 
 
Conclusion II 
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The entire incident raises some important questions about the circumstances of strikes as 
well as incidents of firing and promulgation of section 144 CrPC to deal with labour protests. 
This is not a lone case of labour unrest in Calcutta during January 1939. In addition to Bata 
Shoe Factory workers in Batanagar, Indian Standard Wagons Works in Asansol, Bengal 
Paper Mills in Raniganj, and Busmen in Howrah, all were on strike for one or the other 
demands.279 Most of these situation in addition to firing or not, did experience orders under 
section 144 CrPC. But studying the Bata strike, we observe that there is a difference of 
opinion between the narratives of the police, the Bata Company, and the workers of Bata 
Factory Union regarding the authenticity of workers’ issues raised as well as the leaders of 
a non-recognised representative organisation. But the most significant feature of the entire 
episode related to the wider framework of law and legitimacy. The question of ‘outside’ and 
‘outsider’ creates an interesting tool of analysis to understand the politics of such a situation. 
The ‘inside and outside’ framework has been utilised by Raj Chandravarkar, where he 
studied the continuities between the urban worker and the rural peasant,280 and by Radhika 
Singha in her study of Thuggs,281 where Anti-Thugge campaign laws not only applied to 
Company territories but to territories beyond it. A Thugg, no matter apprehended anywhere, 
could be tried under the jurisdiction of East India company and its laws. In the Calcutta case 
study, the Company considered Benoy Chaterjee as an ‘outsider’, and the workers did not, 
because he was part of their struggle. On the other hand, the company made Idris, one of the 
protestors ‘outsider’ by sending him to work for the Company in Bombay. Also, the 
Company was willing to have a union of the ‘insiders’ only. But at the same time once protest 
meeting against police action started to condemn police action and company’s attitude along 
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with the appeal to boycott Bata goods, the same company got involved in the politics of the 
‘outside’, the larger anticolonial mobilisation. Laws like section 144 CrPC did succeed to 
keep such contestations ‘outside’ a certain area or persons ‘outside’ specific vicinity but it 
could not at times extern politics from the scope of the issue or incident. 
 
Important things follow from this narrative. The use of section 144 CrPC in this case shows 
a clear collaboration of public order laws with the process of economic exploitation of the 
incipient working class by interrupting the political process that made them aware of their 
rights. If elsewhere, section 144 CrPC was used in the aftermath of violence, here it became 
a step facilitating the state’s exercise of violence against workers whose protest was rendered 
illegitimate. This demonstrates the degree of flexibility in the use of laws like section 144, 
which could be used to practically criminalise politics making economic demands, and 
seeking legal protection for basic rights as provident fund, security of tenure, and a certain 
freedom of socialisation. As pointed out above, one of the immediate moves involved was 
the use of the term ‘outsider’. In the case study discussed above, it can be noted that as the 
narrative progressed it was related once again to a tactical and flexible use of ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’ as well as ‘insiders’ who could be made into ‘outsiders’ like Mohd. Idris. It is not 
easy to understand how leaders of workers like Somyendra Nath Tagore and Benoy 
Chaterjee became ‘outsiders’ while J.C. Gupta, the MLA, was not seen as one when he 
presided over the settlement. Here, the most important point is perhaps the subtle shift of 
function – the ability to criminalise a political situation in the name of a problem category 
called the ‘outsider’ and the obscurant total justification of state violence on workers. As 
Suchetana Chattopadhyay has noted that by criminalising early socialist politics and 
projecting it as a potent tool of anti-colonial action, the colonial state ironically facilitated 
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what it had tried to curb and destroy.282 A new category of opponents, aware of the 
mechanisms of colonial surveillance, emerged because of this exercise. The demands of the 
workers of Bata Factory and the response of the MLA and the factory management 
demonstrates that colonial apparatus not only created a system to supress the cultural life of 
factory workers but also provoked and developed cultural alienation. It highlighted a social 
gap between the elites and the working classes. As a result, the political elite assimilated 
colonial mentality and looked down upon the ‘ordinary’, migrant peasant-worker, who did 
not comprehend the efficiency and discipline of urban life and its cultural and economic 
demands. Colonial reports on workers’ unrest repeated their blaming of Congress and 
Communist activists for the creation of labour unrest.283 Especially, after the Government of 
India Act 1935, a fierce combination of worker grievances, anticolonial sentiment as well as 
incapability of dominant political parties to serve the interest of workers, drove a series of 
labour strikes and riots and resulted in major worker’s mobilisations like the Bata Shoe 
factory and beyond. Most significantly, when this case study is seen from a postcolonial 
perspective it has an added implication. On the one hand, it shows the use of section 144 
ostensibly against demands by a section that nationalism saw as its supporters. On the other 
hand, it also displayed a standard tool for dealing with workers’ politics when organised by 
groups like communists.  
 
Conclusion 
The Kot Bhai Than Singh and the Bata Shoe Factory case study highlight two major points. 
One, these case studies point out that the local circumstances on the ground that led to the 
tactical use of section 144 by the colonial administration to curb potential of ‘mob’ violence 
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by banning public protest were diverse in nature and secondly, these case studies further 
demonstrate that the dichotomy of ‘insider(s)’ and ‘outsider(s)’ was often difficult to sustain 
by the colonial administration. Political configurations invigorated by community interests 
or class interests found it convenient to resist prohibition to protest or assemble in groups by 
adopting methods of civil disobedience. Limiting political claims of various groups by 
legitimizing ‘insiders’ problematized colonial state’s legitimacy because in the course of 
these instances, owing to broader anticolonial mobilization, the inside did not remain 
separate from the outside. Infact, as this chapter has demonstrated, there was no outside 
anymore. Colonial tactic of marking problem categories and deeming them outside or the 
outsider(s) began to be challenged in the late colonial period. 
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Chapter three 
Controlling ‘Mobs’ and Maintaining Public Order in Congress-ruled 
Provinces, 1930-1947 
 
Dealing with ‘unlawful assemblies’ to maintain ‘public order’ was one of the primary 
concerns of the colonial government. The use of ‘Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code’ 
(CrPC) was central in this regard. Prohibiting mass gathering, banning both public places 
for public access and individuals from addressing the public were often the basis of 
invocation of this law. All this was done in the name of maintaining ‘public peace and 
tranquillity’. The analysis of the case studies presented in the previous chapter suggests that 
public order laws like section 144 CrPC remained an unchallenged part of administrative 
tactics even after the passing of the 1935 Government of India Act and the subsequent 
elections that took place in 1937, when more powers were granted to Indians, allowing them 
for the first time to form majority governments at the provincial level. The continuing and 
widespread use of colonial tactics of law and order control by the administrations in which 
Indian nationalists held at least a position of responsibility if not power raises important 
questions about how the history of public order legislation would continue after de-
colonization.  Decolonization here simply refers to the moment when the colonial state 
expanded native participation in the structures of governance and decision making. This was 
particularly relevant in those parts of India where the future governing party of Independent 
India – the All India National Congress- could form provincial administrations. Analysing 
how public order legislation was used in UP and Bombay under the guardianship of 
provincial premiers like Govind Ballabh Pant or B.G. Kher - who also became the long-time 
Chief Ministers of the same respective provinces after 1947- allows us to make a larger 
argument about the decolonization of legal regimes in India in the long run.   
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This chapter will argue that public order laws in India were a manifestation of a sovereign 
intention and that they remained an unchanging product of the regulatory will of the 
government in Congress led Provinces like Bombay and UP even after the passing of the 
government of India Act 1935. The chapter will further demonstrate the functioning of the 
everyday state in maintaining law and order, but most importantly, it will point out the nexus 
between the creation of notions of ‘public order’ and the discourse that normalised the use 
of force to deal with them. Such a discourse normalised the use of force by relying on the 
creation of problem categories, a tactic that continued from early colonial administration as 
discussed in earlier chapters through the example of the Thuggs, the Ghadrites, the Akali 
satyagrahis or the agitating workers. In addition to the identification of a ‘problem category’, 
this chapter will exhibit that a binary of outsider-insider was crucial to such an administrative 
strategy. Legal theorist Thanos Zartaloudis while engaging with Giorgio Agamben’s 
scholarship on sovereignty lays out certain paradigms of law. According to Zartaloudis, law 
performs various functions addressing four paradigms namely the ‘reference paradigm’, the 
‘salvation paradigm’, the ‘universality paradigm’ and, the ‘consensus paradigm’.284 The case 
studies will discuss these paradigms towards the end of this chapter and will evaluate their 
impact on the way the law and order situation would unfold in the case studies. In the 
following sections, the narrative of the case studies would point out that the provincial 
Congress ministries in the late colonial period operated on a tightly knit relationship between 
sovereignty, law, and control, at least when it was in government from 1937-1939. 
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The chapter will discuss case studies from Congress-led provinces. One case study from the 
Bombay province and two instances from the towns of Lucknow and Kanpur in the United 
Provinces.  The case study from Bombay will discuss a major incident of ‘communal 
violence’ which started over a game of cards and resulted in the arrest of around 2500 people. 
It enabled the Bombay administration and the provincial Bombay government to invoke the 
category of the ‘hooligan’ or badmash and deploy it as an administrative currency when it 
came to deal with ‘offenders’ in the city. In the U.P case studies, the first is the Cawnpore 
strikes of 1936-38 where Cawnpore was brought to a halt by serious conflict between 
workers and the mill management. The second example to study the use of section 144 is 
the Shia-Sunni conflict in Lucknow in 1937-38 often referred to as Madh-e-Sahaba 
controversy or the tabarra agitations. Both conflicts took place in two major towns of UP 
and lasted for much of the 1930s. However, it was only after 1935 that they emerged as a 
major law and order problem for the UP government. The cities of Cawnpore and Lucknow 
remained a significant ‘law and order’ concern for the colonial administration of the then 
United Provinces Congress government. Though both labour and Shia-Sunni issues 
continued until 1947 and beyond, the period under review represents the height of tension 
and governmental crisis in UP. Both the cases to be examined in this chapter demonstrate 
how majority congress governments in late colonial period, in this case in Bombay and the 
United Provinces, despite having autonomous Congress-led governments resorted to time-
tested colonial tactics to contain civil disturbances or riots. Through the case studies, the 
chapter will also illustrate how Congress as an organisation did not move away from the 
colonial understanding of an alienation between state and society. 
 
The instances of urban conflict to be discussed in these three case studies fit in with a wider 
debate about the relationship between the urban growth and the nature of late colonial 
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politics. Scholars like Raj Narayan Chandravarkar,285 Nandini Gooptu,286 Prashant 
Kidambi,287 Subho Basu,288 Chitra Joshi289 etc., have elaborated on issues concerning rural 
to urban migration, survival of the migrant workers through the sustenance of rural networks 
while working or struggling for jobs in the city, the emergence of a class of ‘troublemakers’ 
from amongst the informal non-regularised workers, contingent workers’ mobilizations 
within the factory and outside or, communal confrontations between communities because 
of the direction of politics at a broader (national) level. But my concern in this thesis is 
different. I am more interested in utilising the existing scholarship such as mentioned above 
and focus more on the questions of law or legal regime, which earlier had only been dealt in 
passing. 
 
Responsibility without Power: Congress and the Government of India Act 1935 
 
The two major constitutional moments of the late colonial period - the Government of India 
Act 1919 followed by the Government of India Act 1935- one Act followed by another, both 
aimed at widening the ambit of colonial model of democracy in India. However, the 1935 
Act faced resistance and rejection, most vociferously from the Congress. Much had to do 
with the internal ideological shifts within the congress party as well as outside it, that later 
left no choice for the Congress but to engage with the new Act. A little context of this 
situation is worthy here. 
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By 1934, the Civil Disobedience movement had fizzled out and Gandhi had temporarily 
withdrawn from political events. Disagreements among various groups within Congress 
emerged mainly on the issues of council entry and office acceptance. Notably, disagreements 
had also erupted earlier when Gandhi withdrew from the Non-cooperation movement. In 
May 1934, the left wing of the Congress formed the Congress Socialist Party within the 
Congress. It was an elusive arrangement of radical nationalism influenced by Marxian 
scientific socialism. The year 1935 was a watershed moment in the late colonial history of 
India. The Government of India Act 1935 was passed in August 1935, but came into force 
only after the provincial elections that took place in February 1937. With the passing of the 
Government of India Act 1935, the late colonial state introduced controlled and limited 
decolonization broadening membership of the provincial assemblies by including more 
Indian representatives and enabled them to form majorities and to form provincial 
governments. Federalism was a core project of the original Act but was never introduced. 
The new Act also increased franchise from seven million to thirty-five million, aimed at 
widening the ambit of colonial democracy. Congress opposed the Act because it argued for 
real power at the central government level, which the colonial state was unwilling to 
consider. Though the Act of 1935 was an important moment in the long process of 
decolonization in India, it achieved two goals simultaneously. It offered increased yet limited 
participation to Indians in provincial decision making and, it also succeeded in distracting 
Indian National movement from demands of an immediate dominion status.  In this regard, 
the Lucknow Congress of 1936 was significant in some ways. Senior Congress leaders like 
Rajendra Prasad and Vallabhai Patel accepted the fact, with Gandhi’s approval, that 
contesting elections and subsequently accepting office, under the Government of India 1935, 
was a better option rather than direct confrontation. Next year, a meeting of the All India 
Congress Committee was held in Bombay in the month of August where a decision to contest 
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elections was made. However, the meeting resolved that decision regarding acceptance of 
office should be deferred until the conclusion of elections. Andrew Muldoon in Empire, 
Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act has observed that “the vision many in British 
governing circles had of the Indian Act raises important questions about the ways in which 
the Raj worked.”290 Other scholars have noted that the supporters of the 1935 Act within the 
British Parliament believed that the plans for federation and provincial autonomy in India 
would effectively counter the growing nationalist movement by potentially creating a split 
in the All India National Congress and would therefore succeed in distracting Indians from 
a united nationalist movement.291 Furthermore, according to the new Government of India 
Act 1935, the British central Government retained the right to suspend provincial 
governments and the provincial governors retained important reserve powers.  Even though 
the Indians believed that they deserved dominion status and powers to run responsible 
governments on its own like Australia and Canada at that time. The British Parliament 
disagreed with such claims. Moreover, Egypt was granted a dominion status and India was 
not despite the enormous contributions of India (both economic and manpower) to Britain’s 
war efforts. Many in India were puzzled as to what Egypt had done to secure dominion status 
or what India had not. 
 
The years 1936-1937 intensified contestation and political articulation in all sections of 
Indian society. The Congress party had announced that it would reject the new Act. while 
also undergoing reconstitution of its provincial Committees. Both Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel were interested in the top job of the Congress supremo and sought 
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to react to the new reality in ways that furthered this aim. A columnist in The Leader in 
December 1936 raised questions regarding Congress’ dilemma as follows: 
 
In December, the National Congress will decide its attitude towards the new 
constitution. Will it enter India’s new Parliament? If it does, will it enter to bring the 
legislative machine to a deadlock, wrecking and obstructing? Or will it accept office 
if in a majority, and work for the constitution?292 
 
This column also pointed out that the Muslim League and other organisations would accept 
the new Act in a somewhat positive spirit, resulting in leaving Congress party no choice but 
to engage with it as well. Because the Hindu leaders would try to recover the ground they 
had lost among other sections of the society, a recovery for the Congress was now possible 
only through the new constitution that the 1935 Act had brought. The column concluded in 
a resilient tone, “But - whatever happens - the new constitution is going to be worked despite 
Indian discontent with it.” 293  
 
Political organisations other than Congress highlighted its dilemma and did not hold back 
from challenging the indecisive Congress on the issue of the new constitution and the 
upcoming elections. Increasing pressure and sharp political attacks from the Muslim League, 
National Liberal Association and National Agriculturists and the Communists forced the 
Congress to make its position clear on the new constitution, which the party had planned to 
postpone until after the elections.294 As the nominations concluded and Nehru was re-elected 
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as the President of the Indian National Congress295, Congress clarified its policy. One 
objection to the new constitution, was that it was imposed from without. But a far greater 
objection was the understanding that it did not give true self-government. In the end the 
matter had to be approached pragmatically: 
 
If the new constitution can be utilised in any measure to take us nearer to that 
supreme goal, there would be no point in refusing to put it to such a use simply 
because it has been imposed by an outside authority.296  
 
The Congress party further explained that even though the party’s manifesto started with the 
presumption that the new legislatures could not yield substantial benefits, it could not be 
ignored that many of the reforms that the manifesto promised it would try to achieve were 
very much within the competence of the new legislatures. The Congress party emphasised 
that the activities of the upcoming legislatures could be to expand the development of 
administrative measures essential to freedom and to help with work on the ground - outside 
the assembly and the Councils - among the masses.  
 
There was also pressure from others. Given the increasing pressure from trade union 
sentiment and peasant leaders, Congress leaders like M.N. Roy made appeals to ‘radicals’ 
to understand and find a pragmatic and country-specific solution to the problem of 
‘socialism’.297 Meanwhile, Mohammad Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League made it clear that 
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they would positively contest upcoming provincial elections with an open mind.298 
Chimanlal Setalvad of the Indian Liberal Association and Liberal Federation, Cowasji 
Jehangir also urged the masses to make the new constitution work by extracting the greatest 
possible good out of it. He suggested that Congress should not outright reject the new 
constitution but rather should try to engage with it. In case if the Governor would interfere 
with the provincial government unreasonably, the new government could always resign.  
 
In UP, there were other voices appearing in newspapers supporting the new constitution. For 
example, a letter to editor in The Leader by one A.A. Zakaullah (probably a Muslim League 
supporter) stated: 
 
The advantages of the new constitution are so self evident and obvious for the Indian 
states and the disadvantages of the refusal to federate so patent that it is difficult to 
understand why the states should not have been able to make up their minds in this 
regard long, long ago and should still be hesitating.299 
 
When Jawaharlal Nehru toured UP regarding canvassing both for an extension of his role as 
the Congress President and for the possible candidates for the upcoming elections in 
February 1937. An important issue in the election would be the Congress’s openly socialist 
rhetoric arguing for the abolition of the zamindari system under Nehru’s leadership. The 
right wing of the Congress was not very happy with this new departure as zamindars 
constituted an important part of the provincial party.  Meanwhile peasants and mill and 
factory workers were growing closer to communist organizations. Many zamindars 
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threatened by the socialist posture of Congress moved towards the National Agriculturist 
party of the Nawab of Chhatari, which represented the interests of the landlord class.  
 
To attract peasantry towards Congress in UP, Nehru took a strong position against the 
zamindari system. By December 1936, when the ‘Indian Congress Agrarian Committee’s 
Report’ came out, it proposed “drastic curtailment of the zamindars’ rights, writing off the 
arrears of rent and the wiping out of debts and alteration of the law of inheritance.”300 The 
Committee also urged the imposition of death duties on zamindari property above a certain 
level and suggested that the rent should be a charge on surplus produce after deducting the 
cost of production and maintenance expenses of peasants. Broadly, the report aimed to 
appeal to a broader mass of people by acknowledging their problems and by taking a very 
comprehensive view of the various defects of the agrarian system. Many letters to the editor 
during this period warned how the drastic curtailment of zamindari rights could have adverse 
effects. The recommendations of the Congress report were more an attempt to emphasise the 
movement’s commitment to the cause of the peasantry and the working classes, rather than 
practical policy suggestions.  
 
To deliver on any of these promises, Congress would have to enter the upcoming elections 
whole-heartedly and win government power at the provincial level. On December 6, 1936, 
the United Provinces Congress Committee elected its new office bearers. Acharya Narendra 
Deo became the new President of the U.P Congress, replacing Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Babu Purshottam Das Tandon, and G.B. Pant 
became the vice presidents. Pandit Keshodev Malviya, Sampurnanand, Pandit Mohanlal 
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Gautam, and Damodar Swaroop Seth became the secretaries.301 Numerous members were 
elected, too. It is apparent from the composition of this new committee that the left wing of 
the Congress was now dominant in the United Provinces Congress Committee.  
 
When Congress entered the electoral arena with full commitment it stated that its sole 
purpose to play along with the new colonial constitution was to ‘wreck’ it. Congress already 
announced in advance that it would observe a hartal on April 1st 1937, the first day of the 
working of the new constitution after the provincial elections, although there were many 
who were sceptical about such policies. 
 
Popular leaders like Madan Mohan Malviya along with other senior leaders had started 
campaigning for the Congress party by December 15th, 1936.302 However, anxiety over who 
to stand and contestations within Congress was appearing in various constituencies, for 
instance in Pilibhit. At times, there were more than one popular Congress leaders in a 
constituency, with local candidates nervous about having to make space for a party stalwart 
from elsewhere.303 Nominations for the new provincial government had to be completed by 
December 20th, 1936. The election to the new provincial assembly and Councils in the United 
Provinces under the new constitution (1935 Government of India Act) had to be concluded 
by the end of February.  
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After nominations were finalised and candidates declared, elections took place amongst 
great enthusiasm. For the United Provinces assembly of 228 seats, Congress won 133, the 
Muslim League 26, the National Agriculturists 22, and independents 47. For the United 
Provinces Legislative Council of 60 seats, Congress won 8, the Muslim League none, the 
National Agriculturists 4, Independents 40 and Europeans 8. The major outcome of the 
election was that Congress emerged as the strongest party in the United Provinces. The 
Muslim League won less than half of the seats reserved for Muslims, only 26 out of 64. For 
the Bombay province assembly of 175 seats, ,  Indian National Congress contested on 110 
seats and won 88, Independents won 32, Muslim League 20, Independent Labour Party 12, 
Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians won 8 and the rest were won by Non-
Brahmans, Democratic Swarajya Party and the Peasants party. Both the provinces saw the 
emergence of Congress as the dominant party in the legislature.  
 
The election process as well as the results released a new potential for Congress in the United 
Provinces. On one hand the Congress Party humiliated the Muslim League by securing a 
majority of the Muslim reserved seats, and emerged as the dominant political voice in UP. 
On the other hand, even after Nehru’s declaration of socialist policies in the election 
manifesto, it failed to secure broad and formidable backing amongst the small-holders of the 
United Provinces because peasants were not usually enfranchised unless they owned some 
land, given the substantial success of the National Agriculturists. Also, there started to 
appear general discontent amongst socialists and Muslims over whether they should be part 
of the Congress’s nationalist movement or not.  
 
The situation in Bombay, the other Congress-led provincial government under review in this 
chapter was subtly different. After the conclusion of 1937 provincial elections, Congress 
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emerged as the winner with majority in the legislative assembly as well as the legislative 
council. However, it declined to form the provincial government. As a result, the Governor 
invited Sir Dhanjishah Cooper, an independent member, to form an interim ministry. The 
interim ministry could not last in the face of an elected majority. In the end, Congress 
ministry under B.G. Kher formed the Bombay government. Kher was a lawyer and the owner 
of a major law firm in Bombay. He served as the premier of Bombay Province in 1937 and 
continued until October 1939, when Congress ministries resigned. Later he resumed the 
premiership of the province from March 1946. A Times of India report published in March 
2007304 discussed declassified MI5 documents referring to the ‘Anglophilia’ of the London 
High Commissioner Krishna Menon. The same set of MI5 documents, however, described 
B.G. Kher, the successor of Menon as “a good choice” as the London High Commissioner 
because he was “discovered by a European solicitor” earlier in the late colonial period. He 
was acceptable to the MI5 because he was perceived to regard British or Anglo-Saxon 
“ways” as superior to others. Notably, such a British perception of Kher had sustained itself 
through the tumultuous post 1935 late (anti)colonial politics in India. Another Congress 
legislator K.M. Munshi, who served as the Law Minister in the 1937 Kher led Congress in 
Bombay province would also be appreciated by the colonial officials in the Bombay case 
study for his colonial-like response to the law and order situation in Bombay at a time when 
Congress was at the helm of provincial government in the province. 
 
 
Case Study I 
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From a game of cards to a full-blown riot: Instant communalism, 
‘hooligans’ and the passing amendment to the City of Bombay Police Act 
in 1938. 
 
Like the Punjab, Bombay province experienced a period of heightened communal tensions 
in the 1930s. Political conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League was 
particularly intense, and with it debates about how to police and safeguard law and order. 
This case study will discuss communal confrontation between Hindus and Muslims in the 
city of Bombay, when men belonging to these communities had a disagreement during a 
game of cards. A seemingly insignificant and ordinary incident became a larger communal 
event leading to rioting at different localities in the city leaving quite a few dead and many 
more injured. The consequent police action led to the arrest of hundreds of people. A broader 
survey of Governor’s fortnightly reports from Bombay did offer a diverse set of case studies 
ranging from occasional communal conflicts and labour riots but the case study being 
focused on in this section offers a distinctive understanding of maintaining law and order in 
the Bombay province. In addition to the communal riot that initiated the entire episode 
necessitating the invocation of a preventive law like section 144 followed by curfew, this 
case study demonstrates the significance of ‘problem categories’ in the dynamics of utilising 
law and order issues for larger administrative benefits.  Swift decision of instituting 
extraordinary measures by the Bombay administration was followed by instituting a new 
provision for the expulsion of ‘problem categories’ by the Police Minister. Later, the judicial 
proceedings of people arrested for the violation of such preventive orders add to our 
understanding how ‘extraordinary’ times made the judiciary act while conducting trials for 
the violation of such orders. This case study highlights that the colonial mind-set got 
normalised amongst the Indian Ministers too, eventually.  
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Bombay city and the casual immigrant worker 
 
The city of Bombay was significant to the British empire because of its location, as a port, 
and remained one of the central points of its trade. In 1872, a formal census recorded the 
total population of the city to 644, 405. These figures kept growing with the influx of 
migrants from various parts of the country, seeking work at ports and various mills and 
factories the city had.305 By the end of 1930s, the total population of the city had increased 
to 1, 489, 883 as enumerated in 1941. In the beginning of the twentieth century Bombay as 
a province enjoyed special status in the colonial government.  
 
The city had many informal labourers because of the diverse industry such as ports, cotton 
mills, railways etc., that offered employment opportunities not only to the educated but the 
distressed peasant from outside Bombay who did not benefit as much from cultivation 
anymore and sought a steady income.306 The migration of labourers into the city of Bombay 
commenced in the 1880s and accelerated in the early twentieth century. Scholars have noted 
that the supply of labourers was reinforced by migration from Northern parts of India307 and 
majority of them were employed on a casual basis or in the small manufacturing units 
evading regulations of the Factory Act.308 Prashant Kidambi has argued that the crises in the 
form of large scale urban riots309 that the city went through in the 1890s initiated changes 
																																																						
305 Royal Commission on Indian Labour: Memorandum from the Government of Bombay (Bombay, 1929) 
page 3. 
306 See, Claude Markovits, Claude. ‘Bombay as a Business Centre in the Colonial Period: A Comparison with 
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307 Upadhyay, S.B. Cotton Mill Workers in Bombay, 1875 to 1918: Conditions of Work and Life, Economic 
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308 See Chandavarkar, R. S., The Origins of industrial capitalism in India: business strategies and the working 
classes in Bombay, 1900-1940, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1994, pp72-123. 
309 Prashant Kidambi has noted that there were two large scale riots in the 1880s. The first, a sectarian conflict 
between Hindus and Muslims, took place on 11 August 1893 resulting in the death of 80 people. It led to fifteen 
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between the state and society in Bombay. As a result, the colonial state hereon adopted a 
more interventionist approach to urban governance.310 The Royal Commission on Indian 
Labour published its report in 1929 and noted that the unruly labourer in Bombay was 
primarily an “agriculturist” and not a disciplined one. To transform the “agriculturist” into 
an “effective” worker, the Commission recommended significant changes to the existing 
regime of production through new technologies of labour management. Valerian DeSousa 
has argued that the Commission’s recommendations along with other studies and reports on 
labour, became the basis of a series of labour laws that were enacted between 1911 and 1936 
and saw the arrival of  the “modern” labour subject.311 An interventionist approach led to a 
fractious relationship between the colonial state and the society but it also led to the growth 
of a civil society comprising of association of educated Indians who came to believe in a 
new ethic of social service that aimed to improve and uplift the urban poor. 312 The large 
scale urban riots that took place in the 1890s also led to the “rapid growth of an unregulated 
proletarian ‘secondary economy’ and public culture centred on street”313 which came to be 
seen as a threat to the public order of the city that had already undergone massive industrial 
urbanisation and labour migration. This case study tends to agree with Prashant Kidambi’s 
framework where he alerts us to see colonial state neither as omnipotent nor too fragile. 
Kidambi has highlighted that focusing merely on the processes of mutual accommodation 
and reciprocity between the colonial state and the society downplays the conflictual logic 
																																																						
hundred arrests under the ‘unlawful assembly’ laws. The second one occurred on 9 March 1898, as result of 
colonial state’s frenzied attempts to suppress a major plague epidemic that broke out in Bombay city. A police 
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that governed the relationship between the colonial police and the urban working classes. 
Everyday relations between the colonial police and the poor were marked by persistent 
antagonism and friction. Kidambi has highlighted the significance of the new police Act 
which was introdued in 1902. The 1902 Police Act, according to Kidambi, “rendered the 
police an increasingly obtrusive presence in the social relations of the street and the urban 
neighbourhood.” 314  He noted: 
 
[T]he wide powers granted to the police by the new act, in a context where its very 
limitations precluded a comprehensive and consistent enforcement of the law, served 
especially to amplify the scale and dimensions of the potential friction between the 
police and the urban poor in the years leading up to the First World War.315   
 
An army of leisurely rioters 
 
The growing army of casual workers in the city of Bombay, who, given the nature of their 
employment, would resort to playing cards in parks in their past time while waiting for new 
job opportunities. On April 17, 1938, it was a usual evening in Bombay when men gathered 
in local places to play a game of cards and smoke beedis and cigarettes and sip chai, when 
trouble broke out. A group comprising both Hindus and Muslims were playing a game of 
cards at Northbrook Gardens around 6 p.m., fell out and had an argument. Soon groups of 
men, who most probably were casual workers, which were later referred to as ‘hooligans’ in 
the newspaper reports, belonging to both the communities formed in the garden which was 
generally frequented by members of both communities. The altercation escalated and these 
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groups confronted each other resulting in a fight with sticks and stones. Soon after, a police 
force from Mahar Bavdi police station under Deputy Inspector Sohrabji rushed to the spot 
and stopped the fight. One person was injured in the fight and given the volatile situation a 
police picket was posted on the spot. The city appeared to be quiet for almost two hours after 
the incidence, but a rumour spread in the meantime that a serious communal fight had taken 
place in Northbrook Gardens. By 9 p.m. the tension had spread to localities like Bapu Khote 
Street, Null Bazar, Erskine Road, Chowki Mohalla, Duncan Road and Bhendy Bazar. Most 
of the clashes took place in Duncan Road where the police had to open fire thrice. But the 
first serious fight between the two groups took place at the junction at Bapu Khote Street 
and Erskine Road, near Null Bazar. By 9.15 p.m., a tramcar passing Golpitha towards 
Pydhonie was stopped by a mob at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Erskine Street. 
The mob pelted stones at the tram, injured the driver, and then attacked passengers, three of 
whom were stabbed with knives. There was a general scene of violence in various localities 
and, stones and soda-water bottles were hurled at each other from all directions by the mob. 
The police did arrive on the spot after some time and dispersed the crowd. The initial 
altercation over the game of cards, which had now become a full-blown riot spread to other 
localities, especially to Null Bazar and Duncan Road areas. Many people returning home 
from work that day were taken unawares and were assaulted with knives in lanes and street 
corners. Within half an hour of the commencement of the disturbance, over 25 people were 
taken to the J.J. Hospital. The assaults continued until 10 p.m. that night resulting in more 
people taken to J.J. Hospital.  
 
The police by now had the sense that situation was getting out of control which prompted 
them to post pickets at all strategic points in Mahar Bavdi area. The situation did not get any 
calmer as even after 10 p.m. groups of Hindus and Muslims began to collect at Duncan Road. 
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When these groups were throwing stones, brickbats and soda-water bottles at each other near 
Mutton Street, the police officer on the spot Inspector Lyon had to fire two shots to disperse 
the crowd. Shortly after, two other groups started fighting in a similar situation. When 
Inspector Sohrabji with some constables rushed to the spot and asked the crowd to disperse. 
The mob turned abusive towards him and shouted, ‘beat the police’. Sensing the situation 
spinning out of control, Inspector Sohrabji fired three shots to disperse the mob. Five people 
were killed that night including a faqir sitting near the Round Temple at Golpitha, and a 
fitter in the G.I.P. Railway, who was going along Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola Road. Both were 
stabbed by a group of ‘hooligans’. The fitter Ganpat died on the spot while his friend was 
taken to the J.J. Hospital. Bhimbai, a film actress, who was going in a bus at Null Bazar was 
also stabbed in her left arm and was also taken to J.J. Hospital for treatment. Many stray 
assaults took place that night resulting in altogether fifty persons being taken to J.J. Hospital, 
of whom thirty had to be admitted. Eleven persons who sustained knife injuries in the Null 
Bazar area were taken to the G.T. Hospital where six of them were admitted. 
 
 The traffic was stopped in the city following assaults in various localities. The Minister for 
Law and Order (Home Minister) K.M. Munshi had to cut short his visit to the south of the 
Bombay Presidency after being informed about the situation. He immediately visited the 
affected areas and held a conference at the police headquarters. As a result, the Chief 
Presidency Magistrate Mr. Kandalawala, issued orders under section 144 CrPC prohibiting 
any gatherings of five or more people and the carrying of lethal weapons. At the same time, 
he issued a curfew order, which was to operate between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. for fourteen days 
beginning from 18th April 1938, the next day.316 
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In the meantime, the police began strenuous efforts to round up the ‘Mawalis’317, as they 
were referred to in the newspaper reports, in the disturbed area of Null Bazar. Next day, the 
newspapers reported, “the greatest safeguard of all has been the arrest of over 400 men on 
suspicion of being what can be described as badmashes.” These ‘Basdmashes’ according to 
the report were “carefully hand-picked by police during the day” and were to be detained for 
fourteen days at least. Many of them had knives, sticks or lethal weapons in their possession. 
Orders were served on several vernacular newspapers like Khifat-e-Roaznamah, Insaf, 
Prabhat, Al-Hilal and Sadaqat, warning them against publishing anything that might inflame 
the ‘religious susceptibilities’ of the people. However, they were permitted to publish news 
and articles with the previous approval of the Director of Information.318 It is unclear as to 
why the vernacular press had to be regulated if it were the ‘hooligans’ who were responsible 
for the mayhem. We know that the political climate in Bombay was particularly 
confrontational between the Congress party and the Muslim League after the introduction of 
provincial politics with the passing of the Government of India Act 1935. 
 
Instituting curfew and prosecuting the ‘hooligans’ 
 
The government enforced the curfew orders very strictly arresting anybody who even 
unknowingly or innocently violated it. 10 p.m. was the time everybody had to be indoors or 
else police would arrest. The Commissioner of Police, Mr. W.R.G. Smith, visited all the 
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disturbed localities and discussed with the police officials the arrangements for the 
enforcement of the orders meant for the ‘preservation of peace’. By 19th April 1938, 
headlines were reporting that the ‘situation is (was) under control’. The total number of 
deaths resulting from the disturbances was eight and the injured were 89. The total number 
of arrests made by the police from the commencement of the disturbances on Sunday night 
up to 9.pm on Tuesday was approximately 740, most of them were the ones rounded up by 
the police as ‘bad characters’ while the rest were the ones arrested for disobeying curfew 
orders. Over 500 persons who were arrested either on the suspicion of being involved in the 
disturbances or for the breach of Chief Presidency Magistrate’s orders or the Police 
commissioners ban were placed before Mr. Oscar H. Brown and Mr. W.K. Mankar on 
Monday and Tuesday immediately. Some of the arrested were allowed bail while others 
were sent to jail. Many people who were arrested for defiance of orders of curfew were 
people who got late to reach their home from work. The Magistrates were very strict while 
dealing with these cases. In the case of a man who was arrested at Abdul Rahman Street by 
the Commissioner of Police himself, his lawyer pointed out that ‘there was a 
misunderstanding’ that led to the arrest of his client. The Magistrate replied sternly that the 
“[t]he misunderstanding is all on your side.” The judge, in a way, made it clear that the 
administrative decisions are final. Any assessment of a situation by the administration during 
a disturbance to public order was reasonable.  Later, when a batch of four persons wanted to 
make a speech about their innocence, which the magistrate cut short and responded that 
“[y]our speeches are all very well in normal times. But these are abnormal times and your 
place is everywhere.” The reference to time and space by the magistrate is significant here. 
In instances of public disturbances, when the administration had instituted a curfew, the 
permission to be present in a public place was restrictive. A person could not be in public 
place after the curfew had begun which meant the public time would be before 10 PM only. 
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Therefore, a peculiar fracture between the public and private emerged. However, after 10 
P.M., one will only have a private time, within the four walls of their home, with their family.  
 
Another case emerged when the railway police arrested a woman under the Arms Act who 
arrived from Delhi with a swordstick. Her lawyer pleaded with the judge that she bought the 
stick at Mathura station because she fancied it and was ignorant of the law. The magistrate 
observed that he was allowing bail in this case just because she was a woman, otherwise she 
would have been sternly punished. Similarly, numerous such cases were tried. Some accused 
were remanded to jail custody for a fortnight while others were allowed a bail of Rs. 500 
with a surety of Rs. 200 to be deposited. Some managed to get a bail on lesser amounts.319 
In total some 2500 persons were arrested for defying one or the other order.320 The sheer 
scale of the arrests during this riot, made by the Bombay police, was ostentatious. Recurrence 
of the disturbances once again began after a comparative peace and quiet of three days 
following rumours, which unfortunately, could not be traced in the archive. These renewed 
clashes did not last but resulted in the death of one person and seven injured.321 Meanwhile, 
on April 28th, 1938, there were talks scheduled between Jinnah and Gandhi on the communal 
question related to representation, participation and other political contestations in India. 
 
Legislating new extraordinary law for the sake of public peace: the desperation of the 
provincial government in Bombay 
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What is significant about this incidence of riot, which is one among many such instances in 
the Bombay Presidency, is that it had an administrative dimension involved too. In a 
confidential letter322, Roger Lumley, the Governor of Bombay to Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy 
and Governor-General of India appreciated the measures taken under the guidance of the 
Congress Ministry as prompt and effective and expressed that Munshi, the Home minister 
deserved considerable credit for his efforts to deal with those riots. He also revealed that 
even though the Commissioner of Police as well as the Secretary to the Home Department 
and the Governor himself were away, Munshi, shouldered the entire responsibility for 
containing the situation himself and “set the Police arrangements for the situation working 
at once,” and “instituted a curfew order”, “promulgated section 144 and forbade the carrying 
of weapons.” This act on the part of Munshi anticipates decolonization, where a Congress 
Minister acted by himself to use a notorious preventive legislation from the colonial era. 
This points out that the colonial state was considerably successful in normalizing its 
administrative strategy of calculated repression to Indian Ministers. Munshi, a Congress 
minister, acted exactly like a British administrator, by making large scale arrests, instituting 
a curfew and branded unruly mob as ‘hooligans’.  
 
The Governor, as the letter reveals, did not believe that the outbreak of riot could be put 
down solely to the card-playing incident. He believed that the main cause was the growing 
tension amongst the ‘Mahomedans’, due to the propaganda of the Muslim League that 
Mahomedans were in danger of being swamped by Congress. Meanwhile several Muslim 
newspapers that published some ‘very inflammatory’ articles were to be prosecuted once the 
situation would stabilise. Roger Lumley asserted that he had no doubt that ‘this tension 
																																																						
322 Report No. 15, Confidential, Yellapur, 1st May 1938, (Page 88 of the File L/PJ/5/156) from Roger Lumley, 
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amongst Mahomedans was the main cause of the trouble’ and some Ministers had expressed 
that ‘it was a deliberate plan by the Muslim League in order to discredit the Congress 
Government, which is(was) anyways perceived as a weak government’.  
 
This letter also provides us with evidence that Munshi, the Home Minister of Bombay 
Government had much more than controlling the immediate situation on his mind. As 
Lumley wrote, “Munshi has taken the opportunity provided by this situation”323 to introduce 
in Assembly a Bill intended to restore to the Police the power deporting undesirable elements 
from Bombay City. Most pertinently, powers of such nature existed in the Bombay Police 
Act just a couple of years earlier but was rendered inoperative by a decision of the Bombay 
High Court. Lumley was quite hopeful that the Bill would not be unduly whittled down 
because he thought that the power to deport ‘bad characters’ who congregated in Bombay 
was an “important weapon for helping to preserve the peace of the City.”324 
 
Thus, the fractious relationship between colonial state and society, as argued by Prashant 
Kidambi, was rejuvenated in the aftermath of these riots. The case study demonstrates that 
the Bombay Police Act 1902, which was repealed, was now to be replaced by a similar 
stringent law. It appears that the late colonial state, even after provincial governments were 
setup, sought to replenish its power by resorting to legislate extraordinary laws which would 
aim to create the image of a strong government. However, in the process it also exposed 
administrative vulnerabilities, now not only of the colonial administrators but Congress 
Ministers too. 
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Another confidential letter325 from J.M. Sladen, Secretary to the Government of Bombay to 
J.A. Thorne, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, reveals to us that the 
Bill was introduced on April 25th and was passed in its third reading on April 29th and even 
the usual seven days of time required in the process was also waived off in this matter. The 
recent riots in Bombay ‘emphasised the urgency of the necessity’ for a law empowering 
police to outlaw/deport individuals from the city in order to restore peace and. The object of 
this Bill, Sladen’s letter points out, was to ‘rearm’ the Commissioner of Police. He clarified 
further that the older section was dealing with such issues quite irregularly. This law now 
had safeguards and among others right to appeal to the Government against Commissioner’s 
order. The person aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner was given the right to appeal 
to the Provincial Government. The Government was already anxious to get ‘the Bill to 
amend the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902’ passed as soon as possible given the elections 
to the District Local Boards in the Northern and Central Divisions were due to take place 
very soon. Some sections of the opposition were not ready to accept the ‘urgency’ of the Bill 
and therefore the second reading of the Bill took about ten days and the Bill was passed only 
on the second instant. On April 25th, during the discussion of this Bill the Speaker for making 
an objectionable remark against the Chair expelled one of the opposition members S.L. 
Karandikar for a day because he was unwilling to withdraw that remark. Unfortunately, we 
know nothing of this remark. Sladen’s letter brings to our attention that many perceived the 
Bill as ‘reactionary’, giving excessive powers to the executive. However, the Government 
managed to pass this Bill ‘almost unchanged’ by the House. In fact, Dr. Ambedkar proposed 
adding a section, which gave Police wider powers for expelling bad characters during a 
period of emergency such as riots. The question of declaration of an event as an ‘emergency’ 
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calling upon such powers to be used, as incorporated in Dr. Ambedkar’s amendment arose 
only in case of riots or factional fights, when people had to be deported. The Government 
accepted the section with certain amendments. But the Governor in his report of 17th May 
was quite pleased with what he described as Munshi “getting away” with ‘something’ that 
no one realised. It appears what J.M. Sladen was delighted about in his communication with 
J.A. Thorne, was the success of the colonial government in making the Congress Ministers 
see the ‘mob’ as always unruly and unpredictable, and accepting the administrative logic 
that such threats to public order could only invite stricter, extraordinary laws. The Congress 
ministers, it would seem, had graduated in colonial administrative tactics now. 
 
Meanwhile, carrying on with the commendation for the Government and particularly 
Munshi’s handling of the riot situation, the non-Muslim League press continued to shower 
praise on him. They emphasized that Munshi had ensured that the City of Bombay Police 
Amendment Bill was aimed at ‘hooligans’ and ‘pucca mawalis’, and thus it was an attempt 
to prevent violent outbreaks only. Because similar laws in the past had been used against 
thieves, ‘dadas’, ‘mawalis’, pimps and smugglers but in no case, it had been applicable to 
any political worker or a worker in an economic cause. Earlier, preventive sections of law 
were used ordinarily when riots occurred. But in 1935, as one of the newspaper reports, 
although there were no riots, 282 persons were dealt with using such powers. In 1936, when 
riots occurred between October and December, 577 persons were dealt with this law and in 
May 1937, when there were riots 540 persons were dealt with using such laws by the 
police.326 It is pertinent to mention, that though the law was promulgated by the District 
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Presidency Magistrate, carried out by various police officers of different ranks, cases in 
hundreds tried by judges, yet Munshi remained the centre of colonial praise. 
 
Ambedkar in his speech during the discussion on the amendment bill called the amendment 
‘thoroughly justified’327 even though others like Jamnadas M. Mehta representing Railway 
Labour, felt that the Bill was ‘objectionable’ and moved an amendment aiming to restrict 
the life of the measures till the last session of the Legislative Assembly. Jamnadas M. Mehta 
argued that a measure of such character, hurriedly drafted and rushed through, could not stay 
on the Statute book permanently. He further contended that the Bill once placed permanently 
on the statute book would affect the 1,200,000 people in Bombay city and therefore, violated 
the fundamental right of citizens, which were guaranteed by one of the resolutions passed at 
the Karachi session of the Congress. R.R. Bhole representing Poona moved another 
amendment to Mehta’s amendment seeking to limit the life of the Bill to two years. I.I. 
Chundrigar representing Ahmedabad, adding to Bhole’s amendment remarked that the right 
to determine whether the person was mawali or not was left solely in the hands of the 
Commissioner of Police which could turn out to be quite autocratic. Both Mehta’s and 
Bhole’s amendment was rejected by 53 to 27 votes and 54 to 28 votes respectively.  
 
What the legislative assembly debates highlight is that extraordinary laws or exceptional 
laws were perfectly acceptable to both the British and the Congress if it did not deal with 
imminent politics but focused on known problem categories. Similar strategy was adopted 
by the colonial administration in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century too as 
demonstrated by the earlier chapter. In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the issue of 
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problem categories will emerge frequently, highlighting the continuous relation between 
problem categories and the invocation of extraordinary legislation. Gramsci had argued that 
the ruling class could manipulate the value system and mores of a society, so that their view 
becomes the world view.328 Terry Eagleton proposes that Gramsci’s use of the word 
hegemony refers to a governing power which wins consent to its rule from those it 
subjugates.329 However, Ranajit Guha from the subaltern school of thought proposed 
hegemony to be a kind of persuasion. As per Guha’s subaltern thesis, the Indian case 
experienced dominance without hegemony. In colonial India, political coercion outweighed 
persuasive cultural hegemony in civil society and this carried over to the post-independence 
period as well. The postcolonial elite had distinctly different interests that the subaltern 
groups in the new nation. Guha argues this split in the politics of the state meant that the 
indian bourgeoisie, unlike the European bourgeoisie, failed to establish Gramscian cultural 
hegemony over Indian subalterns. The inability of the colonial state and the independent 
nation to assimilate civil society into political society led the state to exercise dominance 
without hegemonic consent.330 However, we notice that the Congress ministries even before 
independence had internalized the colonial administrative strategy of dominance. The 
colonial state had to often resort to dominance because it partially failed to establish 
hegemony in the face of a persistent anticolonial mobilization. We notice, that the provincial 
government in Bombay in 1938, could not persuade the inhabitants of the city to remain 
peaceful, now that they had their own ministry. Munshi’s first administrative reflex was to 
resort to the time-tested formula of the colonial state, depending on extraordinary laws and 
problem categories.   
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We know that Bombay was a major industrial centre in colonial India with numerous mills 
and factories in the city. It was also an important port for sea trade. It was a city which was 
full of migrant labour from United Provinces, Bengal, Hyderabad and the nearby Konkani 
region. These workers both in factories and outside served in formal as well as informal 
labour sector. The new law that the provincial government aimed to legislate to control 
‘hooligans’ appears to be aimed at them. Also, the unrestricted powers granted to a 
Commissioner to declare person(s) as hooligan or badmash highlights the autocratic 
tendencies present in the late colonial administration, now provincially led by Indians, when 
it came to maintaining ‘public peace and tranquillity’. The Bombay Amendment Bill got 
passed despite reasonable objections and the Governor was right in saying that Munshi had 
got away with something nobody realised. The Al-Hilal and the Khilafat, two Urdu daily 
newspapers of Bombay which were publishing objectionable matter for some time and 
tended to excite communal hatred, were finally booked. As the Governors situation report 
for 2nd June 1938, highlights that action against them for exciting communal hatred had been 
under consideration for quite some time. The outbreak of communal rioting in Bombay and 
the consequent emergency orders issued against these papers under section 144 CrPC had 
caused the postponement of further action. However, Al-Hilal and Khilafat, the Urdu daily 
newspapers of Bombay moved an application to the High Court challenging the validity of 
the orders served on them under section 144 CrPC by the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The 
case was heard by the High Court and judgement was given on 30th September where the 
court found that there was insufficient material to justify the order and that the Magistrate’s 
delegation of discretion to another officer to censor the newspaper articles was ‘illegal’ and 
directed that the orders be set aside. It is noteworthy that like in the case of Punjab case study 
discussed above pre-emptive legislation was open to scrutiny from the courts after the event.  
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Being one of the most important trade cities for the empire, the Government of Bombay 
enjoyed direct access to the Secretary of State, on all matters except financial. Therefore, it 
could appeal against virtually any order of the Government of India. Furthermore, it 
possessed a special cadre of the Indian Civil Service and had full autonomy in making 
provincial appointments.331 Overall, the political framework after the passing of the 
Government of India Act 1919 and later 1935, delegated powers to provincial governments. 
It meant that the provincial governments enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy from 
the central Government of India. Decolonization here, is understood as the moment when 
the colonizer was willing to allow limited decision-making participation of the colonised in 
the everyday government. They had substantial financial and law-enforcement powers. In a 
way, the ends of the colonial government would now be pursued by the provincial 
governments, lead by Indians, autonomously in their own ways. 
 
The above discussed case study highlights some important issues. The case study offers a 
very clear illustration of several watermarks in the career of laws like section 144, curfew 
etc. containing emergency provisions in the late colonial period. It is evident that these laws 
were being invoked regarding specific cases of disorder but furthered other aims like dealing 
with vernacular media and marking certain individuals/classes as hooligans as well as 
replenishing the ambit of coercion entailed by foregone administrative reforms. However, 
administrative tactics of invoking extraordinary legislation, like in the case of Al-Hilal and 
Khilafat newspapers in Bombay, sometimes did get rescinded in the court of law 
highlighting the fact that such orders were not always logical. Also, the creation of new 
provisions when similar laws were already available only points out the colonial hunger for 
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extraordinary laws. Moreover, it also shows that such law-making always had certain 
calculations in mind mostly ambitions to bypass basic rule of law or to cover up 
administrative vulnerabilities. Notably, sometimes Congress politicians like Munshi 
themselves took charge of the situation to actively argue in favour of such extraordinary 
provisions. 
 
Munshi’s course of action was like earlier British colonial administrators, whose perspective 
stemmed from an urge to act against crime as acting against degeneration. The creation of a 
yet another extraordinary law by Munshi to tackle ‘hooligans’ was both judicial and 
extrajudicial at the same time. It was commanded by the principle of universal justice but 
was simultaneously informed by a sense of constant surveillance of hooligans i.e. mostly the 
casual immigrant workers. The scope of the new extraordinary law on the inhabitants of 
Bombay was based on an understanding of surveillance as observing, controlling and 
intervening in the details of social life. Bombay like the Punjab case study, involved problem 
categories within city/society as constant and universal. A defined problem category of the 
hooligan had the undefined potential of universality. New extraordinary law was established 
by the congress minister to be applied to his own constituency. We can notice that in the 
name of problem category there was ample room for universal surveillance. The resultant 
prosecution under the new law would lead to either banishment from the city limits or 
confinement in jail. Furthermore, large scale riots, like in the case of Bombay, did not just 
establish a staging for collective action, but constituted it. Riots in such a context should not 
be seen merely as weakening or abolition of administrative power but rather a theatre of 
power. Large scale collective action like riots managed to reconstitute power, often in the 
hands of administrators who would expand the ambit of law much beyond the actual rioters. 
Colonial administrative power while responding to disturbances did not just repress riots, it 
	 189	
continued it, in the form of penal practices, and in general everyday activities of law. Both 
the British colonial and the late colonial congress provincial government demonstrate an 
agreement that the criminal/ badmash/ hooligan/ mawaali, etc., was the enemy of ‘public 
order’. The delinquent figure of the ‘hooligan’ could be like that of a vagabond in a 
Foucauldian vein, where a vagabond’s status as a criminal emerges from lack of work and 
lack of firm identity in the community. The non-belonging of the mawali or the vagabond, 
it can be argued, was based on the lack of his exact location in the immediate society that 
put him outside the established system of responsibility accrued by defined crimes. Above 
all, a hooligan was proposed to be one who stood outside society, threatening it with both 
individualised as well as collective unauthorized violence.  Such a wholesale definition of 
the enemy of public peace, based on the social contract itself, aimed to define the 
‘mawali/hooligan’ as the enemy of the state and society and, led to evasion of thinking about 
crime more in terms of very particular transgressions, which was the original stated intention 
of criminal procedure code. The colonial state had already institutionalised and 
professionalized criminal justice system by the 1930s, however, we notice that in the late 
colonial period like in Bombay, resorting to extraordinary laws citing threat to public peace 
by specific problem categories opened way for a sociological takeover of persons or groups 
by the extraordinary laws enabling possibility of heterogeneous outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Case study II 
The Mazdur Sabha and the Mill Strikes in Kanpur 1936-1938  
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The Bombay case study discussed above and the Calcutta case study discussed in the earlier 
chapter highlight late colonial tendency to criminalise the agitating worker or the ‘urban 
poor’. There was substantial conflict between the right wing and the left wing of the 
Congress over the socialist rhetoric adopted by the latter. Such an approach destabilised 
Congress’ hold over mass organisation, leading to open disenchantment of the Congress 
Socialist Party. As mentioned above, the Congress Socialist Party was an organisation 
floated in May 1934 within the larger Congress party by its left-wing members. The possible 
connection between the emergency of a socialist wing can be deduced from what Shahid 
Amin and Gyan Pandey have written on the nature of peasant mobilization in the United 
Provinces (then Oudh/Awadh) in the early twentieth century and have amply demonstrated 
its militant character. Shahid Amin has highlighted how the local peasant commodity-
production often depended on questions such as timing of harvest, the timing of the need for 
money and the dates when rents would fall due.332 Misalignment between any of these 
factors would lead to peasant distress at the hands of moneylenders and zamindars. Gyan 
Pandey333 has demonstrated how peasant mobilization against the Oudh Rent Bill during the 
1920-1922, created a peasant political consciousness which was at times inspired by the 
figure of Gandhi and at other times motivated by very local factors. But what remains most 
notable in Gyan Pandey’s analysis is the emergence of Kisan Sabha as the most potent 
organization wielding substantial influence on the UP peasantry. It was also during the 
period when peasant unrest in the rural United Provinces was prominent that Jawaharlal 
Nehru ‘discovered’ the ‘peasant’. Pandey had noted that despite the ‘localism’ and 
‘isolationism’ of the peasant movement in Awadh, “it needed an ally among other anti-
imperialist forces in the country. But the chief candidate for this role, the party of the 
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growing urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, had turned its back on the peasant movement 
long before that time.”334 When the Kisan Sabha signalled that it was ready to learn 
organized politics from the Congress, the Congress ignored, if not declined, Kisan Sabha’s 
offer of association because Congress an organization was pledged to Gandhian idea of non-
violence. The Kisan Sabha, on the other hand, had revolt as its guiding principle which did 
not rule out the use of violence, if required. It is evident that Congress did not want to alienate 
the political interest of peasantry and the working class in joining the anticolonial efforts. At 
the same time, it did not want to steer away from its commitment to the principle of Gandhian 
non-violence. Hence, Congress Socialist Party could deal with the drawbacks of following 
the principle of non-violence which was often ignored by the working classes and the 
peasantry.  
 
On the other hand, in the upcoming elections after the passing of the Government of India 
Act 1935, the right wing of the Congress was to become dominant in the Legislative 
Assembly, the left wing remained in control of much of the provincial congress 
organisation.335  While the left wing was active in organising labour and the peasant 
movement and mobilised workers, the right wing that came to dominate the new UP 
government saw strikes as disorder. The use of section 144 Criminal Procedure Code to 
prohibit strikes and pickets by the United Provinces Congress government posed 
uncomfortable questions about the nationalists’ attitude towards the colonial legal system 
and the purpose of provincial government. 
 
Industrial towns, casual workers and the ‘problem’ of the ‘urban poor’ 
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Kanpur, when compared to other bigger towns of UP, was of more recent origin. It was put 
on the urban map of north India after the arrival of British forces in 1778. The commercial 
activities of the East India Company had developed in the city under the protective presence 
of army. It was one of the important centres during the 1857 uprisings. After the events of 
1857, the British took control and reconstructed the town. It led to the stationing of British 
Indian Army in the town and establishment of an expanded cantonment, a new civil line and 
district offices. Development of commerce and manufacturing industries led to the 
phenomenal growth of the town. It became one of the only important manufacturing centre 
in the province, largely serving military demands and supplying local weavers in upper India 
for cotton twist and yarn. In 1860s, the arrival of railways opened the town to trade with its 
hinterland and became a distribution point for cotton yarn, and textiles, piece goods, grain, 
sugar, oil, oilseeds, animal hides and skins. In addition to British Merchants who owned 
most of the mills and factories, indigenous bankers later also became small-scale industrial 
entrepreneurs in the first quarter of the twentieth century. As a result, rural labourers, mostly 
peasants, gradually began to migrate to Kanpur.  
 
With time, growth in trade resulted in increasing demand for workforce, Kanpur became one 
of the main sites of workers’ agitation in the United Provinces. It was an industrial city with 
numerous Cotton Mills and factories, and during the interwar period became a key centre of 
rural to urban migration. Three new mills were set up immediately after the Great War. 
During the slump, there was little impact on steady growth in Kanpur. Especially during 
1930-37, the total number of millworkers in the city increased by 31.2 %.336 The 1930s was 
a decade of “political change and urbanisation, steady development of industrial activity and 
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changes of social lives of Indian workers and peasants.”337 Migrant labourers often resided 
in slums or bastis that were neighbourhoods of the city largely organised around caste and 
religious community, a situation that was reinforced as a wider array of peasant communities 
made their way to the city.338  
 
The new and urban setup threw numerous challenges to the migrant peasant labourer. A 
major repercussion of the changing demography and occupational relations in the towns had 
significant impact on the urban politics. Employed as a casual worker, the peasant labourer 
had inadequate workplace patronage relations. Also, with no permanent and dignified place 
to stay, the peasant labourers aggravated concerns about maintaining or enforcing social 
control over them. To deal with this challenge, “a range of measures was introduced to 
discipline them, to regulate their living and working habits, and to control their cultural 
expressions, public conduct and political behaviour.”339 Nandini Gooptu has argued that 
“material deprivation” of the ‘urban poor’ went hand in hand with more “overt forms of 
discipline and social subordination.” 340 
 
In the 1930s, the workers in Kanpur city had a powerful political presence and had the 
capability to threaten the industrial life of the entire province. Labour unrest became a 
significant element of late colonial politics in the United Provinces. The Indian Penal Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code and a range of special coercive regulations were introduced 
during periods of intensified political disturbances. The coercive instruments were often 
used to deal with the menace of tumult associated with crowds of onlookers, supporters and 
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participants at demonstrations, pickets and processions were sought to be governed and 
regulated by an elaborate set of rules. Such rules were supplemented by an armed police 
force, who frequently resorted to baton charges or firing. Nanidini Gooptu has argued that 
“the aim of such intervention in collective activities was to impose restrictions and discipline 
on the ‘turbulent’ and ‘lawless element’”.341 Particularly, the year 1936 turned out to be an 
exciting one. In addition to the upcoming Congress elections to choose new party office 
bearers in UP, the provincial elections according to the newly created Government of India 
Act 1935 in the following February were set to take place. Pertinently, this was also a major 
year for strikes. In the interwar years, the deprivation and dispossession of the poor had 
worsened in the towns of the United Provinces. The urban poor were further marginalised 
due to the decisive shifts in local town improvement measures and taxation policies which 
‘impinged more directly and extensively on the economic activities and housing and 
settlement patterns of poor.’ The ‘urban poor’ faced a housing crisis because of the new local 
policies. As a result, “urban living became more conflictual and unstable, and all experienced 
greater vulnerability and insecurity.”342 This sharpened class differences in Kanpur resulting 
in bitter opposition and often hostility among the ‘urban poor’ not only against urban 
authorities but against the propertied classes too. Moreover, the urban poor became aware 
of the unrepresentative nature of their existence, their exclusion from power and rights, in 
the political system.343 
 
Henceforth, the ‘urban poor’ of which the industrial labour were a substantial number, 
became militant. Force and coercion involving police action, often began to be employed by 
the local administration which contributed in an important way to the extensive political 
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unrest and violence in urban north India in the interwar period. As a result, the image of the 
poor as “lawless, disorderly, violent and criminal,” got amplified and “provided justification 
for their control and discipline through policing.”344 It is in such a context that the Kanpur 
case study begins. 
 
 
Workers’ strikes at the Cooper Allen Factory 
 
From November 1936, workers at the Cooper Allen Factory in Kanpur went on strike over 
a supposed cut in salaries and the issue of recognising the Mazdoor Sabha as the union for 
factories in Kanpur. On December 5, more than 3000 workers who were supposed to resume 
work failed to turn up at the factory, though a day earlier, 15 representatives of the workers 
had met for two hours with M.L. Carnegie, the managing director of the company to discuss 
the issues. It was reported that the management decided to agree to the demands of the 
representatives of the workers provided the workers returned to work at eight, the next 
morning. The workers did not turn up for their work the next morning and the management 
put up a notice stating that no further negotiations would take place until the workers would 
return. A notice then appeared at the factory gates (though without any signature of the 
management) that the 150 workers employed by the factory for clearing hides as strike 
breakers would not be dismissed to allow the return of old workers. Also, the management 
maintained that no cut in the wages had taken place.345 Meanwhile the striking workers 
resorted to picketing to keep others away from attending the factory. Meetings were 
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regularly held at the Parade Grounds Kanpur, which had become the main venue of labour 
meetings during the strike.346  
 
By December 8th, the twenty-second day of the strike at the Cooper Allen factory, the 
situation got from bad to worse. Picketing by strikers continued at the gates. The 
unwillingness of the management to take back the 150 workers who had been dismissed 
during strike was the main point of contention. The striking workers saw this as 
victimisation, as a way to penalise striking workers.347 At this point an important link 
emerged between factional infighting within the Congress party preparing for the upcoming 
elections and the labour issue. A resolution of 14 votes to 9, was passed on December 12, at 
a meeting of the members of Kanpur Municipal Board sympathizing with the workers, with 
B.P. Srivastava as the Chairman. The resolution requested the board to allot rupees 10,000 
for the immediate relief of the striking workers who had been out of work for three weeks 
by that time.348 Also, a committee consisting of five persons with B.P. Srivastava as 
Chairman was appointed to bring about a settlement of the issue.349  
 
Meanwhile, a notice was served to some of the striking workers by Rai Bahadur Vikramjit 
Singh, the legal adviser of the Company. The legal notice demanded that some of the strikers 
who were living in the factory quarters in the Allengunj Settlement vacate their quarters. 
Police was deployed at the gates with some of the European employees escorting workers 
into the factory with the help of police. Some of the European employees also visited the 
Allengunj settlement under a police escort to persuade workers to return to work, but failed. 
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The factory management tried to employ hundreds of strike-breakers, but later had to drop 
them, as they did not have the required skills. In the meetings at the Parade grounds that 
followed, the workers condemned the interference by the police in an industrial dispute.350  
 
When the situation could not come to a settlement by the end of December, “fearing a breach 
of peace,” the district magistrate Cawnpore (Kanpur) extended an existing order under 
section 144, CrPC, to the whole city of Cawnpore for a period of two months. According to 
newspaper reports, the order stated specifically noted that in the processions of strikers, the 
Red Flag was displayed and “slogans advocating revolution were shouted to the disturbance 
of ordinary trade and terror of peaceful citizens.”351 It is pertinent to mention here that the 
elections for the next Congress president as well as the nominations for the upcoming 
legislative assembly and legislative council elections in the United Provinces were taking 
place at the same time. Political parties, in general, were busy in their election affairs and 
paid little or no attention to the situation in Kanpur. We also notice that the order under 
section 144 CrPC was part of a calculated tactic by the local administration in Kanpur 
keeping in mind that the upcoming elections would conclude by the end of February 1937, 
when the promulgation would expire.  
 
The factory workers on strike decided to organise a huge procession moving “through all the 
important thoroughfares of the city” which was regarded by the authorities with great 
apprehension. In the wake of the procession, several “important persons” connected with the 
strike were arrested for violating the terms of Section 144 CrPC. Both, Hindu and Muslim 
shops observed hartal on December 20th, 1936, in sympathy with the strikers. According to 
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one report, “Fierce attacks against the attitude of the proprietors of the Cooper Allen Factory 
as well as the police were made in a public meeting held at Shraddhanand Park on December 
20th. Various leaders from the Congress party attended the public meeting.”352 This is the 
first time an active Congress involvement in the campaign was recorded.  
 
Though they coincided with the upcoming election activity, nothing substantial resulted 
from the various meetings and the United Provinces remained busy with elections for the 
new legislative assembly and legislative council. When the elections concluded in February 
1937, the results reshaped the political forces in the United Provinces. The major outcome 
was that Congress emerged as the strongest party in the United Provinces. Once the newly 
formed Congress government started functioning with Govind Ballabh Pant, as the Prime 
Minister (or, the Premier), the issue of factory strikes once again preoccupied matters of 
governance in Kanpur. The strikes, to which little attention was paid during the elections, 
now resurfaced creating a difficult situation for the newly formed Congress government. 
Letters to the editor were questioning the strategy of the Congress party to attain swaraj 
under the new constitution and sought clarifications about its plans to ‘wreck the 
constitution,’ as congress had declared, before and during the elections.353 Meanwhile, 
workers were getting restless over the growing virtual mistri raj in the Kanpur mills, who 
would serve as low level supervisors often supporting factory management rather than 
ordinary workers and did not bother much about regulations.354 
 
Several other mills joined in the strike, and later almost all major factories became involved 
in demanding the recognition of the Mazdur Sabha as a legitimate representative of the 
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workers in Kanpur factories. By the end of July, the representatives of the Sabha had offered 
to mediate between the strikers and the mill management but the offer was declined. 
Representatives Harihar Nath Shastri (a Congressman) and Sant Singh Yusuf (a Communist) 
met the District Magistrate in this connection and the District Magistrate promised to arrange 
a meeting between the management and the Mazdur Sabha representatives.  
 
The banning order under section 144 CrPC that had been imposed on the whole city and 
expired in February, continued to be in place in the factory areas since then. It was reported 
that some clerks working at the mills had been attacked and assaulted by the striking mill 
workers. A meeting was then held, where Harihar Nath Shastri who was the representative 
of the Mazdur Sabha, was congratulated on being nominated to the UP Legislative Council. 
It was further resolved to request the government – now under Congress control - “to lift the 
ban under section 144 CrPC in order to enable the workers to organise.”355 The incorporation 
of Mazdur Sabha representative into the UP Legislative council by the Congress highlights 
the subtle yet important link that Congress had with this agitation, and as a result maintained 
successful control of the situation hereafter. 
 
Provincial Government and labour mobilization in UP 
 
An editorial in the daily The Leader, highlighted the publication of a bulletin by the 
government called ‘Industrial Disputes in India, 1926-36.’ According to the editorial the 
bulletin published statistics that suggested that the number of disputes as well as loss of 
working days dropped since 1928. The editorial mentioned that the improvement was 
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attributed to the appointment of the Royal Commission for Labour in India. This 
Commission had had considerable influence in turning the thought of more moderate labour 
leaders towards constructive activity and cooperation. Labour Commission was further 
credited with having enabled labour leaders to realise that the strike weapon was unlikely to 
achieve more for the worker in comparison to the atmosphere of peace in industry and 
cooperation with official efforts to improve working conditions. The main point of the 
editorial was that such an approach could help undermine the influence of the extremist 
section of leaders. When employers aimed to crush the trade union movement, the editorial 
emphasised, it failed and resulted in the moderate section of the labour leaders losing their 
influence with the workers and an increase in the influence of extremist leaders. Hence, it 
intensified conflict rather than resolving it. The editorial argued that legitimate grievances 
should be paid attention to by the factory managements. However, it criticised the labour 
leaders who resorted to strikes “on every conceivable occasion.” It argued that the condition 
of workers even when there was no strike was of “great poverty and distress” and the 
recurrent strikes made it worse. Most the all-India strikes organised during the year 1934, 
according to the editorial, resulted in failure. This was the reason why the influence of 
extremist labour leaders declined in 1935. The editorial demanded that the workers “who are 
so easily misled” should be more careful in future in the choice of their leaders, which would 
save them “misery and suffering” and, further hoped that the employers would “adopt a more 
progressive attitude towards labour so that extremist leaders may not be able to acquire 
influence.”356  
 
It is not difficult to interpret this editorial within the context of the factory strikes in Kanpur, 
which were continuing since November 1936 and remained unresolved. But now that 
																																																						
356 See, editorial titled “Workers and Employers,” The Leader, Sunday, August 1, 1937, Page 8. 
	 201	
Harihar Nath Shastri of the Mazdur Sabha was nominated for the U.P. Legislative Council, 
we notice that the situation began to change. Neither the assurances of the UP premier to 
look into the workers’ issues sympathetically nor the appeals made by labour leaders to the 
workers of Kanpur factories had any effect to calm the unrest. Instead, labour politics in 
Kanpur re-energised itself with the formation of a 60-member committee to run the strike 
and to demand the withdrawal of section 144 from various areas of Kanpur. 
 
The labour situation in Kanpur began to give ‘considerable anxiety’ to the colonial 
administration. In addition to the Copper Allen Mill and the Muir Mill, the Swadeshi Cotton 
Mills had joined the strike too. The secretary of the Mazdur Sabha Yusuf, wrote a letter to 
the Premier of UP requesting him to constitute an enquiry committee to look into the details 
of the wage-cut issue.357 Since labour was seething with unrest, the local administration 
noticed that more factories were about to join the strike. Yusuf was arrested on the evening 
of August 3, 1937, to prevent the labour unrest from spreading. The district authorities 
became more vigilant and began drafting more police from outside the district to cope with 
the “emergency.”  
 
The deteriorating labour situation in Kanpur required immediate attention from the Congress 
government. The UP Minister of Industries, it was reported, was expected to mediate 
between the strikers and the mill-owners. The “mill magnates” also held a meeting in the 
face of increasing crisis and decided to form an association called “The Northern India Mill-
owners Association” with representatives of the concerned factories on it.358 The Minister 
for Industries, K.N. Katju, finally arrived in Kanpur on August 5th to make efforts to bring a 
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settlement to the strikes. Labour leaders Harihar Nath Shastri, Suraj Prasad Avasthi and 
Rajaram Sastri, met the minister to convey their terms for an agreement. They included the 
recognition of the Mazdur Sabha by the mill-owners, the appointment of a committee to 
examine the question of wage-cutting and other grievances, non-victimisation of labourers 
for having participated in the strikes or normal trade union activities. Mill representatives 
Sir Tracy Gavin Jones, Lala Padmapat Singhania, H.A. Wilkinson, C.W. Tosh, R. Menzies, 
and T.I. Smith, also met the minister. The mill-owners expressed their inability to recognise 
the Mazdur Sabha, because according to them, it was “not sufficiently representative nor 
influential enough to impose its decision on labourers.” The Minister failed to resolve the 
matter and returned to Lucknow.  
 
The Mazdur Sabha demanded that government set up an enquiry committee of five 
members, with three government nominees, and a representative each from the mill owners 
and the workers, in order to look into the grievance of the workers. Most importantly, it 
demanded the re-instatement of workers dismissed during strikes and the withdrawal of 
section 144 CrPC and the ban on holding meetings and processions.359 The mill owners did 
not agree with these demands as stated earlier. Congress leader Balakrishna Sharma who 
was accompanying the minister on this trip, deplored the attitude of the mill-owners in not 
recognising the Mazdur Sabha and expressed that “if the situation was allowed to develop, 
a first-class labour crisis was anticipated in Cawnpore(Kanpur).”360 The crisis moved further 
away from any resolution, when 4000 workers from the Kanpur Textile Mills downed their 
tools and joined the strike. These workers held their meeting at the Muslim high school 
grounds as it was outside the purview of section 144 CrPC. They also passed a resolution 
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criticising the policy of the Government of the United Provinces and expressing resentment 
at the arrest of their “comrade” Yusuf.361 For the first time, the workers began to blame the 
UP government for their problems. The onus of responsibility in the entire crisis began to 
shift from factory management to the Congress ministry of the UP government. 
 
By August 6, almost 20,000 workers from seven Mills had joined the strike. The 
Superintendent of Police G.A. Pearce, Assistant Superintendent D.P. Kohli and Joint 
Magistrate W.G. Raw were confronted and pelted with stones by workers near the Elgin 
Mills. The factory premises were then under a banning order under section 144 CrPC. The 
police in order to disperse the crowd resorted to a lathi charge and later armed police was 
drafted in. A similar situation was witnessed at the Kanpur Cotton Mills. Six thousand 
workers of Juggilal Kamlapat Mills were on strike and while attacking the factory damaged 
buildings and equipment. As a result, police opened fire, wounding a worker with a pistol 
shot. Around 40 workers were arrested at the Juggilal Kamlapat Mills.  
 
M.L. Owen, the District Magistrate was taking stock of the situation. The Premier, Govind 
Ballabh Pant was in touch with authorities as well as congressmen in Kanpur. Acharya 
Narendra Deo, president of the U.P. Provincial Congress Committee was sent to Kanpur by 
the premier to intervene in the situation and to survey all possible solutions.362 As more 
workers from other factories were joining the strike, it was reported that around 4,000 
workers of the New Victoria Cotton Mills went back to work. Local Congress leaders met 
the managing committee of the Employers’ Association of Northern India with proposals 
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forwarded by the Mazdur Sabha. After meeting with local Congress leaders, the Employers’ 
association passed the following resolution: 
 
Provided all mills in Cawnpore (Kanpur) resume normal work by Monday morning, 
Aug 9, the Mazdur Sabha will be recognised by the Employers’ Association of 
Northern India. It, however, has to be understood that recognition will only be 
accorded provided no further strikes take place without reasonable and due notice of 
such intention being given to the association.363 
 
The minister for industries Katju, having earlier failed to resolve the crisis had returned to 
Lucknow. However, he had made a rather ambiguous speech in the capital addressing the 
workers’ situation. On one hand he recognised workers’ hardship, yet, also criticised them 
for going on a strike. On the other hand, he praised the mill owners of Kanpur and recognised 
their services to the growth of industry in the United Provinces. The mill owners, according 
to Katju, were “generous and sensible persons” and could not have tyrannised workers.364 
Katju’s statement reflects Congress motivation in the post 1935 scenario to maintain support 
from urban liberal bourgeoisie without overtly undermining the protest of the working 
classes. 
 
The number of workers who joined the strike had swollen to between 25,000- 30, 000 by 
August according to news reports. Lathi charges for demonstrations and violation of section 
144 continued. The Commissioner for Allahabad, Panna Lall, who was touring the division, 
cancelled the tour midway and proceeded to Kanpur. The Governor’s situation report 
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recorded that the Mazdoor Sabha were anxious to bring about a general strike. Therefore, 
the District Magistrate had to issue new orders under section 144 to prevent the assemblage 
of persons at street corners and at the Mill gates.365  With the rise in labour unrest in Kanpur, 
the government issued a government Communiqué stating that it had decided to appoint a 
committee of enquiry to investigate and report on the relations between employers’ and 
labour and the conditions of labour in Kanpur. It appealed to strikers to maintain calm and 
argued that it could not carry out the enquiry in an atmosphere of unrest and disturbance. 
However, it also added that it was the duty of the government “to maintain order and 
tranquillity” and hoped that the district magistrate would act in “a spirit of impartiality” and 
would ensure that the police acted with restraint while discharging their duties.366  
 
It is pertinent to point out that the government communiqué is a perfect example of a 
calculated and forceful governmental decision. It assured investigation into the condition of 
workers yet asserted the necessity of “public order and tranquillity.” It also recognised that 
the use of force was inevitable and that it was the duty of the governmental apparatus to deal 
with it. The question remained as to how to judge, at what point exactly a police lathi charge 
and firing became “excess.” Given that around 30, 000 workers were now on strike one 
expected that such a massive “rowdy” crowd could only be dispersed or controlled by lathi 
charge and firing. 
 
 
The strikes in Kanpur were making other sections of Congress sympathetic to workers and 
the socialists anxious about the situation. The executive committee of the all-India Congress 
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Socialist party passed a resolution in Patna criticising the United Provinces Government. 
The resolution stated, “the Congress Ministry in U.P. should not have permitted the 
promulgation of section 144, lathi charges, shooting of strikers and imprisonment of the 
leaders.” It demanded the U.P. government to “withdraw all repressive orders” and release 
“imprisoned workers”. The most important part of the resolution was the reference to 
Congress’ election manifesto where it had emphasised “the rights of workers, a living wage, 
and freedom of speech, association and strike.”367 The Congress Socialist Party in 
Allahabad368 and Benares369 passed similar resolutions too.  
 
By August as the situation did not change, the premier, Govind Ballabh Pant, personally 
headed to Kanpur to resolve the situation. Pant’s intervention resulted in the Employers’ 
Association accepting the Mazdur Sabha’s eighteen demands with some modifications. 
According to the communiqué of the Labour Welfare Officer of Kanpur, the Premier, in 
addition to congratulating mill-owners and labour leaders also gave “chief credit” to the 
district collector and magistrate L. Owen who had promulgated banning orders under section 
144. The premier stated, according to the communiqué that the magistrate had worked 
consistently for the “cause of industrial peace” and showed “uncommon tact, patience, and 
ability in dealing with an extremely difficult situation.” The Superintendent of Police, G.A 
Pearce, was also appreciated for his role in handling the crisis.370  
 
But the crisis was not actually averted yet. The strike situation took a complicated turn when 
the workers rejected the settlement between the Employers’ Association and the Mazdur 
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Sabha. They continued the strike and therefore, failed the principle clauses of the agreement 
that workers should resume work. The strikers objected to the agreement on the ground that 
the Mazdur Sabha did not consult the strike committee that was recently formed. Also, they 
demanded immediate increase in wages irrespective of the findings of the enquiry committee 
that the government promised to set up. A new group of workers called the “blue shirts” 
sprung up. It comprised of workers who discredited the agreement and called on the workers 
to hold on to their position. Both members of the Mazdur Sabha and Congressmen made 
frantic efforts and exhorted workers to resume work.371 On the workers’ side, one of the 
issues that came to light was that when workers turned up for work at some factories as 
originally agreed, the work could not be started. Many workers took it as an evidence for the 
dilly-dallying attitude of the factory management, though it was reported later that the real 
issue was that the factories had not generated enough steam to start the equipment until that 
afternoon.  
 
It was reported later that due to the massive number of workers at the parade ground (30,000- 
40,000) when the agreement was announced, proper information could not be communicated 
to the workers due to the unavailability of a loudspeaker.372 According to newspaper reports, 
nearly 40, 000 workers were still out of work in Kanpur by August 10, 1937.373 Editorials 
appeared exhorting government to reform the executive of the Mazdur Sabha to ensure the 
confidence of workers in it.374  
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Congress and the argument for the use of force on agitating workers 
 
In the face of the strike continuing the Employers’s Association stated publicly that they felt 
cheated in the entire process of recognising the Mazdur Sabha. They reiterated that the 
Employers’ Association would have recognised the Mazdur Sabha earlier, had it been 
satisfied that the sabha members possessed the “powers and experience necessary for the 
efficient handling and administration of such a body.375 We notice that the disagreements 
within the various sections of Kanpur labour put the status and ability of the Mazdur Sabha 
in question. Another possibility could be that disgruntled non-congress socialist elements, 
primarily communists, perceived the settlement as a Congress triumph and expansion of its 
labour base.  
 
The Congress party had contested elections vehemently opposing the new constitution 
stating that the 1935 Act did not give maximum freedom to India. Yet, at the same time 
when in power, the Congress ministry actively curtailed workers’ right and freedom to 
organise and protest. An attitude of government was reflected in Jawaharlal Nehru, the then 
National President of the Congress party as well as member of the U.P. Provincial Congress 
Committee. When Nehru was asked as to how the firing at striking workers by police in 
Kanpur was consistent with the Congress policy of non-violence, Nehru replied: 
 
Open violence should only be met by force. Open violence, if it is allowed, will 
dislocate the whole business, trade and normal life of a city, and so it should be 
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supressed by any Government. Whether it is violence by Labourites, or a communal 
riot, which is only looting innocent people, it must be met by effective measures.376 
 
He further stated that a Congress Minister would instruct the police not to take peremptory 
action and to judge each case on its merits before resorting to violence, although, he also 
conceded that the thought of violence as something “vulgar.” However, elucidating 
Congress’ philosophy of non-violence. Nehru clarified that it depended upon “the 
psychological approach to the subject.” He differentiated non-violence as creed propagated 
by Gandhi, as different to non-violence as a policy. He added: 
 
Idealists Utopia where there was no war, no violence, no strife, did not exist. All the 
same violence seldom solved a problem. 377 
 
Nehru’s statement sheds a light on the policy of Congress as government. It followed a 
pragmatic path, which though would claim to be influenced by Gandhi, was hardly different 
to the earlier colonial policy of suppressing labour unrest or protest. Labour unrest in Kanpur 
Mills provides us a window into the politics of public order laws and demonstrates that 
different issues influenced politics locally. It also demonstrates how governments and 
political organisations, specifically the UP Congress, the spearhead of the nationalist and 
anti-colonial mobilisation, responded to various issues that fell in the category of ‘public 
disorder’ or required ‘emergency’ measures to deal with them. 
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Congress emphasised its role in calming the situation in Kanpur in a reply to the accusation 
of the Employers’ Association that it was forced by Congress to agree to the settlement. The 
Congress further claimed that in order to overlook the “economic” causes of the strike, the 
management had called it “political.”378 Owing to the increasing criticism of local authorities 
over resorting to police firing on strikers, the Commissioner of Allahabad Panna Lal issued 
a statement. It read: 
 
The Statements appearing in the press that the police opened fire on the strikers of 
Cawnpore/(Kanpur) is entirely incorrect. The truth is that a small party of police, two 
sub-inspectors and six constables, were in danger of being overwhelmed by an angry 
crowd of ten to 12 thousand strikers who had already stoned them and injured two 
constables. The senior sub-inspector in order to keep back the crowd drew his 
revolver and fired one shot over the head of the crowd. A man at some distance away 
behind the crowd was injured by a spent bullet. He is in hospital, doing well.379 
 
The Commissioners statement demonstrates the nature of police action in case of disorder. 
Limited number of policeman often when faced huge crowds responded with firing. The 
instruction of the Congress ministry to police, suggesting restraint and use of violence only 
in exceptional circumstances appears ambiguous. The commissioner’s statement points out 
that the explanation of any situation endangering lives of policemen justified police violence. 
Also, the Commissioner was not a Congress man but an Indian Civil Services officer 
appointed by the British. 
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While the workers had started to resume work in most of the factories, some issues remained. 
Mazdoor Sabha Secretary Sant Singh Yusuf, complained about the hardships inflicted on 
workers who participated in strikes and suggested it could become a reason for another 
strike. 2500, workers, who earlier worked in night shifts at the Cawnpore Cotton Mills were 
not re-employed. The sabha conveyed to the Northern India Employers’ Association that it 
considered it as a breach of the settlement agreement.380 Both, the labour leaders and the 
Employers’ Association blamed each other for the non-observance of the settlement 
agreement. The Premier invited members of the Sabha, Raja Ram Shastri and Yusuf, after 
they sent a letter blaming the Employers’ association. the latter had already repudiated the 
Sabha’s allegations and even accused it of “communistic tendencies” and of raising a “Red 
Workers’ Army” for the next fight.381 Chitra Joshi has done an elaborated discussion 
regarding the militant spirit of Kanpur workers in 1937 in this regard.382 Discussions held 
during the formation of the inquiry committee point out that little consensus guided the scope 
of the enquiry committee. Govind Ballabh Pant, the premier, held discussions with the 
representatives of workers and the Employers’ Association to find a common path for the 
establishment of the enquiry committee. Finally, Babu Rajendra Prasad was appointed as the 
chairman of the enquiry committee. The premier was grateful to him for “accepting the 
embarrassing responsibility of chairman of the committee”, but was hopeful that he could 
come up with a solution which will be both acceptable and satisfactory to the labour as well 
as management.383 Meanwhile, there were reports of workers assaulting mistris and clerks 
in some factories.384 This put extra pressure on the Inquiry committee. 
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Congress was facing general criticism regarding the firing on workers during strikes. For 
instance, a Congress sympathiser from Benares, in a letter to the editor wrote: 
 
The Congress Ministries, in Provinces where they are in power, profess that theirs is 
a ‘civilized Government’. It is right that this be so. Only one is a little surprised to 
hear certain Congress Ministers say that lathi charges are not taboo even now and it 
was shocking to read the statement of the Congress president justifying the recent 
firing and lathi charge on the Kanpur strikers. Firing and lathi charges on a crowd 
which is unarmed are acts which no civilised Government can allow, much less 
perpetrate. The best way of dispersing such crowds is the use of tear bombs. May I 
hope that Congress Ministers will introduce this avowedly more civilized method of 
coping with similar situations in future and save their supporters from being 
disappointed in them?385 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru, while addressing a meeting of the University Law Society at Allahabad 
indicated that he was well aware of the need to get rid of old laws. However, his reference 
to ‘old laws’ was rather confusing. He often referred to old laws as traditional customary 
laws. While talking about Hindu laws, Nehru said that if law students “wanted to have good 
laws then the laws should be such as would suit the conditions prevailing and should be 
changed when the conditions changed.” Little did he deal with the need to decolonise Indian 
law, now that Congress was in power in most of the provinces. He further stated that “behind 
every law there was some power – it was public opinion, and if public opinion went against 
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law it would become impossible for the law to have any force. The present laws have proved 
to be useless, considering the conditions of the world and of India.”386 Nehru lectured the 
law students regarding changed times and the then changing international situation arguing 
for India to enter the modern world. But, he did not speak about the change in repressive 
laws.  
 
Congress was quite aware of the revolutionary potential of the striking workers in Kanpur. 
It wanted to impose its own way of thinking on the workers influenced by Communism. A 
statement by Tej Bahadur Sapru shed some light on Congress’ frustration with revolutionary 
politics. Sapru made a statement offering help to bring back Lala Hardayal, the most 
important leader of the Ghadr movement. He stated that Hardayal had “recanted his past 
activities.” This statement came in the light of the debates that took place in the Council of 
State in Simla on the question of permitting political exiles to return to India. Sapru added 
that Hardayal had “confessed” to him that he had come to the “conclusion that India’s 
salvation did not lie in revolution but in continuing as a member of the British 
Commonwealth.” Sapru believed that Har Dayal was no longer, a revolutionary.387 Such 
statements demonstrate the urgency that the Congress government in the United Provinces 
felt when dealing with the brewing revolutionary politics among the striking workers. Nehru, 
towards the end of the September 1937 had enough of recurring strikes in Kanpur mills. He 
wrote a special article in the daily Pratap, denouncing labour action.388 In this article Nehru 
emphasised that though Kanpur labour faced great problems, it had to bear in mind that out 
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of 50 million people living in the United Provinces, the workers in Kanpur numbered only 
50, 000. He added, that the majority of the population was one of peasants, and unless the 
problem of poverty was solved, restlessness in the country could not be removed. He argued 
further that if the condition of the ‘peasant’ did not improve, the condition of the ‘labour’, 
who came from among the peasants, could not be bettered. Nehru pointed that it was on the 
account of the unemployment of the peasants that the mill owners could take advantage and 
recruit workmen from the cultivators. Hence, strikes failed despite the strength of labour 
organisations.  
 
Nehru’s article was both an offer of conciliation, an attempt to bond with the working class, 
as well as advocacy for Congress policy of abolishing the zamindari system. However, 
Nehru’s statement also tried to draw up ‘an order of things’ in the United Provinces. He 
attempted to attract support by highlighting his own awareness of issues beyond the labour 
question. The latter would be eventually resolved, but only once the peasant question had 
been dealt with. In the end, for Nehru, the emancipation of labourers related to achieving the 
freedom of India. The main difficulty, according to Nehru, was that “as soon as [the 
labourers] realised that they had obtained strength they began to think they could do anything 
they liked and forgo they had to contend with bigger forces.” Noticeably, when Nehru 
himself arrived in Kanpur towards the end of September, his tone had changed from warning 
to threat. He emphasised that a strike should only be an action of last resort. In a letter 
addressed to the striking workers in Kanpur workers he argued: 
 
Our work and our organisation can only proceed if we are non-violent and peaceful. 
There are people who believe that they can terrify and browbeat others and force 
them to concede their demands by threats or by violence. Such people are living in a 
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fools’ paradise and are completely deluded. If violence is resorted to it is impossible 
that the Government should not interfere, and the army or the police should not be 
called. The workers should remember that the Government is very powerful, and that 
it must put down violence by violence, and that the workers in no time will be 
subdued, and this will have a very bad effect on the workers’ organisation as a whole. 
It will become weak and the attention of the public will be diverted from the 
reasonable demands of the workers to the quarrels.389 
 
A change of tone in Nehru’s remarks can be observed. But what can be further noted is a 
possible course of action that the Congress government could take to deal with the on-going 
strikes in Kanpur. Mohandas Gandhi had expressed his views on the law and order situation 
in the October issue of Harijan.390 He wrote, “civil Liberty is not criminal liberty,” and when 
law and order were under popular control “ministers of that department cannot hold their 
portfolios if they act against the popular will.” Emphasising that assemblies were not 
sufficiently representative of the whole people, suffrage was nevertheless wide enough to 
make them representative. Gandhi added that “in provinces where the Congress ruled it has 
been assumed by some persons that individuals can say what they like. But so far as I know 
the Congress mind, it will not tolerate any such license.” Most importantly, Gandhi 
explained that the extraordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, the penal Code 
and other special legislations which foreign rulers (British) had enacted for their own safety 
and which can be easily identified, should be ruled out from the operation of the Congress 
ministers, who must be guided by the working committee’s interpretation regarding law and 
order. He suggested that “such powers must be exercised by the ministers against those, who 
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in the name of civil liberty preach lawlessness in the popular sense of term.” He concluded 
that “non-violence is a new weapon still in the process of evolution. Its vast possibilities are 
yet unexplored.” While Nehru made threats, Gandhi made a ‘moral’ appeal.  
 
We recall that during the non-cooperation movement, Gandhi instructed Indians to disobey 
certain laws that curtailed the liberty of Indians. Many did get arrested during that time for 
the violation of prohibition laws, for instance, the Salt Law. The Congressmen challenged 
Section 144 CrPC (unlawful assembly) and 124A (sedition) on many occasions during the 
non-cooperation movement. The line on which both Nehru and Gandhi were trying to justify 
their arguments appears flimsy and hypocritical. Meanwhile, the Governor of the United 
Provinces, Sir Harry Haig while delivering a speech at the annual Police parade at Lucknow, 
on November 27, 1937, congratulated the UP police on standards of efficiency and 
discipline. The Governor did mention though that peace could be maintained only with the 
cooperation between the public and the police. While referring to the Kanpur labour strikes, 
he said: 
 
We all know how difficult and dangerous have been the conditions in Cawnpore 
(Kanpur) for some months past. It is not vain exaggeration to say that almost at any 
moment the city of Cawnpore (Kanpur) might find that nothing but the power, the 
authority, the discipline and the courage of the police stood between it and serious 
disorder. Nothing in these circumstances could be more reckless than to organize an 
attack, as was recently done there, on the authority of the police.391 
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The Governors fortnightly report points out that administration constantly kept a keen eye 
on the situation in Kanpur. The friction in certain Mills, the development of issues into 
definite strikes, involving thousands of workers was a worry for the administration. Most 
importantly it was because of a labour unrest at a massive scale, the governor reported, that 
many additional police were drafted into Kanpur, and an order under section 144 was issued 
prohibiting assemblies of more than five persons within half a mile of the Mills concerned.392 
It is pertinent to mention here that the main concern of workers regarding the strike was their 
‘victimization’ by the management, whereas the management accused them of ‘indiscipline’. 
We note that an earlier Governors report recorded that the labour in Kanpur was 
‘undisciplined’.393 Thus, it can be noticed that the administration took the line of the 
management.  
 
Demands for the release of arrested striking workers were also an issue. The Congress 
Ministry was criticized by the Left Wing of the Congress because of the delayed release of 
the prisoners and the action taken under section 144 and 107 CrPC in Kanpur.394 The story 
of labour trouble did not end there. The labour conditions in Kanpur were still unsatisfactory. 
Some 600 to 700 men of one of the mills went on strike against the wishes of the Mazdoor 
Sabha and that too without giving notice. Conditions in Kanpur needed ‘careful watching’ 
by the administration, and the District Magistrate kept issuing orders under section 144 
prohibiting meetings at Mill gates and in the Mill area generally except on the Parade ground.  
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During the peak of workers’ militancy in Kanpur, the commissioner directed the District 
Magistrate to examine the notes of speeches delivered by labour leaders and striking workers 
with a view to take action against the most ‘intemperate speakers’ if ‘considered 
advisable’.395 There were occasions when clashes took place amongst workers and their 
leaders. In Kanpur, a meeting held outside Swadeshi Mills resulted in a minor clash between 
the mill-workers of Swadeshi Mills and the organizer of the meeting. Trouble outside Cooper 
Allen Mills is also reported along with a strike occurring at the Bevin Co. Mills without 
notice and against the wishes of the Mazdoor Sabha. Orders under section 144 were issued, 
the effect of which was reported to be ‘very satisfactory’ and having resulted in ‘calming 
down a situation which was tending to get out of control’.396 In a secret letter (personal) 
dated December 23, 1938, the Governor wrote that he visited Kanpur to attend the jubilee 
dinners of the India Chamber of Commerce, where he had a talk with the District Magistrate. 
The Governor writes that the District Magistrate was very pleased with the effects of his 
order under section 144, because it had the result of practically stopping ‘undesirable’ 
speeches and demonstrations organized by the communists. The Governor wrote that the 
District Magistrate was not interested in pressing for any action in the direction of 
prosecution in respect of the speeches of any individuals. However, the condition in Kanpur 
was not ‘satisfactory’ anymore and orders under section 144 continued397 resulting in 
‘resentment’ against these orders.398 Notably, the administration saw the strikes as 
undisciplined labour and deployed police and invoked section 144 as a tactic to control them. 
 
Not only leaders of Congress and the Governor of UP, but also the press were very critical 
of the striking workers. A distinction was drawn between the unorganised, spontaneous and 
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violent actions of 1937 and the organised and peaceful strikes of 1938. Terms like ‘violent’, 
‘aggressive’, ‘defiant’, ‘unruly’, ‘threatening’ were used in the daily news reports as well as 
official accounts to describe the striking workers who were always ‘a mob of workers’. 
Contemporary newspapers like The Aaj, the The Pioneer and Leader were full of such 
accounts. Most importantly, the police were always reported to have “fired in self 
defence.”399 Also, any police violence was seen as justified because the workers had 
supposedly violated section 144. We see a ménage- a- trois between congress politicians, 
the administration and the press, when it came to legitimise violence on workers. Public 
order and peace were the terms, which could neutralise any claims by workers of police 
atrocities. 
 
The Cawnpore Labour Inquiry Committee appointed by the government of the United 
Provinces finally recommended methods of improving the living conditions of workers and 
published data describing labour conditions in several cotton mills in Kanpur. The findings 
of the committee highlighted the uncooperative attitude of the employers in supplying 
information. It also reported employers’ hostility to the only organized trade union in 
Kanpur- the Mazdoor Sabha.400 The wages at Kanpur mills were much lower than in other 
centres of industry in India, and such low wages were found unjustified by the report when 
compared to the level of profitability in those mills. The committee suggested some 
increments in workers’ wages. For instance, increments ranging from 2 ½ annas in the rupee 
in the case of workers getting between Rs. 13 and Rs. 19 per month to half an anna in the 
rupee in the case of workers getting between Rs. 40 and Rs. 59 per month.401 
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The relationship between the labour organisation and the Congress remained chequered. 
After the death of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi in 1930, the leadership of the Mazdur Sabha 
had passed to Harihar Nath Shastri. Shastri as a congressman was devoted to build a 
Congress labour movement in Kanpur and in the rest of the country. As we noticed in the 
earlier sections, there was for a time close coordination between the Sabha and the Kanpur 
City Congress Committee. Such coordinated action gave strength both to the Congress as an 
organisation and to the trade union movement as a whole. However, it also ran the risk of 
Congress factions getting involved in the affairs the Mazdoor Sabha. They were acceptable 
as long as they served Congress’ interest by serving as its instrument. However, it was during 
the Kanpur strikes that local Communists entered the Mazdoor Sabha and worked in 
coordination with Congress for a while. During the strikes the Sabha gained prominence and 
strength with Harihar Nath Shastri as its president and Sant Singh Yusuf, a Communist, as 
general secretary. As the strikes extended from late 1936 to late 1937, the Communists soon 
acquired a representation of seventeen or eighteen members on the forty-member Council 
of the Sabha, though, the Congress still had a clear majority. Internal factionalism in 
congress (between the right wing and the left wing known as Congress Socialist Party) 
weakened its hold over the Mazdoor Sabha and it was in the 1938 Sabha elections the 
Communists acquired complete control with the support of Balakarishna Sharma and his 
supporters who were opposed to Harihar Nath Shastri. As a result, Sant Singh Yusuf became 
the new president of the Sabha in 1938. It can be noted that a Congress leader, whose primary 
interest did not lie in the labour movement and had little interest in controlling the affairs of 
the Sabha - which was anyways getting out of hands - allied with the Communists for the 
	 221	
sole purpose of defeating a factional opponent in the Congress party.402 Also, when the 
Enquiry report was released the  Employers’ Association rejected it the following month.403 
As a  result, workers in all the Kanpur mills went on strike simultaneously with the total 
number of workers participating up to 40, 000 approximately. Mazdoor Sabha, which was 
stronger than ever, extended its full support to the strike.404 The consolidation of workers’ 
movement in Kanpur under the communist dominated Mazdoor Sabha declined after 1938. 
This was partly because of the ‘People’s War’ politics of the communists. Later, during the 
Second World War, the communist support to the British war efforts led to a thinning of the 
ranks of the Mazdoor Sabha to a significant level. The working class in Kanpur and people 
generally perceived it as a betrayal of the struggle against the British and the fight for 
complete Swaraj. Moreover, during the war period, the promulgation of the Defence of India 
Rules restricted political activity and made political organisation difficult.405 Any political 
organisation creating ‘unrest’ or ‘disorder’ would amount to sedition. 
 
 
Case Study III 
Reciting ‘Public disorder’: Madhe Sahaba and the politics of section 144 
CrPC in Lucknow 1937-1940 
 
In addition to the mill workers’ strike in Cawnpore, the United Provinces government also 
struggled to control communal conflict between the Shia and the Sunni Muslims of 
																																																						
402 Brass, Paul R. Factional Politics in an Indian State, The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965, pp 196-197. 
403 Menon, Visalakshi. From Movement to Government: The Congress in the United Provinces, 1937-42.  Sage 
Publications, 2003, Page 117. 
404 Joshi, Chitra.  Lost worlds: Indian Labour and its Histories, Anthem press, 2003, Page 213. 
405 Ibid. Page 236 
	 222	
Lucknow, known as the Madhe Sahaba controversy or the tabarra agitation. Again, the UP 
Congress and the local administration in Lucknow had to resort to the use of section 144, 
and curfews to maintain ‘public order and tranquillity’. A brief description of the city of 
Lucknow is necessary before discussing the case study. Historically, Lucknow was the seat 
of the Mughal government of the Suba of Awadh from the late sixteenth century. Asaf-ud-
Daulah, the Shia Nawab of Awadh, founded Lucknow as his capital city in 1775 after the 
decline of the Mughals. Lucknow became one of the most flourishing towns of north India 
in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, under the Nawabi court 
patronage. With its majestic Nawabi buildings and the artisan industries, it also became 
famous as a literary, commercial and cultural centre. Artisanship comprised of chikan, 
kamdani, zardozi (embroidered lace, silver and gold-thread work), silver ornaments, calcio 
printing, bleaching, dyeing, shoe-making and ivory work. Events of 1857 brought about the 
demise of the Nawabi culture and polity of Lucknow. As a result, the Muslim courtly classes 
who depended on Nawabi patronage became the most notable casualty after 1857. Their 
decline led to the emergence of Hindu and Jain bankers and merchants who gained social 
prominence in the town as moneylenders to the indigent wasiqdars or royal pensioners and 
as financiers of artisan industries and trade. Kanpur emerged as the chief trading location in 
UP due to the railways, but Lucknow also had a railway junction with large workshops 
connected to it.  Lucknow retained its significance as a centre of grain trade in Awadh. 
However, many of its artisan industries received a serious setback due to the loss of royal 
and courtly patronage. Muslims constituted much of the city’s population. Most importantly, 
Lucknow housed the provincial legislative council and was maintained as an administrative 
centre by the British.406  
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One of the greatest contributing social factors of Shia-Sunni conflict throughout the 1930s 
was the massive shift in population and demography taking place in Lucknow. Before the 
1920s colonial Lucknow had been slow to modernize and remained largely stagnant both in 
terms of economic and population growth. However, Lucknow’s quick development 
thereafter into a major provincial centre of industry and trade saw the city’s population spiral 
after 1921 from 217,000 to 387,000 in just twenty years. This sudden increase stemmed 
partly from a wider trend of urbanization in inter-war north-India, but also owed to the 
establishment of Lucknow as the United Provinces’ political capital, becoming the location 
of the seat of the provincial governor and the United Provinces Legislative Council in the 
aftermath of the 1919 Government of India Act. As a result, Lucknow suddenly became a 
magnet for ever increasing number of politicos, officials and investors, quickly transforming 
the city’s size, composition and character.407 
  
The Madhe Sahaba controversy was a very prominent case of sectarian conflict and a core 
administration concern of the Congress ministry of the United Provinces in 1930s. Scholars 
like Francis Robinson, Mushirul Hassan and Farzana Sheikh have demonstrated how 
developments in the wider Islamic world influenced the political ideologies of North Indian 
Muslims in the 1920s and the 1930s. But the conflict in Lucknow had much older roots. It 
was connected to the ancient religious debate and the Shias and Sunnis over the identity of 
the ‘legitimate’ Caliph/Imam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  The Shias and 
Sunnis have different views on this issue. While the Sunnis believe in a notion of Khilafat 
(a purely worldly political leader who succeeded the prophet in his political and military 
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capacity), the Shias believe in Imamat (a religious as well as political and military leader 
who also inherited parts of the Prophet’s religious charisma through direct family 
descendence). Central to this distinction was the role and status of the Prophet’s son-in-law 
and nephew Ali.408 The Sunnis consider all the four immediate successors to the prophet 
including Ali in high regard and as rightful.  The Shias, in contrast, hold that the first three 
successors of the Prophet and Ali’s rivals were usurpers and guilty of acts of tyranny and 
oppression against the Prophet’s kin. Muharram represents a period of mourning for the sons 
of Ali – Hassan and Hussain- who were massacred by the Caliphate’s army in a civil war 
between the two parties. Sectarian confrontations between the two groups, which were often 
violent, occurred especially during the month of Muharram. Francis Robinson has noted that 
where the Shia live in South Asian towns and cities, arguably, no community has been more 
visible or more audible. Visible because of their great processions at Muharram, and audible, 
certainly at Muharram, but also throughout the year in their majlis, where they gather across 
localities to recount the events of karbala, often transmitting them by loudspeaker to the 
muhalla.409 
 
Scholarship on Muslim politics during colonial rule has implied that during the late colonial 
period both Shia and Sunni overlooked their religious and sectarian differences and worked 
on a common platform for the broader Muslim interest. Many have agreed that such a 
perspective is especially true for the formative moment of the Muslim separatist politics. for 
example, the period from the Muslim deputation to Lord Minto in 1906 to the end of the 
Khilafat Movement in 1924. 410  
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century and later, Shia public figures had to abrogate their 
Shia identity and had to project themselves as the representatives of the broader Muslim 
community due to the nature of the political climate. Justin Jones has argued that many Shias 
later, departed strongly from such a position even in Muslim cities like Lucknow, which was 
seen as a significant centre of the major ideologies and edifices of Muslim separatism in late 
colonial India.411 Justin Jones has demonstrated the discourse of community formation that 
emphasized the differences and separateness of Shia from Sunni that eventually led to the 
systematization of their political differences too.412  
  
The sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni Muslims of Lucknow, went back to at least 
1905. Ashutosh Varshney413 has noted that in that year, quite a while after the end of Shia 
princely rule in Lucknow, the Sunnis began to insist on holding processions involving the 
public recital of verses in praise of all four caliphs (the so-called Madhe Sahaba). Shias 
responded with Tabarra processions of their own, which involved public curses on the first 
three caliphs and praises to Ali and his family. Due to serious violence and conflict between 
the two communities between 1905-1909, a British Committee headed by Arthur Pigott, 
determined that Madhe Sahaba was a recent Sunni invention and prohibited its public 
recitations.414 Varshney has pointed out that Sunni rituals were considered to be an 
innovation because such public expressions of Sunni dominance had simply been 
unconceivable under Shia princes earlier. In the subsequent decades of mass politics, the 
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issue resurfaced in the year 1935 adding to the administrative difficulties of Lucknow 
administration. In 1936, Madhe Sahaba verses were recited every Friday for three months 
leading to confrontations between the two sects and resulting in arrests.415 Lucknow 
witnessed a series of riots when clashes between Shias and Sunnis erupted again in June 
1937.  
 
The Provincial Ministry of Govind Ballabh Pant was already having a troubled time with 
the British colonial government over the release of political prisoners of the Kakori case and 
others in Andaman jails, as well as with the striking workers in Kanpur. The number of 
prisoners awaiting trial in UP prisons was already rather large owing to the Kanpur labour 
crisis, communal riots at Allahabad and Benares, and now the continuous Madhe Sahaba 
riots in Lucknow. The Governor’s situation report regarded the Madhe Sahaba controversy 
as the ‘most important event of this kind’. In June 1937, curfew orders and orders under 
section 144 CrPC were promulgated to control the situation. Premier of the United 
Provinces, G.B.  Pant, and his Minister of Education visited the affected quarters of Lucknow 
city and appealed to Muslims, both Shia and Sunni, to bring about a ‘better atmosphere’.416 
Sheikh Iqbal Ali, who was the Chairman of the Education Committee, Lucknow District 
Board while appealing to his coreligionists to maintain ‘peace and harmony’ congratulated 
the deputy Commissioner, Mr. H.J. Frampton and Mr. Charles, the City Magistrate for the 
tactful handling of the Shia-Sunni riot. He was convinced that they both deserved gratitude 
of the Muslim community. Sheikh Iqbal Ali expressed that for the first time in Lucknow, a 
riot has been brought under control within such a short time.417 Efforts at compromise 
between Shias and Sunnis even after the formation of a joint conciliation board appeared to 
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have failed in its purpose because both sides refused to express regret for their share in the 
origin of the riots. Meanwhile serialized sectarian newspapers like the Sunni al-Najm, 
Haram, Asad, Naqqara etc. and the Shia newspapers represented by publications such as 
Safaraz, Zulfiqar, al-Wai’z, Hukumaran etc. continued to propound the causes of their 
respective communities throughout this conflict.418 
 
 
The Provincial Muslim League on June 6, 1937, also discussed the question at length and 
passed a resolution at the meeting of the executive committee of the provincial unit under 
the leadership of Mr. Ali Zaheer. But the resolution failed to reach any clear decision. This 
meeting authorised Mr. Ali Zaheer and Mr. Ahsanul Rahman to invite the annual session of 
the All India Muslim League in Lucknow for consultation of the general opinion there.419 
The language of the Muslim League resolutions was rather clever. Though it tried to deal 
with the situation in its own way, much of the emphasis was put on the failure of the 
Congress government. For it regretted the riots, loss of life and property of Muslims, and 
opined that such ‘lawlessness’ did not benefit any party and therefore was a ‘menace’ for 
the growth of nationalistic ideas in the country. A second resolution was a lengthy and tricky 
one. It expressed the apprehension of the Shias that the Madhe Sahaba agitation was started 
with a view to put pressure on the Government to alter its previous decision to class the 
Sunni procession ritual as an ‘illicit’ innovation. The aim would be to coerce Shias to 
surrender their ‘legitimate and old established rights’. This along with the ‘Futwas’ and 
organized processions denouncing Shias as ‘Kafirs’ and their Azdari as an act of sacrilege 
that brought rupture between the two communities/sects. Deploring the attitude of some 
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Sunni leaders who persisted on carrying out ‘nefarious propaganda’ and refused to join Shias 
on conciliation board, the resolution also stressed that peace and order was essential at this 
political juncture.  The meeting resolved that the U.P. government should not be influenced 
by predesigned propaganda and threats by a section of Sunnis bearing in mind that Shias 
were a minority within a minority and deserved a right and just resolution of the dispute.  
 
The third resolution of the ‘Central Standing Committee’ of the Muslim League Conference 
observed that the Shias of Lucknow had shown great restraint and forbearance in the face of 
continuous and organized provocation, and sympathized with the relatives of those who have 
lost lives or were injured during the riots.420 The Shias in the Muslim League tried to convey 
their position to the Government both as a request and a covert threat. Through its 
resolutions, they claimed to take responsibility as ‘citizens’ for the maintenance of law and 
order by identifying the origin of disorder.  
 
The Majlis-e Ahrar, a Sunni organisation, which was close to Congress at the time, and 
opposed to Jinnah’s ideas also organised a meeting of its working committee on June 23rd, 
1937. Presided over by Muhammad Ahmad Quazim, M.L.A., the meeting passed resolutions 
requesting the government to expedite the publication of the report of the Madh-e-Sahaba 
enquiry committee. The resolutions argued that any delay was causing anxiety in the minds 
of both sects and apprehended that it might create ‘fresh intrigues’. The meeting also 
deplored the recent riots and requested the government to release political prisoners.421 Justin 
Jones has pointed out that Madh-e-Sahaba and Tabarra processions were used as a garb 
under which political battles were fought. Certain Congressman in the Tabarra leadership 
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like Wazir Hasan and Sayyid Haider Mehdi, emphasized that the conflict was not sectarian 
but aimed at the government’s restrictions on their religion. The Congress party had to suffer 
the wrath of Tabarra agitators when along with the first three caliphs, names of Gandhi and 
Nehru were also included to be cursed. To this Jones adds that there were social and class 
rivalries involved in this issue. The Madh-e-Sahaba front was constituted mostly of Ahrars, 
from the urban, middle-class and artisan backgrounds who were considered by the British 
as lacking moderation and frequently criticised as ‘degenerates’; whereas, on the Tabarra 
front, noble, aristocratic Shia families close to the municipal government were in evidence. 
Therefore, the sectarian controversy could be seen as an attempt by the poor Muslims to 
seize political control and initiative in the urban space of Lucknow.422 
 
We notice an interesting contrast between both the groups, the language of their resolutions 
and the framework of their demands. The Shias used the tactics of pressurizing the Congress 
government and invoked the favourite punchline of the administration i.e. ‘the need for 
urgent peace and order’, regretted the riots. The Sunnis, on the other hand, could not hide 
their anxiety and haste and demanded that the enquiry report be published at the earliest. The 
conflict could not be resolved in the year 1937 but temporary calm was restored. Justin Jones 
has pointed that that as early as 1932-3 “Muharram was becoming ever more schismatic, 
increasingly marked by the separation of Shi’a and Sunni majlis assemblies and processions, 
and the conflation of mourning and munazara.” A wider range of new associations such as 
the Darbar-i- Hussaini, the Idara-i-Yadgar-i-Husaini and the prolifically active Ajnum-i-
Nasr-ul-‘Aza, emerged within a few years and continued to invigorate ta‘ziyadari and 
emphasized the specifically Shi’a understanding of Muharram as an occasion of 
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lamentation.423 As a result, Muharram increasingly became a month that Shi’a and Sunni 
began to  experience in isolation from each other in an atmosphere appropriate to emphasize 
their differences. While earlier some Sunni figures had argued that ‘taking of ta’ziya had to 
be accompanied by the recitation of praises for the Caliphs’, the agitating Majlis-i-Ahrar 
went a step further. They believed that Shi’a ‘innovations’, particularly ta’ziyadari, should 
ceased entirely among Sunnis.424 
 
 
However, the U.P government failed to resolve this intra-religious conflict in Lucknow in 
the year 1938, too. The problem for the district administration had increased further because 
of its inability to intervene in a direct way. Moreover, given that the Muslim community of 
UP was involved, Congress was cautious not to let them slip into the hands of the Muslim 
League. We know from a confidential letter from the Government of United Provinces to 
R.M. Maxwell who was the secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, that 
on December 31, about 1500 Sunnis attended an Ahrar meeting at Tila mosque, Lucknow. 
The meeting criticized the delay in the publication of the Madhe Shaba Committee enquiry 
report, and threatened to launch a civil disobedience if the government did not publish the 
report by January 7, 1938. The threat was later withdrawn, this letter points out, partly on 
the advice of Maulana Habibur Rahman who argued that such conduct could embarrass 
Congress government, and partly because they could not organize it properly in the wake of 
a parallel agitation which was going on in Lahore in connection with the Shahidganj mosque 
issue.425  
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We know from another confidential letter to Maxwell, that meanwhile attempts were made 
to bring about a compromise under the guidance of Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad.426 The 
Congress had made it a regular observance to celebrate ‘Independence Day’ on 26 January. 
The occasion would usually be celebrated by taking out prabhat pheris, and later many flag 
hoisting ceremonies and meetings would follow where the ‘Independence Day’ pledge was 
taken. But in January 1938, the celebrations of such an ‘Independence Day’ interfered with 
a Madhe Sahaba procession, which attempted to take over the park where the Congress 
‘Independence day’ meeting was held. Police managed to intervene on time and averted a 
serious clash, however, considerable excitement prevailed in the city and police had to patrol 
the streets. A confidential letter from the Government of United Provinces to the 
Government of India, emphasized that because the Madhe Sahaba controversy continued to 
be a matter of contention and had by now assumed a more political complexion, the 
Government started contemplating to publish the report of the Madhe Sahaba Committee 
along with the U.P. Governments resolution to the conflict.427 But owing to the resignation 
of the U.P. Cabinet the publication of the report had been postponed until after Muharram.428 
The Ministers who tendered resignation429 in connection with the release of political 
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prisoners reached a settlement on 25th February 1938. The report of the enquiry of Madhe 
Sahaba Committee was finally published on March 28, 1938. 
 
The Governor of U.P., H.G. Haig in a secret letter to the Viceroy and Governor-General of 
India Lord Linlithgow expressed that contrary to many apprehensions the report was 
received ‘very quietly’. It further reported that the Ahrars, who initiated the trouble on the 
Sunni side “seem definitely unwilling at the present stage to embark on any direct action.” 
Moreover, the Shias expressed their satisfaction with the conclusions of the Madhe Sahaba 
report, which stipulated that “while the Sunnis have the right to recite the Madhe Sahaba 
under suitable conditions and at suitable times, they must not do so to annoyance or danger 
of the public, or in manner provocative to Shias.” However, the Governor’s letter 
immediately doubted whether in practice Sunnis could be allowed to make any public recital 
of the Madhe Sahaba in Lucknow, and that this matter therefore would remain a matter of 
executive decision and hence might prove to be a difficult problem.430 The Allsop 
Committee that led the enquiry, stated in its report that though the Madhe Sahaba recitations 
were allowable ‘in theory’ but because of its provocative nature, should be disallowed in 
practice. 
 
Unfortunately, rioting between Shias and Sunnis, again took place on the occasion of 
Chehlum, where according to the Governor, ‘Sunnis most evidently were the aggressors’.431 
Sunnis attacked a Shia procession, which was returning from the Karbala burial ground 
resulting in conflagration. Police managed to control the situation late after 11 persons had 
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died in various assaults and about a hundred injured. The situation was so tense that the 
authorities had to summon the Military. The government was also considering a temporary 
addition to the Lucknow police force though owing to political apprehensions they were not 
prepared to make the Muslim inhabitants pay for it. Congress governments’ hesitation to 
invoke punitive policing by making the inhabitants pay for maintaining order can be noted 
here. Both Sunni and Shia leaders were arrested to contain the situation. While the Shia 
leaders deposited the security in Courts to secure release from detention, the Sunnis, 
Maulana Adbul Shakoor and Zafar-ul-Mulk, chose to go to jail. 432  
 
The Sunnis in Lucknow displeased with the finding of the committee report threatened civil 
disobedience at numerous occasions if recitation of Madhe Sahaba was not allowed.  The 
issue intensified once again. Both Shias and Sunnis clashed at numerous occasions regarding 
the reciting of Madhe Sahaba and carrying out Muharram Tazia processions in Lucknow. 
By mid-May 1938, the Sunnis have given up their ‘civil disobedience’ and as a result 115 
persons, who were arrested during the Chehlum riots were released. Meanwhile, Maulana 
Zafar Ali Khan, Shaukat Ali and the Raja of Pirpur were touring on the behalf of the Muslim 
League and delivered ‘intensely provocative speeches’ particularly at Bara Banki and 
Allahabad.433 . 
 
Congress’s involvement in the Shia-Sunni dispute further complicated the issue. We know 
that there were two Muslim ministers in the new Congress ministry of 1937, and both were 
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Sunni. Due to this fact, the Congress was more inclined to support Sunni claims for Madhe 
Sahaba recitation. This obliged the Congress ministry to offer ‘theoretical support to the 
Sunni side.434 However, Congress also had the support of Shias in Lucknow city, where 
unlike elsewhere in the province most Sunnis supported the League. The All India Shia 
Conference had a substantial support base in Lucknow. Syed Ali Zaheer, a prominent Shia 
leader was a Congress member elected to the legislative assembly from Lucknow. 
Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman, who was a prominent League member, was elected to the 
Legislative assembly from the city with a substantial Sunni support.  
 
Given political circumstances, it is not difficult to decipher that Congress was interested in 
winning Sunni support in the city of Lucknow and sought to use the controversy for this end. 
Some leaders of the Jamiat-e –ulema convinced G.B. Pant that it was possible to enter into 
an alliance if the Ministry allowed Sunnis to take out a procession during barawafat and 
recite Madhe Sahaba. Pant was inclined to allow Sunnis to recite Madhe Sahaba to work 
political calculations in favour of Congress, but Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, a Sunni Muslim and 
congress leader, was opposed to the idea. In such circumstances, positive political signals 
from Congress ministry in UP emboldened Sunni claims.435 
  
On May 30, 1938, after clashes between the two groups, section 144 CrPC was promulgated 
in Lucknow for a month. It was reported that the Sunnis were reciting Madhe Sahaba by 
holding Milads, and Shias in adjacent places were holding Majlis reciting Tabarra. On a 
couple of occasions the local D.S.P. Sardar Sunder Singh handled the situation quickly and 
averted serious clashes.436 The authorities assumed that now that the more aggressive party, 
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the Sunnis, had given up the civil disobedience, situation might improve. But, by the first 
week of June, the crisis once again flared up. Surprisingly, Shias who had taken modest 
positions until then were responsible. Apprehensive that the Sunnis would obtain some 
concession from the Government, they passed a series of resolutions and threatened to recite 
Tabarra if the Sunnis were shown any consideration and allowed any opportunity to recite 
Madhe Sahaba. As a result, the Sunnis began organizing religious meetings where 
recitations of the Madhe Sahaba would take place. As expected, clashes erupted and the 
District Magistrate again promulgated section 144 CrPC.437 On June 2, in the face of severe 
tension between the two communities, Lucknow authorities decided to enforce another 
curfew order for a fortnight between 7.30 p.m. to 5.30 a.m. The peculiar feature of the orders 
promulgated under section 144 CrPC was its applicability to Muslims only. The situation 
did not improve as both sides organized Milad Sharif (Sunnis) and Majlis (Shia) frequently 
in a tit-for-tat spirit. Given that feelings were running high, according to one newspaper 
report, many members of both the communities were now unwilling to listen to reason and 
were behaving in such a manner as to give an impression that they had no other desire except 
to ‘fly at each others throat’. The Deputy Superintendent of Police Sardar Bahadur Sundar 
Singh and officiating City Magistrate, Mr. Kacker were kept awake at night because of the 
situations. In this highly charged atmosphere, special police arrangements were made in 
connection with the Alam to be taken on the occasion of ‘Nauchandi Jumerat’(the first 
Thursday in the Lunar calendar of every Islamic Month).438 Nauchandi Jumeraat which is 
considered pious (Thursday evening) and usually involved prayers only, was used to make 
a political statement by taking out a procession.  
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Four Sunnis including Maulana Abdul Qayum were arrested on June 3, for the holding of 
Milad at Masjid Bisatyan. As the Milad was commencing, the police asked the organizers to 
finish soon with a view to avert trouble owing to the nearness of a Shia mosque.439  
 
The next day an emergency meeting of the Lucknow Municipal Board was held to consider 
a resolution expressing anxiety over the frequent imposition of curfew orders and requesting 
the authorities to withdraw such orders. This resolution also requested the authorities to call 
a representative meeting of Shia and Sunnis to settle the dispute. The resolution was passed 
by 9 votes to 5, deploring the strained relations between Shias and Sunnis and appealing to 
them to sort out their differences.  
 
The most important element of the resolution for our discussion was the argument that the 
curfew order caused hardship to innocents rather than actual ‘culprits’ and therefore 
appealed to authorities to adopt measures by which only ‘culprits’ would be punished.440 
This is an important break from the earlier resolutions adopted by Shia and Sunni 
organizations. This resolution expanded the scope of the conflict by emphasizing the nature 
of its impact on non-participating parts of Lucknow society. In a different register, it 
suggested an exit route to people of both the communities to exit the cycle of violence by 
recognizing them as ‘responsible’ for their own actions. It also aimed to create a binary 
between the innocent and the culprit and therefore provided one with the moral opportunity 
to claim oneself as innocent. Embedded in this proposition of ‘culpability’ was a moral 
discourse of ‘criminality’, opening up the possibility that everyone had a duty to discipline 
																																																						
439 See, The Leader, Monday, June 6, 1938, Page 12, “Madhe Sahaba, Four Muslims arrested.” 
440See, The Leader, Wednesday, June 8, 1938, Page 11, “Shia-Sunni differences, Govt. requested to withdraw 
curfew order, Resolution passed by Lucknow Municipal Board.” 
	 237	
oneself and a choice not to participate in sectarian violence. This ran directly counter to the 
preemptive logic of emergency orders that imposed bans and other restrictions to all 
members of an identified problem category regardless of their actions – in this case Muslims. 
 
None of the three resolutions had any effect on the conflicting parties. On June 7, 1937, 100 
persons were detained for the violation of the curfew order but were however, allowed to go 
the next morning. The curfew order from June 8, was reduced by one hour and instead of 
7.30 p.m. would start at 8.30 p.m.441  
 
Finally the curfew order under section 144 CrPC which had been promulgated on June 2 for 
a fortnight, was lifted on June 15 by the District Magistrate. According to a newspaper 
report, various conciliatory meetings requested the authorities to withdraw curfew orders, 
which greatly harmed trade in the city. Most importantly, the newspaper reported that picture 
houses were hit hard by the curfew orders and two of them were at the verge of closing 
down.442 The Governor lauded the Premier, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, for his ‘reasonable 
attitude’ towards protests and clashes. Pant regretted that “even if people [ordinary] were 
not encouraging the agitation, they must suffer this inconvenience because they did not 
discourage it.”443 
 
The controversy did not cease to exist nor did the clashes stop. Lucknow remained a hotbed 
of political and religious conflict between Shias and Sunnis. In 1939, after the Madhe Sahba 
report was published and a government communiqué allowed Sunnis to carry out Madhe 
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Sahaba recitation and processions but only on the condition that the authorities would decide 
the route and time. Shias were to be also allowed to carry out a Tabarra procession on the 
same conditions. However, this did not please the Shias who saw it as the betrayal by the 
Congress ministry. Justin Jones has argued that these agitations by the Shia as well as the 
Sunnis “can be interpreted as having taken style and idioms of popular politics as it matured 
during the interwar period, commonly characterized as the era of ascendant mass-
nationalism.” Both agitations were craftily mobilised and over the period were peaceful 
resistance or just organised disobedience, which were primarily Congress tactics. Majority 
of the “leading protagonists of both the agitations were attached to the Indian National 
Congress” in one way or another. For example, the nationalist Majlis-i-Ahrar and the 
followers of Husain Ahmad Madani on the Sunni side, and among the Shia politicians, 
figures such as Sayyid Wazir Hasan and Sayyid Ali Zaheer directed the Shia Political 
conference.444 Conflicts in the machinations of party politics during the Congress Ministry 
of 1937 can also be noted. 
 
It was the provincial Congress government that conceded to the demands initially and 
reignited the controversy that was supressed if not settled by the colonial administration.  
Two sets of observations can be deployed here. One, that prominent Muslims like the two 
Muslim members of the UP Congress Committee, other than just Husain Ahmed Madani, 
were sympathetic to the Sunni cause. Second, that Congress attempted to expand its fragile 
support among the UP Muslims in the face of not to be ignored growing popular support for 
the All India Muslim League in the province. Therefore, it appears that Congress was in a 
way willing to grant concession to the demand of the Sunni majority. Administratively, 
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Congress, as noted in the description of the clashes and subsequent mobilizations in the 
sections above, exploited the dispute in order to benefit from the divisions amongst Muslim 
vote-bank, when the League was attempting to establish its ideological platform with the 
advent of provincial politics.445 
 
The Congress administration, to a great extent, handled Shia-Sunni relations with a 
manipulative skill quite similar to their British predecessors who had attempted earlier to 
find cracks in Muslim unity during the issue of Muslim University, jihadist and pan-Islamic 
agitations, as discussed by Justin Jones.446 Therefore, Madhe Sahaba or the Tabarra 
agitations were a garb under which not religious or sectarian but political battles were fought. 
The “unprecedented volume of British, Congress, Muslim League and other political activity 
and the accompanying increase in journalistic output that accompanied Lucknow’s new 
status as provincial capital gave wider resonance to municipal events.”447 
 
A Shia civil disobedience campaign resulted in the arrest of more than 1800 people. In 
August 1939, the Punjabi Khaksar leader Allama Mashriqi visited Lucknow along with 
many of his followers and offered the UP Congress ministry his help to resolve the crisis. 
Members of both sects appreciated Mashriqi’s intervention and agreed to stop the recitations 
for the time being.448But this only shifted the source of the problem. The Khaksars were non-
sectarian but they were also trained paramilitaries subscribing to an idiosyncratic version of 
fascism.449 They kept arriving in Lucknow increasing administrative fears of more disorder.  
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Justin Jones has argued that the Sunni and Shia agitations of the 1930s were different from 
earlier events. The Madhe Sahaba conflict or the Tabarra agitation differed in their “public 
impact, advanced organization and heavy public participation.”450 These prolonged 
agitations were “actualized as mass mobilizations, couched in the language of government 
petitioning and highly resonant of the political activism that typified north India from the 
1920s.” These agitations were no more restricted to episodic limits of Muharram and just 
sporadic local clashes between Shias and Sunnis. Slogans of “collective piety” transformed 
into “demonstrative slogans and tools of communal politics.” The Lucknow agitation did 
not remain an isolated Lucknow event but expanded in scope not only to other towns of UP 
but to other provinces too. During the agitations, numerous ‘outsiders’ from outside 
Lucknow as well as the province arrived to participate in these grand religio-political 
spectacles. The Majlis-i-Ahrar recruited most of its volunteers from neighbouring qasbas 
and towns such as Kakori, Malihabad and Barabanki etc. and from Punjab more widely. The 
Shia agitation, even after the arrest of its substantial population, was sustained by an influx 
of activists from Rampur, Agra, Fayzabad, Barabanki and Allahabad.451 
 
When processions of both Sunnis and Shias, duly authorised and announced by government 
communiqué, were about to take place, a massive riot ensued resulting in the district 
authorities banning the recital of both the Madhe Sahaba and Tabarra for an indefinite time. 
Moreover, one of the biggest problems for the district administration was that now both 
Sunnis and Shias from outside Lucknow and even outside UP began to arrive in Lucknow 
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to join Madhe Sahaba and Tabarra recitations. Ian Copland et al.452 have rightly pointed out 
that despite G.B. Pants criticism of past British practice of prohibition orders and police 
action, the Congress ministry in UP stuck firmly to the ‘tried and tested’ mechanisms for 
dealing with religious quarrels that the Raj had devised. On one hand ‘customs’ continued 
to be the guiding principle for mediating public ritual. On the other hand, whenever situation 
got out of control, standard containment strategies were resorted to in the usual order starting 
with appeals for restraint, negotiating with community leaders, lathi charges, promulgation 
of section 144, curfews and firing by police and troops. Justin Jones has argued that prior to 
the provincial elections of 1937, the Madhe Sahaba or the tabarra agitation, when in its 
earlier phases, offered a convenient opportunity for inciting anti-government protests. 
Colonial administration often responded by supressing public processions in the name of 
maintaining peace and public order. As a result, it often meant “direct government 
involvement in the regulation of religious rituals and festivities.” Colonial administrations’ 
intervention thus, transmuted matters of religious procedure into political and legal 
disputes.453 
 
Banning public space and police action were the tried and tested measures of the British 
colonial government before 1935 and would be equally vigorously deployed by the new 
Congress ministry in the United Provinces. In Lucknow, the controversy resulted in the ban 
on processions of both Shias and Sunnis in the end, but we notice that during the course of 
action the administrative tactic of using section 144 and bringing in troops served not only 
as a handy tool to control the immediate situation, but also as a political manoeuver to 
incarcerate society at large. It sent a message to the larger community of Lucknow that unrest 
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could paralyze life not only of a particular community but of the whole town. These were 
also the moments when the institutional character of the Congress-in-government would 
become visible as it also resorted to banning access to public space and interfered with 
religious practices. It highlights the fact that whether it was British Raj before 1935 or partial 
Swaraj after 1937, the weapon to deal with unlawful assembly, section 144, would never 
become obsolete. It would only intensify, now that Congress was in power and opposition 
to ‘partial’ Swaraj was unacceptable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the Bombay case study, Congress Ministry led by B.G. Kher did not shy away from 
legislating an extraordinary law where K.M. Mushi gave unbridled powers to the Bombay 
Police in the name of maintaining public order. The Informal labourers that participated in 
communal riots, emerged as a danger to urban governance and came to be branded as 
hooligans in the city of Bombay. As a result, Munshi was commended by the colonial 
officials for understanding the tactics of (colonial) governance and the necessity for a 
government to make strict and exclusive laws to deal with problem categories or the source 
of ‘nuisance’ to public order. Whereas, in the light of Cawnpore Mill strikes and the Madhe 
Sahaba controversy in Lucknow, we notice how the Congress ministry sought to control two 
kinds of problem categories, labour under increasing control of Communists in the Kanpur 
case, and the Muslim community in Lucknow under the influence of sectarianism in the 
other. In both the U.P. case studies Congress first, attempted to intervene through political 
manipulation but when this failed, resorted to the repressive mechanisms similar to the 
tactics of the pre-1935 colonial government. what is consistent in these case studies is the 
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theme of the outsider-insider binary. The regulation and control of a situation often depended 
on marking a territory as an inside and its population/residents/members as insiders. Though 
the conflict or case of ‘disorder’ would initially be termed illegal and subsequently 
prohibited but later when ‘outsiders’ would involve themselves in the matter, the insiders 
were marked as the only legitimate party to the conflict. This colonial binary of inside and 
the outside failed frequently in the face of broader political mobilisations. However, such a 
process succeeded in allowing the administration to first create problem categories and then 
criminalize them. This trend continued even in the Congress led provincial governments 
after 1935. For example, the immigrant worker in the city, the hooligan, the labour leaders 
from outside the factory, supporters of political mobilizations from outside the town etc. 
were all termed as outsiders when situation got out of control.   
 
Certain paradigms of law were stated in the initial sections of this chapter. These paradigms 
could enable us to understand the nature of the legal regime in the case studies discussed 
above. Legal theorist Thanos Zartaloudis has argued that the four paradigms of law are 
important to understand any process of the making and enforcement of law.454 In this 
chapter, we observe that the attitude of the UP Congress ministry towards cases of “public 
order” enforced such four legal paradigms the United Provinces455. It fulfilled the ‘reference 
paradigm’ because it conducted a government according to the Indian Penal Code drafted 
by the British colonialists in 1860, therefore the Congress ministry in UP stuck to its meta-
references to natural law or the availability of a self-sufficient legal code. It is ironic how 
Congress first wanted to wreck the 1935 Government of India Act, but not the overtly 
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repressive Indian Penal Code drafted in a colonial context. The frequent invocation of 
section 144, lathi charges, curfews and occasional police firing were derived from the 
‘salvation paradigm’ of law because the justification of the police violence progressed from 
the fact that a situation of disorder necessitated state violence in achieving the ideal of justice 
as law’s end, i.e. violence calls for violence. Public order laws also enforced the ‘universality 
paradigm’ of legal theory by imposing a legal culture on people who were not direct 
stakeholders in the conflicts in Kanpur and Lucknow. Finally, it enforced the ‘consensus 
paradigm’ by rejecting a social consensus that criticised police violence and section 144. 
The consensus in support of section 144 CrPC was generated by multiple interventions from 
Nehru, Muslim and Socialist leaders within Congress, the statement of governor and the 
publications of official reports mediated mass media through continuous reports, letters to 
the editor and editorials.  
 
Cases like these, I would like to argue, show a blurring of the line between the potentiality 
of public order laws and their actuality. These instances not only emphasise but expose, the 
limits as well as the power of public orders laws. They highlight how the logic of 
‘maintaining public peace and tranquillity’ for the Congress government in Bombay and UP 
in situations of anti-government mass mobilisations or other kinds of public action such as 
riots safeguarded the self-sufficiency of these laws. We notice that the Congress ministry’s 
use of public order laws and the justification it used, points towards a certain biopolitical 
thinking, where the use of public order law in various circumstances would aim to establish 
a normalised understanding of how populations ought to behave or were expected to behave 
once such laws were promulgated. The public order laws, such as section 144, as a practice 
of colonial state power blurred ‘norm’ with ‘fact’ and ‘ought’ with ‘is’. The brutality of 
dominance of colonial government and later the congress ministry was achieved in the name 
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of a certain apolitical rationality which thrived on criminalising mass politics. It was a far 
cry from Congress politics in legislature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 246	
Chapter Four 
When the Administration Broke the Law: Peter Budge Scandal and the 
Issue of Race, Name and Law in UP 
 
This chapter deals with the story of an elderly man named Peter Budge who was arrested in 
the city of Lucknow for the violation of magisterial orders under section 144 CrPC and the 
Indian Arms Act. Subsequently he fell prey to repetitive official errors regarding his name 
in administrative files resulting in his detention for almost a year.456 This story may be 
marginal to the great drama of decolonization in India but it offers a unique window at what 
decolonization actually meant at the grass-root level in terms of legal governance, and it led 
to a scandal in the United Provinces administration. Budges’s legal case disappeared 
between the cracks of bad record keeping and insufficient information sharing and led to his 
lengthy and unlawful detention at the precise moment of India’s independence. His ordeal 
raises important questions about the complimentary relation between law and violence and 
about the sometimes fictitious nature of public order laws. The everyday reality of public 
order enforcement is key to understanding the nature and operations of the late colonial state 
in India. Additionally, it highlights the embarrassment and anxiety the newly independent 
UP government faced when the story of Peter Budges’ detention surfaced. His case is 
particularly poignant, since he was arrested before 1947 and was only released after India 
had attained Independence. Forgotten in jail, he missed the glorious opportunity of his 
transition from a colonial subject to the citizen of an Independent India. This story is also 
significant in that it is not about a member of a political party, it is not about a person arrested 
for protesting against the colonial government, the local administration or while participating 
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in a riot. It is a story of an ordinary person who in addition to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time was subjected to bureaucratic manhandling simply because of his name, a name 
which was not Indian but could be easily confused with other names available. This story 
also highlights the quotidian practices of the local police, jail and judicial bureaucracy while 
handling cases of ordinary citizens who would appear to be politically insignificant.  
 
Recalling the political context of 1946-48 is important to understand the location of Budge’s 
case in the larger scheme of things. In 1946, a year after the Second World War had 
concluded, the Cabinet mission was sent to India to discuss the modalities of transfer of 
power to the Indian people. Two major parties, the Congress and the Muslim League were 
both dissatisfied with the proposal of creating groups of religiously demarcated provinces 
yet to retain some form of unity at the federal level. While Muslim League wanted 
safeguards for Muslims in the Constituent Assembly with the power to veto, Congress on 
the other hand was not content with the ‘communal’ framework the Muslim League 
proposed. As a result, the Muslim League renewed its agitation for a separate Muslim state 
of Pakistan. Such a politics exacerbated communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims 
all over India. In the United Provinces, too,457 communalism gained momentum. A 
particularly alarming point was reached when Meo Muslims were reported raiding Jat Hindu 
villages near Agra, Mathura and Meerut and, in retaliation Jats attacked villages populated 
by Muslims.458 There were reports that weapons including swords, lathis and guns were 
being brought into the province in preparation for communal clashes. A press-note from the 
District Magistrate Lucknow on 21st May 1947 is important in this regard.	459 It mentioned 
																																																						
457 For a larger overview of Uttar Pradesh, see “Uttar Pradesh: History, Economy, People and Politics” in Paul 
Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1965, pp 5-33. 
458Mayaram, Shail. Resisting Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of Muslim Identity, Oxford University 
Press, 1997, Pages 298.  
459 “Unlicensed Firearms in UP”, The Leader, Page 5, May 21, 1947. 
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the strong possibility that ex-servicemen who had just returned from serving in the War had 
brought a large number of firearms into the Province from warzones. The District 
Magistrate’s note emphasized that “the possession of a firearm without a license is an 
offence under the Indian Arms Act punishable with imprisonment up to three years and with 
a fine.”460 It was decreed that ex-servicemen in possession of unlicensed arms should 
produce such arms before “the nearest stipendiary magistrate or the police station officer 
within one month”461 of the notification. Such ex-servicemen were encouraged to report such 
weapons with an assurance that their application for a license would be considered 
favourably and that they would be exempted from prosecution.  
 
The rise of communal temperament in the months preceding partition resulted in the 
promulgation of the U.P. Communal Disturbances Prevention Ordinance 1947, just five days 
after the notification for the declaration of unlicensed arms. The communal disorder 
ordinance incorporated a Government Bill for the suppression of communal disorder in the 
province. The law granted the local authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and 
order the powers to take “special measures”462 for the prevention of disturbances. Such 
special powers included the power to shoot at sight any person violating a curfew and, to 
declare whole towns as “disturbed areas.”	463 Also, punishments for certain offences were 
enhanced.464 The United Provinces Congress Ministry promulgated this ordinance after a 
passage of the Bill through both the Houses of the Legislature because the normal process 
of getting the assent of the Governor General would have entailed considerable delay. The 
U.P. Government defended the suspension of due procedure by maintaining that given the 
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463 Ibid. 
464 See National Archives of India, File No. 38/37/47- Public (A). 
	 249	
high communal tensions in the province, the situation necessitated immediate action and 
could not afford the delay involved in getting the Governor’s assent. Bypassing Governor’s 
assent in the face of an emergency highlights that since the process of decolonisation was 
now advanced, provincial governments could make such decisions for themselves within a 
legal framework. The gradual transfer of sovereignty made such autonomy possible.  
 
Under the new law, the powers of the police and magistrates gained a different impetus. The 
Communal Disturbances Prevention Ordinance enabled ordinary policemen to use their 
discretion to decide as to who would fall in what category of crime. For example, they would 
now be able to decide whether or not a person was participating in disorderly activities or 
was in possession of a weapon. First class Magistrates, on the other hand, were now 
empowered to award all the heavy sentences, including transportation for life. The 
Magistrates were earlier empowered to award only two years’ imprisonment and a limited 
amount as fine for similar offences. Furthermore, no appeals could now be made to 
intermediate courts over the decisions of these magistrates, they would now go directly to a 
High Court only. This law extended to ordinary non-gazetted employees, too. Such 
government servants who were to be found guilty of bribery, loot or partiality during 
communal disturbances were to be dismissed by their appointing authority.  
 
In the light of such laws, the relationship between the police and the judiciary stands at the 
very heart of the policies of control. While the function of the judicial wing appears to be 
clear i.e., conducting trials on the basis of evidence, the purpose of the police remains more 
difficult to define. Unlike the judge, the policemen (or one of his superiors) had a great deal 
of discretion over whether or not to take action in a particular situation of public order. But 
uncertainty did not wholly lie on only one side of the relationship of the two institutions. 
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Late colonial police and juridical practice, as I will explain in the following sections, was 
prone to bureaucratic errors and shared with the police a basic disinterest in the liberty of 
individual persons.  
 
William Gould has highlighted corruption as well as the lax character of administrative 
bureaucracy in the United Provinces. He discusses the case against one Lekh Pal465 who 
when applying to a bank for loan discovered that his proof of identity was wrong, since he 
was registered as dead in local records. This error was later discovered to be a conspiracy of 
his uncle who arranged the registration of Lekh Pal’s death by bribing a clerk in order to 
inherit his property.  Lekh Pal spent almost two decades to prove that he was alive. The story 
gains significance since the death certificate recorded and ratified by a bureaucrat would be 
difficult to refute. In fact, it would prove impossible to prove that he was still alive even 
though he existed in the flesh. This particular case came to light when covered by an 
American journalist in 1975. The case finally concluded in 1994 after prolonged suffering 
by Lekh Pal at the hands of UP bureaucracy. Through the case study of Lekh Pal, Gould 
demonstrates the structure and effects of bureaucratic corruption on the lives of ordinary 
Indians. The case study is from the nineteen seventies, which is much later than the period 
under consideration in this chapter, and it serves as an insight into the scope of corruption 
and of the workings of the bureaucratic order in the life of an ordinary citizen much further 
into the career of the postcolonial Indian state.  
 
The case study of Peter Budge will demonstrate that the wrong decision to arrest somebody 
in a public space was not always related to corruption but sometimes to simple and utter 
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disregard for the liberty and rights of an ordinary citizen. This was by no means unique. Just 
to offer one parallel example for how the legal process could be pursued so sloppily as to 
disregard ordinary lives is that of one Raghubar, brought to public attention in an article in 
The National Herald on May 14, 1948. Raghubar, a resident of Mohanlalganj in United 
Provinces, had been arrested in 1946 in connection with the theft of a bullock. The Tehsildar 
then hastily convicted Raghubar on the charge of the theft. However, Raghubar preferred an 
appeal to the sessions judge against the conviction order. In response, the sessions judge 
ordered a retrial on the basis that Raghubar was not given the chance to defend himself. The 
prosecution had the case postponed at every hearing for more than a year on various pretexts. 
Finally, when the magistrate fixed the hearing for April 31, 1948, the witness presented by 
the prosecution during the hearing was ignorant about the case and, in fact, turned out to be 
a witness for some other case. Following this, the Magistrate passed serious strictures on the 
negligence of police and discharged Raghubar immediately. The case of Peter Budge’s 
suffering, meanwhile, throws up an uncanny resemblance to other cases like Raghubar and 
Lekh Pal. It is of added interest for the argument of this thesis as it involves very specifically 
the administration of public order legislation. 
 
 
At the Wrong place at the wrong time: public disorder and the misfortune of Peter 
Budge 
 
Amidst heightened communal discord building up to the partition of India, curfews and 
prohibition orders became frequent. With the promulgation of the Communal Disturbances 
Prevention Ordinance 1947 and the invocation of the Indian Arms Act supplemented by 
curfews and orders under section 144 CrPC, life on the street became ever more difficult. 
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These disturbances were not directed against the colonial administration now but rather 
violent attacks by religious communities on each other in the wake of numerous uncertainties 
that arose with the possibility of the partition of India. In such uncertain times, Peter Budge 
made the unforgiveable mistake of taking a walk with a walking stick in his hand on the 2nd 
of June 1947, two months before India achieved independence.466 While walking, he was 
confronted by two constables Mohammad Saghir and Dudh Nath from Alambagh Police 
Station of Lucknow, who were patrolling the Charbagh area at that time.467 The constables 
confronted Budge and asked about his motives and presence on the street. Following 
arguments with the constables, Budge was arrested and his walking stick confiscated. This 
was around 11.15 a.m. according to the First Information Report (FIR). He was registered 
as an Indian Christian, with sanwala rang (brown skin colour) and as a resident of Kandhari 
Bazar, Lucknow.468 The reason for his arrest was that “he was found carrying a bamboo stick 
in contravention of the orders under section 144 CrPC and refused to give up the stick when 
asked to do so by the constables.”469 It is difficult to understand why the walking stick was 
requisitioned by the constables and how it could violate orders under section 144 and the 
Indian Arms Act. His refusal to hand over his walking stick led to the recording of the stick 
as a “weapon” which contravened the prohibition orders in place. He was arrested and taken 
to the police station, detained in the hawalaat for a day then sent to the City Magistrate’s 
Court next day at 12.25 P.M. The challan stated that he was booked under section 152 CrPC 
and section 188 IPC. After obtaining a complaint from the District Magistrate, Budge was 
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sent to Jail the very same day. He would stay incarcerated for almost a year from then, 
without anyone noticing his detention or his legal case being advanced or dealt with.  
 
The case became prominent after a newspaper reported the story of Peter Budge and 
questioned the functioning of law and order administration in the Province.470 The Premier 
(Chief Minister) of United Provinces personally rang the Deputy Secretary from Nainital to 
enquire about the progress of the enquiry and ordered to deal with the ensuing scandal.471 
Since India was an independent country now, the story of such an administrative lapse 
causing such suffering to a common man embarrassed the government. The news story 
pointed to a potentially dark legacy that the postcolonial Indian bureaucracy had yet to 
overcome. This story is significant to understand just how everyday legal practice had yet to 
be decolonized, suggesting that decolonization was an extended process lasting several 
decades rather than a mere moment – which as it happens, the unfortunate victim of 
bureaucratic error was not allowed to enjoy. Also, it highlights the contradictions of a 
government now run mostly by Indians themselves but still following a colonial legal code. 
To deal with the Peter Budge fiasco, the UP government finally appointed Justice M.C 
Desai, District and Sessions judge of Lucknow to conduct a judicial enquiry into the case.472 
It was only in a letter dated May 15th 1948, that Deputy Commissioner Lucknow A.D Pandit 
enclosed a note on Peter Budge informing the Deputy Secretary to UP government about the 
progress in the judicial enquiry of the case.473 
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1948. Part of file 814/48, Home Department (Criminal) UP state Archives, Lucknow. 
	 254	
 
Law and its lies: the detention of Budge under incorrect laws. 
 
During the colonial government, police action and judicial interest was directed towards 
political activities of various kinds. It appears that the post 1947 government of United 
Provinces initially followed a similar path. Communal clashes, the activities of Hindu 
organisations like the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, maintaining law and order etc. 
remained primary concerns of the government, alongside other colonial obsessions such as 
the control of rural banditry to which we will return in later chapters. An ordinary bystander 
like Peter Budge did not fit into any colonial problem category and hence received little 
attention while ‘more important’ issues were being dealt with. Justice M.C. Desai eventually 
submitted a twenty-eight-page report on the whole affair. His enquiry was meant to 
demonstrate the sincere readiness of the Congress government in United Provinces to pay 
immaculate attention to each and every case.  
 
According to the report:  
 
On 21.5.1947, the District Magistrate Lucknow issued an order under section 144 
Cr.P.C. prohibiting any person from going about armed with any lathi or stick in any 
street or thoroughfare or assembling together in parties or groups of more than five 
persons. The order was passed on account of strained communal and party feelings 
and was to remain in force for two months.474  
 
																																																						
474 See, File No. 462/1948, Home Department (Police) B, “Criminal Law Amendment Act, Question of issue 
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Peter Budge was arrested on the 13th day of this order on 2nd June 1947 and almost two 
months before India’s independence. The scope of the section 144 CrPC order is significant 
to understand the case. As stated by Justice Desai’s report: 
 
“If a person disobeys an order lawfully issued under section 144 Cr.P.C. and if the 
disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction etc. to any persons lawfully 
employed, he is liable to be punished under section 188 I.P.C. An offence under 
section 188 I.P.C. is non-cognizable and bailable. The police have no power to arrest 
a person accused of this without warrant. Government have the power of issuing 
notification under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1932 making an 
offence under section 188 I.P.C cognizable but no such notification was issued by 
the government in June 1947. … According to section 195 Cr.P.C. no court can take 
cognizance of an offence under section 188 I.P.C. except on the complaint in writing 
of the public servant concerned.”475 
 
Most importantly, the report concluded that “the arrest by the constables without a warrant 
or order from the magistrate was altogether illegal.”476 Though there was a provision under 
section 54 that empowered a police officer to arrest without warrant when a person has been 
implicated in any cognizable offence.477 However, such was not the matter in Peter Budge’s 
case. Moreover, this section could not be invoked when the offence of Section 188 IPC is 
non-cognizable.478 Also, under section 57, a police officer has the right to arrest a person 
who has committed a non-cognizable offence in the presence of a police officer along with 
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refusing to give his name and residence address when asked. This is only aimed at 
ascertaining the name and residence of the person in question. This did not apply to Peter 
Budge’s arrest under section 57 because the constables did not even ask Peter Budge his 
name and residence, therefore, the report argued, they could not have relied upon this 
provision. Furthermore, when his name and residence was ascertained at the police station 
his detention would have to cease. So, we now know that Peter Budge’s detention itself was 
unlawful.  
 
The police case further stated that Peter Budge was arrested under section 151 Cr.P.C.479 
The report also pointed out that such a provision was relied upon for arresting the man for a 
non-cognizable offence. Moreover, there was no question of preventing the commission of 
any offence because mere disobedience of an order under section 144 Cr.P.C. is not an 
offence. It is an offence only if the disobedience causes, or is likely to cause obstruction, 
annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction etc. to any person lawfully employed. But the 
statements of Police Constable Saghir Ahmad and Sub-Inspector Manzoor Ali did not 
suggest anything of this sort. Also, it was mentioned in the FIR that there is a chance that 
Peter Budge was of unsound mind because a report was made for his medical examination, 
which never took place. It is incomprehensible as to how such a “half-witted man,”480 when 
disobeying the order could have caused obstruction. His resistance and refusal to surrender 
his stick could have been a cognizable offence but the police or the court did not bring any 
such charge against him in the first place. Therefore, the constables had no authority to 
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demand that the stick should be surrendered to them, the report said. District and Session 
Judge M.C. Desai concluded, “the arrest itself was illegal.”481 
 
During the enquiry it was found that the chaalan report (chargesheet) sent by the Alambagh 
police station was untraceable now482 because according to the Prosecuting Inspector a large 
number of papers from his box were stolen at the time and it was presumed that the chaalan 
of Peter Budge was included amongst those papers. Also, not only was there no warrant of 
custody for Peter Budge addressed to the Superintendent District Jail, he was also admitted 
to District Jail in contravention of the Jail Manual (Para 15). The enquiry note pointed out 
that under Para 39 of the police regulations it was the duty of the Court Moharrir to obtain 
Magistrate’s orders for the detention in the lock-up both in the first instance as well as 
subsequent remands. The Court Moharrir of the City Magistrate’s Court responsible during 
the case had retired by the time of enquiry and was blamed for his negligence. According to 
the note, “each Court Moharrir maintained an unofficial register of undertrial prisoners in 
which the details of the case against them, the various dates of remand and the date of bail 
etc. are mentioned. Therefore, entries regarding his case were not made in the register 
prescribed in Form I of the Oudh Criminal Rules (the Misalband Register) because no actual 
papers reached the City Magistrate.” As a result, it became impossible for the City 
Magistrate to know about the case. According to the report, the City Magistrate Mr. Sanwal 
was subsequently replaced by Mr. Dube in September for a month before Mr. Kaul finally 
took over in the beginning of October 1947. 
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In addition to the Magistrate in whose court cases were under consideration, there were other 
mechanisms available to check on the unnecessary detention of under-trials. According to 
the rules, a monthly inspection of the District Jail had to take place by the District Magistrate, 
followed by periodic inspections by Commissioner and Sessions Judge or non-official 
visitors.483Finally, a monthly list484 of under-trials was to be sent to the District Magistrate 
by the jail, under para 439 of the Jail Manual.  
 
The first inspection after the detention of Peter Budge was carried out by the Additonal 
District Magistrate on 15th September 1947 followed by another inspection on 10th January 
1948. The Additional District Magistrate mentioned the name of Peter Budge in the list 
attached to the inspection conducted on January 10th, 1948 and a note was sent to the City 
Magistrate for report ten days later (on 20th January 1948). Though the City Magistrate 
responded on 27th February 1948 with regards to other prisoners he could not report on Peter 
Budge as reportedly he had no documents in his Court about his case. During the enquiry it 
came to light that he did promise to make enquiries from the Sadr Lock-up of the Moharrir 
but apparently forgot. The Magistrate also reported that the monthly lists of under-trials 
received from September 1947 to the first week of April 1948 were untraceable in his office. 
His roundabout excuse was that it was impossible for his office to have received any lists 
between February and April 1948, as “the jail staff was heavily worked owing to the R.S.S. 
and other detenues”485 following the assassination of Gandhi. In addition, the District 
Magistrate stated that the monthly list of under-trials received from the jail was sent by the 
Judicial Assistant, in the original, to courts for circulation. Therefore, owing to a large 
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number of courts involved, the lists sometimes got lost and reports were never received from 
courts in time.486 The lapse in following stipulated regulations was justified with reference 
to the shortage of staff in the Courts and it was argued that the office of the District 
Magistrate had to deal with a huge volume of correspondence. Although, the District 
Magistrate’s office did file a request for increase in staff no official sanction had been 
received at this point. An attempt to shift the burden of error from individuals to blame 
general overwork is evident here. 
 
The note of the District Magistrate was not shy to admit that the jail inspection notes by 
various officers did not receive adequate attention of the magistrates largely because there 
was heavy congestion in the Courts. He stated that the average of the total number of under-
trials belonging to all courts was around 500.487  According to him, this led to inefficiency 
of the court staff leading to improper entries in warrants of custody when cases were 
transferred from one court to another. As a result, the jail authorities or the Prosecuting 
Inspector were unable to point as to if a case was pending and with what office. Even the 
Superintendent of the Jail complained about the over-work that the under-trial clerk was 
subjected to, even though he worked overtime.  
 
Along with the submission of this note, the District Magistrate issued instructions that no 
prisoner was to be admitted to Jail without a proper warrant of custody or a detention order 
from a magistrate. The District Magistrate pointed towards a ‘fault’ in the system where 
Magistrates did not record cases in their cause-list in which a charge sheet has not been 
received but only remands were being granted. Orders were now also issued to the 
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magistrates to record such cases in their cause-list and they should insist on the production 
of under-trials from the jail on the expiry of their remands. The note admits without any 
further explanation that remands were granted on paper on the request of the police and, the 
under-trial was never taken out of jail until the hearing of the case started.488 This points out 
an indirect confession by the judicial administration of the normalisation of the violation of 
the due process. 
 
Disregard for individual liberty was not uncommon during in the late colonial period. 
Various communal riots, worker’s agitations, nationalist protests were handled by the 
administration on a day to day basis. When the administration was burdened with political 
unrest, individual cases were often dealt with carelessly. Sometimes, the police officer on 
the spot would use their judgement to decide whether the case falls under violation of public 
order or not. Peter Budge’s case was also decided by the two constables, who without 
sufficient information about him lodged a report for violating a curfew and carrying a 
weapon. Clerks both in the police station and in the courts, did not pay attention to detail 
and due to multiple paperwork registered his details incorrectly. The judicial system was 
also inattentive to the possible errors that could be committed in the process. It overlooked 
a general disregard for details and followed a standard habit of issuing warrants and 
conducting trials without ascertaining the details of the trial or the accused. 
 
 
Problem of language and legibility: Chinese whispers, Administrative misconduct and 
the disregard for individual liberty 
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1948. Part of file 814/48, Home Department (Criminal) UP state Archives, Lucknow. 
	 261	
 
Peter Budge’s detention case when investigated turned out to be the result of clerical errors 
while recording his personal details. In addition to the unlawful initial charges under which 
Peter Budge was booked, he was subjected to a conclusively unfortunate spelling blunder. 
Such errors were primarily owed to Urdu-English transliteration problems. Budge’s name 
was sloppily written in Nastaliq and was later wrongly romanized. The report in the general 
diary of the Head Moharrir Munis Khan recorded the name of the accused as “Peer Bajar 
s/o Tanik Bajar” whereas the real name was “Peter Budge s/o Tommy Budge.” Justice 
Desai’s report highlighted the fact that it is this simple carelessness “responsible for all the 
trouble that had arisen in this case.” Though Munis Khan did not know English, the report 
opined, he should have taken care when he was confronted with a strange name and should 
have written it down correctly. Therefore, Munis Khan, according to Desai, could not be 
absolved from the blame for writing down the name incorrectly. Sub-Inspector (SI) Zahir 
Khan’s report, which was treated as chaalani489 report also recorded the name as “Peer 
Bajar.”490  The Inspector without checking the facts for himself copied information as was 
recorded in the general diary of the Moharrir Munis Khan. Though the SI opined that the 
man was “cracked head and insane” and suggested that he should be medically examined to 
find out whether he should be sent to an asylum. As mentioned above such an examination 
never took place and the question of arresting a person with an unsound mind and to remand 
him in custody still remained.  
 
Police constables Saghir Ahmad Khan and Ram Lakhan took Peter Budge to the District Jail 
on 3rd June 1947 with the warrant and he was admitted to the jail. But when the inquiry was 
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conducted into the papers of this transfer, the report highlights that the warrant was lost and 
was declared untraceable. The second level of error occurred when the same man Peter 
Budge was entered into jail under the name “Peer Buj s/o Tomi Buj,”491 adding to the 
confusion of administrative bureaucracy. We know from the observations in the enquiry 
report that the courts did not adopt the practice of returning the warrants immediately after 
examining the period of remand. But the courts in Lucknow district repeatedly failed to 
return the warrants. In the case of Peter Budge too, the “City Magistrate signed the warrant 
remanding the man in jail custody up to 17.6.1947, he did not open any file and did not make 
any entry about the matter in any register.”492 Now, as the arrest was illegal in the first place, 
“the remand to jail custody was also illegal.”493 The problem on the part of the City 
Magistrate was that he did not take cognizance of the offence under section 188 I.P.C. and 
could not do so without the complaint by the District Magistrate. Hence, he could not remand 
Peter Budge for even one day. But we know from the report that he was remanded for 14 
days. 
 
 
The story of clerical errors did not end here. On 4th June 1947, the City Magistrate’s court 
moharrir sent the chalani report of S.I. Rashid Ahmad together with the connected papers 
to the District Magistrate for sanctioning the prosecution of Peter Budge under section 188 
IPC.494 In such a case, when the Police Inspector required District Magistrate’s sanction for 
any case, he had to fill a form and send it to the District Magistrate for his signatures. When 
Prosecuting Sub-Inspector Yusuf Ali Khan along with the chalani report sent the form to 
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the District Magistrate, he wrote the name of the accused as “Peer Bakhair s/o Tank 
Bakhair,”495 leading to further alteration in Peter Budge’s name in police and court records. 
Evidently, the ahalmad496 took 15 days to get District Magistrate’s signature on this form.  
 
 On 21st June 1947, the PI’s office sent the report to the City Magistrate’s Court but the City 
Magistrate at first transferred the case to the court of the Addl. City Magistrate, and the 
complaint did not go to his office. Finally, on 16.7.1947 the case was registered in the court 
of the City Magistrate. The ahalmad opened a file of the case but wrote the name as “Pir 
Bakhair.” In the Misilband register No.1 he wrote down the name as “Pir Baksh s/o Tank 
Bahadur.”497 This kind of alteration was the final nail in the coffin of this case, making it 
now impossible to trace the man later. By this time, the name Peter has been altered to ‘Pir’ 
and Budge had been changed to ‘Bakhair’. Errors did not even spare Peter Budge’s father’s 
name. Budge’s parentage was also recorded incorrectly by different authorities. Peter 
Budge’s father’s name being Tommy Budge was written incorrectly first as ‘Tanik Bakhair’ 
and later as ‘Tank Bahadur’.498 We know that by the time of inquiry the ahalmad of the City 
Magistrate’s Court Ram Sudhrisht Lal was under suspension. Nobody even noticed that the 
City Magistrate had opened a file, though under a corrupted name. Also, nobody took any 
notice of the suggestion in the Police report that the man should have been medically 
examined with a view to find out whether he was of unsound mind or not. No letter was sent 
to the Superintendent Jail for his medical examination either. 
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The period of remand of Peter Budge expired on 17th June 1947, but he was not sent to the 
court on that day in accordance with the rules. In the paperwork, the next day fixed in the 
warrant was 8th August 1947. The report pointed out that “this means that the warrant was 
not sent on June 17, 1947 for extending the period of remand and that the man was detained 
in the jail without any authority up to August 8, 1947.”499 The enquiry report held the 
Assistant Jailor Radha Raman Tewari responsible for this unlawful detention.500 
 
When the city Magistrate fixed the next date as 8th August 1947, he also ordered summons 
to be issued against Peter Budge. This was more evidence for the the carelessness of the 
judiciary as when an accused was already in jail there was no need for the summons to be 
issued. Neither the ahalmad nor the magistrate seem to have read the chalani report and the 
copy of the report of the general diary. The issue became even more complicated when the 
reader of the Court of Oudh Behari stated during the inquiry that on the complaint there was 
Urdu writing. According to the inquiry the words read “mulziman muqayyad hain” (the 
accused is under detention) 501 but Oudh Behari claimed that he read it as “Muqayyad azad 
hain (the detainee is free).”502 The inquiry report disagreed with the possibility of reading 
“muqayyad” as “azad”.503 Adding to the confusion, Prosecuting Sub-Inspector Yusuf Ali 
Khan stated that these words did not even exist when he sent the form to the District 
Magistrate for his signature. Therefore, the inquiry report owed this error to Oudh Behari’s 
negligence for not going through the papers properly. It can be observed that the issue of 
legibility, transliteration and the vernacular, all made official records confusing. Also, 
																																																						
499 See, File No. 462/1948, Home Department (Police) B, “Criminal Law Amendment Act, Question of issue 
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certain bureaucratic habits contravening rules and regulations had become unofficially 
acceptable practices. Be it the careless handling of papers or different authorities be it police, 
jail or judiciary copied each other’s information (sometimes incorrectly) without due 
investigation.  
 
Finally, when on 8th August 1947, Peter Budge was sent by the jail authorities to the City 
Magistrate’s court on requisition. The Court Moharrir Mukhtar Ahmad now understood that 
the case was against “Peer Bajar.” We know of the Moharrir’s false assumption because he 
sent the requisition note in this name to the jail for the accused’s attendance on 8th August 
1947. When the date arrived, the City Magistrate fixed another date for 15th September 1947 
because the accused was not produced in court and was noted as absent by the Magistrate. 
Hence, he ordered another summons to be issued. The reason was once again that no person 
of the assumed name existed. In addition, the issue of summons to a man who was already 
in jail custody was technically wrong. Moreover, the Magistrate could not note an accused 
as ‘absent’ when it was the Jail authorities who did not produce him. However, the inquiry 
report stated that “it was the duty of the City Magistrate to make an inquiry into the cause of 
the absence of the accused” in which he failed. Also, the court Moharrir carelessly put down 
a fictitious date 23rd August 1947 in the warrant and returned it to the jail. Therefore, 
Mukhtar Ahmad, the court Moharrir, was held responsible for entering fictitious dates. But 
Mukhtar Ahmad stated as an explanation that the City Magistrate gave him a standing order 
“to fix a date 14 days ahead in every warrant.”504 This was a highly irregular order, if at all 
passed. When the issue of the fictitious date was raised, the moharrir stated that he never 
used to inquire of the reader about the next date in any case. Also, his jurisdiction for this 
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task was that the under-trials had to be returned to the jail before 5 p.m. and therefore, he 
did not always have an opportunity to find out the next date either from the reader of the 
court or from the file. The inquiry report noted, “Since an accused would be sent to court by 
the jail only on requisition, the noting of a date in the warrant was only a formality meant to 
justify the detention in the jail.”505 Also, if the moharrir would have inquired from the reader 
about the next date fixed in this case, the reader would have noted that the accused was in 
jail. But the practice prevailing in the court was to not pay attention to such details and hence 
there were many facts of which the court administration itself was not aware. 
 
Justice B.D Sanwal who was hearing the case got transferred at this stage and Justice C.B.L. 
Dube began presiding over the court now. Even on 15th September 1947, no one enquired 
about the ‘absence’ of the accused and the court issued another summons. But this time the 
City Magistrate ordered the summons to be issued against the accused for 25th September 
1947 and to be given dasti506 to a constable. But apparently, there was no summons, which 
might have been issued for 15th September 1947. According to the statement of the clerk 
constable of Police Station Qaisarbagh, no summons reached the police station at all. Also, 
the chalan bahi of the ahalmad did not contain any entry about the despatch of the summons. 
This points to the fact that the then ahalmad Ram Sudhrisht Lal failed to issue the summons. 
Once again, a new date, 3rd October 1947, was carelessly endorsed by the court moharrir. 
Also, the court moharrir was supposed to maintain a register of the under-trials remanded 
by the magistrate in jail. But in the lock-up register, Head Constable Liaqat Ali had recorded 
that Peter Budge was released on bail on 10th August 1947. The issue was that no 
correspondence existed for this date, so head Constable Liaqat Ali must also have entered a 
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fictitious date in the cause list. It can be noticed that the clerks often recorded information 
without checking papers and were used to record dates and names carelessly and sometimes 
fictitiously. Noting the ‘absence’ of Peter Budge in the Court, Justice C.B.L. Dube once 
again issued fresh summons for the hearing on 13th October 1947. The Magistrate again 
failed to inquire about the successive absence of the accused from the hearing. The later 
inquiry report noted: 
  
When the accused was absent again and again it was his (magistrate’s) duty to give 
personal attention to the matter and to find out why he was absent.507 
 
At this time, the City Magistrate M.G. Kaul had taken over as Magistrate from C.B.L. Dube. 
When the accused was absent again on 13th October 1947, Justice Kaul at once ordered a 
bailable warrant to be issued against the accused for 11th November 1947. We must note that 
the summons issued for 13th October 1947 was issued late on 30th September 1947 against 
“Pir Bakhair s/o Tank Bakhair.” On the top of the summons was written “Pir Baksh Isai” in 
Hindi and “Pir Baksh” in Urdu. The error regarding the recording of an incorrect name that 
began from the local police station returned back to the point of origin without anyone 
noticing any familiarity with the case.  
 
Budge’s fate was complicated by issues of legibility, race and bureaucratic culture. 
Throughout, Peter Budge was treated like a non-descript, a Christian by religion and Indian 
by race but with an English name. Therefore, he did not fit into any readymade problem 
category. The Police Station Qaiserbagh returned the summons on 12th October 1947 to the 
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effect that no trace of “Pir Bakhair Christian” could be found in Mohalla Qandhari Bazar 
and that there did not live any person by that name. The issue here is that the ahalmad of the 
court failed to endorse the date on which he received the summons back.  If he received the 
order on or before 13th October 1947, the order of the City Magistrate would have been 
wrong. The next step would have been to find out the correct address of the accused instead 
of ordering a warrant to be issued. Because a warrant could only be issued if it was found 
that the accused was evading service of the summons. Magistrate M.G. Kaul too “failed to 
go through the file and discover that the man was rotting in jail since 3.6.1947.”508 
 
On 11th November 1947, the City Magistrate transferred the case to Special Magistrate Dr. 
S.N. Bose without noting anything about the presence or absence of the accused. Even the 
office of the Special Magistrate did not discover the error that the address of the accused was 
incorrect and instead kept issuing summons. The next date of a hearing was 5th January 1948 
and the accused was absent once again. The Special Magistrate once more issued summons 
for 16th January 1948, but this time he took the precaution of issuing it through the challaning 
authority, which meant careful recording of facts which would make any follow-up on the 
case easier. The Special Magistrate still did not bother to inquire himself about the ‘absence’ 
of the accused. When the summons order to be issued for the date was not received back 
from the police station, the case was adjourned to 26th January 1948 and, another summons 
was issued through the challaning authority.  When once again the accused was ‘absent’, the 
Special Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that the accused could not be 
traced. The case against Peter Budge came to an end on 26th January 1948 without anyone 
noticing that Peter Budge was still rotting in jail. He was the present absent that was 
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physically present but absent in the bureaucratic paper trail. His existence in the paperwork 
was more important than his physical existence. It was the paperwork that legitimated his 
presence. 
 
One of the Appendices in the inquiry report includes a letter which the Superintendent Jail 
wrote to the District Magistrate on 7th November 1947 enclosing a total of 93 warrants 
including the one for Peter Budge for fixing new dates. Another letter attached as an 
Appendix to the report proved that the warrants had been repeatedly sent to the Courts for 
fixing dates but were received back as is. The letter sent to the District Magistrate was lost 
in his office and nobody had any idea about it either. The issue pertains to the indexing of 
the 93 warrants sent together. It is at this point that the warrant was received but apparently 
not indexed. We come to know later that the Judicial Assistant received the letter in the 
District Magistrate’s office as he sent the letter together with warrants on 8th November 1947 
to the Prosecuting Inspector. The error was the despatcher’s who made an entry in the Rasid 
Bahi509 though he wrongly put down the number of the letter as 222 instead of 272. 
 
The inquiry report argued that there has been inefficiency in the office of the District 
Magistrate because nobody took any interest in the paperwork after sending it to the 
Prosecuting Inspector. Had the letter been indexed it would appear in the register of 
unanswered references after a month, and the District Magistrate would have been able to 
see that full compliance was not done. The Head Constable Mukhtar Ahmad was responsible 
for the detention of Peter Budge upto 29th October 1947 because he kept on endorsing 
fictitious dates in the warrant without any authority from the City Magistrate. The 
Superintendent of Jail, meanwhile, should have refused to admit an accused to jail whose 
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case is not authorized by the criminal court because he derived his authority only from the 
warrant of custody. The inquiry report also argued that if the warrant authorised detention 
up to a certain date he was bound to send the under-trial to the court and must refuse to 
accept him again unless the date is extended. There is a failure on the part of the jail 
Superintendent too. 
 
The inquiry report concluded that the initial blame lied with the magistrates and court 
moharrirs who were in the habit of doing fictitious work and did not realise their 
responsibility in such matters. But it was the court too that was inattentive even though the 
Jail Superintendent kept sending warrants time and again. According to the inquiry report, 
“it was a question of liberty of an individual who had already undergone unlawful 
detention.”510 
 
 
In the end, Superintendent at some stage actually sent the accused (Peter Budge) to the court 
on three occasions after January 1948, but on each occasion he was returned by the court. 
Finally, when no notice of this matter was taken by anybody, the Superintendent wrote on 
28th April 1948 another letter to the District Magistrate bringing to his notice this unlawful 
detention. When this letter reached the City Magistrate Peter Budge was sent for from jail 
on 6th May 1948 and the next day, he was released immediately under section 249 Cr.P.C.511 
The Magistrate released him on the ground that there were no papers connected with his 
detention and he was never produced before the court.512 Therefore, his detention was held 
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illegal. The irony remains that the court did not bother to inquire if there was any mistake 
on their part or whether the system was itself inefficient and careless. Moreover, Peter Budge 
had himself sent two applications from the jail drawing the City Magistrate’s attention to his 
detention without trial. The first application was sent on 13th March 1948, followed by 
another on 24th April 1948.513 Even these applications were not traceable in the City 
Magistrate’s Court but the ahalmad admitted during the inquiry to having received them. 
More accurately he was forced to admit it because he had signed the jail dak book (postal 
register), otherwise even this instance could have been denied. The entire fiasco highlights 
the fact that the neglect to deal adequately with the inspection notes of the various inspecting 
officers contributed to the unlawful detention of Peter Budge. We now know that the police, 
the magistracy and the staff of the jail and of District Magistrate’s office were all responsible 
in one way or another for the unlawful detention of this innocent man Peter Budge.514 
 
 
The case of Peter Budge resonates in a way with Franz Kafka’s waiting ‘before the law’ 
framework. But this Kafkaesque ordeal owes much to the everyday functioning of file-based 
bureaucracy in India and elsewhere. A few scholars have written about the life of 
bureaucratic file/paperwork/ documents. Matthew Hull for example, has pointed out that the 
foundations of the East India Company itself were based on a Hobbesian framework of 
“body politik,” where there had to be a clear chain of command and hierarchy. The 
movement of paper through various channels ensured the conduct of business of the 
Company. This was later reflected in the late colonial government too, when Crown had 
taken over the business of government. Peter Budges’ case enables us to understand “the 
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implications of such a thorough paper mediation of relations among people, things, places 
and purposes,”515. It demonstrates the Kafkaesque nature of the justice system in India by 
analysing a case of illegal detention of an individual in the name of ‘public order’. Ben Kafka 
in The Demon of writing: Powers and failures of paperwork has argued that bureaucracy is 
as much a myth as material reality. Both the materiality of bureaucracy and its conceptual-
fantastical fashioning should be grasped together.  Ben Kafka’s work is an exercise in the 
‘psychohistory’ of paper work as he himself calls it.516 Bureaucratic myths, like most myths, 
as Ben Kafka suggests, are about managing structural contradictions in how we are governed 
and how we govern ourselves,517 For Kafka, it was the structural contradictions of the liberal-
democratic project, which was responsible for the amount of paperwork that was required 
not only to govern, but also to be governed in the modern world.518 Bureaucratic rationality 
has always demanded that “governing paper-work” creates a sense of certainty in order to 
infuse legal order with legitimacy.  But the case study of Peter Budge demonstrates that at 
the heart of this “Government of Paper” is a Kafkaesque element of error, neglect, and 
confusion. As Matthew Hull has argued that the “Government of Paper” established a system 
where “vouching was done by artefacts, not people.” All official documents had to be 
‘vouched’ by a different official at each level. In the case of Peter Budge trial, we observe a 
very neat system of commands, recording of facts, registration of documents. The structure 
of a system where a conduct of papers is supposed to ensure that individual official did not 
commit error(s) in the process. We note how a system where the logic of the system was 
supposed to defy errors, the entire system of vouching collapsed when an incorrect name 
was registered. This not only endangered the liberty of an individual but also exposed how 
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fragile the conduct of papers was. As a result, the chance of a human error, in a way, 
destabilised the government of papers. I would like to argue that such an uncertainty of law 
was the potential site of everyday injustice in late colonial U.P. I would further argue that 
such errors in the justice system should not be seen as ‘accidental’ only, but should be taken 
as ‘constitutive’ of the larger legal practices in late colonial and early independent India. The 
case of Peter Budge proves that the juridical-bureaucratic rationality was often punctured by 
moments of small decisions that each official made at every step. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Peter budge’s suffering at the hands of local administration of Lucknow above all points out 
the mismanagement of paperwork bureaucracy in colonial India. Three major points emerge 
out of Budge’s illegal detention. One, the process of decolonisation had implications on 
transfer of sovereignty even before 1947 as highlighted by the passing of public order 
legislation without seeking the assent of the Governor. Second, non-political individuals like 
Budge did not figure in the bureaucratic calculations of the law and order machinery. And 
third, colonial bureaucracy was inefficient and ill trained in handling its own paperwork. 
 
British colonial government in India saw as a strength its bureaucracy and the paperwork it 
generated. Legal formality and bureaucratic management of life as the case of budge reveals 
aimed to reinforce elements of precise control at each level.  Though legal procedure 
specified the rules of conduct, the conduct itself was not always legal. Technically, each 
procedure in turn promised a certain outcome but the story was different if a single line of 
procedure was carelessly entered in the paper trail. Legal procedure functioned as a 
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rationality where the colonial state could in principle, master or control all things by 
calculation.	 519  Colonial administration had always argued from the beginning that its 
governance was based on the establishment of a depoliticised bureaucracy, impartial 
judiciary, rule bound norms and a dutiful police. What breathed life into such a bureaucratic 
order was the ‘order of files’ which were argued to be laden with facts and therefore, truth. 
Throughout this chapter, Budge’s story and the inquiry report has challenged such a 
convenient understanding of colonial bureaucracy. The entire process of legal conduct right 
from Budge’s arrest to the dismissal of his case was conducted by Indians throughout. A 
general disjunction between the coloniser and the colonised fails to highlight the nuances of 
the participation of Indians themselves in the structure of governance even after 
decolonisation had begun. 
 
Furthermore, Peter Budge’s ordeal demonstrates the illegality of law in various forms. In 
situations of ‘public disorder’ police officials on the spot would make decisions declaring a 
presence a violation of public tranquillity or declare an object a weapon. What is pertinent 
is the basis on which such action could be taken. Charging a person with a particular 
extraordinary crime and then proving it were two different sides of the administrative 
machinery. Ideally, respite from injustice could be expected by fighting/challenging the 
miscarriage of justice or official prejudice involved. But in the case of Peter Budge, official 
incompetence both in language and law complicated this process further. In Peter Budge’s 
case we notice that the laws invoked by the police constables to book Peter Budge did not 
follow the administrative protocol. The sections of law invoked were to make the accusations 
stronger regardless of whether they made any legal sense or not.  
																																																						
519 See, Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Translated by Talcott Parsons, Dover 
Publications Inc.: Mineola, New York, 2003, Pages 285. 
	 275	
 
Also, in the immediate phase of decolonisation, legibility and the vernacular were important 
in this regard. Unfamiliar names like in the case of Peter Budge could be subjected to 
incorrect or unfair transliteration resulting in the suffering of the accused. Informal rules and 
fictitious records, were also commonplace in clerical practice, enabling further confusion in 
various cases. The case study of Peter Budge becomes highly illustrative in the sense that 
his existence is non-descript. His appearance in the world and on paper left different 
footprints each time. According to the FIR, his skin colour was mentioned as ‘sanwala’ 
which is brown skin. However, his name Peter Budge was an English name. He was the 
quintessential Indian citizen- somebody who did not really belong to any pre-state 
community. His name and the description of the body recorded in files did not go together. 
It was this dissociation between the two that his name could have been recorded incorrectly 
in the first place. The later errors could be owed to the same issue but was followed by 
repetitive bad Urdu-English transliteration. Moreover, Peter Budge was always a present-
absent throughout the case. He was physically present in jail but unaccounted for in the 
paperwork. The administrative scam of the UP police, jail and judicial authorities comes to 
light when we notice that all the three departments did not follow rules and conducted their 
own informal administration which often illegally extended remand days, recording of facts, 
issuing summons etc. It remains difficult to ascertain as to how summons were issued again 
and again for Peter Budge when his case file in the court would have mentioned that he was 
arrested and is under detention for the violation of ‘public order’ laws. This only highlights 
the unofficial acceptable rules of conduct between various law and order institutions.  
 
Had Peter Budge been politically motivated or active member of a political organization, the 
story possibly would have been different. His suffering, it can be said, was also because he 
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was a non-political individual. The late colonial state that boasted of meticulous ways of 
keeping record of its opponents failed to do so in this case. His only crime was that he had 
confronted and argued with the two police constables who were empowered with special 
powers in an unstable law and order situation. Hence, empowered by ‘special powers’, 
decisions of such individuals would often result in serious consequences for ordinary citizens 
with disregard to individual rights and liberty. 
 
What is central to Budge’s ordeal is that he was a person who was neither political nor part 
of a major religious community or even a ‘problem category’. It is precisely because of this 
reason he fell by the way side. Subjects like Budge, who were not legible to political society 
in effect did not exist especially when person(s) did not constitute a ‘law and order’ problem 
for the state. Budge neither managed to enjoy a state-guaranteed citizenship nor participated 
actively in the non-state political society. He did not figure in the everyday calculations of 
the administration and hence remained a present-absent. Most pertinently, Budge suffered 
greatly while further decolonisation was taking place and missed the moment of India’s 
independence too, a moment of transformation of his basic political identity from a colonial 
subject to a citizen of an independent country.  Later, his case was only picked up by the 
Press which augured that there was at least some promise for situation to become better with 
the onset of Congress sovereignty. Whether things became better or not with the 
independence of India with Congress at the helm of affairs after independence, would be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Lineages of a Post-Colonial State: Understanding the ‘New’ Sense of 
Public Order in the United Provinces 1947-1955 
 
 
Partition is usually seen as the great dividing line of South Asian history. But the colonial 
project did not die with independence. Through analysing a range of legal reform initiatives 
aimed at the United Provinces public order administration, this chapter will demonstrate that 
the colonial past was not rejected wholesale but often rather inspired the foundations of the 
postcolonial state. Colonialism was over in a narrow political sense, no doubt, but its 
philosophy and structural legacy still thrived. The Indian Penal Code and the organisation 
of the police were still based on colonial policies and bureaucratic structures. As William 
Gould points out there was very considerable confusion over what freedom from colonial 
rule actually meant. In a situation of uncertainty and flux, legality often occupied the moral-
political vacuum. Extraordinary laws, especially, enabled the continued production of 
‘problem categories’ to whom the rule of law did not apply fully or in the same way as for 
the much invoked modern, civilized and responsible citizenry of an independent India.  
 
Partition continued to provide the context for a case of ‘emergency’ for the state. The 
assassination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in January 1948, added to a sense of 
ongoing political crisis following the transfer of power in August 1947. Granville Austin, 
amongst others,520 has argued that there were many anxieties among Indian leaders during 
the constitution making process that followed the achievement of independence in 1947. 
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Many Indian leaders were highly conscious that the compartmentalised nature of Indian 
society along the lines of caste, class, religion, region and language, was a powerful obstacle 
to national integration, which remained their highest priority and determined how they 
envisioned the codification of the state (province)-centre relations. Distressed by the recent 
experience of Partition, the Constitution of independent India was to ensure that the centre 
could overrule state(s) when it came to matters of national integrity. Austin called it the “the 
Union’s long arm” which had a direct and immediate impact on ‘Emergency Provisions’ at 
the state/province level. But emergency powers and the legislation they were based on 
remained rooted at the provincial – now recast as ‘state’ – level. As this chapter will show, 
it was here that the shape of key institutions of intelligence gathering and law enforcement 
was decided, and a new dialectic between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ – ‘problem categories’ 
and the new ‘normal’ –brought into play. 
 
The United Provinces was renamed Uttar Pradesh in 1950. It was a province where the 
ongoing impact of Partition was particularly strongly felt.521 There was an urgent and 
continuing need to maintain public order which led to the enactment of a range of 
extraordinary legislation. Administrative dominance in postcolonial UP, continued to rely 
on a functional effect that arose from the combined impact of certain political and legal 
regulations. Giorgio Agamben has argued that the problem of exception (extraordinary laws,  
in our case) lay at the heart of sovereignty.522 Utilizing some insights from Agamben, it can 
																																																						
521 For a broader discussion around the impact of partition on the Indian subcontinent see, Ashis Nandy 
“Coming Home: Religion, Mass Violence, and the Exiled and Secret Selves of a Citizen Killer” in Public 
Culture, Volume 22, No. 1, Issue 60, Winter 2010, pp127-147; Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making 
of India and Pakistan, Yale University Press, 2007, pages 250; Joya Chaterjee, Bengal Divided: Hindu 
Communalism and Partition, 1932-47, CUP, 2002, pages 324. For continuation of her discussion on partition 
also see, Joya Chaterjee, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, CUP, 2011, pages 360; Urvashi 
Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, Duke University Press, 2000, pages 328; 
Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India, CUP, 2001, pages 
236; William Gould, Religion and Conflict in Modern South Asia, CUP, 2012, pp175. Specifically see chapter 
5 “State Transformation, Democracy and Conflict” p193. 
522 Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press, 1998. 
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be argued that the measures adopted simultaneously created a sense of legal precariousness, 
and introduced regulations and policies to protect its ‘normal’ citizens against such 
existential precariousness. The legitimization of domination depended on measures that 
attempted to safeguard ‘precarious’ citizens from the dangerous ‘others’. As will be shown 
in this chapter, the privilege of protection or security was based on legal distinctions which 
once again created problem categories who were precarious precisely because they were 
considered less worthy of protection or safeguards. 
 
As the case studies introduced in previous chapters have shown, colonial control depended 
both on making essential distinctions between ‘normal’ and ‘problematic’, while also and 
often deliberately blurring of other distinctions central to the rule of law. On the one hand, 
it distrusted the population and consistently occupied itself with identifying problem 
categories, therefore trying to maintain a distinction between the governing and the 
governed. And on the other hand, its policies increasingly resulted in blurring the dividing 
line between society and the state. Intelligence gathering, the prevention of crime and 
disorder, reading and classifying populations and identifying problem characters were some 
of the central activities of the colonial mode of governance. Often, there was little or no 
separation between the executive and the judiciary. The duplication of functions of some 
offices - especially when it came to maintaining public order - highlights the blurry legal 
and institutional nature of the colonial governance. The office of the District Magistrate 
(DM) was especially important in this regard. The office of a DM was responsible for 
administering the bureaucracy of a district, and he could also serve as a first-class magistrate 
invoking extraordinary legislation when required or deemed necessary by him. One of the 
most striking manoeuvres of blurring and distinction at the same time, finally, was the 
deeply-entrenched notion that all administrative work was by definition ‘non-political’.  
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A variety of scholarly studies suggest that law and order remains one of the main 
preoccupations of the post-colonial state. Maintaining peace and tranquillity is one of the 
important stated aims of all administration. As this chapter will demonstrate, the United 
Provinces/Uttar Pradesh were no different in this respect. The question of how to make the 
old colonial system of police administration, intelligence gathering and special and 
emergency legislation fit for a democratic India introduced a further blurring of lines into 
law and order administration. As this chapter will demonstrate, there were often wide 
fluctuations in how the new Congress administration sought to address the new reality. It 
accepted that the colonial-era police and judiciary had to continue to operate as obvious 
foundation of state functionality, while some other tried and tested institutions like 
Mukhiyagiri and Chowkidari came under criticism and became matters of debate in the 
United Provinces. 
 
On the whole, the post-1947 UP government failed to avoid the seductions of the colonial 
art of governance. All too often it resorted to simply rebranding old institutions in the face 
of ‘changed times’ when the Congress had to actively function as an independent 
government rather than just a mass mobilising front opposing colonial power. While old 
distinctions between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ and a deeply held suspicion of society amongst law 
enforcement institutions continued unabated, there were also attempts to almost abolish any 
boundaries between ‘the state’ and ‘the people’, even in the case of the most sensitive and 
definitive of all state functions, the sovereign protection of people’s lives and property. On 
one hand, the administration argued for the cultivation of responsible citizenship by 
militarising society, while on the other hand it resorted to special powers and extraordinary 
legislation to inculcate a fear of the police in the mind of the masses. For this purpose, a 
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binary distinction was created between ‘reliable villagers’ (the insiders of the nation building 
project as per state directives) and ‘social pests’ (the outsiders, the non-compliant person, 
group or set of populations).   
 
 
 
Identifying ‘bad characters’: The UP Prevention of Crime (Special Powers) 
(Temporary) Bill, 1948. 
 
The Congress government in the United Provinces was keen on dealing with all kinds of 
public disorder swiftly. Almost immediately after independence, the new (and in many ways 
old) government of Govind Ballabh Pant introduced the United Provinces Maintenance of 
Public Order (Temporary) Act 1947 and the United Provinces Communal Disturbances 
Prevention Bill 1947. Ironically, these legislations were enacted under section 88 and 89 of 
the colonial Government of India Act 1935 respectively, as free India did not have a 
constitution yet. Once again, this highlights how colonial principles continued post 1947. 
The United Provinces Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947523, could prohibit the 
entry into the province of any document or newspaper, and imposed collective responsibility 
on the inhabitants of specified areas to perform or abstain from performing certain duties or 
acts. In the second amendment of this act section 10A was added empowering the provincial 
government to seek civil assistance to perform administrative duties for “securing public 
safety” or the “maintenance of public order” or “to maintain essential services to the life of 
community.”524 This law made it mandatory for the entire population of UP to act as the 
																																																						
523 National Archives of India, File No. 87/12/47 – Public (A), The United Provinces Maintenance of Public 
Order (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1947. 
524 National Archives of India, File No. 87/12/47 – Public (A), The United Provinces Maintenance of Public 
Order (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1947. 
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extended organs of the state in the maintenance of public order, thus considerably blurring 
the boundary lines between ‘state’ and ‘society’. This included an obligation to provide 
knowledge of any information of activities that could lead to disorder. Failing to do so, the 
provincial government could impose collective fines on the inhabitants of an area for any 
contravention of such orders. In case of failing to pay such a fine, a person would be 
punishable with imprisonment up to a year, even though the ordinance stated that while 
fining individual persons for contravention of such orders, the court should take into account 
the amount of collective fine apportioned on the accused. This law (second amendment) 
came into existence on October 9, 1947.525  
 
Later, this extraordinary law was further amended and extended since it was to expire on 
December 22, 1947. The new amendment empowered the provincial government to 
confiscate or seal “property of persons engaged in activities detrimental to public peace and 
to impose collective responsibility for the protection of property and the furnishing of 
information.”526 Imposition of collective punitive measures in the form of fine was a salient 
feature of this law. 
 
The United Provinces Communal Disturbance Prevention Bill, 1947, in its summary stated: 
 
The object of this Bill is to meet the threat to public peace and order from communal 
strife in the United Provinces and to empower the authorities responsible for the 
																																																						
525 See, National Archives of India, File No. 87/12/47 – Public (A), The United Provinces Maintenance of 
Public Order (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1947. 
526 See, National Archives if India, File No. 5/6/48 – Judicial, The United Provinces Maintenance of Public 
Order (amendment) Bill, 1947. 
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maintenance of law and order in a communally disturbed area to take special 
measures for the prevention or extension of such disturbances.527 
  
The communal disturbance ordinance was legislated to enable the provincial government to 
take effective steps to maintain public peace and order. Chapter III of this law under 
“offences and punishments”, a section (13) stated that: 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 188 of the Indian Penal Code528, 
whoever wilfully disobeys in any communally disturbed area any order lawfully 
promulgated under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, passed in 
connexion with the prevention of any communal activity or communal disturbance, 
shall be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than two years 
and not more than five years and with fine in the discretion of the court.529 
 
At the height of political uncertainty and communal violence, to ‘disobey’ the administrative 
order, according to such a law, could turn a person into a pariah or a ‘problem category’. 
Such pariah would be treated as outsiders since they refused to obey the government 
directives and declined to participate in the government policy. 
 
Section 144 CrPC, which dealt with unlawful assemblies and potentially riotous mobs, was 
utilised simultaneously with the abovementioned laws. But whereas earlier the use of section 
144 was restricted to unlawful assembly, the new prevention of communal violence and 
																																																						
527 See National Archives of India, File No. 38/37/47- Public (A), The United Provinces Communal 
Disturbances Prevention Bill, 1947. 
528 Section 188 of Indian Penal Code broadly deals with ‘disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public 
servant’. 
529 See National Archives of India, File No. 38/37/47- Public (A), The United Provinces Communal 
Disturbances Prevention Bill, 1947. 
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maintenance of public order ordinances expanded state’s reach to activate ordinary citizens 
as its machinery. In a way, the content of these legislations as the following sections will 
demonstrate, point to one fact, that UP broadly turned into a constitutional edifice where 
boundaries between state and society were no longer meaningful. India became a nation-
state after the transfer of power in 1947 and the relationship between the society and the 
state had also become different as compared to the colonial state. Whoever did not follow 
the directives of the state, as discussed in the section above become the outside/outsider. 
Nation building became a project of the state in collaboration with the ‘true’ and a ‘qualified’ 
citizen and the rest became the problem category. The provincial government in newly 
independent India remained obsessed with extraordinary measures and often resorted to such 
laws to conduct everyday governance in the aftermath of partition.  
 
The Congress government of the United Provinces also went all out to overhaul the image 
of provincial police with the Police Reorganization Committee (PRC) of 1948. It not only 
made several changes towards further formalisation of police institutions in UP but also sent 
out instructions to the Superintendents of Police that the First Information report (FIR) 
would now have to be written in Devanagari script. This move posed as an act of 
decolonising the use of official script but also had other subtle designs. The shift from using 
Urdu and sometimes English to Devanagari had strong ‘communal’ undertones that 
everybody in the aftermath of Partition would have immediately understood. Urdu-using 
Muslims were vastly overrepresented in the police (at about 50 per cent) and after the 
creation of the Muslim nation state of Pakistan their continuing presence aroused at the very 
least suspicion. The introduction of Devanagari was not only an attempt to make official 
files easier to read to the general public (which would have been more literate in that script 
than in Urdu or English)-  it was also a concerted attempt to Hinduize the Police. 
	 285	
 
At the same time, Pant’s administration was contemplating to introduce a new extraordinary 
law called ‘The UP Prevention of Crime (Special Powers) (Temporary) Bill, 1948.’ The 
main premise of this Bill was that “it will not automatically apply to the whole of the 
province but only to such area(s) and for such period as the Government may by notification 
in the Gazette.” Moreover, it was directed against a specific list of potential offenders. 
Therefore, it was deemed useful if “all the District Magistrates” would get lists of the persons 
coming under this law. It was emphasized that lists of such persons “should be checked and 
rechecked” and every effort was to be made to eliminate undue hardship or harassment to 
any person. Also, “complete secrecy” was to be maintained in the preparation and 
maintenance of such lists.530   
 
The main element of this Act was that a Magistrate on a police report or otherwise, could 
act against persons if he was satisfied that the necessary preconditions under this Act were 
met. The main reason for such an action by the magistrate was that the person in question 
was “by repute a bad character.” Four kinds of activities would testify to the bad character 
of a person. First, if a person was a habitual offender and second, if the person habitually 
manufactured or imported, or sold any intoxicant in contravention of the United Provinces 
Excise Act 1910. Third, if a person was a keeper of a “gambling den.” And fourth, if a person 
had committed or was about to commit a non-bailable offence contained in Chapter XVI or 
XVII of the Indian Penal Code. Other descriptions of a bad character were that he was a 
person who habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of 
offences involving a breach of “the peace.” Also, a person who was so dangerous as to render 
																																																						
530 See letter no. 7591-Z/VIII dated 9/12/1948 from Under Secretary to UP Government, Govind Narayan, to 
all District Magistrates, United Provinces. Uttar Pradesh State Archives, File No. 464/1948 Department 
(Police) B.  
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his being at large, without security, hazardous to the community, was classified as a bad 
character according to this law.531 
 
As per the proposed new law, when a notice was to be issued to such a “bad character” by 
the Magistrate, he had to appear before the Magistrate in person and submit a personal bond 
of two sureties not exceeding one thousand rupees each. This bond was a security deposit 
“for good behaviour” or for keeping “the peace” or both until the case was disposed of in 
accordance with the law. A person failing to appear before the court and refusing to submit 
the bond would entail arrest until the security bond was deposited. Generally, filing a case 
against a person in addition to producing witnesses and gathering evidence was the supposed 
duty of the administration. The most interesting aspect of this law, however, was that it gave 
an opportunity to the person against whom the order was passed to give an explanation and 
produce evidence in support of his own representation. But the Judge could also disallow 
any evidence which in his opinion was unnecessary for disposing of the case. If, jurors 
adjudicating such a case were unanimous in their opinion but the Judge disagreed with their 
opinion, the Judge after recording his own opinion and the reasons of the disagreement 
would have to submit the entire record of the case to the Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad and send information thereof to the concerned Magistrate. On the 
other hand, if the jurors were divided in their opinion, the Judge could pass such order as 
might appear to him to be just and proper. This legislation repealed “The United Provinces 
Goondas Act 1932,” a colonial law notorious for its operation outside normal legal 
procedures.  
 
																																																						
531 See, United Provinces Prevention of Crime (Special Powers) (Temporary), Bill 1948. 
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The “Statement of Objects and Reasons” signed by the then Minister for Police for the 
United Provinces, Lal Bahadur Shastri, read: 
 
The United Provinces Goonda Act (No. I of 1932) was enacted to deal with the 
problem of habitual bad characters. But in the light of the changed conditions it is 
considered antiquated. It is proposed to repeal that Act and replace it by a more 
suitable enactment. The object of the present Bill is to enact a short and speedy 
procedure to be applicable in dealing with habitual bad characters and social pests 
whose criminal and anti-social activities may require speedy preventive action. This 
new enactment will be in force for a limited period of twelve months unless the 
Legislature extends it further. It will be applicable only to specified areas which may 
be notified from time to time by the Provincial Government.532 
 
Notably, under the new law the earlier precise and well-defined problem category of a 
‘Goonda” now extended to potentially the whole population, although supposedly aimed at 
the prevention of crime broadly and particularly aimed at, ‘bad characters’ and ‘social pests.’ 
 
A letter by order of the Home Secretary U.P., was sent to all District Magistrates of the 
province. It categorically stated: 
[B]efore taking any further action under this Act, Govt. wish to make it clear that in 
dealing with crime they would like that action should, as far as possible, be taken 
under ordinary law.533  
 
																																																						
532 UP State Archives, File No. 464/1948 (Police B). No. 7591-Z/VIII dated 9/12/1948. 
533 UP State Archives, File No. 464/1948 (Police B). No. 2566-B/VIII, dated 21/05/1949. 
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Action under the new law should only be recommended to government “if the law is not 
found to prove effective in dealing with notorious criminals.”	 534 In this light the UP 
Government asked for revised lists of persons to be booked under the new law. These lists 
had to specify, first, the “[R]easons why the ordinary law does not prove effective and why 
the use of this Act has become necessary”. Second, “[B]rief comments on the general crime 
situation in the district and the nature of the problems faced. The lists had to mention the 
total number of persons against whom the action under the new law was proposed, divided 
into the categories for the offences for which they were to be booked.535  
 
The Inspector General of Police U.P., B.N. Lahiri, was rather keen for this legislation to 
swing into action. He was anxious to wait until the government made a formal notification 
enforcing the provisions of this law. He wrote to the Home Secretary U.P. government, 
Govind Narain: 
 
My view is that as lawlessness is on the increase all over the province, there is need 
to make the Act applicable to the entire province. Will you please let me know if any 
action is being taken in this connection?536 
 
Meanwhile newspapers were already publishing news regarding the new Act. The media did 
not criticise the government regarding the new legislation in any way and actively reported 
on the administrative progress made in the matter. The media reiterated the provincial 
government’s position that only “habitual offenders” need to fear the new law. For instance, 
																																																						
534 See, UP State Archives, File No. 464/1948 (Police B). No. 2566-B/VIII, dated 21/05/1949. 
535 See, Letter No. 2566-B/VIII, dated 21/5/1949, from Secretary UP, by order of Home Secretary UP, to all 
District Magistrates of United Provinces. File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
536 See, Letter No. 3340-B/VIII, dated 3/6/1949, from Inspector General of Police, United Provinces, B.N. 
Lahiri to Home Secretary, UP Govt., Govind Narain. File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
	 289	
The National Herald reported that “while disclosing to press correspondents” Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, the Police Minister of U.P., “that Government were taking every precaution to guard 
against any possible misuse of the act.”	537 The National Herald, Lucknow, further reported 
that “Reports received from nearly 36 district magistrates at the provincial headquarters” 
indicated “a general desire for a speedy enforcement of the act in their areas.”	538 The life of 
this act was reported to be for two years and was to be enforced in major cities of the province 
among other towns and districts. The Press did not question the necessity that required such 
an extraordinary legislation to deal with ordinary crimes. 
 
Soon, most of the District Magistrates provided statistics to the provincial government 
alongside their own opinion on the scope of this law. In their response letter to the UP 
government, most of the District Magistrates vociferously justified the urgent necessity of 
such a strict and extraordinary law to be extended to their respective districts. Only a few 
remained hesitant. However, they too in a couple of months would begin to see the 
administrative benefits of extraordinary legislation and would request the government to 
extend the new law to their districts too. The following figures provide an estimate of the 
scale at which the new law was planned to be used in some of the districts. The number of 
persons proposed to be booked under the new law were 52 in Bara Banki, 217 in Aligarh, 
80 in Mathura, 10 in Etah, 348 in Bijnor, 237 in Unnao, 12 in Nainital, 10 in Pilibhit, none 
in Garhwal and Jaunpur, 123 in Ballia, 49 in Sultanpur, 10 in Fatehpur, 43 in Gonda, 36 in 
Meerut, 73 in Deoria, 79 in Shahjahanpur and 358 in Kanpur. 
 
																																																						
537 See, The National Herald, Lucknow, Dated 9/6/1949. 
538 Ibid. 
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The District Magistrate of Bara Banki, M.G.Kaul, for example, responded539 by stating that 
it was “very necessary” for the act to be made applicable to Bara Banki district. According 
to him, Bara Banki was an “extremely dangerous district” and crimes like dacoity and 
murder were very common. Admitting the “considerable lawlessness” in most of Bara Banki 
district, the District Magistrate wrote that the “hardened criminals and bullies” were in the 
habit of terrorising people. Therefore, “ordinary law” did not “prove effective in dealing 
with these desperate criminals.” The main reason given by him was that it was very difficult 
for the police to get local people to come to court to give evidence against such criminals. 
The reason for this was partly the fear of reprisals and partly because he believed witnesses 
in Bara Banki District were “extremely unreliable and easily bought over.”  Witnesses often 
turned hostile in court and went contrary to the statement made before investigating officers. 
For M.G. Kaul, socialists were another element who had been “infusing spirit of lawlessness 
among the general masses.” He highlighted as common knowledge that zamindars and 
taluqdars, who were locally influential, kept bad characters as their servants to maintain their 
hold and influence over their tenants. Hence, such bad characters got protection from 
zamindars and taluqdars and the police found it “very difficult to get at them through the 
normal process of law.” The Magistrate was concerned that “notorious badmashes” had 
become bolder because “changed conditions” had “decreased the fear which was once 
inspired by the police.” The most important point that Magistrate Kaul’s report brings to our 
attention is that evidence collection was a cumbersome process and prosecution of these 
“badmashes” needed proof according to the ordinary law. Also, in addition to the lack of 
public cooperation in such cases, standard of investigation had deteriorated, according to the 
Magistrate of Bara Banki, mainly because experienced officers had either been promoted or 
																																																						
539 See, Secret letter no.175/ST, dated 14/6/1949, from M.G. Kaul, District Magistrate, Bara Banki, to the 
Secretary to Government, Home Department (Police-C). Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
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retired. Lack of experienced police officers added to the woes of the administration. 
Therefore, M.G. Kaul recommended that it was “absolutely essential” to extend the 
provision of this act to Bara Banki district. 
 
The Superintendent of Police in Bahraich, felt that “[W]ith the advent of freedom the public 
at large had developed a peculiar psychology confusing liberty with license.”540 He believed 
that a public, which did not “consider police as their friends”, would not render the necessary 
cooperation. Therefore, the new Act would ensure that the “bad characters” were nabbed 
despite the lack of public cooperation and despite cumbersome rules of evidence gathering. 
A colonial approach to maintaining law and order through pre-emptive emergency 
legislation was by no means dead – neither institutionally nor in terms of administrative 
doctrine. The apriori profiling of “bad characters” in UP reminds us directly of the anti-
Thuggee campaign in early 19th century colonial India. Orders were issued that as per the 
Rule 31 (b) of the UP Prevention of Crime Act 1948, “The Magistrate shall have fingerprints 
of the person proceeded against taken by a Police proficient and shall further have his 
photograph taken under the supervision of a responsible police officer.”541 The creation of a 
new classificatory information including signatures, thumb impressions and photographs as 
a file on the ‘criminal’ was to be kept at administrations’ disposal. Notably, fingerprinting 
was first developed by the Central Investigation Department (CID), the successor of the 
Thuggee Department. 
 
																																																						
540 See, copy of confidential letter D.O. No. G/37 dated July 20, 1949 from the Superintendent of police 
Bahraich to the District Magistrate Bahraich. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
541 See letter No. 3914-PC/VIII-464-1948, dated 09/08/1949 from Govind Narain, Secretary to Government, 
United Provinces to All District Magistrates, incharge of District, United Provinces. Part of File No. 464/1948 
Department (Police) B. 
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In a similar tone, the District Magistrate of Aligarh lamented as to how the earlier provision 
of sec 110 CrPC was insufficient to book “habitual offenders” and was “very lengthy, 
cumbersome and under the existing conditions very difficult for successful prosecution.”542 
The District Magistrate of Mathura also argued that the “capability and efficiency” of 
ordinary laws was insufficient and admitted that the influence of the police had declined and 
burglaries, robberies and dacoities in the district had increased. Notably, the District 
Magistrate Mathura blamed the situation on the administrative and political challenges that 
had emerged due to independence, and was of the opinion that although the open support for 
the police during the colonial regime had strengthened it, it had also alienated the public. 
This sense of alienation between police and the public, according to the DM of Mathura, 
persisted in the years after independence. The unwillingness of the public to share the 
opinion of the administration and to refuse participation in government policies highlight 
one great hindrance faced by the provincial government in the maintenance of public order 
in UP. The strength of public defiance is further indicated in a statement by the DM of Etah 
arguing that “[O]nce a criminal is let off, he feels emboldened to carry on his nefarious 
activities … the public does not extend cooperation in the detection and investigation of 
crimes in sufficient measure.”543 He added that “[T]he police does not inspire fear. Ignorant 
and illiterate people have got erroneous and perverted conceptions of freedom. They have 
no respect for authority.”544 The DM also admitted the existence of dacoits like Girand 
Singh, Birey and Bashira in the Etah district. The main problem for District administration 
Etah was that some criminals committed crimes “in the expectation that their crimes would 
be attributed to the gangs of Birey and Bashira.” The DM of Bijnor also acknowledged that 
																																																						
542 See, Secret letter no. 254/ST, dated 3/6/1949, from J.M. Raina, District Magistrate Aligarh, to the Secretary 
to Government, UP, Home Department (Police-C), Lucknow. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) 
B. 
543 See, Secret letter no. 205/ST, dated 10/6/1949, from District Magistrate Etah, Ram Kinker Singh, to The 
Secretary to Government (Police-C), Lucknow. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
544 Ibid. 
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“[M]any of the real dacoits” escaped punishment as the “public activity helped them and 
spoilt prosecution evidence.”545  The abhorrence of public behaviour by DM of Etah and 
DM of Bijnor noted above highlights the confusion in governance that emerged in the 
aftermath of independence. On the one hand, the governing -  both elected and administrative 
- did not feel that the population was now worthy of becoming individual citizens and 
believed had misplaced conceptions of freedom. On the other hand, the governed, the 
population, did not completely perceive the government as its own and maintained a distance 
from its apparatuses. Therefore, it can be deduced that the potential of the new extraordinary 
law could enable the administration to create a perceived threat for the larger disobeying 
public through the problem category of a “habitual offender.” The “habitual offender” was 
proposed to be outside of civilized citizenry; he was clearly defined as not only the enemy 
of the state but of society, too. Therefore, the new extraordinary law aimed to provide special 
powers to the state’s law and order machinery by short-circuiting existing process of the rule 
of law. It also created a threat perception amongst the general masses to deter it from 
supporting such offenders. 
 
In many other districts too, for example Lucknow, Ballia, Gonda, Meerut, Deoria, 
Shahjahanpur, Nainital, Unnao, Pilibhit, etc., district magistrates either lamented the 
inefficiency of the ordinary law or the reluctance of the witnesses to come forward or, 
expressed helplessness due to the rise of crimes like dacoities, robberies and bullying in their 
respective districts. Hence, a majority of the DMs requested the extension of the new 
extraordinary law to be extended to their districts.  
 
																																																						
545 See, Secret letter no. 2855/XVIII, dated 10/6/1949, from District Magistrate Bijnor, Raghubanshi, to The 
Secretary to Government (Police-C), Lucknow. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
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In certain districts, the DMs reported that crime existed in conjunction with local politics. 
For example, the District Magistrate of Sultanpur reported that during the nascent stage of 
India’s independence leaders of various groups “try to influence the illiterate people with 
confusing ideologies and promises, the administration is being denied the requisite 
cooperation of the public, without whose support and evidence cases cannot be 
successful.”546 In the city of Sultanpur, there was a curious circumstance of two factions of 
Congress leaders, who not only opposed each other in every matter but also made complaints 
against each as well as each other’s supporters. This led to the formation of two different 
Seva Dals,547 each comprising of several “very undesirable persons” as members. The DM 
of Sultanpur, also reported two cases which had to be discharged under the ordinary law 
because socialists and certain members of the Prantiya Rakshak Dal (PRD), about which 
detailed discussion will take place in the following sections, combined to defend the accused. 
As a result, “bad characters enrolled in rival Seva Dals” and “fanned the spirit of 
defiance.”548 Such a situation put the district administration Sultanpur in a difficult position. 
In the district, about two-thirds of the total 362 cases sent to court in 1948 under the ordinary 
law had failed. Such instances highlight that despite provincial governments drive to create 
problem categories of habitual offenders as outside the standard understanding of 
citizenship, local members of the Congress party often complicated it. It also shows 
executive frustration at the underbelly of postcolonial Congress politics at the local level 
where stakes had shifted from anticolonial mobilization to a new phase of grabbing power.  
The DM implored the state government to extend the new act to Sultanpur where the new 
																																																						
546 See, Letter no. 161/ST, dated 3/6/1949, from H.K. Mathur, District Magistrate Sultanpur, to The Secretary 
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B. 
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extraordinary Act would not only resolve the issue of the decline in administrative and public 
confidence in ordinary process of law, but also ensure swift action against the activities of 
other non-Congress organisations like the Communists, Forward Blockists and various 
communal organizations.549 The new law, according to the DM Sultanpur, would enable the 
district administration to get rid of such “dangers.”550  
 
Such ‘dangers’, in  Fatehpur district were reported to have an “immense terrifying influence 
over the general public.” According to the Superintendent of Police Fatehpur, it was the “the 
GURU”551 i.e., the leader of criminals who had the “expert knowledge” and capability of 
engineering crimes. These Gurus were believed to be the actual masterminds of crimes. The 
ordinary law, therefore, was stated to be unhelpful by the Superintendent of Police Fatehpur, 
in the face of non-cooperative attitude of the public and growing party factions in villages 
which supported the activities of the criminals by harbouring them against the opposing 
party. The collector of Kanpur echoed similar observations when he wrote that “the 
criminal” worked “under the cloak of a political label” to “gain the backing of a political 
party making his arrest difficult.”552 The deployment of the term ‘dangers’ to refer to these 
‘offenders’ or problem categories is notable here. It created a sense of urgency and increased 
threat perception of the state towards its enemies. As discussed in sections above, the gap 
between the governing and the govern was so obdurate that neither fully trusted each other. 
The UP Prevention of Crime (Special Powers) (temporary) Bill, 1948, proved to be the wish 
of the District administrations in UP that was granted under the guise of ridding the society 
																																																						
549 See, Letter no. 161/ST, dated 3/6/1949, from H.K. Mathur, District Magistrate Sultanpur, to The Secretary 
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550 Ibid. 
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Magistrate Fathepur. Part of File No. 464/1948 Department (Police) B. 
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of its dangerous elements by declaring them and their supporters among the public as 
‘enemies’ and excluding them from the ordinary process of the rule of law. 
 
 
Furthermore, there emerged a difference of opinion between the Police and the Judiciary on 
the matter of law and punishment. Where the person responsible for invoking action against 
“bad characters” was a district magistrate, a judge was to give a verdict on it. Some of the 
official communication highlights that judges gave simple imprisonment (SI) rather than 
rigorous imprisonment (RI) to persons booked under this Act. The Magistrates (for example 
DM Ballia and H.A. Siddiqui), were not happy about this.553 According to some magistrates 
the general practice under ordinary law (section 109, and 110 Cr.P.C., both used to book 
habitual offenders) was that a person was awarded rigorous imprisonment.  They appealed 
to the government expressing their discontent. However, the judges also had a reasonable 
argument. They argued that if a person was booked under the new Act, he was arrested not 
as normal accused but under preventive measures. Therefore, simple imprisonment did the 
job by putting the criminal away. Since the proposed person was arrested more on 
recommendation rather than trial, rigorous imprisonment was not necessary or feasible. The 
Home Department United Provinces, replied that if a judge “directs simple imprisonment 
for failure to keep the peace, he is perfectly justified.”554 Also, if a judge “directs simple 
imprisonment even in cases of failure to give security for good behaviour, his order cannot 
be characterised as illegal.” Even the new Act under section 12(2) said that the judge’s order 
was final and conclusive and could not be called into question in any civil or criminal 
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Ballia, H.A. Siddiqi. Part of File No. 464/1948 Home Department (Police) B. 
	 297	
proceedings. This meant that neither a revision nor an appeal could be filed against any such 
judicial order. Section 18(2) of the new Act also stated that the proceedings in such cases 
before the judge were judicial proceedings. Therefore, neither Government nor the District 
Magistrate could issue any instruction to the judge, and if they attempted to do so, would be 
guilty of contempt of court. 
 
 
Initially, only a few District Magistrates expressed confidence that ordinary law was 
sufficient to deal with the crime situation in their respective districts. For instance, the DMs 
of Dehradun,555 Garhwal556 and Jaunpur declined the provision of the new extraordinary law 
to their districts. However, later, some of the District Magistrates, for example in Jaunpur,557 
realised that the extraordinary legislation had the capability of swift action against criminals 
with minimum administrative responsibility and maximum administrative control and 
requested the state government to extend the extraordinary legislation to their districts too. 
By the end of 1949, a total of 44 out of 49 districts had recommended and received the 
extension of the new Act. A majority of the response letters from the DMs of various district 
of UP points out the remarkable seductive pull of extraordinary legislation. It highlights a 
peculiar tendency of the provincial administration in India and particularly in UP to resort 
to absolutist legislation like the one discussed in this section. Even though ordinary laws in 
the Criminal Procedure Code such as section 110 CrPC were available to the administration 
to deal with local criminals but following standard procedures of the rule of law such as 
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collecting evidence, having witnesses and subsequent arrests and trials, were repeatedly 
described by the DMs as inefficient and cumbersome. Therefore, almost all of them argued 
for the extension of the new Act to their districts with the promise of taking swift action 
against the ‘criminals’ and their ‘well-wishers’. It cannot be ignored that some of the DMs 
reported Congress factionalism at local level and related it to criminals. However, it appears 
that the UP Congress led government wished to aim the new law towards its opposition such 
as the communists, Forward Blockists and other communal organisations. The new law 
appears to serve the purpose of a hammer to smash unruly and disobeying population as well 
as non-Congress mobilisation. Such administrative vulnerabilities were further exposed 
through certain other polices adopted by the UP administration that included the 
militarization of society. The following section discusses one such policy where the UP 
government decided to experiment with issuing a gun to one reliable person in every village. 
The primary purpose of such reliable villagers was to assume the role of protecting village 
or nearby villages from the attacks of dacoits. 
 
 
Finding “reliable villagers”: Dacoity and the Proposal of Issuing a Gun to Every 
Village in UP 1948 
 
The United Provinces government created a Police Reorganisation Committee in 1948. The 
UP administration was struggling at various fronts, be it refugee flows or dealing with 
communal disturbances that followed,558  or other issues like creating a sense of ‘citizenship’ 
among the population of UP in the post-independence scenario. The gap between the state 
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and the population has become evident in the previous sections. Scholars have studied, for 
instance, anti-corruption drives in post-independence UP which often rested on vague 
notions of duty and belonging.559 Along with the strained relations between the landed and 
the landless labour class, dacoits constituted a major threat to everyday law and order in 
certain regions of UP, as also discussed in the previous section. The landholding classes in 
UP had participated both in the Congress and the Muslim League during the anti-colonial 
struggle. The colonial model of governance as well as the anti-colonial movement had a fair 
share of upper class support at various levels. As a result, such people, especially the 
zamindars who often acted as community leaders in their respective villages continued to 
hold extraordinary influence. On many occasions, such landholders or wealthy persons in 
villages were the targets of dacoities. The previous section did sketch the problem of dacoity 
in U.P. with more instances in the district of Etah and the bordering districts. We know from 
the official communication of District Magistrates in the earlier section that Girand(ar) 
Singh, Birey and Bashira were some of the notorious dacoits operating across various 
districts in U.P. 
 
The proposal to issue guns to some villagers points out a peculiar sovereign move. In order 
to deal with unrest at various fronts within the province, the UP government and local district 
administrations were willing to arm civilian allies in the face of an increasing disobedient 
population. The duty of the sovereign to protect lives and property was outsourced to private 
‘reliable’ individuals who could function as an extended arm of local administration. Such 
moves often exposed administrative vulnerabilities of the UP government when it came to 
the maintenance of law and order in the province. 
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In January 1948, the District Collector of Bareilly, L.C. Jain, in a top-secret letter560 to the 
Divisional Commissioner of Rohilkhand, N.B. Bonarjee, requested permission to try out an 
experiment in his district. As a measure against dacoities, he proposed to provide every 
village with a gun each. Conscious of the matter that selection of the “right type of men” to 
be issued these guns was necessary, the District Collector proposed the experiment to be 
carried out in Aonla tehsil of Bareilly. According to the collector, this tehsil was chosen 
because it was close to Budaun and Rampur, and because of its proximity to the Moradabad 
border. Geographically it was located in the western part of U.P., where dacoity was a 
recurring problem. At the same time this area was deficient in road accessibility from 
Bareilly due to the absence of a bridge on the Ramganga river which made centrally 
organised police operations more difficult. The idea of the District Collector was to select 
“one man of approved character and standing” in every village under his personal guidance. 
The District Collector believed that if the men were chosen with sufficient care, it might give 
villages considerable self-confidence against bad characters. Also, it was proposed that 
under this scheme, it would be the duty and responsibility of the gun licensee to come to the 
rescue of neighbouring village on “information of trouble.” It was further proposed by the 
District collector that if the Scheme was not successful after fair trial for six months, such 
gun licenses could be recalled.  
 
On receiving the proposal, the Home Secretary to the UP Government, R. Dayal, forwarded 
it to Inspector General of Police (U.P.), B.N.Lahiri, for comments.561 The latter agreed that 
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“it is certainly worth a trial.” However, he added that it might be advantageous to constitute 
Village Defence Society/committees also in particular villages with the gun licensees as their 
leaders. He also reiterated DM Bareilly’s point that such selection had to be made with “due 
care.”562 The government agreed with the proposal of issuing at least one gun license to 
every village as a measure to prevent dacoities, initially as a temporary measure lasting for 
a period of six months. The UP government also wanted to experiment with the idea of 
lending suitable muzzle-loading and breech-loading guns from the Malkhana.  Muzzle-
loading guns had a rifled barrel and involved a complicated process where the bullet and 
gunpowder were inserted from the front while breech-loading guns were modern and used 
readymade cartridges and could be easily loaded and fired. It was proposed that once the 
dacoity situation was under control, the government wanted those guns withdrawn but the 
temporary license of such villagers, who would do “exceptionally good work,” might be 
made permanent. A recommendation was made for the trial of this scheme in Etah and 
Mainpuri districts of the Agra Division because of the activities of a notorious dacoit, 
Girend(ar) Singh.563  
 
The United Provinces government also allowed the Divisional Commissioner, Rohilkhand, 
to follow the example of Bareilly and to provide selected villagers with at least one gun 
license in every village as a “preventive measure against dacoity.” The Government directed 
DM Bareilly to try out the experiment in the areas of his district which he deemed necessary 
to implement this scheme. 
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Thakur Phool Singh, a member of the UP legislative assembly from Meerut constituency, 
also expressed his concern about dacoities. He wrote to the Premier, Govind Ballabh Pant, 
that “dacoities are becoming common because people have smuggled arms during last 
disturbances.”564 He added that the government was left with only two alternatives. Either 
to comb the districts for these arms which according to him, was very difficult owing to the 
large population, or, to arm the people. He suggested that there should be at least one firearm 
in each village and there should be no restriction on the possession of sharp-edged weapons, 
which would necessitate the repeal of the Arms Act. This suggestion was clearly 
contradictory and reflected the conflicted nature of state-society relations at the time. On one 
hand, he suggested combing villages of arms and on the other he suggested arming ordinary 
citizens in UP – the population alternatively seen as a potential problem category that the 
state had to control, and as an extension of the state apparatus itself. 
 
Data was sought from Districts administrations across the United Provinces regarding the 
prevalence of dacoity and the villages most vulnerable to dacoits. Meanwhile, the Collector 
of Bareilly, L.C. Jain apprised the Divisional Commissioner of Rohilkhand, about the status 
of the “Anti-Dacoity Scheme.” According to him565, by August 1948, after scrutiny of 
applications, 60 licenses had been  sanctioned in his district. Out of these, only 43 were 
actually taken out, the remaining 17 awardees had failed to deposit the necessary fee to take 
out the license. Out of the 43 licenses only 11 had been able to secure weapons, while guns 
did not cover the remaining 32 licenses yet. Out of the 11 licensees who secured guns, 5 
licenses were issued to those persons who held licenses earlier but their licenses were 
cancelled. Hence, actually only 6 new guns were purchased in villages with no guns. The 
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main reason for such poor results was attributed to the cost of guns and the difficulty to find 
‘one reliable man’ in each village to invest in a gun. He added, that the number of confiscated 
arms was small and it was difficult to provide arms to the villagers under this scheme. As 
for the idea to issue arms from the Malkhana, the DM of Bareilly added, it held only 
unserviceable or damaged arms. However, the DM also stated that after consultation with 
his Superintendent of Police, he observed that no dacoity was committed in a village where 
a licensed gun was available. Therefore, he contended that it could be used as a strong 
argument in favour of the continuation of the experiment. 
 
The District Collector of Etah, Ram Kinker Singh, reported566 that the dacoity-combating 
scheme was introduced in 13 out of 15 Thanas of the district. The scheme was put in 
operation in 1322 inhabited villages of the police circles. Out of these 1322 villages, Village 
Defence Societies were organized in 846 villages. Meanwhile the Superintendent of Police, 
was only able to recommend 30 applicants, which were subsequently granted licenses. 
Considerable difficulty was experienced by the S.P. in recommending applications because 
most of the people who could afford firearms did not want to work under the Village Defence 
Scheme. Those willing to work under the Village Defence Scheme could not afford to buy 
firearms. Also, people did not want to buy muzzle-loading guns and preferred breech-
loading guns for defence against dacoits. Such guns were not available in the Malkhanas. 
Also, the few muzzle-loading guns available in the Malkhanas were unserviceable and 
needed repairs for which there were no funds. Moreover, according to the DM, in some of 
the Police Circles, there were special circumstances, most notably in Aliganj, Patiali, Jaithra, 
Ganjdundwara, and Sahawar, where the gang of a notorious dacoit Girand Singh operated. 
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Many people in these Police Circles, it was reported, were the sympathisers and supporters 
of Girand Singh. Therefore, the administration was anxious to recommend firearms in such 
villages as they might fall into the hands of dacoits. In police circle Sirhpura, 18 licenses 
were granted for breach-loading guns and 2 for muzzle-loading guns. No dacoity was 
committed in this police circle since the gun licenses were granted. The DM expressed the 
view that it might take some months for the scheme to be fully implemented and licenses 
granted in the 846 villages where VDCs were organised. 
 
The District collector of Mainpuri also expressed his opinion on the operation of this scheme. 
He stated567 that the scheme had been a success to some extent. According to him, there were 
27 dacoities in Mainpuri district between October 1947 to February 1948. But since the 
scheme was implemented there had been only 10 dacoities. There were a few cases where 
armed villages resisted the dacoits. Hence, the increasing number of arms licenses in villages 
had a salutary effect in keeping the dacoits away. However, the District collector Mainpuri 
stated, that the success of the scheme was somewhat limited because of the inadequate 
number of breech-loading guns available. 
 
The Superintendent Police, on behalf of the Deputy Inspector General of Police 
Headquarters United Provinces, sent a list of districts where no firearms were available.568 
These villages, according to the letter containing the list, also recorded higher cases of 
dacoity and were recommended for the provision of one firearm to “reliable residents” in 
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each of these villages. The list included villages from the Districts of Agra, Ballia, Budaun, 
Deoria, Sitapur, Etawah, Bareilly, Jhansi, Farrukhabad, Etah, Saharanpur, Hardoi, Meerut, 
Bulandshahr, Mainpuri, Moradabad, Muzaffarnagar, Jalaun, and Aligarh. These districts, 
according to the list of Police Headquarters, were notorious for the prevalence of dacoity. 
Some districts had more villages nominated in the list than the others, for example Etawah, 
Jhansi, Aligarh and a few others. These lists alarmed the government resulting in making the 
case urgent. A letter to the District Magistrates of the above-mentioned districts was sent by 
the UP government directing them to go ahead with the scheme at a faster pace.569 The letter 
instructed that since guns were not easily available in the market, and prices were too high, 
the DMs should sell guns in serviceable condition out of the quota of 10% forfeited and 
confiscated firearms in Malkhanas to selected villagers in dacoity prevalent areas. It was 
also explained that a case might arise where the number of villagers selected in a district 
would exceed the number of guns available, in that case, Government were willing to 
consider proposals from District Magistrates for the sale of guns out of the district reserve 
of forfeited arms. Again, the government emphasized that careful selection should be made 
of “reliable and public-spirited” villagers who actually resided in villages. More than one 
gun could be issued to a single village in compelling cases. The government was willing to 
sell weapons to villagers at a special concession on the promise that they will assist the 
administration in the prevention of dacoity. If it appeared that they were not providing any 
assistance to the state, their licenses would be cancelled. Also, District Magistrates could fix 
the price of the guns as per their discretion.  
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By the end of 1950, in the 18 districts with high prevalence of dacoity, approximately 1,118 
guns had been issued to various “reliable and public spirited villagers” who were willing to 
help administration in the fight against dacoits.570 By the end of February 1951, the Uttar 
Pradesh government issued orders to all District Magistrates, to “issue freely licenses for 
firearms to reliable members of Village Defence Societies” qualified for the purpose. It was 
hopeful that they would prove of real help to the State Government in “combating dacoity 
menace and lawlessness” prevalent in the villages. Notably, a government scheme that was 
supposed to be experimental in the first place, quickly turned into a full-fledged policy. At 
a certain level, this policy aimed to reduce the gap between the state and the society by 
granting almost a form of commissioned sovereignty to such ‘reliable villagers’ who could 
act as protectors of villagers against dacoities and possessed the authority to kill the dacoits. 
 
We note that while the UP government was hesitant to issue guns earlier, it issued them 
freely later. Even though in some cases, villagers were reported to be sympathetic to dacoits. 
Two contradictory moves made by the UP administrations can be noted here. On the one 
hand, it proposed to issue guns to ‘reliable’ villagers and on the other hand some of its 
legislators argued for permitting civilians to possess sharp edged weapons. In the times of 
intense communal conflict due to the unfolding process of partition and the migration waves 
that followed, arming civilians with guns and sharp-edged weapons seems contradictory to 
administrations stated philosophy of ‘maintaining peace and tranquillity.’ On one hand, the 
UP administration wanted to maintain public order and communal harmony by banning 
unlawful assemblies, and on the other hand, it officially issued weapons to ‘reliable’ 
villagers and formed village defence societies to fight dacoits. When such organisations had 
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a greater chance of being utilised by its leaders for communal violence, their creation and 
existence became questionable.  
 
Rakshak Dal Act and the Logic of Defence and Policing in UP 
 
As promulgating extraordinary laws and issuing guns was not yet sufficient, the U.P. 
government went on to form a civilian defence force, the Prantiya Rakshak Dal. Such an 
organisation, as the following section would demonstrate, expanded the State’s vision of a 
disciplined and militarised society prepared to challenge all kinds of enemies. The irony of 
this move should not be missed here. It is uncanny of a provincial government to first lament 
the uncooperative behaviour of its citizens and then enrol a numerous paramilitary 
organisation from amongst the same population. Such a move once again highlights 
administrative moves of the provincial government in UP to increase its legitimacy among 
the people by incorporating them into quasi-policing structures. 
 
Scholars like Markus Daechsel571 and William Gould572 have pointed out that physical 
culture comprised a major part of various nationalist organisations. Fitness and body control 
were subjects of interest and concern for a range of nationalist ideologues. In the United 
Provinces, Congress leaders like P.D. Tandon who generally would take sides with 
Gandhian ideas of non-violence took initiatives to militarise society by making a case for 
Hindu defence. Such initiatives not only popularised such organisations but legitimised them 
too, as argued by William Gould. Tandon’s participation in Hindu defence projects centred 
around his involvement in the organisation of the Hind Rakshak Dal. His speeches of 
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endorsement for this organisation often embarrassed Congress but demonstrated the 
widespread support for semi-militaristic organisations.573 This section will demonstrate that 
the post 1947 Congress government in UP continued with such projects, and officially 
recognised Tandon’s Hind Rakshak Dal by legislating the Rakshak Dal Act of 1948. What 
such organisations did, as will be explained in this section, was to inculcate a militaristic 
notion of citizenship by involving larger sways of society in policing activities. 
 
While the village defence societies were created to train villagers to defend themselves 
against dacoits, the police administration of UP was further interested in creating other 
organisations to help with local policing in case of urgent emergency situations. In the 
section above, we noticed that while issuing of gun to every village was being considered, 
the Inspector General of Police B. N. Lahiri also suggested the formation of village defence 
societies (VDS). The stated aim of these VDS was to instil confidence in villagers in case of 
attack by dacoits. While the main purpose of the earlier Hind Rakshak Dal was to protect 
village communities from possible invasion attacks during the second world war and also to 
guard the Hindu community in UP in case of any violence by supporters of the Muslim 
League. The now official Prantiya Rakshak Dal would have policing duties sanctioned by 
the district authorities.574 In addition to the certain changes made to the structure and 
functioning of the police in UP, the Prantiya Rakshak Dal was officially created by passing 
the United Provinces Rakshak Dal Act, 1948. It received assent of the Governor of UP on 
December 4, 1948 and was published in the UP Government Gazette on December 11, 1948. 
The organization was voluntary in nature and was set up across the entire province but 
operated at the district level. Its scope was guided by the philosophy of Rural 
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Development.575 The main idea behind setting up of the Prantiya Rakshak Dal in April 1948 
was to mobilise a voluntary force in the village which, in co-operation with police and other 
organisations, could bring about a sense of security and discipline among the villagers and 
channel their efforts into development schemes for the betterment of their living conditions. 
It also rendered social service to the local administration to maintain order during fairs and 
other public events.576  
 
The United Provinces Rakshak Dal Act, 1948, was an intervention designed to provide for 
“the preservation of public peace, training of men in the use of arms to inculcate self-help 
and discipline and the protection of the life of the community and property within the United 
Provinces.” However, the act stated that a volunteer had to “declare and affirm” that he 
understood the “responsibilities and duties” which the membership of this organization 
imposed upon him. He would sign a declaration that he would “honestly and faithfully serve” 
for any period or place prescribed by the authorities and would always be ready to protect 
even at the cost of his life “the honour, integrity, the constitution” and “flag” of India. We 
notice in the membership statement that the scope of Rakshak Dal was more than an ordinary 
civilian voluntary organisation. It imposed a military commitment on the persons taking up 
its membership. The urgency takes into account the potential of war-like situations. The 
recent formation of Pakistan created emergency situation for the government of United 
Provinces.  A mass exodus of Muslims was taking place from India including and especially 
from the UP. Also, this force could now be used to deal with policing mass gatherings, fairs, 
religious fairs, pilgrimages to important sites in UP, and as local committees to deal with 
																																																						
575Chand, Mahesh. Economic Problems in Indian Agriculture, Bombay, Vora & Co. Publishers Ltd., Second 
edition, 1950, page 90. 
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dacoits and robbers. Above all, it provided the Government with an ever-ready pool of 
vigilantes trained in weapon handling and fighting to be put to any use. This was a calculated 
governmental move, productively incorporating civilians into policing activity at a mass 
level while being economically efficient by avoiding the need to employ a permanent police 
force. 
 
Broadly, there were four conditions that would make a person ineligible for the membership 
of the Rakshak Dal. A person was ineligible if he had not attained the age of 18 years or was 
over 45 years in age. Also, a person not passed by the medical authority as fit to perform 
duties required, or has been convicted of an offence involving “moral ineptitude,” was 
ineligible. Ineligibility clauses also extended to any person who was under police 
surveillance or under restraint under any provision of law for the time being in the force. 
The structure of Rakshak Dal was very similar to that of a police force. The headquarters of 
the UP Rakshak Dal were situated in Lucknow with five regional headquarters. In each 
district the organisation consisted of one or more battalion and each battalion could not 
exceed four companies on the basis of one company per tehsil. If a district had more than 
four tehsils, the number of companies for those districts could be raised. Also, each company 
comprised of four platoons. The chain of command was very similar to that of a police force 
but at the higher level, it had commandants, thus making it more military in nature. The 
degree of discipline expected from a rakshak, at least on paper, was no less than was 
expected from a soldier. At the head of the PRD organisation was the Administrative 
Commandant, who was usually an officer of the Indian Police Service. Three Assistant 
Commandants assisted him, one each for training, physical culture and youth welfare.577 
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Though here we are concerned with the PRD immediately after independence but it is worth 
mentioning that an important development in the history of PRD was the creation of a police 
wing in the districts of Lucknow, Agra and Varanasi in September 1957. The necessity for 
such a police wing was the result of the enormous increase in the work of police given both 
the Central and the UP government had passed several legislative enactments against social 
disorders. It was therefore, decided to call up certain PRD personnel under the PRD Act 
1948, and post them under the administrative control of the Senior Superintendent of Police 
of the districts mentioned above. They were further utilised for the maintenance of order at 
fairs and social functions, to assist in traffic controls and to conduct night vigils, among other 
tasks.  
 
We notice that organisations like village defence societies and the Prantiya Rakshak Dal 
demonstrate the broader militarisation of UP society after independence. While VDS were 
created to defend villages against dacoits, the Prantiya Rakshak Dal was created to help 
police in its operations and also to train VDS. What remained the most significant element 
of such organisations was their ability to instil a sense of security and responsibility in the 
minds of citizens to maintain law and order. It surreptitiously aimed to legitimise a certain 
acceptance of violence on behalf of the state through the creation of vigilante organisations.  
 
 
Expanding administrative control and the sanitisation of public spaces:  The extension 
of Section 34, Police Act, to towns and districts in UP 1948 
 
The Congress government of the United Provinces did not want to leave any stone unturned 
to emphasise the fact that the government was to operate on Indian terms in the changed 
political conditions and that old British colonial policies would have to change. At the same 
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time, bureaucratic communication suggests that the UP administration did not trust its 
people. On the one hand, it wanted to de-colonise institutions and attitudes, on the other hand 
it wanted to strengthen its grip and control over the masses at every level. The colonial Indian 
Police Act 1861, gave wide powers to the police at various levels. The irony is, that most of 
it remains unchanged to the present day. Another important move made by the UP 
administration in the immediate aftermath of independence was the extension of section 34 
of the Indian Police Act to various districts of UP. Section 34 of the Indian Police Act 
authorised a policeman to arrest any person without a warrant who within his view was 
“obstructing passengers; throwing dirt … etc. on the street; slaughtering cattle and being 
found drunk or riotous, indecent exposure of person or nuisance by easing himself or by 
bathing or washing in any tank or reservoir not meant for the purpose.”578 The ambit of such 
powers of the policeman extended to “any road or in street or thoroughfare within the limits 
of any town to which this section shall be specifically extended by the State Government.”579 
For such offences, conviction before a Magistrate was liable to a fine not exceeding fifty 
rupees or imprisonment not exceeding eight days. 
 
Though the section actually dealt with offences on the road, the police administration and 
the government wanted to also use it to regulate various fairs in Uttar Pradesh. The 
government sought opinions from District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police 
regarding the necessity of extension of section 34 of the Police Act to various districts of 
UP. We notice that this energised the local district administration in a rather unusual way 
and most of them wrote back to the Ministry arguing how each of their districts would 
qualify for the extension of this law. The eight activities mentioned under section 34 Indian 
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Police Act were rather ambiguous. The first was “Any person who slaughters any cattle or 
cleans any carcass; any person who rides or drives any cattle recklessly or furiously, or trains 
or breaks any horse or other cattle.”580 We know that India did not have proper 
slaughterhouses in those times and slaughtering was often done in the open. It is difficult to 
gauge whether this was either only aimed at maintaining hygiene in open public places or 
was rather aimed at slaughtering of cows and pigs etc., which could lead to communal 
tensions. A second activity that came under this section was “Cruelty to Animals.” It targeted 
“any person who wantonly or cruelly beats, abuses or tortures any animal.”581 Did it mean 
that a person who was ploughing his field and was using a beating stick to steer his bull or 
oxen in the field would also come under its purview? The third activity was “obstructing 
passengers.” It specified “any person who keeps a cattle or conveyance of any kind standing 
longer than is required for loading or unloading or for taking up or setting down passengers, 
or who leaves any conveyance in such a manner as to cause inconvenience or danger to the 
public.” In 1948, India was not a very motorised nation yet. Most of the travel and 
transportation was done through bullock carts and tongas. Also, a policeman deciding the 
precise moment as to when a cart driver has exceeded his stop time on a street is rather 
vague. The fourth activity was “Exposing goods for sale.” The policemen could have easily 
used this section in order to extract bribes from street vendors who would have no license or 
permit to sell their farm or craft produce on the streets in any town. The fifth activity was 
“throwing dirt into the street.” It specified “any person who throws or lays down any dirt, 
filth, rubbish or any stones or building materials, or who constructs any cowshed, stable or 
the like, or who causes any offensive matter to run from any house, factory, dung heap or 
the like.”582 This section could only operate in a highly developed industrial country. 
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Expecting such activities to cease from a primarily agricultural economy in a newly 
independent country appears to be over ambitious and cruel. A politics of elitism and 
exclusion was reflected in such ordinary-looking moves. Above all, it expressed a sense of 
disgust towards the “common people.”  
 
The sixth activity this law would deal with was “being found drunk or riotous.”583 It said, 
“any person who is found drunk or riotous or who is incapable of taking care of himself.” 
The seventh activity prohibited was “indecent exposure” applying to “any person who 
wilfully exposes his person, or any offensive deformity or disease, or commits nuisance by 
easing himself, or by bathing or washing in any tank or reservoir not being a place set apart 
for that purpose.”584 This law appears to be dealing with beggars who would sometimes 
expose their cut off limbs or diseased body parts to beg.585 The final activity that came under 
section 34 of the Indian Police Act was “Neglect to protect dangerous places.” It speaks of 
“Any person who neglects to fence in or duly to protect any well, tank or other dangerous 
place of structure.”586 The activities that come under the purview of town, municipality, 
district or village planning were extended to every person. In a nutshell, this law appears to 
make everybody responsible for everything. It led to the creation of a new kind of citizen 
which had parallels to the model subjects envisioned by the colonial civilising mission. 
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A note (8/7/1952) for the Council of Ministers UP points out that an amendment was 
proposed to section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861). It aimed at enabling 
Government to extend this section to fairs and melas which were held in areas other than 
towns because until this time section 34 could only be extended by notification of the State 
Gazette, and even then only to towns. The note to the council of ministers stressed that there 
were several important fairs that were held in villages every year and attracted thousands of 
visitors. The note argued that in “the interest of law and order” it was “imperative” that 
section 34 should be extended to villages.587  
 
We come to know through this note that in actual practice the provisions of this section of 
the Police Act were applied to villages earlier too. For instance, in the year 1951, when the 
section was extended to a village in Kashipur Tehsil in Nainital District during the Chaiti 
fair, the manager of the fair objected and the order extending the section to that fair had to 
be cancelled. This highlights the fact that the objection raised by the fair manager resulted 
in an administrative embarrassment exposing the illegal nature of some police orders.588 
Following this incident, all the notifications issued earlier to extend the reach of section 34 
to fairs held in rural areas had to be cancelled too. Opinions were invited from District 
Magistrates as to whether the non-application of section 34 to such fairs held in other villages 
would create difficulties in maintaining law and order and enforcing sanitation. To this the 
“District Magistrates unanimously pressed that section 34 be extended to such fairs as it is 
very useful in exercising control and enforcing sanitation.” Therefore, an amendment to the 
Police Act section 34 was drafted to deal with this problem. The approval of the Council of 
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Ministers was solicited to the proposed amendment and was introduced in the forthcoming 
session of the UP Legislature. The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ for this amendment 
read: 
 
Section 34 of the Police act 1861 can be extended at present to towns only. But 
necessity for its extension to melas which very often are held outside the limits of 
towns has been experienced. The present Bill is intended to enable its provisions to 
be so extended to melas in villages and outside towns.589  
 
The policing and control of fairs and melas was in the past an important symbolic occasion 
when the state met the people. The organisation of such local events were tied to the role of 
elites in village society and bonds of kinship.590 It is highly significant that the UP 
government wanted to assume this role and also use it to propagate a new kind of citizen at 
the same time.  
 
The new amendment enabled the government to issue a notification in the official Gazette 
to extend this section to any rural area bridging the gap in public order laws between the 
town and the village. The powers of the police were made ever more intrusive. A law, which 
was initially supposed to extend to villages during melas, could now be, if the administration 
wished, extended for unspecified period. The potential permanent nature of the new 
amendment draws to our attention the mind-set of the Police administration harbouring a 
generalised suspicion of population. It is pertinent to mention that another of the preceding 
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sections, section 31 of the Indian Police Act 1861, already dealt with the issue of Police 
keeping order on public roads. It said: 
 
It shall be the duty of the police to keep order on the public roads, and in the public 
streets, thoroughfares, ghats and landing places, and at all other places of public 
resort, and to prevent obstructions on the occasions of assemblies and processions on 
the public roads and in the public streets, or in the neighbourhood of places of 
worship, and in any case when any road, street, thoroughfare, ghat or landing-place 
may be thronged or may be liable to be obstructed.591 
 
The purpose of the extended Section 34 of the Police Act was not driven by necessity but by 
the desire to safeguard an option for the police to expand its ambit of control to the maximum 
possible location. At another level, the access to all aspects of social life by the police also 
aims at generating an effect of fear of the police. It entailed that a person did not necessarily 
know for what offence he might be charged. The UP government having utilised its power 
to create VDS and Prantiya Rakshak Dal, issuing guns to ‘reliable persons’, expanding its 
power regulate use of public space by invoking section 34 of the Police Act, would also go 
after ‘bad characters’. The following section will explain how the UP government issued 
special powers to the police by legislating an extraordinary law to deal with ‘criminals’. 
 
 
Modernising the Police and Fighting Corruption: the Police Reorganisation Committee 
1948 and the Institution of the chowkidar in the United Provinces 
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After India gained independence from British rule, some local institutions began to be 
questioned by the new political establishment. Prominent among them were the institutions 
of Chowkidars and Mukhiyas. This section will discuss the significance of the institution of 
Chowkidars for local policing and its subsequent abolition and replacement by village 
constables. The Police Reorganisation Committee 1948 paid a lot of attention to this 
particular institution and proposed its abolishing and replacement on “modern” lines.592 
 
The formal institution of Village Chowkidars had been created by the colonial state under 
the Village Chowkidar Act 1870. It was considered as one of the oldest indigenous 
institutions in India. Chowkidars were originally called ‘Goraits’ in some regions and 
worked as village servants.593 During early colonial times Chowkidars were appointed by 
the zamindars and landholders to protect and supervise the persons and properties of tenants. 
They were also used by the zamindars for their private business and were paid for by grants 
of land. They mostly served as watchmen and were the only information-gathering agency 
to inform police work in rural areas. In 1863, when the recent formation of Police 
organisation in the then North-Western Provinces was re-examined, the “Rural Beat System” 
replaced the “Rural Walk System”.594 This implied a growing recognition of the village 
Chowkidar’s utility as a reporting and patrolling agency. When the colonial state took a more 
active role in policing the country, the idea of village Chowkidars underwent some changes. 
With the formal institutionalising of Chowkidari with the Village Chowkidar Act in 1870, 
village policing was overhauled. Preserving law and order and the prevention of crime in the 
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countryside was no more the prerogative of landholders and zamindars. Instead, it now lay 
with the colonial state. Chowkidars were regularised in the the area of the formr province of 
Agra as a state force with the passing of Local Rates Act (XVIII of 1871), and in Avadh 
under Avadh Laws Act (Act XVIII of 1876). The most important feature of these two Acts 
was that Chowkidars had to be be paid in cash, not by grants of land. However, a system of 
paying by grants of land continued until the end of the nineteenth century and was mentioned 
nagtively in the. the U.P. Police Committee of 1890, which further recommended the 
introduction of a a good conduct allowance. Despite such regulation, the old customs of 
‘Goraits’ continued in UP as late as 1936, for example in the district of Mirzapur, where they 
were paid by grants of land rather than in cash. 
 
The modernising of the institution of Chowkidari by the colonial state had much to do with 
installing informants at the lowest local level.595 Apart from regular village Chowkidars, 
there used to be road Chowkidars who patrolled the roads and were part of the apparatus to 
prevent robberies and Thuggee. In 1916, the road Chowkidars were disbanded in UP and 
numbered only 3128 at that time. In 1871, colonial government had suggested that there 
should be one Chowkidar for every 100 houses (which is one Chowkidar for 500-600 
persons). Later, the Indian Police Commission 1902-03 recommended that the ratio of 
village Chowkidars should be one to every 600 persons of the rural population. Though the 
proposal was accepted by the government, even in 1911 the ratio was actually one 
Chowkidar to 482 persons. The Civil Police Committee of 1919 recommended that the 
strength of Chowkidars should be divided into five groups based on the ‘criminality and 
density of the population.’ These ratios started from one Chowkidars for 600 people to one 
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Chowkidar for every thousand people. It aimed to govern population by managing crime 
rates and sustaining the local surveillance apparatus. The less ‘criminal’ an area was, the 
more people a Chowkidar could have under his responsibility and vice versa. In the year 
1890, the strength of Chowkidars in UP was 1,13,979. It was reduced to 80,000- 88, 000 
between the years 1900-1921. In 1924-25, the strength of Chowkidars was 51,929 and 
reduced to 43,797 by 1931. In the year 1947, when India gained independence, the number 
of permanent Chowkidars in UP was 43,876 plus 5127 temporary Chowkidars. In total, in 
the year 1947-48, the United Provinces had 49,003 Chowkidars at its disposal, incurring an 
expenditure of Rs. 21,21,000/. A Chowkidar usually received Rs. 3/- per mensem from the 
government. The village Chowkidari force was considered separate from the police force as 
the Chowkidars were not enlisted in the Police Act as they were not subject to police 
discipline.  
  
In the year 1948, the duties of the Chowkidars broadly dealt with the surveillance of bad 
characters in the village, the reporting of crime and other occurrences to the nearest Police 
Station. Chowkidars also helped in the investigation of a crime, with arresting criminals and 
in tracing absconders. Furthermore, they served as watch and ward in the village during fairs 
and festivals, and also, had to report every birth and death in the village to the local Police 
Station. Finally, their duty included informing the local authorities of the outbreak of any 
infectious diseases. 
 
 The UP Police Reorganisation Committee 1948 doubted the utility of Village Chowkidars, 
as it moved forward to modernise the police system to make it compatible with the new 
political reality of independence.596 The Committee was of the opinion that given the 
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multifarious duties and responsibilities a Chowkidar had to carry out, the efficiency of a 
village Chowkidar was doubtful. The committee argued that the beat of a Chowkidar was 
vast and it was impractical for him to carry out his duties simultaneously with his own private 
work in the fields or elsewhere. Such an overworked figure, it was argued, was not likely to 
be of great use in investigations. Also, there were concerns over whether a Chowkidar 
actually reported all crime or rather concealed information at times. The majority of village 
Chowkidars were completely illiterate and their reporting of diseases was questionable, as 
they did not know one disease from another. Such scepticism was not entirely 
unprecedented. The Police Decentralisation Committee of 1923 – still under colonial control 
- had already floated the idea of the abolishing Chowkidars and suggested field trial in 
selected areas. However, the colonial government did not accept this recommendation then.  
 
It was held by the Police Reorganisation Committee of 1948 that spending Rs. 20,000,00/- 
per annum on an institution whose intelligence was inaccurate was questionable. Also, it 
was suggested that an “intelligent officer” could do the same information-gathering work by 
closely questioning the villagers. The committee was conscious that there was a gap between 
the police and the public owing to the recent colonial experience. In other words, the police 
were aware that the public distrusted them. The most important function that the Chowkidars 
performed during the colonial era was providing a link between the police station and the 
village for reporting subversive activities in a village. The Committee of 1948 held that now 
that the consciousness of the public was developing, therefore a purpose useful in colonial 
times might not be useful anymore. Also, the police needed not maintain an “imperialistic 
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hold”597 over the people in an independent India. Chowkidars were to be abolished and a 
“better class of men who will be better paid” was thought to replace them.598 
 
Now that the argument for the abolition of Chowkidars was made, recommendations for 
what was to replace them came flooding in. To deal with the abolition of the Chowkidari 
system, the Police Reorganisation Committee 1948 recommended two alternatives. The first 
alternative proposed that the strength of the regular police force could be increased to 
provide a few extra constables in every police station to which Chowkidars had previously 
been sanctioned. The number of such police stations at that time was about 700 and would 
require an estimated recruitment of 6000-7000 new policemen. Also, this new force could 
be maintained, it was argued in the proposal, within the same amount of money that the 
Chowkidari system had utilised. The second alternative proposed the creation of another 
new class of police constables who would be required to live within their village beats and 
would be paid Rs. 15/ per month. The PRC was more inclined towards the second alternative 
as it wanted to have an agent of police directly based in a village to report incidents of crime 
and movements of bad characters. Policemen stationed in the police station could not 
adequately fulfil the task of such surveillance. The new force was to be called “village 
constables.”599 They were supposed to be fully literate with a view that they would be able 
to send in written reports to the Police Stations they would be attached to. After calculations 
it was proposed that the strength of these new village constables should be one-fourth of the 
total available strength of the former village Chowkidars. The village constables would come 
under the Police Act and would be liable to the same disciplinary rules applicable to other 
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regular policemen. As the village constables were supposed to live in their villages, it was 
proposed that they should be given cultivation rights by the government. The village 
constable would also undertake “detective duties”600 at the village level. Finally, the PRC 
strongly recommended that the institution of Chowkidars though should not be abolished all 
at once but gradually phased out over the next 5 years.  
 
The Police Reorganisation Committee UP 1948 consisted of ten men.601 In the final report 
three members of the committee had issues with the recommendations of the committee. 
Two of them were the Indian National Congress (INC) Party MLAs V.N.Tivary and Nafisul 
Hasan and one Inspector of Police, M.S. Mathur. They expressed grave doubts over the 
replacement of Chowkidars by the new force of village constables on grounds of efficiency. 
They conceded that complaints about harassment by Chowkidars were not infrequent, but 
argued further that when “half-trained and unseasoned but uniformed policemen”602 would 
be placed in rural areas far away from police stations, the likelihood of harassment would be 
even greater. Also, they emphasised that the intelligence-gathering system at the village level 
would be greatly hampered as a reduction in the number of village police. Their comments 
further emphasised that the matter of pay was not as important as the majority opinion made 
it out to be as it was for “prestige” not monetary gain, that villagers used to volunteer 
themselves for the post of village Chowkidar. According to an example given in the notes: 
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 it is the experience of one of us that in one district when the village Chowkidars of 
a particular circle agitated for an increment of their pay, they were asked to put in 
their resignations and make room for others who were prepared to come in for the 
same pay but not one of the agitators tendered their resignation.603 
 
The abolition and replacement of Chowkidars by fewer village police constables, the three 
dissenting members argued, would create difficulties for Station Officers to find men to 
guard vulnerable points during emergencies, or manage their fairs and festivals, or make 
arrangements for journeys of high profile personages passing through these villages. Also, 
if the number of village constables replacing Chowkidars were reduced to one-fourth, the 
number of villages in question could expect an increase in crime. The dissenters were of the 
opinion that the services of village Chowkidars were of the “greatest value” to the 
administration in detecting and reporting of crimes and surveillance over bad characters. 
According to them, it was precisely because of such indispensable services that such a “hoary 
institution”604 had survived for so long. 
 
In December 1948, that the abolition of the old institution of Chowkidar was announced and 
a phased timetable for the next five years set. It is pertinent to mention here, that the deadline 
for the complete abolition of village Chowkidari system coincides almost exactly with the 
abolition of the village Mukhiyagiri system (institution of village headmen, about which 
more to follow). The U.P press gave substantial coverage to the recommendation of the 
Police Reorganization Committee 1948. The abolition of Chowkidari among other 
modifications in the UP police received wide press coverage. For example, Dainik 
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Vishwamitra605, a Hindi daily, wrote that the institution of Chowkidars did not have any 
value as they usually served the Mukhiya or the Zamindar only. Therefore, the recent move 
by UP congress government to replace them with village policemen provided a properly 
official and neutral – rather than tied to landed interest - presence in case of theft, robbery, 
murder and other crimes. Another Hindi daily Jawala606, wrote that it would be better if the 
government tried to revive the ancient police traditions of India rather than replacing them 
with western models. For this paper, the actual Chowkidari system before the British 
modified it, was one of such institutions and involved community spirit as well as policing. 
Another paper, the Sanmarg607 warned that abolishing Chowkidars would only render 
thousands of men unemployed. It argued further that chowkidari was an important aspect of 
ancient village practices of India. Since the Chowkidar knows a village in and out, he was 
better suited to detect crime rather than the newly recommended village constables.  
 
The press note from the Information Directorate which had announced the abolition of 
chowkidari is noteworthy for its language and line of argumentation. It said, the “ill-paid 
village Chowkidars have no place in a modern police system and this age-old institution 
must now be replaced by a better class of men, who will be better paid.” This statement did 
not raise issues or problems with the Chowkidari system as such but portrayed its abolition 
simply as the necessity of modern times and of the changed scenario of administrative 
expectations in UP in a new and independent India.  
 
 
																																																						
605 See Dainik Vishwamitra issue of  22/12/1948. 
606 See Jawala issue of 24/12/1948. 
607 See Sanmarg issue of 31/12/1948. 
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Catching the mice is more important than the colour of the cat: Mukhiyas and the 
politics of everyday public order in United Provinces 1948-1955 
 
Another left-over of colonial policing in UP were the Mukhiyas and the institution of 
Mukhiyagiri. While Chowkidars were abolished and replaced by village policemen after the 
recommendations of the UP Police Reorganisation report 1948, the institution of Mukhiyas 
attracted considerable discussion within the UP administration.608 This section aims to 
understand how local administration dealt with issues of public order and how it saw its 
subjects, who were now citizens of an independent India, when it came to entrusting them 
with the responsibility of local governance.  
 
The institution of Mukhiya or Mukhiyagiri was one of the most important local institutions 
in the apparatus of colonial governance in India. The Mukhiya was a village headman, often 
a higher caste person and always male, the main point of contact with the colonial 
administration. The head of the traditional caste panchayats was also called Mukhiya. 
However, there was an official and very specific institution of Mukhiya, with important 
duties assigned, mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code itself.  
 
A year after India’s independence the Congress government in United Provinces was 
preoccupied with issues of local governance. Files from the UP administration show that the 
government was concerned with issues of democracy at the local level. A driving concern 
was not so much the opportunity for creative political thinking amongst the UP Congress 
leadership but rather the increasing number of complaints against Mukhiyas that Minister 
																																																						
608 UP State Archives, Home (Criminal) File no. 749/49. Particularly see a letter dated 5/49 from Lal Bahadur 
Shahstri, Minister Police to Home Secretary. 
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(Police) Lal Bahadur Shastri received from various districts. In May 1949, in a letter609 to 
the Home secretary of U.P.,  Shastri wrote that he was not aware of the responsibilities and 
duties of Mukhiyas and did not know how they were recruited. However, he still advised that 
the complaints he received against them might be due to the fact that these Mukhiyas were 
very old and should be substituted with younger and better men. Shastri contended that it 
should be left to the District Magistrate to appoint anyone he considered fit. He was not sure 
whether to retain these Mukhiyas once the new panchayat system started functioning. 
Moreover, he also advised that it was not necessary to dispense with all of them by making 
fresh appointments. Instead, the District Magistrates should look into individual cases 
whenever complaints were received.  Not surprisingly, the post-independent Congress 
government in UP perceived this institution as a significant tool of popularity.  
 
The institution of Mukhiya was significant in the operations of local level village 
surveillance. As per the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Part III, Chapter IV, section 45, 
a District Magistrate or in some cases a Sub-Divisional Magistrate was empowered to 
appoint a village headman.  When required there could be several Mukhiyas. A response 
note (dated 16/5/1949) from Home Secretary to Minister (Police) Shastri brings to our 
attention that the powers that Mukhiya held were not ordinary and simple. Broadly, the 
institution of Mukhiya was a primary point of reference for not only the Magistrate but also 
the officer in-charge of the nearest Police station. He was expected to communicate not only 
the permanent or temporary residence of any notorious person(s) in his village but also the 
presence or passage of such notorious person(s) whom the headmen knew of or reasonably 
suspected to be a thugg(s), robber(s), habitual offender(s) or even an escaped convict. Most 
																																																						
609 Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow, Home (Criminal), File no. 749/49, Complaint against Mukhias and 
subsequent abolition of Mukhiagiri. 
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importantly, he was also responsible to report a violation or a possible violation of orders 
under section 144 IPC. Section 144, which as we have discussed in earlier chapters, dealt 
with the management of disorderly or riotous crowds. A Mukhiya was also responsible to 
report all matters that were likely to affect issues of the maintenance of order, prevention of 
crime or anything that hampers the safety of a person or property as per the general or special 
order made by the District Magistrate. Special orders of the District or Sub-District 
Magistrates derived their authority through the Government authorisation of the Magistrates 
to direct such a communication of information.  
 
The response of the Home Secretary informing the Minister of Police about the institution 
of Mukhiya stated that the rules regarding the appointment of headmen were in Chapter II, 
Volume I of the Manual of Government Orders (MGOs).610 The appointing authority for 
Village headmen or Mukhiyas was the District Magistrate or the sub-Divisional Magistrate. 
In appointing a Mukhiya, a district Magistrate had to take into account the character, position 
and influence of the person to be appointed. However, the police appear to have no 
connection whatsoever with the appointment of Mukhiyas and had no direct authority over 
them. The District Magistrate(DM) and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate(SDM) could remove 
them at any time and it was not necessary to record any reasons for such removal. Also, it 
was at the discretion of the DM or SDM to add or reduce the number of village headmen 
appointed to a village. But we know that according to the rules in the Criminal Procedure 
Code, the first point of intelligence input for such Mukhiyas was in most cases, the local 
police station.  
 
																																																						
610 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note from Home Secretary dated 
16/5/1949. 
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Discussion regarding the retention or abolition of the institution of Mukhiya started 
circulating at different levels of the administration in the United Provinces when the 
Congress government began to think about the creation of a new system of local self-
governments based on gram panchayats.611 One of the major concerns was whether it was 
necessary or administratively feasible to retain Mukhiyas after the new elected panchayat 
system was implemented. The main issue here was the fact that panchayats would be overtly 
‘political’ bodies, based on elections and involving party membership of its delegates. 
Mukhiyas, in contrast, had both political and ostensibly non-political functions – chiefly 
amongst them their role in local intelligence gathering and crime prevention work. This 
conflation of roles had not mattered to the colonial state when all administration was 
essentially deemed to be ‘non-political’. But under the new reality of independence such a 
pretence was no longer defensible. The Home secretary’s response to Shastri captured the 
dilemma well: 
 
party politics is the essential feature of any democratic system but we cannot apply 
that to the functions which should appropriately be performed by public servants. 
Mukhia is not a paid public servant but he performs those duties, which really come 
within the province of public servants. He gives valuable information to the officers 
of the state which he will not be able to do without bias and partiality if he takes 
active part in politics.612  
 
																																																						
611 For a broader discussion, See Crispin Bates and Subho Basu, Rethinking Indian Political Institutions, 
London: Anthem Press, 2005, especially Chapter 9 by Crispin Bates “The Development of Panchayati Raj in 
India,” pp 167-182. 
612 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note from Home Secretary dated 
16/5/1949. 
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The Home Secretary’s main point was that the Mukhiya must essentially be a person free 
from political bias. He further stated that Mukhiyas faced prejudice from some sections of 
local society precisely because of their association with the police. The opposition arose 
from their role as ‘information providers’ to local administration especially the police, and 
therefore they were likely to make many enemies while performing duties that were required 
from them by law. Therefore, a similar function could not be expected from an elected 
member or members of panchayat because under party political pressure they would find it 
difficult to execute such judicial and administrative functions. 
 
Most importantly, it was necessary to maintain the popularity of panchayats by keeping them 
away from the duties which a Mukhiya performed. As stated by the Home Secretary, it was 
bound to lead members of panchayat into controversies and party factions. However, the 
Home Secretary emphasised that “times have changed considerably”613 and it was now 
necessary to drop those who were unable to change their attitudes with the times. Here the 
Home Secretary’s was suggesting that in a newly independent India Mukhiyas would 
become untenable if they continued to hold a colonial attitude towards administration. Also, 
older people should be replaced with younger, more vigorous Mukhiyas. The need for the 
institution of Mukhiya to evolve in postcolonial times was duly emphasised. This reflects the 
moral pressure that UP government faced while dealing with institutions which were 
remnants of colonial administrative structure. Most interestingly, the Home Secretary gave 
a wartime (emergency/exceptional) example to make his point. He wrote, 
 
																																																						
613 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note from Home Secretary dated 
16/5/1949. 
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I remember that when an invasion from Japan was imminent in 1942 it was found 
necessary to replace the older Mukhias to obtain persons who could be more active 
in sending information about the serial bombing etc. and the DM’s were asked to 
examine the list of their Mukhias and eliminate persons found old and decrepit and 
therefore unsuitable. Similar instructions may issue now. The District Magistrates 
may go through the lists with a view to find out who of these should be replaced. 
They can do so under the powers in paragraph 1106 of the MGO Volume 1.614 
 
But there was also another problem at play. India’s new political institutions were still fragile 
while expectations of the new independence government were sky-high. For a transitional 
period at least, it appeared inevitable that ideologically questionable but effective colonial 
institutions had to be retained. Shastri wrote: 
 
The Panchayats will take some time before they begin to function. It would be better 
to ginger up the mukhias, at least during the interval. The activities of the various 
parties who are trying to encourage lawlessness is on the increase. The chaukidars 
and mukhias are not keeping the police informed of such activities. Mukhias might 
be instructed to be vigilant, and those who do not care to perform their duties 
satisfactorily should be replaced by others.615 
 
Just how high expectations for change had become is shown in a popular discourse against 
‘corruption’ which also included the institution of mukhiyagiri. In December 1949616, the 
																																																						
614 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note from Home Secretary dated 
16/5/1949. 
615 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note from Lal Bahadur Shastri 
dated 7/6/1949. 
616 Letter to UP government from Socialist Party, Moradabad dated December 9/1949. 
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Socialist Party of Moradabad District sent a letter to the UP government, submitting a 
resolution passed at the meeting of the party, which held that the institution of Mukhiyas 
should be abolished, as they are no more than the agents of police, and their removal would 
help in ending the corruption.  
 
A year later, in August 1950, the Home Minister UP held a meeting with the Inspector 
General Police and all other Director Inspector Generals of Police617 to discuss the law and 
order situation in United Provinces. Among other issues the necessity of Mukhiyas and the 
formation of panchayats was again discussed. The general opinion was that although 
Mukhiyas were not as effective as before, they were still helpful to the police and their 
continuation was necessary.  Without Mukhiyas there would be considerable dislocation in 
police work in the villages. The suggestion that the Presidents of the Gaon 
Sabhas/panchayats may be appointed as Mukhiyas was also considered at this meeting. The 
meeting held that while in some villages it might work well, in other it might lead to further 
difficulties and may lead to some sort of estrangement between the panchayat and the police. 
In the end the meeting concluded that where the District Magistrate and the Superintendent 
of Police would consider it fit, the presidents or members of the Gaon Sabhas could be 
appointed as Mukhiyas. But they would be liable to removal if they failed in their duties and 
will not get relaxations in rules applicable to everybody else. This highlights the tension 
between the law and order establishment of United Provinces and the newly found 
democracy of a newly independent India.  
 
																																																						
617 An extract note in the file from Home Police, File NO. 260/50 regarding DIGs conference held by Home 
Minister Police, date 24/8/1950. The meeting took place on 22/8/1950. 
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By 1951, discussions of the “future of Mukhiyagiri system”618 were still gathering pace in 
government circles. The state Home Secretary issued a letter to all Divisional 
Commissioners and certain selected District Magistrates seeking their opinions. Their replies 
were almost unanimous. The majority of them held that it would be premature to abolish the 
Mukhiyagiri system or to change the existing system substantially. The main contention was 
that since the introduction of new Panchayats was only recent, it was desirable to watch their 
development before making any attempt to do away with the “old and well-tried institution” 
of Mukhiyas. The Commissioners and Magistrates held that despite individual weaknesses, 
this institution had “stood the test of time” and was still of “considerable use” to the local 
authorities in carrying out their day-to-day administration. There were only two dissenters - 
the District Magistrate of Basti and the District Magistrate of Lucknow. The former was in 
fact not really dissenting at all. He was merely of the opinion that as the available source of 
Mukhiyas had dried up, it was not possible to secure suitable persons for appointments as 
Mukhiyas under the existing system. He recommended that in future Sabhapatis (chairman 
or head) of Gaon Panchayats (and not members) should be appointed as Mukhiyas if found 
suitable. However, the District Magistrate Lucknow, Harpal Singh, was strongly opposed to 
the institution of the Mukhiya itself and called for its abolition. He favoured assigning the 
duties of Mukhiyas to village panchayats. He argued that the abolition of Mukhiyas would 
undoubtedly remove a notorious source of corruption from the village. As the Panchayati 
Raj Act provided for the formation of sub-committees to deal with various subjects and a 
sub-committee may easily be formed to take up the duties of a Mukhiya. He suggested that 
a provision could be made in the rules that allowed the chairman of such a sub-committee to 
be appointed by the District Magistrate from among the most suitable Panch or Sarpanch. 
																																																						
618 UP state Archives, Home (Criminal) File No. 749/49. Specifically see a Note by Home Secretary dated 
2/3/51 titled “Future of the Mukhiagiri System.” 
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As the institution of Mukhiya was a subject of the Criminal Procedure Code, the District 
Magistrate Lucknow further suggested that consequential amendments in the CrPC and the 
MGOs would not be difficult. These rules were suggested to be amended in such a way as 
to enable duties regarded essential from the point of view of quick intelligence gathering 
about serious crimes and other incidents and should be assigned to the proposed sub-
committee under the available Panchayati Raj Act. 
  
The Home Secretary contended that the majority opinion was sound and that it was better to 
keep the “pillars” of local administration until a sufficiently solid and healthy alternative 
was built up. Therefore, the existing system according to the Home Secretary could not be 
considered superfluous until a new system had replaced it.  
 
The local District Congress Committees were also not very comfortable with the institution 
of Mukhiyas. In a letter619 written in the month of April 1951, the District Congress 
Committee of Muzafarnagar forwarded a resolution to the United Provinces government. 
which had been passed at a meeting of the Jansath Tehsil Congress Committee and 
recommended the abolition of the Mukhiyagiri system and suggested that the duties of 
Mukhiya be entrusted to the President of the Panchayat. Such ideas did not find favour with 
the sitting administration, however. The District Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar reacted to the 
resolution in a largely negative way.620 He gave several reasons for his opposition to the idea 
of entrusting the duties of Mukhiya to the president or member of the Gaon Panchayats. 
According to him, the Mukhiyagiri was an old and tried system while the Gaon Panchayat 
																																																						
619 See main file 749/9, serial number 43, extract from letter from District Congress Committee Muzaffarnagar 
no. 603 dated 25/4/1951. 
620 See main file 749/9, serial number 44, reply of D.M. Muzaffarnagar to the Demi official letter dated April 
12, 1951 at slip Z. 
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was a very new institution and hence, entrusting the duties of Mukhiya to the Gaon 
Panchayats in any form was likely to dislocate the village intelligence system. Also, the 
Gaon Sabhas strictly fell within the purview of judicial administration and Mukhiyas 
appointed from the members of the Gaon Sabhas were likely to be less responsible to the 
executive administration. Moreover, the residents of the Sabhas were elected on party lines 
and consequently in some cases were found to command no influence at all, a feature 
essential for being a Mukhiya. This highlights the muddled institutional logic that an 
intelligence gatherer did not need influence. These remarks by the DM of Muzaffarnagar 
reflected how the local administration viewed the Mukhiya as ‘one of their own’ and as 
sharply distinct from ‘party politics’ in a newly democratised system. 
 
The District Magistrate Muzaffarnagar further argued that given some Gaon Sabhas 
comprised of more than one village, pradhan/president of such a sabha when appointed as 
Mukhiya would not be able to perform their duties as a resident Mukhiya in all the villages 
simultaneously. The only way to involve popular opinion in the appointment of Mukhiyas 
was to amend the rules so as to make consultation with Gaon Sabhas compulsory. There was 
a provision in section 22 of the Panchayati Raj Act, a Gaon Panchayat may make a 
recommendation for the appointment or dismissal of a Mukhiya, so the DM was merely 
emphasising a possible administrative tactic already available in the PR Act to deal with the 
issue at hand.  
 
Faced with the necessity to please both the administration and the local Congress or other 
parties the institution of Mukhiyagiri was bound to become a confused institution that could 
not last much longer.  In February 1953, the Senior Superintendent of Police and the District 
Magistrate Allahabad in raised some fresh concerns. They informed the Home Secretary that 
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the office of Mukhiya had become redundant in the existing set up since new Panchayats 
started functioning. In the new circumstances, the Mukhiya had started to work as a “tout,” 
a peddler of information loyal to none. Moreover, with an elected Sabhapati of the Gram 
Sabha in practically every village, the raison d’etre of the office of Mukhiya had disappeared 
altogether. They further recommended that the government should take steps to give more 
prestige to the Sabhapati rather than nourishing a functionary who had now become a 
“misfit.” They added that this was the reason that the collection of revenues was not 
entrusted to lambardars anymore in the new system. The Home secretary and others were 
urged to invite fresh views on this subject.  
 
In his response, the Home Secretary only reminded government officials that when this 
matter was taken up a few years ago, the Minister for Local Self Governance (LSG) had 
observed, “I don’t think that Gaon President or any other member should be appointed as 
Mukhiya. The experiment if any, may be tried with any public man of good repute, one who 
is neither the president nor a member of the panchayat.”621 A year later, the Home 
Secretary622 was still weary of the idea of tampering with the institution of Mukhiyas. Given 
the discussion that this issue had generated, he felt some pressure and conceded that if “an 
experiment has to be made, perhaps the Inspector General of Police must be advised to select 
a few districts of villages for trying other methods in place of the old ones.”  He also floated 
the idea that it might also be worthwhile to ask the Village Defence Society to select five or 
ten persons to serve as potential replacements for the Muhkiyas.  As an alternative option the 
District Magistrate, after informally consulting the leading members of the Village Defence 
Society, may be asked to select one person for the period of one year to start with. The 
																																																						
621A note from Home Secretary U.P. dated 28/7/1953. 
622A note from Home Secretary U.P. dated 27/7/1954. 
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decision was left with the Home Minister U.P., while the Home Secretary U.P., was of the 
view that he had no problem with either of these recommendations. A month later623, the 
additional Secretary followed up on the issue. He stated that the Inspector General of Police 
had suggested that the experiment regarding the appointment of Mukhiyas from among a 
panel selected by the Village Defence Societies, a remnant of war years, should be first tried 
in the districts of Meerut, Muzaffarnagar (as there were complaints from the Socialist party 
from these districts), Barieilly, Bijnor, Allahabad, Jalaun, Banras, Deoria, Sitapur and 
Faizabad. He added that District of Partapgarh could also be included in the list of villages 
selected for this experiment as “desired” by the Home Minister. The Additional Secretary 
noted that it was presumed that the experiment would run for a period of one year. 
 
We do not come across any communication on the running of this trial in the file. However, 
finally in May 1955, the United Provinces Government abolished the institution of 
Mukhiyas.624 After a lot of administrative deliberation for some years, the idea of retaining 
the institution of Mukhiya did not yield any results and added to further complications and 
confusions, so the UP Congress government had to abolish it. The institution of Mukhiyas 
in United Provinces was originally established for North Western Provinces and Oudh by 
the then Lt. Governor and Chief Commissioner vide a notification on 19th January 1895. The 
institution Mukhiyagiri in the state of United Provinces came to an end after a career of 61 
years.  
 
The bureaucratic discussions around the local institution of Mukhiyas make a few issues 
clearer. First of all, we notice that Mukhiyagiri, for all the time it existed was a very 
																																																						
623 A note from Additional Secretary U.P. dated 24/8/1954 
624 The institution of Mukhiyas/Mukhiyagiri was abolished vide a Government order no. 1114/VI-749/1949 
dated 2/5/1955. 
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significant aspect of the Indian Leviathan until 1955. We also notice that attitudes of 
suspicion were not only inherent in the colonial administration but also the post-
independence Congress government as well as the bureaucracy of the United Provinces. 
Bureaucratic discussions around the institution of the Mukhiya demonstrate that the 
provincial government was afraid or rather uncomfortable with too much democratisation. 
Also, though the institution of the Mukhiya was supposed to be for the purposes of local 
governance, we notice that it was primarily a central aspect of local surveillance and security. 
The administrative communication discussed above point out the exceptional and 
indispensable character of the institution of the Mukhiya for the UP administration. The state 
of Uttar Pradesh had to deal with an interesting conundrum. On the one hand, post-
independence communal and sectarian violence, RSS activities, dacoits and robbers, etc. 
compelled the state to maintain this institution. On the other hand, the legacy of Gandhi’s 
gram Sabhas/panchayat, ideology of social welfare of the Congress and a new political 
scenario which demanded inclusion of Indians in decision making process urged the party-
political Congress government to do away with it. 
 
The institution of the Mukhiya, therefore was supposed to be the eyes and ears of 
administration in every village. Emphasises on local modes on government since the days 
of the colonial company-state is brought to our attention by recent works of scholars like 
James Jaffe. Jaffe’s study allows us to appreciate the trajectory of local governance 
institutions in India like panchayats as judiciary forums to panchayats imagined as an 
institution of village and municipal governance. As we know that these ‘local governance’ 
panchayats in the second half of the nineteenth century were not representative because they 
mostly comprised of “respectable” Indians. These “respectable” Indians were appointed by 
local British officers in order to be educated into the art of Western-style government. We 
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know that by the time of 1908 Royal Commission of Decentralisation, the institution of 
panchayat was lauded both by the British as well as Indians as the potential site for the 
growth of a civil society in India. We must not overlook the fact that application of imported 
British ideas of liberalism in India was quite often confused with a suspicion towards the 
local population. The British administration did not trust the uneducated Indian masses and 
mostly relied on either western educated men of distinction or the propertied caste/class. It 
appears that during late colonial period, a time of high nationalism, the colonial state used 
such a civil society with the aim of nation building. In other words, to neutralise anti-colonial 
state attitudes by making the local population understand the virtues of the British 
administration and concern through such men of ‘distinction’ and ‘repute’. James Jaffe urges 
us to understand the nature of such a civil society as opposed to the understandings we might 
already have. Such a civil society neither fell into the very recent theoretical understandings 
of civil society nor the one proposed by scholars like Partha Chaterjee who further suggests 
the notion of a political society as distinct to the western ideas of civil society, rather it 
should be understood in its historical context as indicating a specific set of conservative 
institutions based not only upon an idea of progress but more specifically upon the rule of 
law, the right to private property, and the importance of elite participation in governance.625 
Different leaders had different opinions on the potential of these local bodies. For example, 
both Gandhi and Ambedkar had strong views on the institution of panchayat. Whilst Gandhi 
saw it as a unique way of democracy operating through these micro republics called 
panchayats, Ambedkar saw it as a tool of caste oppression and therefore, undemocratic and 
anti-liberal.  
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Conclusion 
 
Even after independence, the government of United Provinces remained keen on utilising 
extraordinary laws to deal with everyday law and order. this chapter demonstrated how 
everyday law and order problems in UP were often termed as ‘public order’ issues in the 
early years after independence. Unclear about the objectives of independence, the Congress 
government in UP utilised the opportunity to invoke public order laws freely. Specific 
extraordinary laws, all dealing with public order and peace were justified with the help of a 
wider narrative of chaos. This narrative of chaos is reflected in the administrative 
communication expressing suspicion and unreliability of villagers, in particular. There was 
often a contradiction in the broader moral politics of democracy that Congress preached and 
the seduction of extraordinary measures not very different from the attitude and rationality 
of their colonial predecessor. Many would frequently refer to ‘changed times’ or 
‘independent India’. But it was not only the masses who did not know what independence 
would entail, but it was the administration too who did not know what to expect of it. There 
was a difference of opinion between the executive and the judiciary. Extraordinary laws 
displayed a general disregard towards normal procedures to deal with crime bypassing the 
foundations of modern law i.e., production of evidence and witnesses, particularity of a 
crime, conducting a trial, preparing accusations and then finally imprisonment or fine. 
Finally, the police and the judiciary did not always agree with the functioning of such laws.  
 
Preventive laws like the ones discussed in the first set of case studies had a warlike element 
to them. These measures played an important role in the establishment of a violent 
postcolonial state which otherwise would claim to be democratic in character. It is when we 
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analyse the legislative moments of extraordinary laws that we begin to see the absolutist 
potentials of a postcolonial state like India. Michel Foucault, when discussing Clausewitz in 
the early chapters of Society Must Be Defended argued that Clausewitz’s maxim “war is 
politics by other means” is actually an inverted one and should be “politics is war by other 
means.” In case of ‘emergency’ and ‘disorder’ we notice that the UP government did follow 
the latter maxim to some extent. Everything that was seen outside the accepted bounds of 
the postcolonial state-nation, be it bad characters, dacoits, or the littering masses, were 
treated as enemies of the state and therefore society. Meanwhile, the boundary between state 
and society became blurred. The differentiation of state sovereignty was blurred when 
people as members of society were burdened with the moral responsibility to assist the state 
in purging undesired elements, or as they were referred to in the ‘objects and statements’ of 
the Prevention of Crime law by Lal Bahadur Shastri, as “social pests.”  
 
Furthermore, it can be deduced from the various administrative moves discussed across 
various sections of this chapter that the Congress government treated any outside opposition 
as its enemy now that the country was independent and development was thought of as a 
collective effort of both the state and the society. Most importantly, Congress also aimed to 
activate such laws, as we saw above, to deal with other political organisations like the 
communists or socialists in UP. The socialist framework that congress sustained with great 
difficulties during the anticolonial movement was now too ordinary and any demand in that 
spirit from outside Congress was seen as unworthy of positive attention and considered 
unnecessary.   
 
We notice that the Congress government in UP first created a moral necessity to legislate 
extraordinary laws apparently as a move towards nation building. However, such laws 
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always needed to be grounded on the inevitability to justify the existence of a criminal and 
dangerous other. In its operation, it remained essentially similar to colonial precedent. 
Bandits, uncivilised masses and bad characters and habitual offenders provided an excellent 
ground for such laws. However, the functioning of extraordinary laws was not always 
smooth. Congress’s involvement with criminals or rather criminals involved in Congress 
politics would often derail the force of the spirit of such laws and create administrative 
dilemmas.  
 
Above all, this chapter has also demonstrated the broader attitude of early post-colonial UP 
administration towards its citizens. The bureaucracy did not see the larger population of UP 
as trustworthy. They may have considered the issuing of guns to every village in the time 
immediately after Partition, but they also deemed it necessary to extend Section 34 of the 
Police Act to various districts and towns because they did not believe that the normal rule of 
law was sufficient to ensure order. Most importantly, many other states in India followed 
UP’s lead and enacted similar public order laws thus, demonstrating that the conditions for 
the legislation of ‘extraordinary laws’ was always there, what mattered was the tactical 
invocation at the right moment. Also, the inclusion of these sweeping powers in the 
Constitution of independent India was remarkable, considering the bitter opposition 
Congress posed to similar provisions in the Government of India Act 1935. However, 
partition and the broader chaos of decolonization provided a context to the Constituent 
Assembly as well as the leaders of the country to realise the necessity, rather the inevitability 
of such emergency powers in a country like India, which was often prone to fissiparous and 
centrifugal tendencies.  
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It is the inevitable aspiration of constitutional sovereignty that the idea of sweeping powers 
made its mark on its way through the Constituent Assembly and its various committees, and 
was finally incorporated into Part XVIII of the Constitution as Emergency Provisions, 
including Articles 352 to 360, supplemented by Article 365. Such provisions had a serious 
effect on the basic nature of the constitution and the conception of ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances, anything that had the potential to challenge the authority of the state. While 
the emergency measures in the Constitution of India were the provisions for national 
emergencies such as war or external aggression or internal disturbance(s), which made the 
constitution for all practical purposes a unitary one during the pendency of such emergency, 
the public order laws legislated by states had an authoritative effect to create terror in the 
mind of its people. Above all, while the emergency measures in the constitution aimed for 
an indestructible Union, the public order legislation in the states were aimed at 
demonstrating the ability of the state to threaten and to deter.  
 
Information gathering about various aspects of life was a significant exercise in the 
maintenance of quotidian public order in the United Provinces. The case of Peter Budge in 
the previous chapter highlighted how ordinary and low-level officials like Hawaldars and 
Moharrirs and Ahalmads, who were liminal to power held an altogether different agency 
when it came to maintaining the other order of the public, namely the government of paper 
and files. When the administration decided to impose a curfew or to invoke laws like section 
144 or Indian Arms Act etc., misinformation often questioned the basis of such actions. The 
routine of quotidian violence both on the streets and within the government institutions made 
the entire exercise of justice and order redundant.  
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The basic structure of government in the post-independent UP government was not starkly 
different from the colonial set-up that had preceded it. Given that the bureaucratic structure 
was carried over, it too followed the path of an administrative ambition based on a distinction 
between knowers and the known. Information gathering at local levels through Mukhiyas 
and Chowkidars was an important case in this regard. It required everyday surveillance at 
the village level. While Mukhiyas did not fit into the political calculations of the new 
government, Chowkidars were seen as an unnecessary, uneconomic and inefficient burden 
on the government. Such institutions, which were prominently perceived as the remnants of 
the colonial order, were invaluable for the administration, and needed to be repackaged and 
indigenised to meet the demands of the new emerging postcolonial public order. In other 
words, these changes could be seen as the necessary labour pains for the birth of a 
postcolonial order which could utilise the same set of laws efficiently but with an invigorated 
legitimacy.  
 
The new panchayats that saw the abolition of the Mukhiya were calculated to serve the 
Congress government in normalising its governmental discourse and decisions among the 
masses. The new village constables, on the other hand replaced the apparently underpaid, 
illiterate, overburdened and unreliable Chowkidars. In both the cases we notice that in a way 
the arrival of the postcolonial state was declared by making certain administrative facelifts. 
These initial administrative decisions by the UP government were important. It would 
facilitate a hidden complicity between the colonial and the postcolonial order.  
 
From the material presented in this chapter, I would like to argue that the prism of 
‘independent’ India is insufficient to understand the postcolonial order because the moment 
of ‘transfer of power’ in India exposes the pseudo-dialectics of the constituent and the 
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constituted power. The foundational moment when people give law to themselves, never 
happened in a real sense. On the one hand, Congress as a mass social praxis was now a 
government in UP and therefore, became a dominant protagonist of determining political 
and administrative possibilities, and the course of action. A line drawn by colonial 
‘oppressive’ laws, as we know, often structured how the purpose of the colonial 
administration and the scope of the anticolonial movement were understood in India. Also, 
the potentiality of such public order laws and bureaucracy was already profaned by the 
negative and oppressive mediation it offered to the anti-colonial movement in UP as in the 
rest of India. What the Congress government in UP did after independence was to retain the 
same set of laws and same structure of administration with minor changes but holding a 
transcendental righteousness to do so. The continuity of colonial law and order attitude 
safeguarded the self-sufficiency of a potential repression in the postcolonial state in India. 
Additionally, it adopted a classic sovereign move that rested on the currency of 
precariousness and thrived on the creation of problem categories or outsiders. Such outsiders 
were proposed to be both outside normal social life and the ambit of ordinary rule of law. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has set out to investigate how law was used as a tool of governance in late colonial 
and early postcolonial India, with special reference to the invocation of states of exception 
or simply, extraordinary laws. The question was closely related to another issue, the creation 
of certain ‘problem categories’ to whom the normal process of law did not apply and which 
represented a legalised and permanent state of exception. With regards to both questions this 
thesis has found a consistency in perspective across the colonial – post-colonial divide. 
Bureaucrats in independent India were just as obsessed with maintaining peace and 
tranquillity as the colonial law and order administration. The case studies discussed in this 
thesis were diverse both in terms of their focus on different regions and the analytic angle of 
each instance involved. However, a certain overall pattern emerged from these case studies. 
There was an important but subtle difference between the kind of situations leading to the 
invocation of extraordinary legislations and, the nature of those ‘exceptional categories’ of 
people- or problem categories, in late colonial and early postcolonial India. The question 
arose to what extent the former (exceptional laws) could sustain itself without the existence 
of the latter (problem categories).  
 
With the advent of the First World War and the Ghadr mutiny plot, the necessity for the 
invocation and promulgation of extraordinary laws like the Defence of India Rules and the 
Rowatt Bills became acute. The introduction of wartime measures like the Defence of India 
Rules ushered an era of legal exceptionalism in a colonial situation. It set a precedent for 
making the Rowlatt Bills possible. While the war was an international affair, the colonial 
government took the opportunity to lump two enemy categories together to expand the scope 
of those problem categories to which the normal operations of the law could no longer be 
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applied. The enemies of the Raj outside, like the Germans, and the enemies of the Raj at 
home, like the Bengali revolutionaries and the Ghadr party were in collusion with each other 
and together posed an existential threat to internal peace. They were no longer simply a 
criminal or even law and order problem but ‘enemies’ of the sovereign government in Carl 
Schmitt’s totalising sense. The Ghadr party’s boast to be the ‘enemy of the British Raj in 
India’ added weight to such totalising claims of the colonial administration. The Rowlatt Act 
highlighted the awareness of the colonial administration that revolutionary organisations and 
the growing anticolonial nationalist movement in India could only be suppressed by ignoring 
usual protocols of the due process of justice. The colonial administration made a clear 
distinction of its enemies and friends. However, in reality this distinction was not so clear. 
The Rowlatt Bills had the potential to book anti-colonial agitators whether they were part of 
a revolutionary organisation or not. This was a moment when the specificity of an enemy 
category was given up and the general population declared as at least potentially a hotbed of 
revolutionaries. Such a moment legitimized the colonial strategy of emphasizing legal 
distinctions between its friends from its enemies. Eventually, the Raj ended up with a 
declaration that the much trumpeted rule of law – which was so central to its own self-
justification - applied only to friends, while when dealing with enemies, the administration 
did not have to follow the rule of law at all. In consequence, during the First World War and 
its immediate aftermath, the colonial administration normalised legal exceptionalism by way 
of making extraordinary laws permanent. Maintaining order, peace and tranquillity, 
preventing civil war and dealing with revolutionary violence were some of the justifications 
cited by the colonial administration for such decisions. The Jallianwalla Bagh massacre 
demonstrated that even peaceful gatherings of otherwise unspecified groups of people could 
be declared to stand outside the law.  
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The colonial administration had always operated by identifying certain problem categories, 
and then pushed such groups of people beyond the purview of ordinary law(s). Thuggee 
serves as an excellent early example and offers a paradigmatic case for the workings of 
colonial legality in this regard. Later we notice that ‘revolutionaries’, ‘satyagrahis’, 
‘badmaashes’, ‘goondas’, ‘mawalis’, ‘habitual offenders’, ‘the illiterate masses’ and the 
trade unionists populated an ever-increasing list of problem categories. Such administrative 
moves were always aimed at maintaining dominance over the population. The late colonial 
state in India, by use of extraordinary legislation, managed to distance itself from an active 
responsibility towards its subjects. It managed to set a clear boundary as to what was allowed 
in terms of political protest and what was not.  
 
Every law and order situation was not only an administrative question for colonialism but 
also a crisis management challenge. Leaving aside the ability to use a declaration of a state 
of exception as reaffirmation of sovereign power, a whole range of tactical moves could be 
observed. The interwar period witnessed an excessive and frequent use of preemptive laws 
like section 144 CrPC. Preventive detentions and curfews became routine. The broader 
strategy adopted by the colonial law and order machinery and its repetitive resort to 
extraordinary legislation had more to do with instituting a rule of fear than the proper 
application of the law. Such a governmentality highlights the vulnerability and fragility of 
the colonial order. Although it was not necessarily intended as such at the time, the passing 
of the Government of India Act 1919, marked the beginning of the long process of 
decolonisation with the introduction of ‘diarchy’. The process continued with the passing of 
Government of India Act 1935, devolving more powers to provinces and invigorating the 
Indian political scene with elections and the possibility of representation. It offered an 
opportunity to its subjects to share limited sovereignty by encouraging and strengthening 
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provincial politics, but also promised an extension of liberal constitutional legality. Ground 
realities were often different, however. In the late 1930s we notice that extraordinary 
legislation was frequently used as a tool to depoliticize dissent. Indigenous political parties 
including the Congress by no means always rejected such colonial manoeuvres. They 
sometimes contested political dissent as in the Punjab case study, and sometimes affirmed 
it, as in the case of Bombay. The language of legality was often involved in such choices, as 
highlighted by the assertion of Akalis activists in Punjab as well as the Home Minister 
(Minister of Police) K.M. Munshi in Bombay. Both emphasized human rights and notions 
of legal citizenship that were in fact sustained through other special categories when the law 
was used pre-emptively. Extraordinary legislation got normalised whilst also being 
reintegrated into the rule of law myth by opening it up to the courts and making courts the 
new temples of impartial justice. Draconian preventive measures like banning people from 
public places or police firing often remained embedded in a nominally ‘normal’ legal 
framework, typically tied to ‘ordinary’ laws like section 144 CrPC. The discursive link 
between legality and legal exceptionalism legality enabled colonial administration not only 
to maximise its might but derive a certain moral legitimacy for itself too. 
 
Confrontational situations often provided the colonial government with a justification to 
invoke public order laws and impose curfews or resort to police firing in order to enhance 
its own administrative calculations. Yet, it defeated its own principle of maintaining state 
impartiality over competing political groups at numerous occasions and facilitated 
administrative intervention in community lives. This is born out in different ways in the case 
study of Punjab, UP and Bombay. For Example, the issue of Mazdoor Sabha and Mill Strikes 
of Kanpur in the 1930s and the Madhe Sabha issue in Lucknow had to face invocation of 
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these cases progressed from the fact that a situation of disorder necessitated state violence 
in achieving the ideal of justice as law’s end, i.e. violence begets violence. The command of 
the colonial government and the behaviour of the Congress ministry in UP responded by 
imposing a violent legal culture upon all the indirect stakeholders in the conflicts in 
Cawnpore and Lucknow. The Congress ministry also rejected a certain social consensus that 
criticised police violence and the imposition of extraordinary laws like section 144 and 
curfews. The logic of ‘maintaining public peace and tranquillity’ for the Congress 
government in UP- and supported by prominent nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Mohandas Gandhi, although from different perspectives- during acute situations of anti-
government mass mobilisations further safeguarded the self-sufficiency of these laws. 
 
Furthermore, the case studies also highlighted that the Congress ministries in the provinces 
where anti-colonial mobilisation was spearheaded by ‘nationalists’ of the ruling party itself 
also often justified the use of pre-emptive public order legislation. Right from the moment 
they were involved in provincial self-governance, the nationalist elite in waiting normalised 
a ‘correct’ way for populations to behave once extraordinary legislations was invoked. The 
invocation of such states of exception unified legal norms and political facts. The late 
colonial state working in tandem with Congress nationalists fine-tuned the argument over 
the use of extraordinary legislation, frequently arguing that ‘facts on the ground’ made it 
impossible to maintain order through the use of ordinary laws. Though the colonial 
administration always emphasised its impartial role in the justice system, it along with 
Congress ministries in the 1930s criminalised mass politics in the name of a certain apolitical 
rationality where ‘public order’ came to be thought of as a priori to any political discussion. 
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Several case studies in this thesis highlighted the use of laws like 144 in cases of intense 
political confrontation. However, the story of Peter Budge in chapter four, not only 
highlighted the careless attitude of the late colonial and early postcolonial government 
towards civil liberties of ordinary individuals but it also posed questions as to the fictitious 
nature of colonial bureaucracy which relied heavily on paperwork. Individuals like Peter 
Budge and possibly many others could figuratively be brushed under the carpet if they did 
not have any political value. Furthermore, the case study of Peter Budge raised some 
questions regarding the nature of paperwork that sustained colonial bureaucracy. Low level 
officials not entirely at home with switching between English, Hindi and Urdu, often made 
mistakes that lead to blunders and miscarriage of justice. Right until the end of colonialism 
in India administrative practice defended it itself with reference to a depoliticised 
bureaucracy, impartial judiciary, rule bound norms and very dutiful police. Ironically, all 
these claims were shown to be hollow by the manner in which Budge was arrested and then 
suffered a lengthy ordeal of incarceration. Significantly, Budge’s case was entirely run and 
managed by Indians, right from the invocation of extraordinary legislation, to arresting the 
accused, to the transfer of his case between various offices, to his detention in Jail and his 
subsequent presentation (or non-presentation) before a court. The judges appointed to hear 
the case were all Indians. In addition to the police, as Budge’s case study demonstrated, even 
judges were guilty of carelessness when it came to following the rules. It is at such moments 
that we understand that the usual separation between the coloniser and the colonised does 
not offer much analysis or a nuanced understanding of the native participation in the 
structures of governance in general and legal governmentality in particular, even when the 
process of decolonisation was well under way. 
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The most striking conclusions about the decolonisation of public order in India come to the 
fore with the postcolonial initiatives that were activated right after independence. 
Expectations of independence, freedom from colonialism and imperialism, put great 
pressure on the successors of colonial administrators. However, despite best intentions, these 
initiatives to bring administrative practice in line with the new reality of independence did 
not achieve much - as demonstrated throughout chapter 5. The basic formula of managing 
populations and the art of colonial legal governmentality was difficult to do away with. 
Postcolonial law-and-order management retained the framework as well as the catalogue of 
colonial policies of control. When reconsidering old colonial institutions like Chowkidari 
and Mukhiyagiri the administration and the political elite became entangled between the 
rhetoric of independence based on the promise of better times to come, and the usefulness 
of a colonial apparatus for continuing the dominance of the state in the lives of its citizens. 
At places, the law and order administrators had to acknowledge the effectiveness of the 
colonial way of managing disorder.  
 
The best example were discussions around new laws to deal with ‘habitual offenders’ who 
could not be dealt with under the ordinary sections of the Criminal Procedure Code. State 
suspicion towards the citizens of a new India was highlighted when the issuing of guns to 
every village to enable it to protect itself against dacoits was under consideration. Ordinary 
villagers were deemed unreliable to be issued a gun. The focus on ‘dacoits’ meanwhile 
served as a reminder how much the new administrative thinking was still preoccupied by 
identifying certain legal problem categories in advance to subject them to extra-legal 
measures. The Dacoits of 1950 were the direct descendants of the Thuggs in the 1830s in 
this regard. Meanwhile, society was militarised with the creation of quasi-military 
	 353	
organisation like the Prantiya Rakshak Dal. It blurred the boundaries between the state and 
society.  
 
After deliberations the post-colonial state realised that it had to move away from maintaining 
public order to managing chaos. Congress which was at helm in various provinces/ states 
was entangled with local politics which often involved criminal elements. A significant shift 
back to normality occurred when the new (and old) problem categories listed by the post-
colonial state in India - ‘social pests’ like bandits, goondas, badmashes, habitual offenders 
and even littering masses - were once again made the subjects of ordinary law and no longer 
regarded as rather than enemies of the state. The attitude was not altogether dissimilar to that 
of the colonial state but the tone was reformative. Hence the bureaucratic apparatus in 
postcolonial India, as demonstrated in this thesis with reference to UP, continued colonial 
instructions and preserved the potential for state repression for the times to come.  
 
The study of the process of the decolonisation of public order in India has a bearing on 
contemporary debates about the continuing habit of the Indian state to declare states of 
exception and to use extraordinary colonial-era laws to deny citizens their rights in the 21st 
century. Such a repressive vision of legal governmentality in India is reflected in various 
laws devised to deal with the issues of terrorism, sedition and tribal and secessionist 
insurgency. Recent debates around the question of repressive police action and the 
administrative response that followed the cases of land acquisition by the state governments 
for corporates, urban protests that took place regarding the issue of women safety and rape 
in India, nationwide protests in India in the wake of everyday atrocities against Dalits, has 
once again brought to our attention the colonial character of the Law in India. Furthermore, 
the narrative that normalises state violence in the mind of most Indian citizens when it comes 
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to maintaining public order, peace and tranquillity in ‘disturbed areas’ of the ‘Red Corridor’, 
the North-Eastern States of India and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir demands careful 
attention. The idea of citizenship that has emerged in contemporary India appears to be more 
in agreement with the colonial repressive tactics of dealing firmly with ‘problem categories’ 
of all classes, especially when it comes to maintaining the sovereignty of the Indian state, 
rather than citizens in a democratic self-determined nation. There is a continued significance 
of understanding colonial legal governmentality to make sense of politics in contemporary 
postcolonial societies like India. 
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